Allahabad High Court
Arun Sharma And Another vs State Of Up And Another on 5 July, 2024
Author: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
Bench: Saurabh Shyam Shamshery
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR Neutral Citation No. - 2024:AHC:108987 Reserved on : 01.07.2024 Delievered on : 05.07.2024 Court No. - 74 Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 9570 of 2024 Applicant :- Arun Sharma And Another Opposite Party :- State of U.P. and Another Counsel for Applicant :- Kunwar Ajay Singh,P.K. Singh Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Ritvik Upadhya And Case :- APPLICATION U/S 482 No. - 14404 of 2024 Applicant :- Vinod Sharma Opposite Party :- State of U.P. Counsel for Applicant :- Pratik Kumar,Surendra Kumar Srivastava Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A.,Ritvik Upadhya Hon'ble Saurabh Shyam Shamshery,J.
1. Heard Sri P.K. Singh and Sri Arvind Srivastava, Advocate holding brief of Sri Pratik Kumar, learned counsel for applicants and Sri V.K.Upadhya, Advocate assisted by Sri Ritvik Upadhya, learned counsel for O.P. No.2 and Mithilesh Kumar, learned A.G.A. for the State.
2. The applicants before this Court are aggrieved by impugned order dated 16.01.2024 passed by Metropolitan Magistrate, Kanpur Nagar under Section 204 Cr.P.C., whereby they have been summoned to face trial under Sections 406, 504 and 506 I.P.C. along with other co-accused.
3. Learned counsel for applicants vehemently submitted that they have no concerned with the firm M/s V & P Enterprises. It was earlier run by father of applicants and any outstanding out of any transaction with said firm, would not devolve upon the applicants. Learned counsels also submitted that contents of complaint, statements of complainant recorded under Section 200 and statement of witnesses recorded under Section 202 Cr.P.C. are even considered to be true, still ingredients of offences under Sections 406, 504 and 506 I.P.C. are not made out.
4. Learned counsels referred judgments passed by Supreme Court in Sarabjit Kaur Vs. The State of Punjab and Anr., (2023) 5 SCC 360, Vinod natesan Vs. State of Kerala and Ors., AIR 2019 Supreme Court 296 and Sudhapati Nageswara Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2012) 8 SCC 547 and relevant parts thereof are reproduced hereinafter :-
"1. Sarabjit Kaur Vs. The State of Punjab and Anr.
A breach of contract does not give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction. Merely on the allegation of failure to keep up promise will not be enough to initiate criminal proceedings. From the facts available on record, it is evident that the respondent No.2 had improved his case ever since the first complaint was filed in which there were no allegations against the appellant rather it was only against the property dealers which was in subsequent complaints that the name of the appellant was mentioned. On the first complaint, the only request was for return of the amount paid by the respondent No.2. When the offence was made out on the basis of the first complaint, the second complaint was filed with improved version making allegations against the appellant as well which was not there in the earlier complaint. The entire idea seems to be to convert a civil dispute into criminal and put pressure on the appellant for return of the amount allegedly paid. The criminal Courts are not meant to be used for settling scores or pressurise parties to settle civil disputes. Wherever ingredients of criminal offences are made out, criminal courts have to take cognizance. The complaint in question on the basis of which F.I.R. was registered was filed nearly three years after the last date fixed for registration of the sale deed. Allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of cess of the Court. process
2. Vinod natesan Vs. State of Kerala and Ors.
6. Having heard the appellant as party in person and the learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the original accused as well as the State of Kerala and considering the judgment and order passed by the High Court, we are of the opinion that the learned High Court has not committed any error in quashing the criminal proceedings initiated by the complainant. Even considering the allegations and averments made in the FIR and the case on behalf of the Appellant, it cannot be said that the ingredients of Sections 406 and 420 are at all satisfied. The dispute between the parties at the most can be said to be the civil dispute and it is tried to be converted into the criminal dispute. Therefore, we are also of the opinion that continuing the criminal proceedings against the Accused will be an abuse of process of law and, therefore, the High Court has rightly quashed the criminal proceedings. Merely because the original accused might not have paid the amount due and payable under the agreement or might not have paid the amount in lieu of one month Notice before terminating the agreement by itself cannot be said to be a cheating and/or having committed offence under Sections 406 and 420 of the IPC as alleged. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court.
3. Sudhapati Nageswara Rao Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh
7. In order to appreciate the above contentions, it is useful to refer the definition and punishment of criminal breach of trust and related provision provided under Sections 405, 406 and 409 Indian Penal Code which read as under-
"405. Criminal breach of trust. Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or willfully suffers any other person so to do, commits "criminal breach of trust".
406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust. Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.
409. Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent. - Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property in his capacity of a public servant or in the way of his business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
In order to prove the offence of criminal breach of trust which attracts the provision of Section 409 Indian Penal Code, the prosecution must prove that one who is, in any manner, entrusted with the property, in this case as a dealer of fair price shop, dishonestly misappropriates the property, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property. In other words, in order to sustain conviction under Section 409 Indian Penal Code, two ingredients are to be proved: namely, i) the accused, a public servant or a banker or agent was entrusted with the property of which he is duty bound to account for, and ii) the accused has committed criminal breach of trust. What amounts to criminal breach of trust is provided under Section 405 Indian Penal Code. The basic requirement to bring home the accusations under Section 405 are the requirements to prove conjointly i) entrustment and ii) whether the accused was actuated by dishonest intention or not, misappropriated it or converted it to his own use to the detriment of the persons who entrusted it."
5. The above submissions are opposed by Sri V.K. Upadhya, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Ritvik Upadhya, learned counsel for opposite party No.2/complainant and he submitted that on a similar circumstances, challenge to other criminal proceedings at behest of applicants were rejected by a judgment dated 22.12.2022 passed in Nitin Agarwal and another Vs. State of U.P. and another, application under Section 482 No.21126 of 2021, wherein ingredients of Section 405 were found to be exist and he referred following paragraphs of Nitin Agarwal and Another (supra) :-
"2. Learned counsel for applicants has referred to contents of F.I.R. as well as statement of complainant that there was a commercial transaction between applicants and complainant in regard to stainless steel materials in which complainant was vendor and applicants were vendee. Initially money was duly paid, however, later on it was not duly paid within time prescribed as well as interest of delayed payment was also not paid and finally outstanding amount was more than Rs. 1.83 crores.
3. Learned counsel also submitted that essential ingredients of Section 405 I.P.C. i.e. Criminal Breach of Trust are ;
(1) The accused must be entrusted with the property or with dominion over it, (2) The person so entrusted must use that property, or;
(3) The accused must dishonestly use or dispose of that property or wilfully suffer any other person to do so in violation,
(a) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or;
(b) of any legal contract made touching the discharge of such trust.
4. However, in present case, there was no entrustment of any property. Dispute was in regard to payment of material supplied and in case there is violation of condition of mutual agreement, remedy would lie by filing a civil suit not in launching a criminal proceedings.
5. Above submissions have been opposed by Sri Paritosh Kumar Malviya, learned A.G.A.-I for State and Sri V.K. Upadhyay, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Ritvik Upadhyay for opposite party no.2/complainant and submitted that in similar circumstance, Division Bench of this Court in case of Premchandra Singhal and 3 others vs. State of U.P. and 3 others, Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 7006 of 2017 decided on 09.03.2022 has rejected similar arguments that there were specific allegations that with a criminal intent, that accused has availed supply of goods or material on credit and have misappropriated it by utilising goods without paying amount and that there is no bar that criminal proceedings may go on simultaneously or if ingredients are present of alleged offence, criminal proceedings may not be quashed.
6. Learned Senior Advocate also placed reliance on Kamla Devi Agarwal vs. State of West Bengal and others, (2002) 1 SCC 555 that High Court should be slow in interfering with proceedings at initial stage and that merely because the nature of dispute is primarily of civil nature, the criminal prosecution cannot be quashed because in cases of forgery or fraud, there is always some element of civil nature. Further reliance was placed on R. Kalyani vs. Janak Mehta and others, (2009) 1 SCC 516; Kamlesh Kumari and others vs. State of U.P. and another, (2015) 13 SCC 689; V. Ravikumar vs. State, (2019) 14 SCC 568; Devendra Kumar Singla vs. Baldev Krishan Singla, (2005) 9 SCC 15; Rama Shankar Mishra vs. State of U.P. and 6 others, 2021 (8) ADJ 374 and Calicut Engineering Works (P) Ltd vs. Batlibol Ltd., 2007 (1) ICC 573.
7. It is well settled that given set of facts may make out a civil wrong as well a criminal offence also and only because a civil remedy may be available to complainant that it cannot be a ground to quash criminal proceedings. The relevant test would show whether allegations in complaint as well as evidence recorded during investigation discloses alleged criminal offence or not. (see Vesa Holdings Pvt. Ltd. and another vs. State of Kerala and others, (2015) 8 SCC 293 as well as Vijay Kumar Ghai (supra))
8. In above background on law and facts, I have carefully perused contents of F.I.R. as well as statement recorded during investigation. It was a consistent case of complainant that there were commercial transactions between complainant firm with prior condition that if payment is not made within 15 days of supply of goods by applicants' firm, the applicants' firm is to pay amount with 24% interest. Initially, transactions were smooth, however, it was alleged that with dishonest intention, material was procured by applicants' firm but neither amount was paid within 15 days nor 24% interest was paid after expiry of 15 days. During proceedings before this Court, a proposal was given to settle dispute by paying accepted amount by applicants, however, it was not materialized.
9. In order to consider whether basic ingredients of Section 406 I.P.C. as referred above are made out or not, the Court has to scrutinize whether any property was entrusted upon applicants by complainant. It is not seriously disputed that stainless steel material was supplied by complainant firm which was received by applicants firm.
10. During investigation, ledger has been brought on record in order to show outstanding amount to be paid by applicants firm to complainant firm. Word used in Section 405 I.P.C. includes that "in any manner entrustment with property" which may include a property given in commercial transaction especially when it was on basis of credit and ownership will be transferred only when amount of property is paid in accordance with terms of agreement, as in present case, with 24% interest in case amount is not paid within time prescribed.
11. Facts also disclose that material has not been returned to complainant and it has been used by applicants firm. Applicants have dishonestly used property in violation of legal contract between parties, therefore, essential ingredients of Section 405 I.P.C. i.e. "there is enstrustment of property, a person so entrusted has used property in violation of legal contract" and since essential ingredients are made out prima facie, therefore, present case would not fall under category of a case where it does not disclose any criminal offence.
12. The inherent powers of this Court are very wide, however, it can be exercised in sparingly and it cannot be used to cause sudden death of a criminal proceedings, especially when ingredients of offence alleged are prima facie made out. Inherent powers cannot be used to throttle any legitimate prosecution. "
6. Heard counsel for parties and perused the record.
7. Before adverting with rival submissions, the relevant part of complaint, statements recorded under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. as well as impugned order are reproduced hereinafter :-
"बयान अंतर्गत धारा 200 Crpc नाम- राहुल सूद पुत्र स्व० हरमेश चंद सूद, उम्र-52 वर्ष निवासी- 7/115, टेंपल टावर, फ्लेट - 104, स्वरूप नगर, कानपुर, थाना- स्वरूप नगर, पेशा- व्यापार, सशपथ ब्यान किया कि मैने डॉक्ट्रेट तक पढ़ाई पूर्ण कर रखी है। मै रिमझिम इस्पाल प्राईवेट लिमिटेड़ में डाईरेक्टर के पद पर कार्यरत हूँ। विपक्षीगण विनोद शर्मा, अरूण शर्मा, मुन्नी शर्मा, रितु शर्मा, राशि शर्मा मेरे फर्म के ग्राहक 2018-19 के मध्य बने थे। मेरी फर्म स्टील रोड़स बनाने का कार्य करती है। विपक्षीगण द्वारा जनवरी 2019 को मुझे 85 मिट्रिक टन स्टील (SS) रोड सप्लाई भेजने का काम सौपा था। जिसकी कुल कीमत मु. 1,32,18,000/- रूपये थी। विपक्षीगण द्वारा उक्त कीमत बैंक ट्रास्फर द्वारा चुकाई जानी थी। पूर्व में खरीदा गये माल का भुगतान विपक्षीगण द्वारा किया जा चुका था जिसमें से केवल मु०. 92,000/- रू० बकाया था। दि. 18.02.2019 को भेजे गए माल का आखिरी भुगतान विपक्षीगण द्वारा मुझे बैंक ट्रांस्फर द्वारा किया गया था। उक्त भुगतान केवल मु० 2 लाख रू० का विपक्षीगण द्वारा किया गया था। विपक्षीगण द्वारा पुनः माल भेजे जाने का आवेदन किया गया परंतु बकाया पैसा चुकता करने हेतु मना कर दिया गया। अगस्त 2019 में मेरे द्वारा विपक्षीगणों को बकाया धनराशि चुकाए जाने हेतु अधिवक्ता द्वारा नोटिस भेजवाया गया जिसका केवल विपक्षी सं० 3 व 6 का जवाब आया जिसमें उनके द्वारा भुगतान करने से इंकार कर दिया गया। बकाया धनराशि मांगने पर विपक्षीगण अभद्र भाषा का प्रयोग किया और मारने-पीटने की धमकी दी। जनवरी 2020 में मेरी विपक्षीगणों से आखिरी बार बात हुई थी जब उनके द्वारा पैसे देने से सरासर इंकार कर दिया गया था। मुझे और कुछ नही कहना है यही मेरा बयान है।
बयान - 202 सी.आर.पी.सी.
नाम- शरद मिश्रा s/o श्री प्रकाश मिश्रा निवासी आई- 267 कल्यानपुर खुर्द कानपुर नगर सशपथ बयान करता हूँ कि मै शरद मिश्रा रिमझिम इस्पात लि० 3ए/275, आजाद नगर थाना नवाबगंज में एकाउंटेंट के पद पर कार्यरत हूँ वी०एम०पी० इन्टरप्राइजेज के कर्ताधर्ता/प्रोपराइटर/प्रबन्ध निदेशक गण विनोद शर्मा, अरूण शर्मा, मुन्नी शर्मा, रितु शर्मा, राशि शर्मा के बीच एस०एस० राड लगभग 85 मिट्रिक टन माल जिसका इनवाइस नं० 10254 दिनांक 22.01.19 वजन 7.175 टन कीमत 1100645 व इनवाइस नं० 10355 दिनांक 24.01.19 वजन 7.604 टन कीमत 1189877/ व इनवाइस नं० 10543 दिनांक 27.01.19 वजन 9.900 टन कीमत 1518660/- व इनवाइस नं० 10735 दिनांक 30.01.19 वजन 7.201 टन कीमत 1104633/- व इनवाइस नं० 10810 दिनांक 03.02.2019 वजन 9.909 टन कीमत 1520041/- व इनवाइस नं० - 10941 दिनांक 07.02.19 वजन 11.770 टन कीमत 1805518 व इनवाइस नं० 16 दिनांक 14.20.19 वजन 20.554 टन कीमत 3293869/- माल खरीदा सम्पूर्ण माल रिमझिम इस्पात लि० से वी.एम.पी. इन्टरप्राइजेज को प्राप्त हो गया जिसकी कीमत 1,32,18,802/- है। तथा पुराना बकाया 94394/- रू० कुल 1,33,13,196 धनराशि बकाया थी। रिमझिम इस्पात द्वारा कई बार वी०एम०पी० इन्टरप्राइजेज से रूपये की मांग की गयी। जिसमें विपक्षी गणों द्वारा विवाद किया गया तथा मु० 213196/- रू० दिनांक 18.02.2022 में दिया गया, रिमझिम इस्पात लि० द्वारा दिया गया। माल का पैसा वी०एम०पी० इ० के मालिक गण विनोद शर्मा पुत्र पालीराम शर्मा, अरूण शर्मा पुत्र पाली राम शर्मा, मुन्नी शर्मा पत्नी पालीराम शर्मा, रितु शर्मा पत्नी विनोद शर्मा, राशि शर्मा पत्नी अरूण शर्मा सभी लोग प्लाट नं० 1501 HSIIDC इन्डस्ट्रियल इस्टेट वी०ए० राय सोनीपत हरियाणा हाल पता म०न० 30 वैशाली न्यू दिल्ली सभी विपक्षीगण एक राय होकर पैसा देने से इंकार कर दिया। रू० एक करोण इकत्तीस लाख विपक्षीगणों द्वारा वादी रिमझिम इस्पात लि० को आज तक अदा नहीं किये। आपराधिक न्यास भंग विपक्षीगण द्वारा किया गया है। हम कर्मचारियों द्वारा अरूण शर्मा व ऱाशि शर्मा से टेलीफोन पर बात करने पर विपक्षीगणों द्वारा जान-माल की धमकी दे रहे है। अपशब्द गाली-गलौच कर रहे है। इसके उपरान्त ही वादी द्वारा यह परिवाद माननीय न्यायालय में दाखिल किया है। इसके पूर्व लिखित कानूनी नोटिस सभी विपक्षीगणों को भेजी गयी जो विपक्षीगणों को प्राप्त हो गयी। परन्तु आज तक बकाया धनराशि नहीं दी गयी। विपक्षीगण एक राय होकर जाल साजी करते हुए धोखाधडी करते व जान- माल की धमकी देते हुए अपराध कारित किया है। विपक्षी दोषी व्यक्तियों के विरूद्ध कार्यवाही की जाये। यही मेरा बयान है।
न्यायालय महानगर मजिस्ट्रेट, कक्ष सं०-02, कानपुर नगर परिवाद सं०- 145592/2022 रिमझिम इस्पात लि० बनाम मे० वी०एम०पी० इण्टरप्राइजेज आदि दिनांक-16.01.2024 पत्रावली आज आदेशार्थ नियत है। परिवादी के विद्वान अधिवक्ता को तलबी के बिन्दु पर पूर्व में सुना जा चुका है।
संक्षेप में कथानक इस प्रकार है कि परिवादी रिमझिम इस्पात लि०, कानपुर नगर में प्रबंधक के पद पर कार्य करता है। संस्थान द्वारा स्टेनलेस स्टील के निर्माण व विक्रय का कार्य किया जाता है। परिवादी के संस्थान से वी०एम०पी० इंटरप्राइजेज विपक्षीगणों द्वारा 2019 के पूर्व से व्यापार चल रहा है। वी०एम०पी० इंटरप्राइजेज के प्रबंध निदेशक एवं कर्ताधर्ता विनोद शर्मा, अरूण शर्मा, मुन्नी शर्मा, रितु शर्मा, राशि शर्मा के द्वारा संस्था का प्रतिनिधित्व करते हुए दिनांक 22.01.2019 से दिनांक 14.02.2019 तक लगभग 85 मीट्रिक टन माल क्रय किया था। जिसमें लगभग पूर्व क्रय किये गये माल का बकाया व 85 मीट्रिक टन माल की कुल धनराशि मु० 1,31,00,000/- का भुगतान विपक्षीगणों पर शेष था। परिवादी/प्रार्थी द्वारा भुगतान के लिए कहने पर विपक्षीगणों द्वारा प्रार्थी के साथ गाली-गलौज करते हुए जान-माल की धमकी दी गयी। प्रार्थी द्वारा उक्त लोगों को विधिक नोटिस भेजा गया। परन्तु उक्त लोगों द्वारा कोई जवाब नहीं दिया गया। तब प्रार्थी द्वारा मा० न्यायालय के समक्ष परिवाद पत्र प्रस्तुत किया गया।
परिवादी द्वारा अपने कथन के समर्थन में स्वंय का बयान अंतर्गत धारा 200 दं० प्र० स० तथा धारा 202 दं०प्र०स० के अंतर्गत साक्षी शरद मिश्रा व साक्षी भास्कर बाजपेयी को परीक्षित कराया गया।
सुना तथा पत्रावली का अवलोकन किया।
फरियादी द्वारा अपने बयान अंतर्गत धारा 200 दं०प्र०सं० में विपक्षीगणों पर परिवादी की फर्म से लगभग मु० 1,31,00,000/-उधार माल क्रय करने के पश्चात भुगतान से इंकार करने व भुगतान की धनराशि मांगने पर अभद्र भाषा का प्रयोग करने व मारने-पीटने की धमकी देने का आरोप लगाया है। उक्त आक्षेपों का पूर्ण समर्थन उसके द्वारा परिक्षित कराये गए साक्षी PW-1 साक्षी शरद मिश्रा व PW-2 साक्षी भास्कर बाजपेयी ने अपने बयान अंतर्गत धारा 202 दं०प्र०सं० में किया है। पत्रावली में परिवादी व साक्षियों के बयान के आधार पर प्रथम दृष्टया परिलक्षित हो रहा है कि उभयपक्षों के मध्य व्यापार के संबंध में लेन-देन व रूपयों का आदान-प्रदान होता आ रहा है। उपरोक्त प्रकरण में न्यायालय द्वारा 202(1) दं०प्र०सं० के तहत अनवेषण आख्या संबंधित थाने से आहूत की गयी, जो की संलग्न पत्रावली है। उक्त आदेश के अनुक्रम में संबंधित थाने के द्वारा प्रारंभिक जांच कर अनवेषण आख्या दिनांक 18.11.2023 को न्यायालय में प्रेषित की गयी। जिसके अनुसार- "वी.एम.पी. इंटरप्राइजेज कार्यालय प्लाट नं०- 1501, एच.एस.आई.आई.डी.सी., इण्डस्ट्रीयल इस्टेट, वी.ए. राय सोनीपत, हरियाणा के मालिक विनोद शर्मा पुत्र पालीराम शर्मा आदि 06 नामिक व्यक्ति को विभिन्न बिलों द्वारा परिवादी के संस्थान एस.एस. राउन्ड माल वी.एम.पी. इंटरप्राइजेज द्वारा क्रय किया गया। बिलो से यह प्रतीत होता है कि दोनो पक्षों में दिनांक 22.01.2019 से दिनांक 14.02.2019 के बीच माल क्रय-विक्रय किया गया जिसका शेष भुगतान 1,32,18,802/- रूपये वी.एम.पी. इंटरप्राइजेज, सोनीपत हरियाणा द्वारा, परिवादी रिमझिम इस्पात लि० कानपुर नगर को भुगतान नहीं किया गया है। इस संबंध में थाना हाजा पर कोई अभियोग पंजीकृत नही है।"
अतः उपरोक्त तथ्यों के क्रम में विपक्षीगण ने वादी मुकदमा के रुपये हड़प कर व वापस न देकर अमानत में ख्यानत कर आपराधिक न्यास भंग किया जाना परिलक्षित हो रहा है तथा उक्त बकाया धनराशि मांगने पर गाली गलौज के साथ मारने पीटने का मामला भी परिलक्षित हो रहा है। इस प्रकार विपक्षीगण द्वारा प्रथम दृष्टया ऐसा अपराध किया जाना परिलक्षित हो रहा है, जो भा.दं. संहिता की धारा- 406, 504, 506 के अंतर्गत दंडनीय है। अतः विपक्षीगण विनोद शर्मा, अरूण शर्मा, मुन्नी शर्मा, रितु शर्मा, राशि शर्मा के विरुद्ध प्रथम दृष्टया मामला अंतर्गत धारा-406,504,506 भा०दं०सं० का पाया जाता है। विपक्षीगण उपरोक्त धारा में वास्ते विचारण जरिए सम्मन तलब किये जाने योग्य है।
आदेश विपक्षीगण विनोद शर्मा, अरुण शर्मा, मुन्नी शर्मा, रितु शर्मा, राशि शर्मा को अंतर्गत धारा- 406, 504, 506 भा०दं०सं०में विचारण हेतु जरिये सम्मन तलब किया जाता है। विपक्षीगण जरिये सम्मन तलब किये जाये। परिवादी सूची गवाह एवं पैरवी दाखिल करें। समन के साथ परिवादपत्र की प्रति संलग्न की जाये। वास्ते हाजिरी दिनांक 12.02.2024 को पेश हो। "
8. The first issue before this Court to consider whether in view of judgment passed in Nitin Agarwal and Another (supra), no case is made out for interference and learned Senior Counsel has vehemently placed reliance on its finding which has already been referred.
9. I have carefully perused the Nitin Agarwal and Another (supra). It was a case where there was a commercial transaction between parties and there was an agreement also with a specific condition and since the condition was not fulfilled the Court holds that since the goods entrusted were used without fulfilling the condition, therefore, offence under Section 406 I.P.C was made out, whereas in the present case, it is the argument of learned counsels for applicants that it was a purely civil transaction with a company under the proprietorship of father of some of applicants as well as that they are not responsible for any non-payment and ingredients of Sections 406, 504 and 506 are not made out.
10. In the aforesaid circumstances, I do not find that Nitin Agarwal and Another (supra) will come in the way to decide the present case on basis of material available and argument raised on fact as well as on law that whether there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the applicants and whether ingredients of Sections 406, 504 and 506 are made out or not.
11. It is evident from complainant, statement recorded under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. that both firm have commercial transaction. Earlier there was no dispute since money was paid to complainant company for goods sold to accused company. On basis of material it could not be denied that accused company has made default, however, Court has to scrutinize whether such default in payment of money in commercial transactions would saddle any criminal liability under Section 406 I.P.C. or it would be a case where complainant has given a cloak of criminal offence to a dispute which is essentially of civil nature arising out of a business transaction.
12. As referred above in order to make out a case of 'criminal breach of trust' there must be 'entrustment' along with presence of 'dishonest intention' to misappropriate it or correct it to his own use to the detriment of the person who entrusted it.
13. The expression 'entrustment' carries with it the implication that person handing over any property or on whose behalf that property is handed over to another, continues to be its owner. Further the person handing over the property must have confidence in the person taking it. The property so as to create a fiduciary relationship between them. A mere transaction of sale cannot amount to an entrustment. (See Velji Raghavji Patel Vs. State of Maharashtra, (1965) 2 SCR 429 & the State of Gujarat Vs. Jaswant lal (1968) SCR 2 408)
14. At this juncture, few paragraphs of Deepak Gaba and others Vs. State of U.P. and another (2023) 3 SCC 423, being relevant are reproduced hereinafter :-
"14. Section 406IPC [ "406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.--Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both."] prescribes punishment for breach of trust which may extend to three years or with fine or with both, when ingredients of Section 405IPC are satisfied. For Section 406IPC to get attracted, there must be criminal breach of trust in terms of Section 405IPC. [ "405. Criminal breach of trust.--Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do, commits "criminal breach of trust".***Illustrations***(b) A is a warehouse-keeper. Z going on a journey, entrusts his furniture to A, under a contract that it shall be returned on payment of a stipulated sum for warehouse room. Adishonestly sells the goods. A has committed criminal breach of trust.(c) A, residing in Calcutta, is agent forZ, residing at Delhi. There is an express or implied contract between A and Z, that all sums remitted by Z toA shall be invested by A, according to Z's direction. Z remits a lakh of rupees to A, with directions to A to invest the same in Company's paper. A dishonestly disobeys the directions and employs the money in his own business. A has committed criminal breach of trust.(d) But if A, in the last illustration, not dishonestly but in good faith, believing that it will be more for Z's advantage to hold shares in the Bank of Bengal, disobeys Z's directions, and buys shares in the Bank of Bengal, for Z, instead of buying Company's paper, here, thought Z should suffer loss, and should be entitled to bring a civil action against A, on account of that loss, yet A, not having acted dishonestly, has not committed criminal breach of trust.***(f) A, a carrier, is entrusted by Z with property to be carried by land or by water. A dishonestly misappropriates the property. A has committed criminal breach of trust."(Explanations 1 and 2 and Illustrations (a) and (e) to Section 405IPC are excluded, as they are irrelevant.)]
15. For Section 405IPC to be attracted, the following have to be established:
(a) the accused was entrusted with property, or entrusted with dominion over property;
(b) the accused had dishonestly misappropriated or converted to their own use that property, or dishonestly used or disposed of that property or wilfully suffer any other person to do so; and
(c) such misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal should be in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract which the person has made, touching the discharge of such trust.
16. Thus, criminal breach of trust would, inter alia, mean using or disposing of the property by a person who is entrusted with or otherwise has dominion. Such an act must not only be done dishonestly, but also in violation of any direction of law or any contract express or implied relating to carrying out the trust. [Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v. CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 646]
17. However, in the instant case, materials on record fail to satisfy the ingredients of Section 405IPC. The complaint does not directly refer to the ingredients of Section 405IPC and does not state how and in what manner, on facts, the requirements are satisfied. Pre-summoning evidence is also lacking and suffers on this account. On these aspects, the summoning order is equally quiet, albeit, it states that "a forged demand of Rs 6,37,252.16p had been raised by JIPL, which demand is not due in terms of statements by Shubhankar P. Tomar and Sakshi Tilak Chand". A mere wrong demand or claim would not meet the conditions specified by Section 405IPC in the absence of evidence to establish entrustment, dishonest misappropriation, conversion, use or disposal, which action should be in violation of any direction of law, or legal contract touching the discharge of trust. Hence, even if Respondent 2 complainant is of the opinion that the monetary demand or claim is incorrect and not payable, given the failure to prove the requirements of Section 405IPC, an offence under the same section is not constituted. In the absence of factual allegations which satisfy the ingredients of the offence under Section 405IPC, a mere dispute on monetary demand of Rs 6,37,252.16p, does not attract criminal prosecution under Section 406IPC.
28. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the assertions made in the complaint and the pre-summoning evidence led by Respondent 2 complainant fail to establish the conditions and incidence of the penal liability set out under Sections 405, 420 and 471IPC, as the allegations pertain to alleged breach of contractual obligations. Pertinently, this Court, in a number of cases, has noticed attempts made by parties to invoke jurisdiction of criminal courts, by filing vexatious criminal complaints by camouflaging allegations which were ex facie outrageous or pure civil claims. These attempts are not to be entertained and should be dismissed at the threshold. To avoid prolixity, we would only like to refer to the judgment of this Court in Thermax Ltd. v. K.M. Johny [Thermax Ltd. v. K.M. Johny, (2011) 13 SCC 412 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 650] , as it refers to earlier case laws in copious detail."
15. In above background, it would be evident that there was a commercial transaction between two firms without any element of 'entrustment'. As soon as goods were handed over to purchaser, the seller loses ownership over it. There is no material or document that in absence of default of payment purchaser has to return the goods or on demand of seller, the purchaser has to return the goods sold. Further there is no material or evidence of 'dishonest intention'.
16. In aforesaid circumstances, ingredients of Section 406 I.P.C. are not made out.
17. So far as other offences under Section 504 and 506 I.P.C. are concerned, it would be relevant to mention few paragraphs of Mohammad Wajid and Another Vs. State of U.P. And Others, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 951 and relevant paragraphs are reproduced hereinafter: -
"SECTIONS 503, 504 AND 506 OF THE IPC
24. Chapter XXII of the IPC relates to Criminal Intimidation, Insult and Annoyance. Section 503 reads thus:--
"Section 503. Criminal intimidation. --Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation.--A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section.
Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to resist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation."
25. Section 504 reads thus:--
"Section 504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.--Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
26. Section 506 reads thus:--
"Section 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation. --Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;
If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.--And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both."
27. An offence under Section 503 has following essentials:--
1) Threatening a person with any injury;
(i) to his person, reputation or property; or
(ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested.
2) The threat must be with intent;
(i) to cause alarm to that person; or
(ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or
(iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat.
28. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised selfcontrol or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant.
29. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. In King Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai, (1902) 4 Bom LR 78, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out that:--
"To constitute an offence under Section 504, I.P.C. it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds."
(Emphasis supplied)
30. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant.
31. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to constitute the offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC may probably could be said to have been disclosed but not under Section 504 of the IPC. The allegations with respect to the offence punishable under Section 504 of the IPC can also be looked at from a different perspective. In the FIR, all that the first informant has stated is that abusive language was used by the accused persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in the FIR. One of the essential elements, as discussed above, constituting an offence under Section 504 of the IPC is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is the use of the abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present."
18. As referred above, the statements of complainant and witnesses and reasons assigned in impugned order also fall short to refer basic ingredients of Sections 504 and 506 I.P.C. since intentioned insult is missing. It does not have element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace as well as intent to cause alarm is also missing.
19. In aforesaid circumstances, present applications are a fit case to invoke inherent jurisdiction, accordingly, impugned order dated 16.01.2024 is hereby quashed.
20. It is observed that Court has not entered into the legal or factual issue, whether the applicants are liable to pay default money towards commercial transaction involved in present case.
21. Accordingly, these applications are disposed of with aforesaid observation.
Order Date :- 05.07.2024 P. Pandey