Delhi District Court
Sh. Laxmi Narain vs Radha Parihar on 29 January, 2019
Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
IN THE COURT OF SH. G. N. PANDEY
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE (NE)
KARKARDOOMA COURTS, DELHI
RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18
RCA DJ No. 56/18
IN THE MATTER OF :
Sh. Laxmi Narain
S/o Late Sh. Babu Lal
R/o A29, Gali No. 4,
West Karawal Nagar,
Delhi94
.......Appellant
VERSUS
Radha Parihar
w/o Satpal
R/o K94, Karawal Nagar,
Delhi94
......Respondent
Date of Institution of Appeal : 08.06.2018 Arguments heard on : 29.01.2019 Date of Judgment/Order : 29.01.2019 Decision : Appeal is allowed with costs RCA DJ No. 68/18 IN THE MATTER OF : Sh. Laxmi Narain S/o Late Sh. Babu Lal R/o A29, Gali No. 4, West Karawal Nagar, Delhi94 .......Appellant RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 1 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
VERSUS
1. Kala Devi w/o Late Mool Chand R/o H. No. 3147, Lal Darwaja, Sita Ram Bazar, Delhi06
2. Bhuley S/o Late Lakhi Singh R/o K94, Parihar Gali, Karawal Nagar, Delhi94
3. Satpal S/o Bhuley Singh
4. Radha Parihar w/o Satpal Both R/o K94, Karawal Nagar, Delhi94 ......Respondent Date of Institution of Appeal : 26.07.2018 Arguments heard on : 29.01.2019 Date of Judgment/Order : 29.01.2019 Decision : Appeal is allowed with costs J U D G M E N T
1. By this common judgment, following two regular civil appeals are disposed off:
(i) RCA DJ No. 56/18 titled as Laxmi Narain V/s Radha Parihar
(ii) RCA DJ No. 68/18 titled as Laxmi Narain V/s Kala Devi & Ors.
2. The appeal bearing RCA No. 56/18 titled Laxmi Narain V/s Radha Parihar impugns the judgment and decree dated 22.05.2018 passed by Ld. JSCC/ASCJ/GJ (NE), Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in suit No. 104571/15 whereby the suit for permanent injunction filed by Smt. Radha Parihar RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 2 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
against the appellant / defendant was decreed ; and The second appeal bearing RCA No. 68/18 titled Laxmi Narain V/s Kala Devi & Ors impugns the judgment and decree dated 10.05.2018 passed by Ld. JSCC/ASCJ/ GJ (NE), Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in suit No. 105136/15 whereby the suit for permanent injunction, mandatory injunction and declaration filed by Laxmi Narain against the defendants was dismissed.
3. Plaintiff Smt. Radha Parihar filed one suit for permanent injunction against defendant Sh. Laxmi Narain praying to restrain the defendants, agents, associates, attorney etc from illegally dispossessing the plaintiff and from interfering in the construction raised by the plaintiff in the property bearing No. 29, out of Khasra No. 17/18, situated at Gali No. 4, Som Bazar, Karawal Nagar, Delhi admesuring 50 Sq. yards ( hereinafter called the suit property).
The suit is filed contending that Sh. Laxmi Narain purchased 100 Sq. yards of the aforesaid property from Bhuley on 01.06.1987 vide GPA, agreement to sell, receipt and will and Laxmi Narain disposed of 50 Sq. yards to Smt. Kala Devi (sister of Sh. Laxmi Narayan) on 26.07.1996 for Rs. 18,000/ to further sold to Satpal S/o Sh. Bhuley Singh for Rs. 6,00,000/ through GPA, agreement to sell, will, receipt, possession letter and affidavit. Sh. Satpal thereafter transferred the property in favour of plaintiff Smt. Radha Parihar vide registered GPA dt. 18.03.2011, gift deed and possession letter.
The plaintiff claimed to be in possession of the suit property. As the defendant interfere in the construction of the suit property by the plaintiff, the complaint was made to local police and as no steps was taken, plaintiff RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 3 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
filed the suit for permanent injunction.
4. The defendant Sh. Laxmi Narain filed written statement claiming that the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the suit ; her possession was denied alongwith transaction in question from Smt. Kala Devi claiming that the suit is filed on the basis of forged and fabricated documents. It is further contended that suit is filed in collusion with Kala Devi to grab the property which was purchased by him from Bhule Singh. It is further contended that Kala Devi being real sister of defendant was handed over the original documents of the property on the pretext of safe keeping and Kala Devi in collusion with Bhule Singh forged and fabricated of the document on the basis of which, the suit is filed.
The defendant Laxmi Narain also filed other suit titled Laxmi Narain V/s Kala Devi & Ors for permanent, mandatory injunction and declaration on the averments as claimed in the WS.
5. The appellant has preferred the instant appeals on the ground that the impugned judgment and decree dated 10.05.2018 and 22.05.2018 are not sustainable in law and facts and is passed without application of judicial mind. It is further contended that the judgment is not passed on the basis of the admitted facts and the judgment suffers from illegality and infirmity. As mentioned, the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate the correct facts and contradictions. It is further mentioned that the finding of Ld. Trial Judge regarding the suit filed without any cause of action is not supported with the records. Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate the facts in proper perspective and reached to wrong conclusion ; Ld. Trial Judge has not applied his mind and disposed off the suits without following due process of law and considering the relevant aspects. These appeals are filed praying RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 4 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
to set aside the impugned judgments.
6. Along with the appeal, the appellant has filed an application U/s 5 of Limitation Act seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal on the ground detailed in the application. It is contended that the counsel of the appellant could not file the appeal on time and therefore the appellant should not suffer. It is further mentioned that the delay in filing the appeal is neither intentional nor deliberate and it is prayed that the application be allowed and delay in filing the appeal may be condoned.
7. The application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal is replied by the respondents whereby the averments in the application is denied with prayer to dismissed the application as well as appeal on the ground of delay.
8. I have heard the arguments in both the appeals addressed by Ld. Counsel for appellant and respondents. I have also gone through the written arguments filed on behalf of appellant and brief points of argument filed on behalf of respondents.
9. I have given my thoughtful considerations to the submissions made on behalf of the parties and gone through the trial court records.
10. Before disposing of appeal, I propose to adjudicate upon the application of the appellant U/s 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. The Ld. Counsel for the respondent denied the contentions and prayed to dismiss the appeal being barred by limitation and without any merit.
11. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 contained the provision regarding the condonation of delay in filing the appeal which is reproduced RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 5 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
herein for reference: Section5 Extension of prescribed period in certain cases Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ( 5 of 1908) may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.
Explanation The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section.
12. The prescribed period of Limitation for filing the appeal is 30 days from the date of the decree or order. Under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the delay in filing the appeal may be condoned and an appeal may be admitted after the prescribed period of the limitation if the appellant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period.
13. It is well settled principle of law that while dealing an application for condonation of delay in filing appeal, the court shall adopt liberal approach and the expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the live purpose for existence of RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 6 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
the institution of the courts and in this regard the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag vs. Mst. Katiji AIR 1987 SUPREME COURT1353 can be referred to and para 3 of the judgment reads as under: "The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 "Any appeal or any application,other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Civil Procedure Code,1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression "sufficient cause"employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters, instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:
Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 7 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
lodging an appeal late. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay every second's delay ? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other,cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a nondeliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."
14. In this regard another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani AIR 1996 1623 is also relevant for reference and para no. 6 and 7 of the judgment read as under:
RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 8 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
"6. In O.P Kathpalia v.Lakhmir Singh (dead), (1984) 4 SCC 66 : (AIR 1984 SC 1744), a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay.Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107 : (AIR 1987 SC 1353), a Bench of two Judges considered the question of the limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the Court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression "sufficient cause" is adequately elastic to enable the Court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of the justice that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression "every day's delay must be explained' does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 9 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise justice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justiceoriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before the law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note making, fileushing, RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 10 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
and passingontheuck ethos, delay on its part is less ifficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represent collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigantongrata status. The Courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay was accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Smt. Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra, (1987) Supp SCC 338 : (AIR 1987SC1726), this Court had held that the Court should not adopt an injustice oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law."
15. This court is required to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice, which is the life purpose for existence of the court. In the facts and circumstances of the case and to do substantial justice between the parties, as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mst. Katiji's case (supra) and Chandra Mani's case (supra), the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal U/s 5 of Limitation Act is hereby RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 11 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
allowed and the delay in filing the appeal is condoned.
16. To appreciate the rival contentions of the parties, it is necessary to refer relevant provisions of law of Specific Relief Act, 1963 which is as below:
34. Discretion of court as to declaration of status or right Any person entitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any property, may institute a suit against any person denying, or interested to deny, his title to such character or right, and the court may in its discretion make therein a declaration that he is so entitled, and the plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief:
Provided that no court shall make any such declaration where the plaintiff, being able to seek further relief that a mere declaration of title, omits to do so.
35. Effect of declaration. A declaration made under this chapter is binding only on the parties to the suit, persons claiming through them respectively, and, where any of the parties are trustees, on the persons for whom, if in existence at the date of declaration, such parties would be trustees.
38. Perpetual injunction when granted (1) Subject to the other provisions contained in or referred to by this Chapter, a perpetual injunction may be granted to the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 12 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
existing in his favour, whether expressly or by implication.
39. Mandatory injunction When, to prevent the breach of an obligation, it is necessary to compel the performance of certain acts which the court is capable of enforcing, the court may in its discretion grant an injunction to prevent the breach complained of, and also to compel performance of the requisite act.
17. Section 38 of Specific Relief Act enables the court to grant perpetual injunction to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in favour of applicant, whether expressed or implied. Meaningly, the question is to be examined as to whether there exists an obligation in favour of the applicant and if the answer is in affirmative and the case falls within the ambit of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act an injunction cannot be granted. It is also necessary to mention that rights and obligations are corollary each other and the right places a correspondence duty also for its existence. The injunction is a discretionary relief and its grant of refusal depends upon the circumstances and facts of a particular case. The discretion has to be reasonable guided by judicial principles and law. It must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful. Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act enumerates the cases where an injunction will be denied.
18. As held in JT 1994 (6) SC 588 , interest of right not shown to be in existence cannot be protected by injunction. Issuance of order of an injunction is absolutely discretionary and equitable relief. In a given set of facts, injunction may be given to protect the possession of the owner or RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 13 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
person in lawful possession. It is not mandatory that for mere asking such relief should be given. Injunction is a personal right under Section 41 (j) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the plaintiff must have personal interest in the matter. The interest or right not shown to be in existence cannot be protected by injunction.
19. As held in M. P. Mathur Vs. DTC, AIR 2007 SC 414, the discretion under the Section which the court has to exercise is a judicial discretion and has to be exercised on well settled principles. The court has to consider as the nature of the obligation in respect of which performance is sought, circumstances under which the decision came to be made, the conduct of the parties and the effect of the court granting the decrees. The court has to look at the contract and ascertain as to whether there exists an element of mutuality in the contract. Further, as held in American Express Time Vs. Kolkata Steel Company, (1993) 2 SCC 199 , the grant or refusal of relief of declaration and injunction under provisions of Section 34 is discretionary and the plaintiff cannot claim the relief as of right. It has to be granted according to sound principles of law and ex debito justitial.
20. It is well settled that a suit has to be tried on the basis of the pleadings of the contesting parties which is filed in the suit before the trial court in the form of plaint and written statement and the nucleus of the case of the plaintiff and the contesting case of the defendant in the form of issues emerges out of that. Being a civil suit for partition, this suit is to be decided on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. As held in Raj Kumar Singh & Anr. Vs. Jagjit Chawla, reported in 183 (2011) DLT 418, "A civil case is decided on balance of probabilities. In the case of Vishnu Dutt Sharma Vs. Daya Sapra, reported in (2009) 13 SCC 729, the Hon'ble RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 14 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
Supreme Court was pleased to observe as under:
'' 8. There cannot be any doubt or dispute that a creditor can maintain a civil and criminal proceedings at the same time. Both the proceedings, thus, can run parallel. The fact required to be proved for obtaining a decree in the civil suit and a judgment of conviction in the criminal proceedings may be overlapping but the standard of proof in a criminal case visavis a civil suit, indisputably is different. Whereas in a criminal case the prosecution is bound to prove the commission of the offence on the part of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt, in a civil suit " preponderance of probability"
would serve the purpose for obtaining a decree".
21. Section 101 of the Evidence Act, 1872 defines " burden of proof"
and laid down that the burden of proving a fact always lying upon the person who asserts the facts. Until such burden is discharged, the other party is not required to be called upon to prove his case. The court has to examine as to whether the person upon whom the burden lies has been able to discharge his burden. Until he arrives at such conclusion, he cannot proceed on the basis of weakness of other party. In view of Section 103 of Evidence Act, the burden of proof as to any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to believe in its existence, unless it is provided by any law that the proof of that fact shall lied on any particular person. Further, Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act contained that no fact need to be proved in any proceedings which parties thereto or their agents agree to admit at the herein, or which, before the hearing, they agree RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 15 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
to admit by any writing under their hands or which by any rule of pleadings enforce at the time they are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings.
22. There is no admission regarding the facts by any of the parties. Plaintiff Smt. Radha Parihar filed the suit for permanent injunction for restraining the defendant Laxmi Narain ( Original owner through whom the ownership is transferred). Before proceeding, it is necessary to note that the suit property in dispute is a vacant plot and dispute started when the construction was started by Smt Radha Parihar and therefore the suit for permanent injunction was filed. Thereafter the other suit for declaration, permanent and mandatory injunction was filed by Laxmi Narain against Radha Parihar & Ors.
23. The arguments of the appellant is that the respondents has no right title or interest in the suit property. Appellant undisputedly is the owner of the suit property as the defendant Smt. Radha Parihar is claiming right, title or interest through him only. After the appeal titled Laxmi Narain V/s Radha Parihar was filed, local commission was appointed to ascertain regarding the possession of the suit property i.e. 50 Sq. yards disputed property and local commissioner filed report whereby the appellant is in possession of entire 100 Sq. yards (including 50 % Sq. yards vacant suit property). The report of the local commissioner is not challenged at all by any of the parties. The contentions of the Ld. counsel for appellant regarding possession of the suit property appears to be sustainable as respondents has not filed any documents to show that they remained in possession of the suit property. Even otherwise, the suit property was a vacant plot and therefore the possession of such property goes only with the title in view of the judgment of Supreme Court reported as AIR 2008 SC RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 16 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
2033 wherein the scope of a suit for permanent injunction was examined by Hon'ble Supreme Court in detail and the position in regards to the suits for prohibitory injunction relating to immovable property is summarized as under:
(i) Where a cloud is raised over plaintiff's title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction is the remedy. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with plaintiff's lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simplicitor.
(ii) As a suit for injunction simplicitor is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on possession. But in cases where de jure possession has to be established on the basis of the title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession.
(iii) But a finding on title cannot be recorded in a suit RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 17 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
for injunction, unless there are necessary pleadings and appropriate issue regarding title ( either specific, or implied). Where the averments regarding title are absent in a plaint and where there is no issue relating to title, the Court will not investigate or examine orrender a finding on a wuestion of title, in a suit for injunction. Even where there are necessary pleadings and issue, if the matter involves complicated questions of fact and law relating to title, the Court will relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a suit for mere injunction.
(iv) Where there are necessary pleadings regarding title, and appropriate issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the matter involved is simple and straight forward, the court may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in a suit for injunction. But such cases, are the exception to the normal rule that question of title will not be decided in suits for injunction. But persons having clear title and possession suing for injunction, should not be driven to the costlier and more cumbersome remedy of a suit for declaration, merely because some meddler vexatiously or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to encroach RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 18 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
upon his property. The Court should use its discretion carefully to identify cases where it will enquire into title and cases where it will refer to plaintiff to a more comprehensive declaratory suit, depending upon the facts of the case.
It was further held while answering the scope of the suit for permanent injunction relating to immovable property, the general principles as to when a mere suit for permanent injunction will lie and when it is necessary to file a suit for declaration and/or possession with injunction as a consequential relief are well settled. It is mentioned: 11.1 Where a plaintiff is in lawful or peaceful possession of a property and such possession is interfered or threatened by the defendant, a suit for an injunction simplicitor will lie. A person has a right to protect his possession against any person who does not prove a better title by seeking a prohibitory injunction. But a person in lawful possession is not entitled to an injunction against the rightful owner.
11.2 Where the title of the plaintiff is not disputed, but he is not in possession, his remedy is to file a suit for possession and seek in addition, if necessary, an injunction. A person out of possession, cannot seek the relief of injunction simplicitor, without claiming the relief of possession.
11.3. Where the plaintiff is in possession but his entitled to the property in dispute, or under a cloud, or RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 19 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
where a defendant asserts a title thereto and there is also a threat of dispossession from defendant, the plaintiff will have to sue for declaration of title and the consequential relief of injunction. Where the title of the plaintiff is under a cloud or in dispute and he is not in possession or not able to establish possession, necessarily the plaintiff will have to file a suit for declaration, possession and injunction.
The ratio of the judgment is squarely applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case. The title of the appellant is admitted whereas the defendant has claimed the right on the basis of documents executed by appellant which are not sufficient to create right, title or interest therein.
24. The respondent / defendant Radha Parihar has claimed right, title or interest in the suit property on the basis of documents stated to be executed by Laxmi Narain in favour of Smt. Kala Devi who transferred the same to Satpal and consequently it was transferred to the defendant. It is further worth to note that in this case, the parties are related in some or other way as Kala Devi is sister of appellant Laxmi Narain and defendant Satpal as well as Radha Parihar is related to Smt Kala Devi. I have gone through the documents relied by Radha Parihar in support of claim regarding permanent injunction. The transfer of the documents in favour of Smt. Kala Devi is claimed on the basis of one GPA, agreement to sell, receipts, will all dt. 26.07.1996 and all these documents are merely notarized documents which are not sufficient to create right, title or interest in respect of the suit property in her favour. The possession of suit property was never handed RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 20 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
over to Kala Devi at all nor any document is placed on record. The subsequent document was executed by Kala Devi in favour of Satpal i.e. GPA, agreement to sell, will and possession letter and affidavit are also notarized only and therefore their effect to transfer the immovable property as per the provision of transfer property act is not sufficient. In nut shell, as Smt. Kala Devi herself has not been transferred the suit property nor have succeeded any right, title or interest therein, she had no right to transfer subsequently either to Satpal or to Smt. Radha Parihar. On the basis of the documents relied upon by respondent, respondent has by no stretch of imagination can be considered to be the owner of the suit property having right, title or interest in the same. It is reiterated that defendant did not produce any documents that she is in possession.
25. There is no dispute between the parties that appellant is the owner of the suit property as the respondent claimed right, title or interest through him only. The appellant categorically denied having sold the suit property to the respondent. The evidence of the parties led before Ld. Trial Court was somehow on the similar lines as contended in the plaint. Further the respondent failed to prove that she has purchased the suit property and received the possession. The ownership of the appellant is admitted by the respondent. As held in judgment reported as Uttam Chand Kothari Vs. Gauri Shankar Jalan, AIR 2007 Gau. 20, admission in the written statement cannot be allowed to be withdrawn impugned judgment therefore does not appears to be sustainable and the appellant is therefore entitled for the relief as prayed in the suit.
26. Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ( ' TP Act' for short) defines ' transfer of property' as under: RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 21 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
" 5. Transfer of Property defined: In the following sections " transfer of property " means an act by which a living person conveys property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself 9 for to himself) and one or more other living persons; and " to transfer property" is to perform such act." XXX XXX Further Section 54 of the TP Act defines ' sales' thus :
" Sale" is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or partpaid and partpromised.
Sale how made. Such transfer, in the case of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument.
In the case of tangible immovable property of a value less than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immovable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property.
Contract for sale. A contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 22 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
between the parties.
It does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property."
Section 53 A of the TP Act defines ' part performance ' thus :
" Part Performance. Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.
And the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and had done some act in furtherance of the contract.
And the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor b the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 23 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract:
Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof."
Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908: " 17. Documents of which registration is compulsory. (1) The following documents shall be registered, if the property to which they relate is situate in a district in which, and if they have been executed on or after the date on which, Act XVI of 1864, or the Indian Registration Act, 1866 ( 20 of 1866), or the Indian Registration Act, 1871 ( 8 of 1871), or the Indian Registration Act, 1877 ( 3 of 1877), or this Act came or comes into force, namely
(a) Instrument of gift of immovable property;
(b) other nontestamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish , whether in present or in future, any right, title or interest, whether vested or contingent, of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, to or in immovable property.
27. It is settled law that title of immovable property above the value of Rs. 100/ can only be transferred by way of a registered instrument as RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 24 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
prescribed Under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 and by way of documents of sale as recognized under Section 54 of the Transfer of the Property Act. As held in AIR 1969, SC 1316, the documents of which registration is necessary under the transfer of Property Act ( such as under
Section 54 of the TP Act) but not under the Registration Act fall within the scope of Section 49 of the Registration Act and if not registered are not admissible as evidence of any transaction of acting any immovable property comprise therein and do not affect any such immovable property.
28. As held in 128 (2006) DLT 407 (DB) titled M. L. Aggarwal Vs. Oriental Bank of Commerce & Ors, : " The petitioner has only produced an agreement to sell, will and a power of attorney and a receipt for payment of money but these in our opinion do not constitute a sale. Under Section 17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act, Sale of an immovable property can only be by a registered deed. In our opinion, the petitioner has no right, title or interest in the suit property as he has not purchased it by any registered sale deed. An immovable property cannot be purchased by a mere power of attorney or agreement to sell."
The ratio was further reiterated by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in AIR 2003, Delhi 120 titled G. Ram Vs. DDA wherein it is mentioned that transfer of immovable property can only be affected by executing a registered documents. Merely making an agreement of sale or execution of power of attorney could not transfer right, title or interest of any immovable property.
29. This court is guided in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suraj Lamps & Industries Pvt Limited versus State of Haryana & RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 25 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
Another, reported as 183 (2011) DLT 1 (SC) . As held, the document of title i.e. GPA , Agreement to Sell, Will and receipt would not confer ownership rights in respect of immovable property in his favour. Hon'ble Supreme court vide order dt. 15.05.09 reported as Suraj Lamps & Industries V/s State of Haryana, 2009(7) SCC (366) referred illaffects of GPA sells or sell agreement/ GPA/ will transfer holding that there cannot be sell by execution of power of attorney nor there can be transfer by execution on agreement to sell and power of attorney and will.
It is relevant and necessary to reproduce relevant paras of judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suraj Lamps ( supra) reported as Manu/SC/1222/2011 which read as under: Scope of an Agreement of Sell:
11. Section 54 of TP Act makes it clear that a contract of sale, that is, an agreement of sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. This Court in Narandas Karsondas V. S. A. Kamtam and Anr. (1977) 3 SCC 247, observed: "A contract of sale does not of itself create any interest in, or charge on, the property. This is expressly declared in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. See Rambaran Prasad Vs. Ram Mohit Hazra ( 1967) 1 SCR 293. The fiduciary character of the personal obligation created by a contract for sale is recognized in Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, contract for sale is recognized in Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and in Section 91 of the Trusts Act. The personal RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 26 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
obligation created by a contract of sale is described in Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act as an obligation arising out of contract and annexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein."
In India the word ' transfer' is defined with reference to the word ' convey'. The word ' conveys' in section 5 of Transfer of Property Act is used in the wider sense of conveying ownership........ ....... that only on execution of conveyance ownership passes from one party to another ..........."
In Rambhau Namdeo Gajre Vs. Narayan Bapuji Dhotra (2004) (8) SCC 614, this court held: " Protection provided under Section 53 of the Act to the proposal transferee is a shield only against the transferor. It disentitles the tranferor from disturbing the possession of the proposed transferee who is put in possession in pursuance to such an agreement. It has nothing to do with the ownership of the proposed transferor who remains full owner of the property till it is legally conveyed by executing a registered sale deed in favour of the transferee. Such a right to protect possession against the proposed vendor cannot be pressed in service against a third party"
RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 27 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
It is thus clear that a transfer of immoveable property by way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance ( sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance ( duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immovable property can be transferred.
12. Any contract of sale( agreement to sell) which is not a registered deed of conveyance ( deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of Section 54 and 55 of Transfer of Property Act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable property ( except to the limited right granted under Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act). According to Transfer of Property Act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession or without possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act enacts that sale of immovable property can be made only by a registered instrument and an agreement of sale does not create any interest or charge on its subject matter.
Scope of Power of Attorney
13.A power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer in regard to any right, title or interest in an immovable property. The power of attorney is creation of an agency whereby the grantor authorizes the grantee to do the acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor, which when executed will be binding on the grantor as if done by him( see section 1A and section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882). It is revocable or terminable at any time RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 28 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
unless it is made irrevocable in a manner known to law. Even an irrevocable attorney does not have the effect of transferring title to the grantee. In state of Rajasthan v. Basant Nehata MANU/SC/0547/2005 :
MANU/SC/0547/2005 : 2005 (12) SCC 77 this court held :
A grant of power of attorney is essentially governed by Chapter X of the Contract Act. By reason of a deed of power of attorney, an agent is formally appointed to act for the principal in one transaction or a series of transactions or to manage the affairs of the principal generally conferring necessary authority upon another person. A deed of power of attorney is executed by the Principal in favor of the agent. The agent derives a right to use his name and all acts, deeds and things done by him and subject to the limitations contained in the said deed, the same shall be read as if done by the donor. A power of attorney is, as is well known, a document of convenience.
Execution of a power of attorney in terms of the provisions of the Contract Act as also the Powers ofAttorney Act is valid. A power of attorney, we have noticed hereinbefore, is executed by the donor so as to enable the done to act on his behalf. Except in cases where power of attorney is coupled with interest, it is revocable. The done in exercise RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 29 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
of his power under such power of attorney only acts in place of the donor subject of course to the powers granted to him by reason thereof. He cannot use the power of attorney for his own benefit. He acts in a fiduciary capacity. Any act of infidelity or breach of trust is a matter between the donor and the donee.
An Attorney holder may however execute a deed of conveyance in exercise of the power granted under the power of attorney and convey title on behalf of grantor.
Scope of Will
14. A will is the testament of the testator.
It is a posthumous disposition of the estate of the testator directing distribution of his estate upon his death. It is not a transfer inter vivo. The two essential characteristics of a will are that it is intended to come into effect only after the death of the testator and is revocable at any time during the life time of the testator.
It is said that so long as the testator is alive, a will is not be worth the paper on which it is written, as the testator can at any time revoke it. If the testator, who is not married, marries after making the will, by operation of law, the will stands revoked. ( see Sections 69 and 70 of Indian RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 30 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
Succession Act, 1925). Registration of a will does not make it any more effective.
We therefore reiterate that immovable property can be legally and lawfully transferred/ conveyed only by a registered deed of conveyance. Transaction of the nature of 'GPA sales' or 'SA/GPA/WILL transfers' do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognized or valid mode of transfer of immovable property. The courts will not treat such transaction as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor create any interest in an immovable property. They cannot be recognized as deeds of title, except to the limited extent of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. Such transactions cannot be relied upon or made the basis for mutations in Municipal or Revenue Records. What is stated above will apply not only to deeds of conveyance in regard to freehold property but also to transfer of leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only under a registered Assignment of Lease. It is time that an end is put to the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/WILL transaction known as GPA sales.
30. A reference to the aforesaid paras shows that unless there is a proper registered sale deed, title of an immovable property does not pass. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has however reiterated that rights which are created pursuant to Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 dealing with the doctrine of part performance ( para 12), an irrevocable right of a person holding a power of attorney given for consideration coupled with interest as per Section 202 of the Contract Act, 1872( para RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 31 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
13) and devolution of interest pursuant to a will( para 14).The object of giving validity to a power of attorney given for consideration even after death of the executants is to ensure that entitlement under such power of attorney remains because the same is not a regular or a routine power of attorney but the same had elements of a commercial transaction which cannot be allowed to be frustrated on account of death of the executant of the power of attorney.
Therefore, no doubt, a person strictly may not have complete ownership rights unless there is a duly registered sale deed, however, certain rights can exist in an immovable property pursuant to the provisions of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, Section 202 of the Contract Act, 1872. There also takes place devolution of interest after the death of the testator in terms of a Will.
31. It is settled that ownership and possession are two entirely different concepts. It necessarily follows that it is not only possible but also permissible to transfer one without the other. In simple words it is permissible to transfer ownership without transferring possession. Similarly, it is also possible to transfer possession without transferring ownership. It is relevant to note here that in this case neither the ownership had been transferred nor possession of the suit property was ever handed over to the plaintiffs in pursuance of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act.
32. Section 27 of Indian Stamp Act, 1899 casts upon the party, liable to pay stamp duty, an obligation to set forth in the instrument all facts and circumstances which affects the chargeability of duty on that instrument. Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 makes deed of conveyance RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 32 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
compulsorily registrable. The transfer of an immovable property can only be by a deed of conveyance and in the absence of a deed of conveyance ( duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immovable property can be transfered. With regard to the legal validity of such documents i.e. agreement to sell, GPA, Will and receipt, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Suraj Lamps and Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana reported in AIR 2009 SC 3077 has held that such documents cannot create any right in respect of immovable property. The only way a contract of sale can create title to immovable property is by way of a deed of conveyance as defined under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and registered in pursuance of the provisions of Section 17 of The Registration Act, 1908. No such document has been executed in favour of respondent by appellant.
33. This Court is conscious of the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court in the case of Sh. Ramesh Chand Vs. Suresh Chand reported in 188 (2012) DLT 538 in which the judgment in the case of Suraj Lamps (supra) was interpreted. In the case of Ramesh Chand (supra) the Hon'ble High Court was pleased to hold that right to possess immovable property arises not only from a complete ownership right but also by having a better title.
34. As discussed, respondent cannot be considered as owner on the basis of the abovesaid documents i.e. GPA, agreement to sell, receipt etc. Even if the documents i.e. GPA, agreement to sell, receipt etc are accepted to be executed by appellant, they are not sufficient to confer the right, title or interest on the respondent in respect of the suit property.
I have gone through the section 17(1 A) of the registration Act, 1988 which is amended with effect from 24.09.01. It is reproduced herein for RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 33 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
reference: (1A) The documents containing contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property for the purpose of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882) shall be registered if they have been executed or or after the commecement of the Registration and other Related laws ( amendment) Act, 2001 and if such documents are not registered on or after such commencement, then, they shall have no effect for the purposes of the said section 53A} In view of the aforesaid provisions, the claim of the respondent having purchased the suit property from appellant appears to be baseless and have no defence. The contentions of respondent regarding the possession in view of the part performance of the agreement to sell have no merits. This court is further guided by judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court reported as 222 (2015) DLT 285 titled as Yashvir Singh Tomar V/s Dr. OP Kohli and others in this respect. As held in relevant para No. 4 and 5: " (4) By virtue of the amendment brought about to section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 w.e.f. 24.09.2001 by the Act 48 of 2001, an agreement to sell in the nature of part performance cannot create rights unless the agreement is registered and stamped at 90 % of the value of the sale deed as per Article 23 A of the Schedule 1 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 as applicable to Delhi which was accordingly amended by the Act 48 of 2001"
RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 34 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
" (5) In view of the above, since the Agreement to sell in question is an unregistered and unstamped Agreement to Sell, no rights can be claimed under the same. What cannot be directly done cannot be indirectly done and a power of attorney, merely because it is registered, will not confer rights in the nature of ownership in the property. I may note that in fact a power of attorney which effectively gives ownership right of the suit property by allowing the attorney to sell the immovable property by virtue of Article 48 (f) of the Indian Stamp Act as applicable to Delhi will have to have the same duty as a conveyance deed as per Article 23 of the Indian Stamp Act for the amount of consideration"
The ratio of the judgment is squarely applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. The respondent failed to prove regarding any transfer of property in his favour by appellant and his ownership as claimed in the plaint. Neither Section 53 A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 nor Section 202 of the Contract Act, 1872 is applicable for ownership of appellant and the law laid down the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) No. 13917 of 2009 titled as Suraj Lamp Industries Pvt. Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. also is squarely applicable in the facts of this case. In view of the aforesaid provisions of law, the claim of the respondent regarding ownership on the basis of unregistered / notarized agreement to sell, GPA etc is not sustainable. The contentions of the respondent accordingly appears to be totally shattered. Since there is no registered sale deed executed in favour of the respondent in respect of the suit property in accordance with provisions of Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 35 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
respondent is not the owner of the suit premises and the appellant is entitled for decree of permanent, mandatory injunction and declaration as prayed in the suit.
35. I have gone through the judgment reported as (2003) 8 SCC 752. As held: Whether a civil or a criminal case, the anvil of testing of " proved", " disproved" and " not proved" as defined in Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is one and the same. It is the valuation of the result drawn by the applicability of the rule contained in Section 3 of the Evidence Act, 1872 that makes the difference. In a suit for possession of property based on title, if the plaintiff creates a high degree of probability of his title to ownership, instead of proving his title beyond any reasonable doubts, that would be enough to shift the onus on the defendant. If the defendant fails to shift back the onus, the plaintiffs burden of proof would stand discharged so as to amount to proof of the plaintiff's title. The present case being a civil one, the plaintiff could not be expected to prove his title beyond any reasonable doubt; a high degree of probability lending assurance of the availability of title with him would be enough to shift the onus the plaintiff's burden of proof can safely be deemed to have been discharged. In the opinion of this Court the plaintiff has succeeded in shifting the onus on the defendant and therefore, the burden of proof which RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 36 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
lay on the plaintiff had stood discharged.
In view of the ratio of this judgment, this court is of the considered view that the plaintiff / appellant Laxmi Narain has proved his case and discharged the onus. Plaintiff / appellant Laxmi Narain is therefore entitled for the relief in suit No. 105136/15
36. The impugned judgment and decree dt. 10.05.2018 and 22.05.2018 suffers from illegality and infirmity and therefore cannot be upheld and is liable to be set aside. This court does not finds itself in consonance with the findings of Ld. Trial Judge. The impugned judgment and decree dated 10.05.2018 and 22.05.2018 appears to be not sustainable in view of the aforesaid discussions and findings. Both the appeals are accordingly allowed with costs and resultantly the impugned judgment and decree dated 10.05.2018 and 22.05.2018 are set aside and plaintiff / appellant Laxmi Narain is entitled for the following reliefs: RELIEF :
37. In view of the aforesaid discussions and findings, this court is of the considered opinion that plaintiff / appellant Laxmi Narain has proved his case and he is entitled to the following relief:
(i) Decree of permanent injunction is passed in favour of plaintiff Laxmi Narain and against the defendants. Defendants, their agents, servants and associates are restrained from interfering in the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the whole suit property i.e. A 29, Gali No. 4, West Karawal Nagar, Delhi94 comprising in 100 Sq. Yards (situated in the Khasra No. 17/18 of the area of Karawal Nagar, Delhi).
(ii) Decree of mandatory injunction is passed in favour of the plaintiff Laxmi Narain and against the defendant No. 1, attorneys, representative, RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 37 of 38 Sh. G. N. Pandey, Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
agents etc. thereby directing the defendant No. 1 to return all the original titled documents of the suit property i.e. A29, Gali No. 4, West Karawal Nagar, Delhi94 executed in the name of plaintiff.
(iii) Decree of declaration is passed in favour of plaintiff Laxmi Narain and both the defendants and it is declared that the plaintiff is the absolute and rightful owner of the whole suit property i.e. A29, Gali No. 4, West Karawal Nagar, Delhi94 measuring 100 Sq. yards.
(iv) Further, decree of declaration is passed in favour of plaintiff Laxmi Narain and both the defendants and it is declared that any documents executed for the sale of the half portion of the suit property either by the defendant No. 1 or by the defendant No. 2 are null and void with regard to the ownership of the suit property i.e. A29, Gali No. 4, West Karawal Nagar, Delhi94.
(v) The appellant Laxmi Narain is also entitled for costs.
38. Copy of judgment be placed in both the civil appeals bearing RCA DJ No. 56/18 and 68/18. Decree sheet be drawn accordingly in both the civil appeals.
39. Files be consigned to record room after necessary compliance.
Digitally signed byGorakh Gorakh Nath Pandey Location: Court No.69, North East Nath District, Karkardooma Court, Announced in open Court Delhi on this 29th day of January, 2019 Pandey Date: 2019.01.29 16:47:07 +0530 G. N. Pandey Addl. District Judge (NE) Karkardooma Courts, Delhi RCA DJ Nos. 56/18 & 68/18 page 38 of 38