Delhi High Court
Skipper Bhawan Flat Buyers Assn. & Ors. vs Skipper Towers Pvt. Ltd. on 3 September, 2012
Author: A.K.Sikri
Bench: Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, A.K.Sikri
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CMs 7932/2009, 21202/2011 in RFA (OS) No. 23 of 1998
% Judgment delivered on: 3rd September, 2012
Skipper Bhawan Flat Buyers Assn. & Ors. ... Appellant
through : Mr. D. Verma, Mrs. Neha S.
Verma, Advocates
VERSUS
Skipper Towers Pvt. Ltd. ...Respondents
through: Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. R.K. Sanghi,
Mr.Satyendra Kumar, Advs.
for applicants
Mr. Rajiv Bahl, Adv. for OL
CORAM :-
HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
A.K. SIKRI (Acting Chief Justice)
RP 162/2003
RFA(OS) 23/1998 was decided by a Division Bench of this Court
vide judgment dated 23.11.2001 and one of us (A.K. Sikri, Acting Chief
Justice) was a member of that Bench. Thereafter the applicant M/s
William Jacks and Company (India) Ltd. filed Review Application
No.162/2003 seeking review of this judgment. Main reason for filing the
application for review was that vide judgment dated 23.11.2001, the
applicant was allotted 4822 sq.ft. area on the 12 th floor of Skipper House
at 22, Bara Khambha Road, New Delhi - 110001 whereas it had obtained
RP 162/2003 in RFA (OS) 23/2008 Page 1 of 16
the decree dated 5.9.1997 in Suit No.728/1987 allotting an area of
7460.342 sq.ft. on the 11th floor which decree had become final as no
appeal was filed thereagainst. The plea, therefore, was that such a decree
could not be varied in the aforesaid proceedings in which applicant was
not a party and more so when the decree obtained by it had become final.
This application was disposed of vide order dated 26.5.2004. While
rejecting the application, the Division Bench, however, referred the
matter back to the Committee appointed by it to determine the question of
calculation of cost of area as booked by the applicant. According to the
applicant, certain issues were not decided by that order. Aggrieved by
this order, the applicant approached the Supreme Court by way of Special
Leave Petition. In this Special Leave Petition, the Supreme Court passed
orders dated 31.3.2009 with direction to hear the review application filed
by the applicant on the merits of the case. This is how the aforesaid
application has come up for hearing. During the pendency of this review
petition, the applicant has also filed CM 21202/2011 seeking allotment of
space on the 12th floor on the ground that on this floor, there is going to
be further construction under the supervision of the Committee and,
therefore, applicant can be allotted space therein. After remand from the
Supreme Court, the applicant also filed CM 7932/2009 with a request to
hear the review petition.
2. As already pointed out above, applicant had filed Suit No.728/1987
before the original side of this Court. In this suit, it was stated that
applicant had booked certain area in the Skipper House and Agreement
for Sale dated 29.6.1982 was entered into between the applicant and
Skipper Towers Pvt. Ltd. Area booked was measuring 10,000 sq.ft. @
Rs.550/- per sq.ft. in installments. Balance amount was to be paid by
RP 162/2003 in RFA (OS) 23/2008 Page 2 of 16
30.9.1987. As certain disputes arose, the applicant filed aforesaid suit for
specific performance. It was decreed vide order dated 5.9.1997 allotting
an area of 7460.342 sq.ft. Judgment debtor had not filed any appeal
thereagainst and, therefore, this decree has attained finality.
3. However, RFA(OS) 23/1998 was filed by Skipper Bhawan Flat
Buyers Association and Ors. against judgment dated 5.9.1997 before the
Division Bench of this Court in which judgment dated 23.11.2001 was
passed. Vide this judgment, area of various allottees was reduced
including that of the applicant from decretal area to 4822 sq.ft. The
submission was that once the decree had been passed which had attained
finality, that could not be altered in some other appeal in which not only
the applicant was not a party, but the applicant was not even heard in the
matter. It is submitted that the aforesaid proceedings in RFA could not be
treated as representative suit as permission of the court under Order 1
Rule 8 of the CPC is mandatory and was not taken. Reference is made to
the judgment of the Supreme Court in Kalyan Singh v. Smt. Choti &
Ors. (1990) 1 SCC 266. It is also submitted that public notice dated
19.11.2000 issued in the RFA by the Division Bench was of no
consequence. Main argument, thus, is that once the decree had become
final between the parties, it could not be varied. For this purpose,
judgment of the Apex Court in Premier Tyres Ltd. v. Kerala State Road
Transport Corporation, AIR 1993 SC 1202 is referred wherein it is held
as under:
"1. The short and the only question of law that
arises for consideration in this appeal is the effect of
non filing of appeal in the connected suit tried
together with common issues.
xxx xxx xxx
RP 162/2003 in RFA (OS) 23/2008 Page 3 of 16
3. The validity of this finding has been assailed by
Shri Raja Ram Aggarwal, the learned Sr. Advocate
appearing on behalf of the appellant. It is urged that
Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code does not apply
as such. According to him since both the suits were
connected and decided by a common order the issue
in neither suit can be said to have been decided in a
former suit. Therefore, the basic ingredient of
Section 11 of the C.P.C. was not satisfied. The
submission derives some support from observations in
Narhari v. Shanker [1950] 1 SCR 754, that, 'even
when there are two suits it has been held that decision
given simultaneously cannot be a decision in the
former suit'. But this decision was distinguished in
Sheodan Singh v.Smt. Daryao Kunwar : [1966] 3
SCR 300, as it related to only one suit, therefore, the
observations extracted above were not relevant in a
case where more than one suit were decided by a
common order. The Court further held that where
more than one suit were filed together and main issues
were common and appeals were filed against the
judgment and decree in all the suits and one appeal
was dismissed either as barred by time or abated then
the order operated as res judicata in other appeals, 'In
the present case there were different suits from which
different appeals had to be filed. The High Court's
decision in the two appeals arising from suits Nos. 77
and 91 was undoubtedly earlier and therefore the
condition that there should have been a decision in a
former suit to give rise to res judicata in a subsequent
suit was satisfied in the present case. The contention
that there was no former suit in the present case must
therefore fail'. In Shri Ramagya Prasad Gupta v. Sri
Murli Prasad : [1974]3SCR915 , an effort was made
to get the decision in Sheodan Singh : [1966] 3 SCR
300 (supra) reconsidered. But the Court did not
consider it necessary to examine the matter as the
subject matter of two suits being different one of the
necessary ingredients for applicability of
Section 11 of the C.P.C. were found missing.
RP 162/2003 in RFA (OS) 23/2008 Page 4 of 16
4. Although none of these decisions were
concerned with a situation where no appeal was filed
against the decision in connected suit but it appears
that where an appeal arising out of connected suits is
dismissed on merits the other cannot be heard, and has
to be dismissed. The question is what happens where
no appeal is filed, as in this case from the decree in
connected suit. Effect of non filing of appeal against a
judgment or decree is that it become final. This
finality can be taken away only in accordance with
law. Same consequences follows when a judgment or
decree in a connected suit is not appealed from."
4. It is also submitted that the aforesaid judgment of Supreme Court
in Premier Tyres Ltd. (supra) has been relied upon in the subsequent
judgment in the case of Harbans Singh & Ors. v. Sant Hari Singh &
Ors., JT 2009 (2) SC 32.
5. The aforesaid argument appears to be attractive when it is taken in
isolation and without the context of the present proceedings. Once the
background in which judgment dated 23.11.2001 in RFA (OS) 23/1998
and other connected case is taken note of, it would become apparent that
these arguments have no merit. This is stated so in detail in the judgment
and the salient aspects thereof are recapitulated in brief.
6. The judgment debtor (hereinafter referred to as „the Skippers‟) who
were constructing commercial building at 22, Bara Khambha Road, New
Delhi (hereinafter referred to as „the Skipper Tower‟) advertised the
proposed construction and solicited buyers. The bookings started in the
year 1976 and went on for a long period. Many persons booked the flats.
Admittedly the space booked by the Skippers was much more than the
space which was ultimately constructed and available in the building.
The land on which the Skipper Tower was to be constructed belonged to
RP 162/2003 in RFA (OS) 23/2008 Page 5 of 16
six persons/group of persons having 1/6th share each who had all entered
into collaboration agreement with the Skippers. Disputes arose between
the Skippers and the owners of the land. Even thereafter, the Skippers
kept on making bookings. Because of the disputes, complete construction
could not be made. Buyers, on the other hand, started filing suits for
specific performance. Number of suits were filed and the idea of that can
be gauged from the fact that along with RFA No.23/1998, 219 other
RFAs were also decided which had arisen from the judgment and decree
passed in those suits. Crisply said, the area available was less than the
subject matter of the area covered by all the suits. Thus, had all the suits
been decreed, no way the decrees could be executed. When these suits
started piling up before the learned Single Judge, the learned Single Judge
thought it appropriate to appoint a Committee which could consider the
claims of all the flat buyers and suggest the areas which could be allotted
to each of them depending upon the area booked by these flat buyers and
payments made. The Committee did detailed exercise and filed
exhaustive report before the learned Single Judge who was seized of all
the suits. However, when the suits came up for hearing and dealt with by
another Single Bench, he took the view that each suit for specific
performance was to be dealt with on its own merits. The report was thus
discarded and separate orders passed in each of the suits, albeit by
common judgment. That is how spate of appeals came to be filed. Lead
appeal was RFA(OS) 23/1998 filed by Skipper Bhavan Flat Buyers
Association which association was formed by many flat buyers. The
Division Bench was of the opinion that in a situation like this, the report
should not have been discarded and should have been acted upon and it
was doing substantial and complete justice to all the flat buyers.
Obviously in this report, area which was suggested to be given to each of
RP 162/2003 in RFA (OS) 23/2008 Page 6 of 16
the buyers stood reduced as full area, as booked, could not have been
given to any buyer.
7. It would also be pertinent to mention that Skipper Bhawan Flat
Buyers Association had come to the Court in a representative capacity.
Others who had filed the appeals were those whose suits had either not
been decreed by the learned Single Judge or the decree was not to their
satisfaction. What is emphasized is that in none of the cases, Skippers
filed the appeals as nobody was there to file those appeals. That was the
reason that where the suits were decreed, in which category the applicant
belong to, no appeals were filed.
8. Accepting the report would have meant affecting those also in
whose favour decrees were passed but which were not under challenge.
Reason for not challenging, as already stated above, is Sardar Tejwant
Singh, who was the anchor of Skipper Group was behind the bars. The
Division Bench, in such circumstances, felt that since others can be
affected, let there be a public notice issued. Public notice was issued.
Even specific notices to all the parties including applicant were issued. It
would be significant to state that even the Committee while doing its
exercise had issued notices to all the flat buyers. The justification for
adopting this course of action was given in the detailed judgment in the
following words:
"...This opinion of ours is influenced by the following
considerations:
1) Order dated 1st October, 1991 passed by the learned
Single Judge and the terms of reference mentioned
therein gave power to the Committee to consider the
cases of all the flat buyers for allotment/equitable
allotment of the space.
RP 162/2003 in RFA (OS) 23/2008 Page 7 of 16
2) This order was challenged in appeal. The Division
Bench affirmed this order and dismissed the appeal.
The learned Single Judge was bound by the interim
order dated 1st October, 1991 passed earlier in the suit
which was even the stamp of approval from the
Division Bench.
3) The Committee invited all the flat buyers to lodge
their claims and considered the claims on merits.
Therefore, there was legitimate expectation in the
mind of the flat buyers that once the Committee had
been appointed by this court with directions to look
into the claims of all flat buyers and they succeed
before the Committee, they would be allotted the
space. The court was, thereafter, required only to
accepted Report with or without modifications having
regard to the objections which were filed by some flat
buyers.
4) In a matter like this where the skippers created
problems for the flat buyers by booking the space
more than the available space, the court cannot
confine itself to the case of those only who filed the
suits. What would be the position if, in respect of one
particular flat the Skippers entered into agreement
with two or more persons? If only one of them files
the suit for specific performance although he entered
into agreement with Skippers at a later date and paid
lesser money that was paid by another person who
entered into an agreement at an earlier date and paid
full consideration before the agreement? Would it be
equitable in such circumstance to decree the suit of
the person who had filed the suit, ignoring the claim
of the person who failed to do so. Answer is
obviously, No. This example in respect of one flat can
be magnified in the instant case as similar problem
would emerge in respect of other flats. Therefore, it
was but proper, in a situation like this, to consider the
claims of all persons even when the claims of those
flat buyers who filed the suits had to be decided.
Otherwise, it would create inequitable results.
RP 162/2003 in RFA (OS) 23/2008 Page 8 of 16
5) Even technical problem can also be taken care of.
Afterall, the Committee considered the cases of all the
claims and submitted the Report. Depending upon the
outcome of the Report and the ultimate decision
thereon by the court with modifications, if any, those
claimants who are held entitled to allotment of the
space could be given the space subject to their filing
requisite application with court fee as if it was a suit
filed by such person.
6. The approach of the learned Single Judge vide
order dated 1st October, 1991 and confirmed by the
Division Bench was, therefore, reasonable, just and
proper. It was adopted with the purpose of doing
justice in the broader sense of the matter keeping
aside narrow and pedantic approach. Situation may
arise when, to do complete justice in the matter courts
have to ignore the technicalities of law. As aforesaid,
even if claims of those who filed the suits had to be
decided, it could not be done in isolation and without
considering the entire gamut, amplitude and
peculiarity of the nature of problems being faced in
such cases. As is clear by now that these cases relating
to this building have posed a peculiar problem. It has
to be dealt with by adopting an approach which is
justice oriented. Imparting justice has to be the prime
consideration with the growing complexity of social
relations, new types of problems would come in the
courts. There may not be perfect precedent to follow.
If following an old principle yields wrong results or
leads injustice, occasion would be ripe to formulate
new principle. New situation demand new solutions.
By treading the beaten path, one may not reach the
goal. The goal is to do justice. In such situations
social engineering has to be the guiding factor. It
would be opportune to quote from the book "The
Nature of the Judicial Process" which is a
compilation of the Storrs lectures delivered
by Benjamin N.Cardozo at Yale University. Quoting
various eminent Jurists, Cardozo makes the following
remarks:
RP 162/2003 in RFA (OS) 23/2008 Page 9 of 16
"It is true, I think, today in every department of the
law that the social value of a rule has become a test
of growing power and importance. This truth is
powerfully driven home to the lawyers of this
country in the writings of Dean pound. "Perhaps
the most significant advance in the modern science
of law is the change from the analytical to the
functional attitude"(Refer :Pound, "Administrative
Application of Legal Standards" Proceedings
American Bar Association, 1919, pp. 441, 449).
"The emphasis has changed from the content of the
precept and the existence of the remedy to the
effect of the precept in action and the availability
and efficiency of the remedy to attain the ends for
which the precept was devised. (Refer: p.451, of.
Pound, "Mechanical Jurisprudence, "Columbia
L.R. 603. Foreign Jurists have the same thought:
"The whole of the judicial function," says Gmelin,
(Refer: Sociological method," trnasl., 9, Modern
Legal philosophy Series, P. 131.) "has... been
shifted. The will of the State expressed in decision
and judgment is to bring about a just determination
by means of the subjective sense of justice inherent
in the judge, guided by an effective weighing of
the interests of the parties in the light of the
opinions generally prevailing among the
community regarding transactions like those in
question. The determination should under all
circumstances be in harmony with the
requirements of good faith in business intercourse
and the needs of practical life, unless a positive
statute prevents it; and in weighing conflicting
interests, the interest that is better founded in
reason and more worthy of protection should be
helped to achieve victory."(Refer: Gmelin, supra;
of. Ehrlich, "Die juristische Logik," p. 187;
Duguit, "Les Transformations due profit deputies
le Code Napolean, "transl., Continental Lega Hist.
Series, Vol.XI pp. 72, 70.) "On the other hand,
"says Geny, (Refer :Op.cit., Vol II, p.92 Section
159) "We are to interrogate reason and conscience,
RP 162/2003 in RFA (OS) 23/2008 Page 10 of 16
to discover in our inmost nature, the very basis of
justice; on the other, we are to address ourselves to
social phenomena, to ascertain the laws of their
harmony and the principles of order which they
exact." And again: (Refer: Vol. II, p.91) "Justice
and general utility, such will be the two objectives
that will direct our course."
It may also be added that one has to be more liberal
while dealing with the procedural aspects of the case.
In the field of procedure, major changes have been
witnessed over a period of time. The tendency today
is in the direction of a growing liberalism. Cardozo in
the aforesaid lectures, taking note of this tendency has
also stated:
"The new spirit has made its way gradually; and its
progress, unnoticed step by step, is visible in
retrospect as we look back upon the distance
traversed. The old forms remain, but they are filled
with a new content. We are getting away from
what Enrich calls "die spielerische und die
mathematische Entischeidunig" (Refer:Enrich,
"Die juristinsche Logik," p.295; cf.pp.294, 296).
The conception of a lawsuit either as a
mathematical problem or as a sportsman's game.
Our own Wigmore has done much to make that
conception out of date. (Refer: Treaties on
Evidence). We are thinking of the end which the
law servers, and fitting its rules to the task of
service."
We must adopt an active posture and view in a larger
perspective the functionalism of legal humanism. If
the situation demands adoption of a broad principle to
meet the ends of justice, the court should not feel shy
in adopting the same. 'The history of law is the history
of the effort to mould legal institutions and doctrines
to meet the felt necessities of each period in the
Nation's development'. Access to justice is the
demand of the day. The problem of access to justice
has many dimensions. What is crucial is that people
RP 162/2003 in RFA (OS) 23/2008 Page 11 of 16
should be the participants and beneficiaries in the
administration of justice. The Supreme Court has
already given new dimensions to the access
jurisprudence in expanding the principle of locus
standi which led to the introduction of public interest
litigation in this country.
Cappelletti clarified his view on the crucial aspect of
access to court in the Administration of Justice thus:
"The right of effective access to justice has
emerged with the new social rights. Indeed, it is of
paramount importance among these new rights
since, clearly, the enjoyment of traditional as well
as new social rights presupposes mechanisms for
their effective protection. Such protection,
moreover, is best assured by a workable remedy
within the framework of the judicial system.
Effective access to justice can thus be seen as the
most basic requirement-the most basic 'human
right'-of a system which purports to guarantee of
legal rights. (Australian law Reform Commission,
Discussion Paper No.4, p.3)."
Once we are able to find the way that too within the
existing norms, of course, by giving it a new meaning,
and more so when it advances the justicing process,
there should not be any difficulty in adopting the
same. Afterall it has also to be seen in the present case
that it is not in the nature of adversary litigation any
longer. We are dealing with class action.
It is not necessary to indulge in a detailed
jurisprudential exercise. Our purpose would be served
by mentioning that even our own Supreme Court has
shown the path by holding repeatedly that the
procedure is the hand maid of justice. It is to facilitate
justice and further its end. It is the means designed for
furtherance of justice and not to frustrate the same.
(Refer: Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal,
Kota, AIR 1955 SC 422).
RP 162/2003 in RFA (OS) 23/2008 Page 12 of 16
It may be interesting to note at this stage that the
Committee in the concluding paragraph of its Report
itself indicated the peculiar nature of the problem, the
approach adopted by it and advised the flat buyers not
to indulge in conventional litigation. This is what it
observed:
"Our task was both exciting and innovative. We
are not required to try suits for specific
performance, as we have said. Our commission
was to facilitate a just settlement between hostile
parties. Out of the conflicting and opposing claims
we had to find what was just and equitable. In the
final analysis, we have tried to make the best of a
bad bargain.
We have reached the end of our report. Before we
close we will added a word of advice to the flat
buyers. The disputes will have to be settled within
an openness to compromise on the lines suggested
by us or as may be suggested by the court. Because
the final word is with the court. But one thing is
clear. Conventional litigation will not avail the flat
buyers. They should avoid lawsuits. The Poet John
Prom fret in 1700 wrote:
"Law-suits I'd shun, with as much studious care.
As I would dens where hungry lions are".
If some of the flat buyers were convinced by the
aforesaid advice and did not file individual suits after
the recommendation of the Committee allotting them
certain area believing that they would get the same
now from the court on the basis of this
recommendation, they cannot be faulted with.
Rejecting their claims only because they adhered to
the aforesaid advice, would amount to causing gross
injustice to such persons.
We may hasten to add that this approach is adopted
keeping in view the peculiar nature of these cases and
the magnitude of the problem involved. By no means
RP 162/2003 in RFA (OS) 23/2008 Page 13 of 16
we are suggesting that even in routine problems of
trivial types, such procedural requirements are to be
given go-by."
9. Report submitted by the Committee was thus made the basis. Each
case was also discussed separately. This is how the final orders came to
be passed. Once we take that into account, we are of the opinion that
there is no merit in this review application filed by the applicant
inasmuch as what is now sought to be argued was all before the Division
Bench but the Division Bench adopted the aforesaid approach in
consonance with justice.
10. We would also like to point out that the applicant had the
knowledge of the proceedings. However, it stayed away from the
proceedings when the appeals were being heard. On this ground also, we
say that the applicant is precluded from filing such an application for
review. In N.K. Prasada v. Government of India & Ors., (2004) 6 SCC
299, the Apex Court has observed as under:
"24. The principles of natural justice, it is well-settled,
cannot be put into a strait-jacket formula. Its
application will depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. It is also well-settled that
if a party after having proper notice chose not to
appear, he a later stage cannot be permitted to say that
he had not been given a fair opportunity of hearing.
The question had been considered by a Bench of this
Court in Sohan Lal Gupta (Dead) through LRs. and
Ors. Vs. Asha Devi Gupta : (2003)7SCC492 of which
two of us (V.N. Khare, C.J. and Sinha, J.) are parties
wherein upon noticing a large number of decisions it
was held: (SCC p.506, para 29)
"29.The principles of natural justice, it is trite,
cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. In a given
case the party should not only be required to show
RP 162/2003 in RFA (OS) 23/2008 Page 14 of 16
that he did not have a proper notice resulting in
violation of principles of natural justice but also to
show that he was seriously prejudiced thereby.
25. The principles of natural justice, it is well
settled, must not be stretched too far."
11. The justice oriented approach adopted by the Division Bench also
finds support from the judgment of Supreme Court in Ajit Kumar Nag v.
General Manager (PJ), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Haldia & Ors.,
(2005) 7 SCC 764 wherein the Supreme Court observed as under:
"44. We are aware of the normal rule that a person
must have a fair trial and a fair appeal and he cannot
be asked to be satisfied with an unfair trial and a fair
appeal. We are also conscious of the general principle
that pre-decisional hearing is better and should always
be preferred to post- decisional hearing. We are
further aware that it has been stated that apart from
Laws of Men, Laws of God also observe the rule
of audi alteram partem. It has been stated that the first
hearing in human history was given in the Garden of
Eden. God did not pass sentence upon Adam and Eve
before giving an opportunity to show cause as to why
they had eaten forbidden fruit. (See R. v. University
of Cambridge). But we are also aware that principles
of natural justice are not rigid or immutable and hence
they cannot be imprisoned in a straight-jacket. They
must yield to and change with exigencies of
situations. They must be confined within their limits
and cannot be allowed to run wild. It has been stated:
"To do a great right after all, it is permissible
sometimes to do a little wrong". [Per Mukharji, C.J.
in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, (Bhopal Gas Disaster), SCC p.705, para 124]. While interpreting legal provisions, a court of law cannot be unmindful of hard realities of life. In our opinion, the approach of the Court in dealing with such cases should be pragmatic rather than pedantic, realistic rather than RP 162/2003 in RFA (OS) 23/2008 Page 15 of 16 doctrinaire, functional rather than formal and practical rather than 'precedential'."
(emphasis supplied)
12. We do not, therefore, find any merit in this review application which is accordingly dismissed. CM 7932/2009 also stands disposed of.
CM 21202/201113. In this application, the applicant has pointed out that space is admittedly available on 12th floor. No allotment has been made to anybody on the 12th floor. Therefore, if the area is granted to the applicant on this floor, it will not prejudice any other allottee and no other allotment would be disturbed. Since the matter is now pending before the Supreme Court and Supreme Court has appointed a Committee, replacing the committee appointed by this Court, which is headed by Justice S.K. Mahajan (Retd.), it would be open to the applicant to make such a request to that Committee as such an exercise is being undertaken by the said Committee. This application is disposed of with these observations.
All pending applications shall also stand disposed of in view of the above.
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE (RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW) JUDGE SEPTEMBER 03, 2012/pk RP 162/2003 in RFA (OS) 23/2008 Page 16 of 16