Allahabad High Court
Kalika Prasad vs State Of U.P. Through Principal Secy. on 15 October, 2019
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2019 ALL 2683
Author: Saurabh Lavania
Bench: Saurabh Lavania
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH Court No. - 30 Case :- SERVICE SINGLE No. - 4713 of 2000 Petitioner :- Kalika Prasad Respondent :- State Of U.P. Through Principal Secy. Counsel for Petitioner :- Anurag Srivastava,Dhirendra Pratap Singh,Shailesh Chandra Tiwari Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C. Hon'ble Saurabh Lavania,J.
1- Heard Sri Sameer Singh Advocate, holding brief of Sri Dhirendra Pratap Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner and learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents.
2- By means of the present writ petition, the petitioner has prayed the following main reliefs:-
"i) a writ or writs, direction or directions and/or order or orders in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned orders dated 1.12.1999 and 17.6.2000 respectively passed and issued by the District Superintendent of Police, Hardoi and the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lucknow Range, U.P. Lucknow as contained in Annexure Nos. 1 and 2 hereinabove alongwith the ab-initio non-est proceedings of so called disciplinary enquiry conducted ex-parte against the petitioner, after summoning the originals of the same from the concerned opposite parties.
ii) a writ or writs, direction or directions and/or order or orders in the nature of mandamus staying the operation, enforcement and implementation of the impugned orders dated 12.12.1999 and 17.6.2000 respectively passed and issued by the District Superintendent of Police, Hardoi and the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lucknow Range, U.P., Lucknow as contained in annexure nos. 1 and 2 to the accompanying writ petition during its pendency in the Hon'ble Court."
3- Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed on the post of Constable and thereafter he was promoted on the post of Head Constable in the year 1997. In the year 1999 a disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner and charge-sheet dated 14.6.1999 was served upon the petitioner on 18.6.1999. Charge in the charge-sheet was to the effect that the petitioner was absent from duty without prior permission and sanctioned leave. The charge mentioned in the charge-sheet is quoted below for ready reference:-
Þfd vki fn0 4-8-98 ls fcuk iwoZ vuqefr@Lohd`r vodk'k ds euekus 4- It appears from the record including the enquiry report and memo of appeal filed by the appellant/petitioner against the impugned order dated 12.12.1999 that petitioner failed to appear before the Enquiry Officer and also failed to file reply to the charge-sheet. It further appears from the record that during the enquiry proceedings the witnesses mentioned in the charge-sheet were examined and thereafter the Enquiry Officer prepared the report dated 8.8.1999 and placed before the Disciplinary/Appointing Authority. After submission of enquiry report by the Enquiry Officer a show cause notice dated 18.8.1999 was issued to the petitioner. Thereafter the impugned order dated 1.12.1999 was passed, whereby the petitioner was dismissed from service.
5- Against the dismissal order, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Appellate Authority. In the appeal the petitioner has specifically raised a plea to the effect that he was not well and due to mental illness, he could not appear before the Enquiry Officer and even could not file the reply to the charge-sheet and also could not examined the witnesses.
6- The Appellate Authority after considering the material available on record including the contents of memo of appeal, dismissed the appeal of the petitioner vide order dated 17.6.2000.
7- Aggrieved by the dismissal order dated 1.12.1999 and 17.6.2000, the present writ petition has been filed.
8- Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the enquiry proceedings have been concluded behind the back of the petitioner and proper opportunity of hearing was not provided to the petitioner. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that relevant documents, which were mentioned in the charge-sheet, were not provided to the petitioner alongwith charge-sheet. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that on account of depression/serious illness of the petitioner, he could not participate in the enquiry proceedings and Enquiry Officer has concluded the proceeding in absence of the petitioner and recorded its findings that petitioner was absent from duty without prior permission and sanctioned leave. Further submitted that the order passed by disciplinary authority on the basis of enquiry report of the Enquiry Officer is illegal as in the enquiry report there is no finding to the effect that he was willingly absent from duties. Learned Counsel for the petitioner further submits that Appellate Authority while passing the order dated 17.6.2000, on the appeal preferred by the petitioner, has failed to appreciate the specific plea taken in the memo of appeal, which is to the effect that due to serious depression/serious illness, the petitioner could not participate during the enquiry proceeding and entire enquiry proceedings are invalid being ex-parte and on the basis of the same, order of dismissal ought not to have been passed by the Disciplinary/Appointing authority.
9- In rebuttal, learned Standing Counsel submits the charge-sheet as well as documents mentioned therein were provided to the petitioner but he failed to appear in enquiry proceedings. In enquiry proceedings the witnesses were examined and dates were fixed for the same under intimation to the petitioner but he failed to appear before the enqury officer on the date fixed. The enquiry officer after considering material available on record including statement(s) of witnesses prepared the report and submitted before the disciplinary authority. After submission of enquiry report the show cause notice was issued on 18.8.1999 which was served on the petitioner on 04.09.1999 but the petitioner failed to submit his reply. The disciplinary authority after considering the material available on record, passed the order of dismissal dated 1.12.1999. Thus, the order dated 01.12.1999 was passed after providing proper opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. In the facts of the case the orders dated 1.12.1999 and 17.6.1999 are reasonable and proper. In support of his submission learned Standing Counsel has placed reliance upon paragraph 4 of the appeal wherein the petitioner himself has admitted that he has received the relevant documents but he could not appear before the Enquiry Officer on account of depression/ serious illness.
10- Learned Standing Counsel further submits that petitioner himself failed to provide any document medical certificate in support of his story of illness, before the competent authority at appropriate time. The medical certificate which has been annexed as Annexure No. 9 to the writ petition is not related to the relevant period, as the enquiry proceedings were initiated and concluded in the year 1999 and the medical certificate relates to the period with effect from 15.2.2000 to 26.2.2000. Learned Standing Counsel further submits that petitioner is not entitled to any indulgence of this Court on the basis of medical certificate. It has also been argued that it is settled Principle of Law, that if a proper opportunity of hearing was provided and has not availed by the person concerned then in that event he is not entitled to take advantages/benefits of the plea related to non observance of Principle of Natural Justice, during enquiry proceedings.
11- In regard to the appellate order the learned Standing Counsel submitted that the appellate order is just and proper and has been passed after taking into consideration the material available on record. The appellate authority while passing the order dated 17.6.2000, considered the plea of the petitioner to the effect that Sri Ashok Kumaar threatened the petitioner and in regard to the same, the appellate authority recorded a finding in its order dated 17.6.2000 to the effect that the same has no force as the petitioner has failed to prove the same. The appellate authority also considered the plea of the illness taken by the petitioner on account of which he could not participate in the disciplinary proceedings and in regard to the same, the appellate authority has recorded specific finding that the petitioner has failed to prove the said plea by placing medical certificate. The appellate authority also considered the proportionality of the punishment and recorded his finding that he was absent from 4.8.1998 without sanctioned leave and accordingly dismissal order is just and proper.
12- Considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.
13- It is established from the material available on record that the petitioner was served with charge-sheet for absence from duty without leave and he failed to appear in the enquiry proceedings.
14- It also appears that during the enquiry proceedings the proper opportunity was provided to the petitioner and even than the petitioner failed to appear before the Enquiry Officer during the enquiry proceedings. The relevant portion of the enquiry report is reproduced as under:-
Þlk{; fo'ys"k.k xokg dk0 464 uk0iq0d`".k iky flag us vkjksfir gs0dk0 {izks0} 40 ,0ih0 dkfydk izlkn dh fn0 4-8-98 dks jkf=x.kuk o vafdr xSjgkftjh jiV ua0 54 le; 20-00 cts fn0 4-8-98 izekf.kr fd;k gS rFk izn'kZ d&1 cuk;k x;k gSA vkjksfir gs0dk0 {izks0} dh xSjgkftjh ds laca/k esa rRdkyhu izfrlkj fujh{kd Jh xqykc flag us ,d fjiksVZ 3-9-98 iqfyl v/kh{kd] gjnksbZ dks izsf"kr fd;k Fkk ftls izn'kZ d&2 cuk;k x;k gSA vkjksfir gs0dk0 {izks0} dh xSjgkftjh ds laca/k esa {ks=kf/kdkjh uxj Jh iznhi xqIrk }kjk izkjfEHkd tkap dh x;h Fkh rFkk vius dFku esa izk0tka 9 vk[;k dks izekf.kr fd;k gSA ftls izn'kZ d&3 cuk;k x;k gSA vkjksfir gs00dk0 {izks0} dks fnukad 10-6-99 dks dk;kZy; esa mifLFkr gksdj vkjksi i= lwph lk{; vkfn izkIr djus gsrq }kjk fo'ks"k okgd i= la[;k ih,Q& 28@99 fnukad 14-6-99 ds ek/;e ls vkjksi i=@lwph lk{; izkIr djk;k x;k rFkk vkjksiksa ds laca/k esa fnukad 24-6-99 rd Li"Vhdj.k izf"kr djus dh vis{kk dh x;hA ;g vkjksi i= vkjksih gs0dk0 {izks0} }kjk fnukad 18-6-99 dks izkIr fd;k x;k gSA vkjksih dk fuf'pr frfFk fn0 24-6-99 rd dksbZ Li"Vhdj.k@tokc u izkIr gksus ,oa mlds mifLFkr u vkus ds mijkUr vkjksih dks mlds fuokl LFkku ij }kjk fo'ks"k okgd i= la[;k ih,Q&28@99 fnukad 24-6-99 ds ek/;e ls bl vk'k; dh lwpuk Hksth x;h fd lk{; gsrq fn0 3-7-99 fuf'pr dh tkrh gSA ;g i= vkjksih }kjk fn0 26-6-99 dks izkIr fd;k x;k gSA vkjksih ds fuf'pr lk{; dh frfFk 3-7-99 dks mifLFkr u vkus ij mldh vuqifLFkfr esa xokgksa ds c;ku vafdr fd;s x;s rFkk vkjksih dks mlds fuokl LFkku ij }kjk fo'ks"k okgd i= la[;k ih,Q&28@99 fnukad 7-7-99 ds ek/;e ls mldh vuqifLFkfr esa xokgksa ds c;ku vafdr dj fy;s tkus ,oa fnukad 17-7-99 rd Li"Vhdj.k@tokc izsf"kr djus dh vis{kk dh x;hA ;g i= vkjksih }kjk fnukad 8-7-99 dks izkIr fd;k x;k gSA vkjksih gs0dk0 {izks0} 40 ,0ih0 dkfydk izlkn le; le; ij lwpuk izkIr djus ds mijkUr Hkh u rks mifLFkr vk;k vkSj u gh viuk dksbZ Li"Vhdj.k gh izsf"kr fd;k gSA vkjksih ds fuokl LFkku ij Hksts x;s fo'ks"kokgdksa us vkjksih dks LoLFk fn[kus dh ckr vius dFku esa vafdr djk;h gSA fu"d"kZ %& bl izdkj vkjksih gs0dk0 {izks0} 40,0ih0 dkfydk izlkn fn0 4-8-98 dh jkf= x.kuk ij xSjgkftjh izn'kZ d&1 izekf.kr gSA vkjksih gs0dk0 {izks0} fcuk fdlh Lohd`r vodk'k@vuqefr ds vukf/kd`r :i ls vuqifLFkr py jgk gSA {ks=kf/kdkjh uxj }kjk dh x;h izkjfEHkd tkap vk[;k izn'kZ d&3 esa vuq'kklughurk rFkk ykijokgh dk nks"kh ik;k x;k gSAß 15- In the present petition, the petitioner has not denied the facts as mentioned in the enquiry report particularly the portion quoted above and has only narrated the reasons on account which he could not appeared before the Enquiry Officer. The reasons/grounds on which he could not appear in the enquiry proceedings were taken into consideration by the appellate authority and it is evident from the order of appellate authority dated 17.6.2000 that the appellate authority considered the same and rejected the reasons given by the petitioner.
16- In addition to the above, before this Court the petitioner has not placed any medical certificate on record from which it can be gathered that the petitioner was under depression or serious illness during the period in which enquiry proceedings were initiated and concluded i.e. w.e.f. 14.6.1999 to 1.12.1999.
17- In view of above, this Court is of the view that there is no procedural irregularity or illegality in concluding the disciplinary enquiry and entire proceeding and passing of dismissal order dated 1.12.1999 and order of appellate authority dated 17.6.2000, are just and proper.
18- The scope of judicial review with respect to the departmental proceedings is limited.
19- This Court under its power conferred by Article 226 of Constitution of India, can interfere in the matter of disciplinary proceedings if the disciplinary/enquiry proceedings were conducted in violation of manner prescribed and against Principle of Natural Justice and if the order of concerned authority is non speaking and unreasoned. This Court can interfere in the matter of disciplinary proceedings if the decision making process is in violation of Rules or against Principle of Natural Justice. The judicial review in the matter of departmental proceedings is permissible with respect to decision making process and not against the decision itself unless it is shown that the decision is without any evidence or suffers from malafide or malice or harsh or without jurisdiction.
20- In the case of Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Ashok Kumar Arora, (1997) 3 SCC 72 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
"At the outset, it needs to be mentioned that the High Court in such cases of departmental enquiries and the findings recorded therein does not exercise the powers of appellate court/authority. The jurisdiction of the High Court in such cases is very limited for instance where it is found that the domestic enquiry is vitiated because of non-observance of principles of natural justice, denial of reasonable opportunity; findings are based on no evidence, and/or the punishment is totally disproportionate to the proved misconduct of an employee. There is a catena of judgments of this Court which had settled the law on this topic and it is not necessary to refer to all these decisions. Suffice it to refer to a few decisions of this Court on this topic viz. State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [(1964) 3 SCR 25 : AIR 1963 SC 1723 : (1964) 2 LLJ 150] , State of A.P. v. Chitra Venkata Rao [(1975) 2 SCC 557 : 1975 SCC (L&S) 349 : (1976) 1 SCR 521] , Corpn. of the City of Nagpur v. Ramchandra [(1981) 2 SCC 714 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 455 : (1981) 3 SCR 22] and Nelson Motis v. Union of India [(1992) 4 SCC 711 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 13 : (1993) 23 ATC 382 : AIR 1992 SC 1981]".
21- In the case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank, (2003) 3 SCC 583 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
"17. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority.
18. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44] the scope of judicial review was indicated by stating that review by the court is of decision-making process and where the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on some evidence, the court or the tribunal cannot reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding.
19. As observed in R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab [(1999) 8 SCC 90 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1424] in paras 16 and 17 the scope of interference is rather limited and has to be exercised within the circumscribed limits. It was noted as follows: (SCC p. 96) "16. Before adverting to the first contention of the appellant regarding want of material to establish the charge, and of non-application of mind, we will have to bear in mind the rule that the court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the function of the court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The inquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the court in writ proceedings.
17. A narration of the charges and the reasons of the inquiring authority for accepting the charges, as seen from the records, shows that the inquiring authority has based its conclusions on materials available on record after considering the defence put forth by the appellant and these decisions, in our opinion, have been taken in a reasonable manner and objectively. The conclusion arrived at by the inquiring authority cannot be termed as either being perverse or not based on any material nor is it a case where there has been any non-application of mind on the part of the inquiring authority. Likewise, the High Court has looked into the material based on which the enquiry officer has come to the conclusion, within the limited scope available to it under Article 226 of the Constitution and we do not find any fault with the findings of the High Court in this regard."
22- In the case of Allahabad Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
"7. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions at the Bar. It is true that a writ court is very slow in interfering with the findings of facts recorded by a departmental authority on the basis of evidence available on record. But it is equally true that in a case where the disciplinary authority records a finding that is unsupported by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which no reasonable person could have arrived at, the writ court would be justified if not duty-bound to examine the matter and grant relief in appropriate cases. The writ court will certainly interfere with disciplinary enquiry or the resultant orders passed by the competent authority on that basis if the enquiry itself was vitiated on account of violation of principles of natural justice, as is alleged to be the position in the present case. Non-application of mind by the enquiry officer or the disciplinary authority, non-recording of reasons in support of the conclusion arrived at by them are also grounds on which the writ courts are justified in interfering with the orders of punishment. The High Court has, in the case at hand, found all these infirmities in the order passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority. The respondent's case that the enquiry was conducted without giving a fair and reasonable opportunity for leading evidence in defence has not been effectively rebutted by the appellant. More importantly the disciplinary authority does not appear to have properly appreciated the evidence nor recorded reasons in support of his conclusion. To add insult to injury the appellate authority instead of recording its own reasons and independently appreciating the material on record, simply reproduced the findings of the disciplinary authority. All told, the enquiry officer, the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority have faltered in the discharge of their duties resulting in miscarriage of justice. The High Court was in that view right in interfering with the orders passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority."
23- In the case(s) of Bank of India v. Apurba Kumar Saha, (1994) 2 SCC 615; Pepsu Road Transport Corporation v. Rawel Singh, (2008) 4 SCC 42 and Board of Directors, Himachal Pradesh Transport Corporation v. K.C. Rahi, (2008) 11 SCC 502, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that if an employee refused to avail opportunities provided to him in the disciplinary proceedings and choose not to participate in the enquiry then in such event he cannot be permitted to raise the plea of denial of reasonable opportunity in defending his case during enquiry proceedings. An employee would waive his right to raise the plea of not providing reasonable opportunity of hearing during the enquiry if he himself has avoided the disciplinary proceedings and such employee would be estopped from raising the plea of non-compliance of principles of natural justice.
24- In regard to the submissions of learned Counsel for the petitioner to the effect that the punishment order dated 01.12.1999 a well as appellate order dated 17.06.2000 are liable to be interefered by this Court as there is no finding in the enquiry report that the absence of petitioner was willful, this Court feel it appropriate to refer the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others. Vs. T.T. Murali Babu reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108. The relevant paras are quoted below for ready reference:-
22. The learned counsel for the respondent has commended us to the decision in Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India [Krushnakant B. Parmarv. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 178 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 609] to highlight that in the absence of a finding returned by the inquiry officer or determination by the disciplinary authority that the unauthorised absence was wilful, the charge could not be treated to have been proved. To appreciate the said submission we have carefully perused the said authority. In the said case, the question arose whether "unauthorised absence from duty" did tantamount to "failure of devotion to duty" or "behaviour unbecoming of a government servant" inasmuch as the appellant therein was charge-sheeted for failure to maintain devotion to duty and his behaviour was unbecoming of a government servant. After adverting to the rule position the two-Judge Bench expressed thus: (SCC pp. 181-82, paras 16-18) "16. In the case of the appellant referring to unauthorised absence the disciplinary authority alleged that he failed to maintain devotion to duty and his behaviour was unbecoming of a government servant. The question whether ''unauthorised absence from duty' amounts to failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant cannot be decided without deciding the question whether absence is wilful or because of compelling circumstances.
17. If the absence is the result of compelling circumstances under which it was not possible to report or perform duty, such absence cannot be held to be wilful. Absence from duty without any application or prior permission may amount to unauthorised absence, but it does not always mean wilful. There may be different eventualities due to which an employee may abstain from duty, including compelling circumstances beyond his control like illness, accident, hospitalisation, etc., but in such case the employee cannot be held guilty of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant.
18. In a departmental proceeding, if allegation of unauthorised absence from duty is made, the disciplinary authority is required to prove that the absence is wilful, in the absence of such finding, the absence will not amount to misconduct."
23. We have quoted in extenso as we are disposed to think that the Court inKrushnakant B. Parmar case [Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 178 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 609] has, while dealing with the charge of failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a government servant, expressed the aforestated view and further the learned Judges have also opined that there may be compelling circumstances which are beyond the control of an employee. That apart, the facts in the said case were different as the appellant on certain occasions was prevented to sign the attendance register and the absence was intermittent. Quite apart from that, it has been stated therein that it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to come to a conclusion that the absence is wilful. On an apposite understanding of the judgment Krushnakant B. Parmar case [Krushnakant B. Parmar v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 178 : (2012) 1 SCC (L&S) 609] we are of the opinion that the view expressed in the said case has to be restricted to the facts of the said case regard being had to the rule position, the nature of the charge levelled against the employee and the material that had come on record during the enquiry. It cannot be stated as an absolute proposition in law that whenever there is a long unauthorised absence, it is obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to record a finding that the said absence is wilful even if the employee fails to show the compelling circumstances to remain absent.
24. In this context, it is seemly to refer to certain other authorities relating to unauthorised absence and the view expressed by this Court. In State of Punjab v. P.L. Singla [State of Punjab v. P.L. Singla, (2008) 8 SCC 469 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 719] the Court, dealing with unauthorised absence, has stated thus: (SCC p. 473, para 11) "11. Unauthorised absence (or overstaying leave), is an act of indiscipline. Whenever there is an unauthorised absence by an employee, two courses are open to the employer. The first is to condone the unauthorised absence by accepting the explanation and sanctioning leave for the period of the unauthorised absence in which event the misconduct stood condoned. The second is to treat the unauthorised absence as a misconduct, hold an enquiry and impose a punishment for the misconduct."
25. Again, while dealing with the concept of punishment the Court ruled as follows: (P.L. Singla case [State of Punjab v. P.L. Singla, (2008) 8 SCC 469 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 719] , SCC pp. 473-74, para 14) "14. Where the employee who is unauthorisedly absent does not report back to duty and offer any satisfactory explanation, or where the explanation offered by the employee is not satisfactory, the employer will take recourse to disciplinary action in regard to the unauthorised absence. Such disciplinary proceedings may lead to imposition of punishment ranging from a major penalty like dismissal or removal from service to a minor penalty like withholding of increments without cumulative effect. The extent of penalty will depend upon the nature of service, the position held by the employee, the period of absence and the cause/explanation for the absence."
26. In Tushar D. Bhatt v. State of Gujarat [(2009) 11 SCC 678 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 668] , the appellant therein had remained unauthorisedly absent for a period of six months and further had also written threatening letters and conducted some other acts of misconduct. Eventually, the employee was visited with order of dismissal and the High Court had given the stamp of approval to the same. Commenting on the conduct of the appellant the Court stated that he was not justified in remaining unauthorisedly absent from official duty for more than six months because in the interest of discipline of any institution or organisation such an approach and attitude of the employee cannot be countenanced.
27. Thus, the unauthorised absence by an employee, as a misconduct, cannot be put into a straitjacket formula for imposition of punishment. It will depend upon many a factor as has been laid down in P.L. Singla [State of Punjab v. P.L. Singla, (2008) 8 SCC 469 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 719] ."
24- In the instant case, the petitioner has failed to prove that under compelling circumstances he was absent from duties without sanctioned leave. Thus, in view of the same as well as in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (supra), this Court does not find any force in arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner on the issue of recording specific finding of willful absence.
25- For the forgoing reasons, the writ petition lacks merit and accordingly dismissed.
No order as to costs.
Order Date :- 15.10.2019 Vinay/-