Karnataka High Court
Smt. Sangeeta W/O. Mahanteshwara ... vs Mahanteshwara S/O. Basappa Hosamani on 30 May, 2022
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RPFC No. 100062 of 2017
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 30th DAY OF MAY, 2022
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE E.S.INDIRESH
REV.PET FAMILY COURT NO. 100062 OF 2017 (-)
BETWEEN:
SMT. SANGEETA W/O. MAHANTESHWARA HOSAMANI,
AGE: 37 YEARS, OCC: HOUSEHOLD WORK,
R/O: CLO. HEMANNA PADIYAPPA NAGAMMANAVAR,
PUROHIT NAGAR, HOUSE NO.2,
KALGHATGI ROAD,
DHARWAD.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. S.B.DODDEGOUDA, ADVOCATE FOR
SMT. SUMANGALA A CHAKALABBI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
MAHANTESHWARA S/O. BASAPPA HOSAMANI,
VN AGE: 42 YEARS, OCC: DTP OPERATOR,
BADIGER
R/O: GAJENDRAGAD, TQ: RON,
Digitally signed DIST: GADAG.
by V N BADIGER
Date: 2022.06.02
11:27:01 +0530
...RESPONDENT
(SRI. N.R.KUPPELUR, ADVOCATE FOR
SRI. S.S.KOLIWAD, ADVOCATEADVOCATE)
THIS RPFC FILED UNDER SEC.19(4) OF THE FAMILY COURT
ACT, 1984, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER DTD:31.03.2017,
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RPFC No. 100062 of 2017
IN CRL.MISC. NO.135/2014, ON THE FILE OF THE PRINCIPAL JUDGE,
FAMILY COURT, DHARWAD, DISMISSING THE PETITION FILED
UNDER SEC.125 OF CR.P.C.
THIS PETITO N C OMING O N FOR FINAL HEA RING
THIS DAY, THE COURT MA DE THE FOLLOWI NG:
ORDER
1. In this petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 31/3/20217 passed in Crl.Misc. No.135/2014 on the file of the Family Court, Dharwad, dismissing the petition.
2. The relevant facts for the adjudication of the petition are that the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 26/5/2009 at Ron. It is further stated in the claim petition that the petitioner was not taken care of by the respondent and due to the harassment meted out from the respondent, the petitioner has left the matrimonial home and started residing with her parents. Accordingly, the petitioner has filed Crl.Misc.
No.135/2014 before the Family Court, Dharwad seeking maintenance under Section 125 of Cr.P.C.
-3- RPFC No. 100062 of 20173. On receipt of summons, the respondent entered appearance and resisted the petition. To prove the case, the petitioner was examined as PW.1 and produced 11 documents which were marked as Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.11. On the other hand, respondent examined two witnesses as RW.1 and 2 and produced 14 documents which were marked as Ex.R.1 to Ex.R.14. The family Court, after considering the material on record, by order dated 31/3/2017 rejected the petition. Feeling aggrieved by the same, petitioner has presented this petition.
4. I have heard Sri.S.B. Doddegouda, learned counsel on behalf of Smt.Sumngala A Chaklabbi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri.N.R.Kuppellur, learned counsel on behalf of Sri.S.S.Koliwad, learned counsel for the respondent.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that, the Family Court rejected the petition based on the ground that the petitioner has refused to reside in the matrimonial home and she is qualified to eke -4- RPFC No. 100062 of 2017 out her livelihood, are incorrect. He further contended that the Family Court has not properly appreciated the material on record. Accordingly, the learned counsel for the petitioner sought for interference of this Court.
6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondent sought to justify the impugned order passed by the Family Court. He further contended that the Family Court, taking into consideration the material on record, has rightly rejected the petition which does not call for interference in this petition.
7. I have carefully considered the reasons assigned by the Principal Judge, Family Court. The undisputed facts of the case are that the petitioner and the respondent are the husband and wife and their marriage was solemnized on 26/5/2009. Perusal of the impugned order would indicate that the petitioner had serious medical aliments and in this regard she had taken treatment. I have also noticed that the petitioner herein was working as teacher at St. John's Primary School for few days and thereafter, she left the job -5- RPFC No. 100062 of 2017 and residing with her parents. Perusal of para 12 of the impugned order would indicate that the petitioner was seriously ill and had taken treatment at KLE Hospital, Belagavi with regard to multiple organ failure.
8. In the light of the factual aspects of the case as well as the scope and ambit of Section 125 of Cr.P.C., it is useful to refere to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Smt. Sudha Devi and another V/s. State of UP, reported in, 2015 Cri. L.J.3339, wherein at Paragrahs No. 14, 15 it is held as under:
"14. Now it may not be out of place to extract the relevant section of 125(2) of Cr.P.C. herein below :-
"125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents.-(2) Any such allowance for the maintenance or interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance or interim maintenance and -6- RPFC No. 100062 of 2017 expenses of proceeding, as the case may be."
15. As is obvious that the aforesaid section does not contain any such requirement that the reasons ought to be accorded or assigned by the court while directing the maintenance to be paid from the date of application, there is no reason to read in the section something which is not written there. At several places in several sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure there is a statutory mandate to record the reasons while adopting a particular course which a court may deem fit to adopt. There is no reason to attribute negligence or ignorance to the wisdom of the legislature. If the legislation in its wisdom has not chosen to lay down condition or has not chosen to mandate a certain course or modality to be adopted while doing something, then the language of the statutes ought not to be strained or tortured to give out to a particular meaning or a particular interpretation. Such a construction will be all the more bad if it leads to the disadvantage of one for whose benefit the legislation has -7- RPFC No. 100062 of 2017 been brought in existence and the statute enacted. The very object of introducing Section 125 of Cr.P.C. has been to save the vagrancy of destitute wives who had been suffering neglect at the hands of their husbands who were under the legal as well as moral obligation to maintain their wives and children. It appears that the two phrases used in Section 125 of Cr.P.C. that, "from the date of order, or, if so ordered from the date of the application", might have been aimed to indicate a guiding presumption for those cases where it may not have been specifically mentioned in the judgment as to from which date the amount of maintenance shall be payable. If in a given case the court simply passes the order that certain amount is to be paid to the wife and it has not been made explicit or express in the order as to from which date it shall be payable it shall be then presumed that the husband shall be liable to pay the amount of maintenance from the date of the order. But, if the court specifically orders the payment from the date of the order, there is no need entering in any presumption. That's why the -8- RPFC No. 100062 of 2017 legislation in its wisdom seems to have used the particular phraseology in the sub-section which it did. If a court wants to make the husband liable to pay the amount of maintenance from the date of institution of the suit it is always open for the court to do so and it will have to make an order to that effect also. The use of the word, "if so ordered" does not indicate anything more. To impute any interpretation to the sub-section which makes it a legal requirement to assign reasons before making an order in the event of fixing up the amount of maintenance from the date of application is, in the view of this Court, not a very sound interpretation. With greatest respect to the views expressed by the Hon'ble Judges in the aforesaid judgments, this Court has not been able to persuade itself to agree with the same. The Division Bench decision given in Jagat Narain's case too has a binding effect on the Benches of lesser strength, and even in that view of the matter also this Court adopts the same view."
-9- RPFC No. 100062 of 20179. In the light of the law laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court with regard to scope and ambit of Section 125 of Cr.P.C., I am of the view that the reasons assigned by the Prl Judge, Family Court is incorrect in dismissing the petition on the ground that the petitioner is a MA. BEd.
Graduate; is having immovable property at Dharwad, are not the basis for rejection of the petition and in that view of the matter, I am of the view that the petition requires reconsideration by learned Prl. Judge, Family Court.
In the light of the observation made above, I pass the following:
ORDER
1. The Revision Petition is allowed;
2. Order dated 31/3/2017 in Crl. Misc. No.135/ 2014 by the Prl. Judge, Family Court, Dharwad is set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Family Court, Dharwad for fresh consideration, after affording opportunity of hearing on both the sides;
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RPFC No. 100062 of 20173. In order to avoid further delay in the matter, parties are directed to appear before the Family Court, Dharwad on 16/6/2022 without awaiting for the notice from the concerned Family Court;
4. Learned Family Judge is directed to dispose of the petition within six months from the date of the receipt certified copy of this order;
5. It is made clear that Prl. Judge, Family Court shall not be influenced by the observations made by this Court in this order.
Sd/-
JUDGE Vb/-