Madras High Court
P. Pichaimuthu vs Mr. D.R. Premchander on 2 June, 2025
Author: Sathi Kumar Sukumara Kurup
Bench: Sathi Kumar Sukumara Kurup
Crl.A. No.736 of 2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED : 02.06.2025
CORAM :
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SATHI KUMAR SUKUMARA KURUP
Criminal Appeal No.736 of 2018
---
P. PichaiMuthu
Rep. By Power Agent Mr. P. Sivamuthu,
At No.407, Suresh Block Chitra Avenue,
No.9, Choolaimedu High Road,
Chennai – 600 094. .. Appellant
Versus
Mr. D.R. Premchander .. Respondent
Criminal Appeal filed under Section 378 of Cr.P.C., praying to call for
the records and set aside the Judgment dated 03.03.2018 passed in C.A. No.
190 of 2016 on the file of the learned XVII Additional Sessions Judge full
additional charge of XVI Additional Sessions Judge, Chennai thereby
reversing the Judgment dated 09.06.2016 passed in C.C. No. 135 of 2007 on
the file of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court – III,
Saidapet.
For Appellant : Mr. R.Ananth
for Mr.D. Kanagasundaram
For Respondent : Mr. L. Thiyagaiya
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Crl.A. No.736 of 2018
JUDGMENT
This Criminal Appeal had been filed to set aside the Judgment dated 03.03.2018 passed by the learned XVII Additional Sessions Judge, Chennai in C.A.No.190 of 2016 reversing the Judgment dated 09.06.2016 passed in C.C.No.135 of 2007 by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court – III, Saidapet.
2. The brief facts, which are necessary for the disposal of this Criminal Appeal, are as follows:-
2.1. The Appellant is the Complainant, who had filed the complaint in C.C.No. 135 of 2007 under Section 138 of The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. According to the Appellant, he retired from Government service and was planning to start a business. At this stage, the Respondent/Accused approached and requested him to invest in the business of trading packaged drinking mineral water carried on by him and assured of a reasonable return.
Therefore, a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- was deposited by the Appellant in the business run by the Respondent and on such deposit, the Appellant was inducted as a partner. According to the Appellant, the Respondent assured him of Rs.10,000/- as monthly return which will be paid on or before 10th of every month. An agreement dated 16.03.2004 was also entered into between the 2/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 Appellant and the Respondent. According to the Appellant/Complainant, until March 2005, he received the sum of Rs.10,000/- every month from the Respondent, but thereafter, the Respondent did not pay the amount and committed default in such monthly payment. Further, the cheques given by the Respondent to the Appellant were dishonoured on presentation. At this juncture, the Appellant demanded the Respondent to return back the sum of Rs.2,00,000/- paid by him. After discussion of the dispute among the Appellant and the Respondent, a Memorandum of Understanding dated 17.08.2005 was entered into between them in which the Respondent admitted the default in payment committed by him and issued a cheque No. 312910 dated 06.08.2006 for Rs.2,00,000/- towards the amount deposited by the Appellant. When the cheque was presented for collection on 30.08.2006 with the bankers of the Appellant – Indian Overseas Bank, Choolaimedu Branch, Madras, it was returned as unpaid for the reason 'funds insufficient' and a return memo dated 31.08.2006 was issued to that effect. In such a circumstances, the Appellant sent a legal notice dated 27.09.2006 calling upon the Respondent to pay the cheque amount. However, the Respondent did not come forward to neither pay the cheque amount nor sent a reply notice. Therefore, the Appellant has filed C.C. No. 135 of 2007 before the trial court.
2.2. On presentation of the complaint under Section 138 of the 3/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the sworn statement of the Complainant was recorded by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court-III, Saidapet. On perusal of the documents filed by the Complainant the learned Metropolitan Magistrate concluded that a prima facie case was made out against the Accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate therefore took cognisance of the complaint and numbered it as C.C.No.135 of 2007. Thereafter, summons were issued to the Accused along with the copy of the complaint under Section 204 of Cr.P.C., The Accused appeared and on his appearance, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate questioned him regarding the charge under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The Accused denied the charge and claimed to be tried. Therefore, trial was ordered during which, the Complainant examined himself as P.W-1 and another witness by name Umapathy as P.W-2 and the Manager of the Bank was examined as P.W-3. On appreciation of the evidence, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate had convicted the Accused/Respondent herein for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and sentenced him to undergo six months simple imprisonment and to pay the cheque amount as compensation under Section 255 (2) Cr.P.C., 2.3. Aggrieved by the Judgment of conviction, the Accused had 4/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 preferred an Appeal in Criminal Appeal No. 190 of 2016 before the learned Principal Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai. The Appeal was made over to the file of the learned XVII Additional Sessions Judge, City Civil Court. After hearing the argument of the learned Counsel for the Appellant as well as the learned Counsel for the Respondent, the learned XVI Additional Sessions Judge holding full additional charge of learned XVII Additional Sessions Judge, by Judgment dated 03.03.2018 allowed the Appeal reversing the finding of guilt recorded by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court-III, Saidapet in C.C.No.135 of 2007 dated 09.06.2016.
2.4. Assailing the validity and correctness of the Judgment of acquittal recorded by the learned XVI Additional Sessions Judge holding full additional charge of learned XVII Additional Sessions Judge, City Civil Court, the Complainant/Respondent had preferred this Appeal.
3. The learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Appellant is the Complainant before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court -III, Saidapet. The Appellant/Complainant is a retired Police Official and as requested by the Respondent/Accused, the Appellant/Complainant invested Rs.2,00,000/- in the business of package drinking water carried on by the Respondent/Accused. It is stated by the 5/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 learned Counsel that the Appellant and Respondent are neighbours residing in adjacent blocks in No.9, Choolaimedu High Road, Chennai – 600 094. The Complainant is residing in Flat No. 407, Suresh Block, while the Accused resides in Flat No.101, Anand Block, Chitra Avenue.
4. The XVI Additional Sessions Judge, City Civil Court, on misconception of law reversed the well considered Judgment of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court-III, Saidapet, based on adverse presumption as if the cheques were issued towards security by relying upon the case law which is not at all applicable to the facts of this case.
5. The learned Appellate Judge failed to consider that the statutory notice dated 27.09.2006 sent by the Complainant was received by the Accused as could be evident from Ex.P-5 marked through P.W-2. The learned XVII Additional Judge as Appellate Court had given much importance to the evidence of P.W-1, whereas on the other hand, P.W-2 who is the Postmaster who has deposed that the legal notice was served on the Accused on 28.06.2009 and the said evidence was not disputed by the Accused. However, the appellate Judge concluded that the Accused was not residing in the same address at the time of service of legal notice was not proper. However, the 6/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 learned Appellate Judge failed to consider the fact that the Accused was served summons in the C.C. No.135 of 2007 at the same address to which the legal notice was served. The Judgment of the learned XVII Additional Judge is against the settled principle of law and is to be set aside as perverse.
6. The learned Appellate Judge also failed to note that as far as the liability is concerned, it is clearly proved through P.W-1 to P.W-3 that the cheque was issued towards a legally enforceable debt. The signature in the cheque was also admitted by the accused. The Appellate Court failed to note that Ex.P-8 and Ex.P-9 are letters issued by the Accused about the issuance of cheque. However, the Appellate Court held that the cheque was issued by the Accused to the Appellant only for security purpose. The Appellate Court failed to consider that the undertaking letter issued by the Respondent would show that the cheque was issued towards discharge of past debt. The Appellate Court erred in stating that as there is an arbitration clause under Ex.P-7, a private Complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is not maintainable.
7. The learned Counsel for the Appellant also submitted that the Appellant had marked 10 documents and examined three witnesses in support 7/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 of his case. However, the Accused entered appearance and claimed that he had shifted his residence and the notice was not served. Regarding the service of notice, P.W-2/Post Master was examined to show the same. Similarly, the Manager of the Bank was also examined to prove that the cheque issued by the Respondent was dishonoured for want of funds. Notwithstanding the above evidence, which clearly prove that the Appellant had raised a strong presumption in his favour, which was not properly considered by the Appellate Court while reversing the well considered Judgment of the trial court.
8. The learned Counsel for the Appellant invited the attention of this Court to the Judgment passed by the learned XVII Additional Sessions Judge, the relevant portion of it reads as follows:-
“This agreement was made in writing between Accused and Complainant on 16.03.2004. Till March 2005, the Accused has paid the monthly share to the Complainant, but subsequently he defaulted in paying the monthly shre of Rs.10,000/-. Several cheques given by the Accused to the Complainant's monthly share were bounced due to insufficient funds.
20. As accepted, for the business the said amount was invested by the Complainant with the condition to give share in the profit at Rs.10,000/- per month. As accepted by the Complainant, from the profit, Rs.10,000/- was paid by Appellant only for a few months relating to the deposit of agreement also entered between the parties. In the said deposit agreement Ex.P-6, it is stated that the cheques were given only for the purpose of security and any dispute arise between them the matter to be decided by the Arbitrator appointed by mutual consent.8/38
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24. As far as this case is concerned, the mandatory requirement is not complied with. It is the duty of the Respondent/Complainant to prove that the Appellant/Accused has issued the cheque and it was bounced for want of sufficient funds. But on perusal of the documents Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-10, it is evident that all the cheques were issued by the Appellant to the Complainant only for the security purpose.”
9. By pointing out the above observation, the learned Counsel for the Appellant invited the attention of this Court to the Appeal preferred by the Accused before the learned XVII Additional Sessions Judge, City Civil Court in which he is said to have given two different address and it is a only ploy to evade the payment by the Accused. The relevant portion of the appeal reads as follows:-
(i) No.101, Anand Block, Chitra Avenue, No.9 Choolaimedu High Road, Chennai – 600 094.
(ii) G-4, Rams Apartment, Bharathiyar 5th Street, S.S.Colony, Madurai.
10. Also, the learned Counsel for the Appellant invited the attention of this Court to the grounds of Appeal in C.A.No.190 of 2016 filed before the learned Principal Sessions Judge, Chennai. The relevant portion reads as follows:-
“H) It is submitted that the Respondent filed the additional documents and the same has been marked as Exhibits No.6 to 10 for misleading before the learned trial Judge. Because the Appellant neither enter or wrote or signed in the memorandum of understanding dated 17.08.2005, which has been marked as Exhibit No.7 and letters dated 02.12.2005, which has been marked as Exhibit No.8 and letter dated 20.01.2006, which has been marked as Exhibit No.9 by the Respondent, except the Deposit agreement dated 9/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 16.03.2004, which has been marked as Exhibit No.6 before the learned trial Judge.
T) the learned Magistrate failed to see that Exhibit 6 & 7 documents are unregistered one and not according with law laid down in stamp duty act. But learned Magistrate ought to have taken the above Exhibits for reasons of conclusion for the Judgment as against the Appellants.
11. The Accused however did not step into the witness box to rebut the initial presumption raised by the Complainant/Appellant through direct evidence. Notwithstanding the same, the Appellate Court erroneously reversed the finding of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court- III, Saidapet and acquitted the Respondent/Accused. In support of his contentions, the learned Counsel for the Appellant relied on the following rulings:-
11.1. In the case of C.C.Alavi Haji Vs. Palapetty Muhammed & Anr.
The relevant portion reads as follows:-
“14. Section 27 gives rise to a presumption that service of notice has been effected when it is sent to the correct address by registered post. In view of the said presumption, when stating that a notice has been sent by registered post to the address of the drawer, it is unnecessary to further aver in the complaint that in spite of the return of the notice unserved, it is deemed to have been served or that the addressee is deemed to have knowledge of the notice. Unless and until the contrary is proved by the addressee, service of notice is deemed to have been effected at the time at which the letter would have been delivered in the ordinary course of business. This Court has already held that when a notice is sent by registered post and is returned with a postal endorsement \023refused\024 or \ 023not available in the house\024 or \023house locked\024 or \023shop closed\024 or \023addressee not in station \024, due service has to be presumed. (vide Jagadish Singh Vs. Natthu Singh; State of M.P Vs. Hiralal & Ors. And V.Raja Kumari Vs. P.Subbarama Naidu & Anr.) It is, therefore, 10/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 manifest that in view of the presumption available under Section 27 of the Act, it is not necessary to aver in the complaint under Section 138 of the Act that service of notice was evaded by the Accused or that the Accused had a role to play in the return of the notice unserved.
15. Insofar as the question of disclosure of necessary particulars with regard to the issue of notice in terms of proviso (b) of Section 138 of the Act, in order to enable the Court to draw presumption or inference either under Section 27 of the G.C.Act or Section 114 of the Evidence Act, is concerned, there is no material difference between the two provisions. In our opinion, therefore, when the notice is sent by registered post by correctly addressing the drawer of the cheque, the mandatory requirement of issue of notice in terms of Clause (b) of proviso to Section 138 of the Act stands complied with.” 11.2. In D.Purushotama Reddy & Anr. Vs. K.Sateesh in Civil Appeal No.4751 of 2008 (Arising Out of SLP (Civil) No.8520 of 2007, the Honourable Supreme Court made certain observations, the relevant portion of which reads as follows:-
“8. Contention of the Respondent, however, is that as the said question was not and could not have been raised before the trial Court, the impugned Judgment is sustainable. It was furthermore urged that in view of the well-settled principle of law that pendency of a criminal matter would not be an impediment in proceeding with a civil suit, the impugned Judgment should not be interfered with.
9. A Suit for recovery of money due from a borrower indisputably is maintainable at the instance of the creditor. It is furthermore beyond any doubt or dispute that for the same cause of action a complaint petition under terms of Section 138 of the Act would also be maintainable.” 11.3. In the case of Kishan Rao Vs. Shankargouda in Criminal Appeal No.803 of 2018 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.10030 of 2016, relevant portion reads as follows:-11/38
https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 “6. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that the offence having been proved before the trial Court by leading evidence, the conviction was recorded by the trial Court after appreciating both oral and documentary evidence led by the Appellant which order was also affirmed by the Appellate Court. There was no jurisdiction in the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence on record and come to the conclusion that Accused has been able to raise a doubt regarding existence of the debt or liability of the Accused. He submits that the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 379 r/w. 401 Cr.P.C., can interfere with the Order of the Conviction only when the findings recorded by the Courts below are perverse and there was no evidence to prove the offence against the Accused. It is submitted that in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction the High Court cannot substitute its own opinion after re-appreciation of evidence.
7. It is submitted that the presumption under Section 139 was rightly drawn against the Accused and Accused failed to rebut the said presumption by leading evidence. There was no ground for setting aside the Conviction Order.
19. This Court held that the Accused may adduce evidence to rebut the presumption, but mere denial regarding existence of debt shall not serve any purpose. Following was held in Paragraph 20:
20......... The Accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. However, the Court need not insist in every case that the Accused should disprove the non-
existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consequences and existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of the Accused. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the Complainant. To disprove the presumptions, the Accused should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the Court may either believe that the consideration and debt did not exist or their non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that they did not exist.......”
22. No evidence was led by the Accused. The defence taken in the reply to the notice that cheque was stolen having been rejected by the two Courts below, we do not see any basis for the High Court 12/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 coming to the conclusion that the Accused has been successful in creating doubt in the mind of the Court with regard to the existence of the debt or liability. How the presumption under Section 139 can be rebutted on the evidence of P.W-1, himself has not been explained by the High Court.” 11.4. In the case of Sunil Todi & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr in Criminal Appeal No.1446 of 2021 wherein it was held as follows:-
“17. The issues which arise for our consideration are as follows:-
(i) Whether the dishonor of a cheque furnished as a 'security' is covered under the Provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act;
(ii) Whether the Magistrate, in view of Section 202 Cr.P.C., ought to have postponed the issuance of process; and
(iii) Whether a prima facie case of vicarious liability is made out against the Appellants.
25. The explanation to Section 138 of the NI Act provides that 'debt or any other liability' means a legally enforceable debt or other liability. The proviso to Section 138 stipulates that the cheque must be presented to the Bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within its period of validity. Therefore, a cheque given as a gift and not for the satisfaction of a debt or other liability, would not attract the penal consequences of the Provision in the event of its being returned for insufficiency of funds.
30. The submission which has been urged on behalf of the Appellants, however, is that the fact that the cheques in the present case have been issued as a security is not in dispute since it stands admitted from the pleading of the second Respondent in the Suit instituted before the High Court of Madras.”
12. By placing reliance on the above decisions, the learned counsel for the Appellant-Complainant submits that the Respondent/Accused did not step into the witness box and disproved the case projected by the Complainant. 13/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 That therefore, the Judgment passed by the learned XVII Additional Sessions Judge, City Civil Court, reversing the well considered Judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court, is to be set aside as perverse.
13. Per contra, the learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that on considering the business reputation of the Respondent, the Appellant approached him and expressed his intention to invest amount in the business run by him. In this context, an agreement dated 16.03.2014 was entered into between the Appellant and the Respondent. However, in the Complaint, the Appellant stated that the Respondent approached and asked the Appellant to invest in his business. But in his cross-examination, he had clearly stated that vjpupia vdf;F ed;whf bjupa[k; vd;Wk; ehdhfj;jhd; vjpupia miHj;J me;j bjhHpypy; nru ntz;o gzk; nghLtjhf brhy;yp gzk; bfhLj;njd;/ Thus, it could be evident that the Appellant's testimony is contradictory to what has been stated in his Complaint.
14. The learned Counsel for the Respondent also invited the attention of this Court to the cross-examination of P.W-1 wherein he has stated that he gave the money to the Respondent in cash partially and other amount by way of cheque. But the date and time of the issuance of the cheque also was not 14/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 mentioned in the Complaint as well as in the Proof Affidavit. The relevant portion reads as follows:-
vjpupapd; bjhHpypy; g';Fjhuuhf nruntz;oa gzk;
bfhLj;jnghJ xU Kiw buhf;fkhft[k; xU Kiw fhnrhiyahft[k;
bfhLj;jjhf “hgfk;/ vjpup bra;J te;j bjhHpypy; KjyPL bra;tjw;fhf me;j tHf;F fhnrhiyia brf;a{uplo; f;fhf bfhLj;jjhuh vd;why; fhnrhiy bfhLj;jhuh ,y;iyah vd;W "hgfkpyi; y/”
15. The learned Counsel for the Respondent/Accused also submitted that the Appellant in the Complaint has stated that the Respondent has not paid the profit of Rs.10,000/- for each month and many cheques given by the Respondent were bounced due to “insufficient funds”. From this averment, it is clear that the Respondent gave many cheques only for security purpose. On several occasions, the Respondent issued cheques for Rs.2,00,000/- which were also returned to him. The Appellant was in the habit of getting new cheques from the Respondent returning the old cheques to him. These cheques were issued only for security purpose. Even otherwise, the Respondent has settled the entire amount of Rs.2,00,000/- deposited by the Appellant by way of installments. But the Appellant demanded interest for the above said deposit amount. It is in this context, a dispute arose between them which led to the filing of the present complaint. The Respondent never gave any instruction to present the cheque, but the Appellant wantonly presented the 15/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 cheques to harass the Respondent through the Criminal proceedings.
16. The learned Counsel for the Respondent submitted that at the time of examination-in-chief of the Appellant he has stated that notice was not served to the Respondent. When a suggestion was made as to whether the Appellant is aware that the Respondent vacated the house from the above said address which was mentioned in the cause title of the Complaint and settled in his native place of Madurai, he did not raise any objection to the same. The Appellant never gave two months notice to the Respondent to refund the amount nor came forward to resolve the dispute before the Arbitrator as per the terms and conditions of the agreement dated 16.03.2004. Therefore, the act of the Appellant clearly reveals that there is no enforceable debt against the Respondent.
17. The learned Counsel for the Respondent further submitted that notice and summons were not properly served on him and they were served only to the Chennai address which the Respondent had vacated. When the Respondent entered appearance in this case through his counsel, he came to know that the security cheque given by him was presented by the Appellant with an ulterior motive. The Appellant failed to establish that the cheque was 16/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 issued for discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability, either in whole or in part through legally acceptable evidence.The Appellant filed the Complaint before the learned trial Judge even though he did not have a valid proof of service to show that the above said notice had been served on the Accused. In this regard, the learned counsel invited the attention of this Court to the deposition of the Appellant during his cross-examination, wherein he has deposed as follows:-
“2006 Mk; Mz;oy; vjpup brd;idapy; ,Ue;J btspnawp jdJ brhe;j Cuhd kJiuf;F brd;W m';F Fonawptpll; hu; vd;W brhd;dhy; vdf;F bjupahknyna vjpup ,unthL ,uthf fhyp bra;J bfhz;L brd;W tpll; hu;/ vjpup brd;idapy; cs;s tPl;il thliff;F tplL ; brd;whbud;why; vjpupaplk; gzk; bgw ntz;oa egu; me;j tPl;il Mf;fpukpgg; [ bra;J bfhz;lhu;/ th/rh/3 mwptpg;g[ vjpupapd; ve;j Kftupf;F ehd; mDg;gpndd; vd;why; vjpupapd; Kftupna vdf;F bjupahJ/ gpwF ve;j KftupfF ; ehd; mDg;g[ntd;/ th/rh/5y; vjpupjhd; me;j mwptpg;ig bgw;Wf;bfhz;lhuh vd;W ve;j thrfKk; ,lk; bgwtpyi ; y vd;why; vjpupjhd; me;j mwptpgi ; g mDg;gt[ jw;F Kd;ng tPl;il fhyp bra;J ngha;tpll; hu;/ mjdhy; me;j mwptpg;g[ bjupahky; ,Ue;jpUf;fyhk;/”
18. Further, the Postmaster was examined as P.W-2. In his cross- examination he stated that th/rh/5 ftu; cs;ns vd;d Mtzk; itj;J mDg;gg;gl;lJ vd;gij gw;wp vdf;F bjupahJ/ vd;Dila Kjy; tprhuizapd; nghJ 28/09/2006,y; blyptup bra;ag;gl;lJ vd;W brhd;dhy; cs;ns mJ tHf;fwp"u; mwptpg;g[ jhndh vd;gJ gw;wp vdf;F bjupahJ/ th/rh/5 Mtzj;jpy; ahu; ve;j fojj;ij bgw;W bfhz;lhu; vd;gJ gw;wp tptuk; ,y;iy/ The Appellant/ 17/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 Complainant also in his evidence stated that the legal notice sent by post was not delivered since the Respondent had already vacated the house. But the Postmaster/P.W-2, in his evidence, along with covering letter dated 09.11.2006, stated that the item was delivered on 28.09.2006 but was not stated by P.W-2 as to whom the item was delivered. Hence it is clear that the notice has not been delivered to the Respondent and there were contradictory testimonies of P.W-1 and P.W-2.
19. The learned Counsel for the Respondent invited the attention of this Court to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 which reads as follows:-
“Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency of funds in the account etc.,-
(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.”
20. The learned Counsel for the Respondent also invited the attention of this Court to Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 which reads as follows:-
“142. Cognizance of offences, -- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)-
(a) no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 138 except upon a Complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque;18/38
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(b) such Complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138;
(c) no Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under Section 138”.
21. The learned Counsel for the Respondent/Accused submitted that on an analysis of the aforesaid two Sections, for making out a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 the following ingredients have to be made out and they are:-
“(i) the payee of the cheque in case of non-payment of the cheque is required to sent notice within thirty days in writing to the drawer of the cheque from the date of receipt of information about the non-payment demanding the amount of cheque,
(ii) the drawer fails to make payment of the amount within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice, there would be a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provided the action is taken for cognizance of the offence as provided under Section 142 of the said Act.”
22. According to the learned counsel for the Respondent, a legal notice under Section 138 (b) of the said Act was sent by the Appellant to the Respondent through registered post on 27.09.2006. However, there is no evidence or acknowledgment card of the Post Office to show that the said legal notice dated 27.09.2006 was ever served personally on the Respondent. While so, the question of the Respondent/Accused failing to pay the cheque amount even after 15 days of the receipt of the notice as contemplated under Section 19/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 138 (b) of the Act will not arise in this case. In order to fasten the criminal liability on a person, the requirement of law has to be fully complied with. In the present case, it has not been shown that the notice of demand, as required under Section 138 (b) of the Act, was served on the Respondent. The reply of Postal Department is marked as Ex.P-5 before the trial Court, showing the status that article was delivered, but not on the Respondent. In the absence of service of notice under Section 138 (b) of the Act, no Prosecution and cognizance of offence is permitted to be taken against the Respondent/Accused as held in the Judgment reported in the case of Rajiv Kumar Vs. State of U.P reported in AlR 1991 Cri.L.J. 3010. In this case, when the Appellant failed to establish that the notice dated 27.09.2006 was served on the Respondent before the trial Court, the Judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court is perverse.
23. The learned counsel for the Respondent also invited the attention of this Court to the additional documents filed by the Appellant before the trial Court as Ex.P-6 to Ex.P-10. The signature in the deposit agreement under Ex.P-6 varies from Ex.P-7 to Ex.P-9. In Ex.P-8 and Ex.P-9, the Respondent's sign is depicted as “R. Premchander” whereas the Appellant normally signs as “D.R. Premchander” which is reflected in Ex.P-6. Further, Ex.P-6 and Ex.P-7 20/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 are unregistered documents which were not in accordance with law under the Stamp Act and therefore, they are legally not admissible. Further, Ex.P-6- Deposit Agreement dated 16.03.2004 reveals that the said cheque was issued for security purpose and not for discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability.
24. In support of his contention, the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent/Accused relied on the following rulings:-
24.1. In the case of M/s.Harman Electronics (p) Limited and another Vs. M/s. National Panasonic India Limited reported in (2009) 1 SCC 720.
The relevant portion reads as follows:-
“20. Indisputably all status deserve their strict application, but while doing so the cardinal principles therefore cannot be lost sight of. A Court derives a jurisdiction only when the cause of action arose within his jurisdiction. The same cannot be conferred by an act of omission or commission on the part of the Accused. A distinction must also be borne in mind between the ingredients of an offence and commission of a part of the offence. While issuance of a notice by holder of a Negotiable Instrument is necessary, service thereof is also imperative. Only on service of such notice and failure on the part of the Accused to pay the demanded amount within a period of 15 days thereafter. The commission of an offence completes. Giving of notice, therefore, cannot have any precedent over the service. It is only from that view of the matter that Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Ltd., Vs. Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd., emphasis had laid on service of notice.” 24.2. In the case of Sarav Investment & Financial Consultancy Private Limited and Another Vs. Llyods, Register of Shipping reported in 21/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 2007 14 SCC 753 it was held as follows:-
“23. Submission of the learned Counsel for the Respondent in regard to the conduct of the Appellant is besides the point. The allegations made in Complaint Petition, if did not subserve the requirements of law were not maintainable and, thus, the same could not have been entertained. Proper application of mind was necessary in that behalf by the learned Magistrate. The learned Magistrate proceeded on the basis that the service of notice upon the Company at its registered Officer would subserve the requirements of law. But, in this case, point taken by the Appellant is a different one.” 24.3. In K.N.Kandasamy Gounder Vs. P.Dhamodharan reported in 2009-2-L.W (Crl.) 1275 the following observations are made which reads as follows:-
“14. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides for a penal provision. Such a penal provision enacted in terms of the legal fiction drawn would be attracted and when a cheque is returned by the Bank unpaid. Before a proceeding thereunder is initiated, all the legal requirements therefor must be complied with. The Court before whom a private Complaint is filed has to be satisfied with all the ingredients of the Commission of offence under the provisions have been complied with.”
25. By pointing out the above decisions, the learned counsel for the Respondent/Accused submitted that the cheque in question was not issued for a legally enforceable debt and liability. The statutory notice was not served on the Respondent/Accused, whereby the Appellant-Complainant has failed to comply with the mandatory requirements under The Negotiable Instruments Act. Furthermore, as an accused, he can maintain stoic silence and he need not examine himself to rebut the initial presumptions raised. One of the methods 22/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 for rebutting the initial presumption is to cross-examine the witnesses examined on the side of the Complainant. In this case, through the cross- examination of the witnesses examined on the side of the Appellant- Complainant, the Respondent/Accused has rebutted the initial presumption. The Appellate Court, on an in-depth analysis of the entire evidence on record, has acquitted the Respondent/Accused. The Appellate Court, as a fact finding Court, acquitted the Respondent/Accused and it need not be interfered with by this Court as a second appellate Court to tweak into the facts and evidences involved. This Court can only examine as to whether the Judgment of reversal of the Appellate Court is based on sound reasoning and in the light of the material evidence recorded before the Trial Court. Even if two views are possible, the one which is in favour of the Respondent/Accused can always be considered to confirm the Judgment of acquittal passed by the Appellate Court. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the Respondent/Accused prayed for dismissal of this appeal.
Point for consideration:-
Whether the Judgment passed by the learned XVII Additional Sessions Judge, Chennai in C.A.No.190 of 2016 dated 03.03.2018 thereby reversing the Judgment passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court – III, 23/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 Saidapet in C.C.No.135 of 2007 dated 09.06.2016 is to be set aside as perverse?
26. Heard the learned Counsel for the Appellant and the learned Counsel for the Respondent. Perused the records, including the Judgment passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court-III, Saidapet and the Judgment passed by the learned XVII Additional Sessions Judge, Chennai.
27. On perusal of the Judgment of the learned XVII Additional Judge, City Civil Court, it is found that the learned Sessions Judge failed to consider the fact that the evidence of the Complainant is to the effect that the whereabouts of the Accused were not known. However, he claimed in the complaint that service of notice on the Accused could not be completed as per the provisions of Sections 138 to 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. At the same time, the summons sent to the Accused as per the Complaint was served and the Accused appeared. Therefore, it gives a presumption that the Complainant had filed the complaint properly by following the due procedure. When the Accused wantonly evaded the statutory notice, the learned Judge had recorded that it was deemed that service was effected on the Respondent/Accused. Further, as per the ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court 24/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 in the case of K.Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another reported in AIR 1999 Supreme Court 3762, the parties who evaded the notice wantonly to avoid being arrested or for the purpose of filing complaint are risking imprisonment. Therefore, when the statutory notice contains the details of the address of the Accused and the summon also bears the same address, the presumption is that the Respondent/Accused evaded the statutory notice for obvious reasons. Under those circumstances, the arguments of the learned Counsel for the Respondent in this Appeal that there is no cause of action at all arisen for filing the complaint as the statutory notice was not served cannot be accepted. When the Accused appeared before the Trial Court on receipt of summons along with a copy of the Complaint, then the Accused should have raised the question of maintainability of the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for not properly serving the statutory notice. The Respondent/Accused did not do so as the statutory notice was duly sent and the Complainant also examined P.W-2/Postmaster to show that the notice was duly served. At that stage, the Court shall order notice and help the Accused to offer his explanation for not receiving the notice and also to explore his readiness to settle the amount, opportunities shall be given. Here, the Accused appeared but he has not properly explained as to how the summons sent through the Court to the same address has been received by 25/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 him. When the accused disputes the receipt of statutory notice, it is his duty to disprove it through legally acceptable evidence, but he had not done so. Therefore, it is clear that the Respondent/Accused was aware of the Complaint to be filed against him.
28. In cases of this nature, when the Accused was not served with notice or the Accused offered his explanation before the Court regarding the service of notice, the Accused shall be given an opportunity to prove the same. Even sufficient time to respond to the notice would have been given to the Accused but he had not raised such issue. If the argument of the learned Counsel for the Appellant is considered, then the private Complaint cannot proceed till the time is exhausted from the date of appearance of the Accused either to interact with the Complainant or to close the case or to try the case within a specified time. The Accused had not availed such chances and he is duty-bound to explain how he received notice in the complaint. If the address was wrong, summons to the Accused would have returned, unserved. But in this case, the Accused entered appearance through his Counsel and contested the case after receipt of summons from the trial court. Therefore, as per the reported decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K.Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another reported in AIR 1999 Supreme 26/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 Court 3762, it is a deemed service where the Accused received the notice sent through the Court. The Accused could have very well sought time to either settle the dues or to pronounce Judgment based on merits. But the Accused had not done so. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court-III, Saidapet had considered those circumstances and rejected the contention of the learned Counsel for the Accused that there was no cause of action to file the Complaint, while convicting him. However, the learned XVII Additional Sessions Judge failed to consider this particular aspect. If the address shown in the complaint was false, how did the Accused came to know about the proceedings, entered appearance through Counsel and contested the case. This was not properly explained by the Accused.
29. When the Accused had not denied the signature in the unfilled cheque, it is treated as a bill of exchange thereby giving authorisation to the person to whom the cheque was handed over, to fill up the cheque and hand over the filled cheque to the holder of the cheque. Thus, even assuming that the cheque was unfilled but only signed, it duly authorise the holder to fill it up. Therefore, the Respondent/Accused cannot claim that the cheque in question is a self created document. The claim of the Accused that the private complaint is not at all maintainable as there is an arbitration clause in the 27/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 agreement is also not acceptable. If the agreement is insisted upon by the Accused, the Accused ought to have mentioned the name of the arbitrator to whom the matter is to be referred. When he received summons and appeared before the Court in the usual course, cause of action arises for entertaining the complaint. In any event, the Complainant issued statutory notice immediately after the cheque issued by the Respondent/Accused bounced. Therefore, after receipt of notice within 15 days, the accused should make arrangements for the amount covered in the cheque or seek time to pay the same within a specified period. In the absence of the same, the Complainant filed the complaint within the period specified under the Act.
30. During trial, the Respondent/Accused had not pleaded that as per the clause in the agreement between the Accused and Complainant, the dispute, if any, has to be referred to arbitration. The Respondent/Accused ought to have pressed for such a relief at the first instance. In this case, on the date of appearance before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court-III, Saidapet, the Respondent/Accused only claimed that he had not received the statutory notice before filing the Complaint and therefore, he was prejudiced in not being able to give reply to the statutory notice. If that is the defence, he ought to have on his first appearance before the Court, made a 28/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 mention and sought time for his response, before proceeding with the trial in the Court. In cases where the Accused evaded notice but appeared on service of summons, the Accused himself or herself has to invoke such a right to reply to the statutory notice by seeking time. In this case, without doing so, allowing the Court to proceed with the trial and then claimed that the learned trial Judge before taking cognizance of the offence failed to consider that there is no cause of action, in this case, for filing of a complaint as the statutory notice was not served on the Accused does not arise. Therefore, the plea of the Respondent/Accused that his valuable right to reply and respond to the statutory notice was lost cannot at all be accepted.
31. The learned Counsel appearing for the Accused cross-examined P.W-1 regarding the non-availability of the Accused in the address mentioned in the statutory notice for which the Complainant answered that the Accused had shifted his residence and his whereabouts are not known. Whereas on receipt of the summon sent to the Accused from the Court, he appeared and it shows that the answers given by the Complainant, as PW1, alone was considered by the Appellate Judge instead of considering the fact that the Accused had entered appearance, contested the case and now come up before the learned Appellate Judge seeking to set aside the Judgment of Conviction 29/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 on technicalities of law.
32. The Accused cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. The learned XVII Additional Sessions Judge, City Civil Court had reversed the finding of guilt recorded by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court-III on the ground that the statutory notice issued by the Complainant before lodging the Complaint was not served on the Accused as per the provision of the Sections 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Here, it is the contention of the learned Counsel for the Respondent that cognizance taken by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate is not proper as per the definition under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The said argument of the learned Counsel for the Respondent cannot at all be accepted. The Accused is aware that the cheques given by him had bounced and returned for insufficient funds. Being neighbours residing within the same compound in different blocks in different flats, the Complainant had informed the Accused of the same. Therefore, he was aware of every likelihood of the Complainant proceeding with a private complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. However, he had wantonly avoided receiving statutory notice from the Complainant.
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33. In the cross-examination of the Complainant as P.W-1 it was suggested that the notice was not served on the Accused to which the Complainant replied that notice was not served as he had evaded notice. That is why, he had examined the Post-Master for proper service. Further, P.W-1 stated that he did not know the whereabouts of the Accused as he had shifted his residence. Only in the Appeal, the learned Counsel for the Accused states that the Accused shifted to Madurai/his native place, without informing the Complainant. The Accused having shifted from Chennai to Madurai indicates that he had cleverly avoided receipt of the notice. In cases of this nature, when the Accused was unable to respond to the notice but appeared through counsel before the Court, then it is the duty of the Accused to claim that the notice was not served on him and seek time to respond to the notice. In such cases, the learned Metropolitan Magistrate is duty bound to grant 15 days time as per Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. On that score, the entire Judgment of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court cannot be set aside.
34. In cases of this nature, the Accused is very clever enough to act knowing the consequences of issuing cheques. The accused adopted all methods to defeat the purpose of the Parliamentary intent in enacting an 31/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 amendment to Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. As per the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of K. Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and another reported in AIR 1999 Supreme Court 3762 the Accused in cases of this nature tend to defeat the purpose of filing the Complaint. Such an Accused cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. Here, after the cheque was bounced, the Accused came to know about it and sought replacement with a new cheque. Still, he had not made arrangements for honouring the cheque from his Bank. Under those circumstances, the conduct of the Accused also has to be analysed from the facts and circumstances of this case. The Appellate Court was carried away by the arguments of the learned Counsel for the Appellant/Accused and had not analysed the conduct of the Accused before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court-III, Saidapet.
35. The rulings cited by the learned Counsel for the Respondent before this Court will not help his case. The conduct of the Accused is found condemnable in evading the due process of law when he claims that the address given in the statutory notice is his previous address and he had filed vakalat through Counsel wherein the address mentioned is the same. Also, in the Appeal ground before the learned XVII Additional Sessions Judge, he had 32/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 mentioned the same address and not the address given in Madurai. The address in the Appeal is same as stated by the Complainant before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court-III, Saidapet. However, the learned XVII Additional Sessions Judge, City Civil Court failed to consider those aspects and was carried away by the argument of the learned Counsel for the Appellant/Accused that the cause of action had not arisen as per Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Therefore, the Judgment of the Appellate Court is found perverse in the light of the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as well as the facts and circumstances arising from this case.
36. The Accused is alleged to have made representation to his neighbour a retired Police Official to invest money in his business of package drinking water and entered into an agreement according to which the complainant is to invest a sum of Rs.2,00,000/- and in return the Accused agreed to pay Rs.10,000/- per month to the Complainant. He had also entered into a Memorandum of Understanding claiming that when dispute arises, an arbitrator is to be appointed. Here, a dispute arose. Before proceeding with the complaint, he had shifted his residence without informing the Complainant. Therefore, he cannot be permitted to take shelter under the Memorandum Of 33/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 Understanding between the Complainant and the Accused to refer the dispute to arbitration. If that was the case, he had time before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court-III, Saidapet before whom he entered appearance through Counsel. If what had been stated by the Accused was true that notice was not served on him, he should be given a chance to respond to the notice. The date of appearance on summons before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court-III is to be treated as notice served. Then, it is for him to seek time to respond to the notice making a mention to the learned Metropolitan Magistrate. If he insisted on an appointment of Arbitrator as per the Memorandum of Understanding between him and the Complainant, he should have verified with the Complainant and his Counsel and sought appointment of an Arbitrator as per the Memorandum Of Understanding between them. He did not adopt those methods before commencement of trial. After suffering a conviction, when he approached the Appellate Court with an Appeal, at least before the Appellate Court, he should have made a mention to refer the dispute to arbitration. He had not done so before the Appellate Court also. His only attempt was to defeat the purpose of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Therefore, he cannot be heard to claim that the complaint itself is not maintainable as there is no cause of action. The Judgment of the learned XVII Additional Sessions Judge, City Civil Court 34/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 reversing the finding of guilt recorded by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court is therefore found to be perverse and it is liable to be set aside.
37. In the light of the above discussions, the Point for Consideration is answered in favour of the Complainant/Appellant and against the Respondent/Accused before this Court. The Judgment of acquittal dated 03.03.2018 recorded by the learned XVI Additional Sessions Judge holding full additional charge of the learned XVII Additional Sessions Judge, City Civil Court in C.A.No.190 of 2016 is found perverse and the same is to be set aside and the Judgment of conviction recorded by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court – III, Saidapet, in C.C.No.135 of 2007, dated 09.06.2016 is to be restored.
In the result, this Criminal Appeal is allowed. The Judgment of acquittal dated 03.03.2018 recorded by the learned XVI Additional Sessions Judge holding full additional charge of the learned XVII Additional Sessions Judge, City Civil Court in C.A.No.190 of 2016 is set aside and the Judgment of Conviction recorded by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court – III, Saidapet, in C.C.No.135 of 2007, dated 09.06.2016 is restored. 35/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 The learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court – III, Saidapet is directed to issue warrant in continuation of Judgment recorded by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, to secure the Accused. The Complainant is within his discretion to take action to recover the sum of Rs.2,00,000/- through filing Execution Petition before the City Civil Court or filing such application before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court as per law.
02.06.2025 dh Index: Yes/No Internet: Yes/No Speaking Order/Non-speaking Order 36/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 To
1. The Metropolitan Magistrate, Fast Track Court – III, Saidapet.
2. The XVII Additional Sessions Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai.
3. The Section Officer, Criminal Section, High Court Madras.
37/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm ) Crl.A. No.736 of 2018 SATHI KUMAR SUKUMARA KURUP, J dh Judgment made in Crl.A.No.736 of 2018 02.06.2025 38/38 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis ( Uploaded on: 16/07/2025 05:21:33 pm )