Kerala High Court
Harrisons Malayalam Ltd vs P.V.Raveendran(Died,Lrs Impleaded) on 27 November, 2025
2025:KER:91764
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE EASWARAN S.
TH
THURSDAY, THE 27 DAY OF NOVEMBER 2025/6TH AGRAHAYANA, 1947
RSA NO. 1076 OF 2011
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 17.06.2011 IN AS NO.7
OF 2010 OF THE SUB COURT,KATTAPPANA ARISING OUT OF THE
JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 10.02.2010 IN OS NO.188 OF 2008 OF
MUNSIFF COURT, PEERUMEDU
APPELLANTS/RESPONDENTS/DEFENDANTS:
1 HARRISONS MALAYALAM LTD
REGISTERED OFFICE AT BRISTOW ROAD,, WILLINGDON
ISLAND, KOCHI-682 003,, REPRESENTED BY ITS
MANAGER-LEGAL, M.V.H.MENON.
2 MANAGER
HARRISONS MALAYALAM LTD.,, WALLARDIE ESTATE,
VANDIPERYAR KARA,, PEPRIYAR VILLAGE, IDUKKI
DISTRICT-PIN-685533.
BY ADVS.
SRI.E.K.NANDAKUMAR (SR.)
SHRI.BENNY P. THOMAS (SR.)
SHRI.K.JOHN MATHAI
SRI.JOSON MANAVALAN
RESPONDENTS/APPELLANTS/PLAINTIFFS:
1 P.V.RAVEENDRAN(DIED) (LRS IMPLEADED)
SON OF VELAYUDHAN,, PUTHENPURAYIL HOUSE, 62ND
MILE KARA,, PERIYAR VILLAGE, PEERMADE TALUK,
PIN-685533.
2025:KER:91764
R.S.A No.1076 of 2011
2
2 V. VIJAYAN
AGED 65 YEARS, SON OF VELAYUDHAN, CHAITHANYA
HOUSE,, CHANNIKKADU KARA, PANACHIKADU VILLAGE,,
KOTTAYAM TALUK, PIN-686 533.
*3 ADDL.R3 R SHEELA
AGED 51 YEARS
W/O.SUNIL,RESIDING AT 'HARISREE HOUSE',HPC
KARA,VANDIPERIYAR P.O,PERIYAR VILLAGE,PEERMADE
TALUK,IDUKKI-685533
*4 ADDL.R4 SURESH
AGED 49 YEARS
S/O P.V. RAVEENDRAN,RESIDING AT 'PUTHENPURAYIL
HOUSE',62ND MILE KARA,PERIYAR VILLAGE,PEERMADE
TALUK,IDUKKI-686533
*5 ADDL.R5 SINDHUKUMARI P.R
AGED 41 YEARS
D/O.P.V. RAVEENDRAN,RESIDING AT 'PUTHENPURAYIL
HOUSE',62ND MILE KARA,PERIYAR VILLAGE,PEERMADE
TALUK,IDUKKI-686533
(LEGAL HEIRS OF DECEASED R1 ARE IMPLEADED AS
ADDL.RESPONDENTS 3 TO 5 AS PER ORDER DATED
27.07.2022 IN IA No.1/2019 IN RSA No.1076/2011)
*6 ADDL.R6 R.RAJESH,
AGE NOT KNOWN,S/O.P.V.RAVEENDRAN, PUTHENPURAYIL
HOUSE, 62 MILE KARA, VENDIPERIYAR P.O., PERIYAR
VILLAGE,PEERMADE TALUK, IDUKKU-686533.
(LEGAL HEIR OF THE DECEASED R1 IS IMPLEADED AS
ADDL.RESPONDENT 6 AS PER ORDER DATED 01.11.2024
IN IA.NO.3/2020)
BY ADVS.
SMT.LAYA SIMON, FOR R1 AND R2
SRI.M.NARENDRA KUMAR, FOR R3 TO R5
THIS REGULAR SECOND APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON
27.11.2025, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
2025:KER:91764
R.S.A No.1076 of 2011
3
EASWARAN S., J
--------------------------------
R.S.A No.1076 of 2011
-------------------------------
Dated this the 27th day of November, 2025
JUDGMENT
The appellant company aggrieved by the judgment and decree in A.S No.7/2010 on the files of Sub Court, Kattappana, which reversed the dismissal of the suit by the Munsiff's Court, Peermade, in O.S No.188/2008 has come up in this appeal.
2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as follows:-
The 1st appellant-company granted a licence in favour of the plaintiffs over 18.88 Hectares of land in Survey No.91, 61/2 and 61/3 of Periyar Village in Peermade Taluk, for cardamon plantation, known as Wallardie Estate. The period of licence was for one year with effect from 01.02.2004. During the period of licence, it appears that a request was made by the plaintiffs to the company to put up certain 2025:KER:91764 R.S.A No.1076 of 2011 4 structures in the property. The request was accepted and a communication was issued on 20.04.2004 by the manager of the 1st appellant-company permitting the plaintiffs to put up certain structures in the property for the purpose of carrying out the agricultural operation. Based on the said permission, the plaintiffs had dug up a small pond for drawing water for the agricultural operations and had constructed a structure, nature of which is disputed seriously by the parties. The plaintiffs claimed that it is of permanent nature, whereas the appellant-company contends that the said construction is temporary in nature. As stated above, the period of licence expired on 01.02.2005. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs continued in possession of the plaint schedule property. While so, the plaintiffs apprehended that their possession over the plaint schedule property will be disturbed by the 1 st appellant- company in as much as there was a notice issued by the company causing to terminate the licence agreement. Therefore, apprehending eviction proceedings, the suit was filed contending that, after the expiry of the period of licence, 2025:KER:91764 R.S.A No.1076 of 2011 5 the plaintiffs were in possession of the plaint schedule property based on an oral lease for a period of 15 years and therefore the defendants had no right to evict the plaintiffs during the currency of the said period. However, the plaintiffs later sought to amend the plaint and incorporate a fresh statement that the continuation of the plaintiffs after the expiry of the period of licence was not on the basis of a lease, but on the extension of the period of licence. It was further pleaded that in view of the permission granted by the 1st defendant-company, the plaintiffs have put up structures in the licensed property, therefore the licence is irrevocable. The defendants entered appearance and contested the suit and contended that there is no right of permanency attached to the licence granted in favour of the plaintiffs and that the permission, if any, granted by the 1st defendant-company is only during the currency of licence agreement. It was further contended that going by the terms and conditions of the licence agreement, as and when the licence is terminated, the licensees are required to remove the structures put up by 2025:KER:91764 R.S.A No.1076 of 2011 6 them and vacate the premises. On behalf of the plaintiffs, Exts.A1 to A15 documents were produced and PW1 was examined. On behalf of the defendants, Exts.B1 to B5 documents were produced and DW1 was examined. Exts.C1 and C1(a) are the report and the plan of the Advocate Commissioner. Exts.X1 and X2 were marked through third party. CW1 to CW4 were examined as court witnesses.
3. The trial court on appreciation of the pleadings and evidence on record framed the following issues for consideration:-
1. Whether the plaint schedule property is identifiable?
2. Are the plaintiffs in possession of the plaint schedule property?
3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for the reliefs claimed for ?
4. Relief and cost?
4. The trial court on appreciation of the evidence adduced by the parties came to conclusion that, it is clear that what has been put up by the plaintiffs is only a temporary shed roofed with asbestos sheets and therefore the construction cannot be termed as permanent and accordingly dismissed the suit. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs 2025:KER:91764 R.S.A No.1076 of 2011 7 preferred A.S No.07/2010. By the judgment dated 17.06.2011, the First Appellate Court on re-appreciation of evidence came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are entitled to the protection provided under Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, and accordingly reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court and decreed the suit, granting an injunction in favour of the plaintiffs. Hence, the defendants are on appeal before this Court.
5. On 09.11.2011, this Court while admitting the appeal framed the following substantial question of law for consideration:-
When Ext.A1/B1, deed of license shows that a building exists on the date of its execution and Ext.C1 report of the Commissioner shows existence of only that building, whether the first appellate court was justified in granting protection provided under Sub Section (b) of Section 60 of Indian Easement Act to the appellants.
6. Heard Shri.Joson Manavalan, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Shri.M.Narendra Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
2025:KER:91764 R.S.A No.1076 of 2011 8
7. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the plaintiffs had no authority to continue in the licensed premises, after the expiry of the licence period. The permission granted under Ext.A3 to put up structures cannot be read in isolation and it cannot be construed as novation of the contract between the parties. The First Appellate Court misread the contents of Ext.A3 and went wrong in concluding that the terms and conditions of the licence agreement has been superseded by Ext.A3. Evidence on record would clearly indicate that no structures of permanent nature has been put up by the plaintiffs in the plaint schedule property. The construction, if any, is only of temporary nature with a shed, roofed with asbestos sheet. Even going by the oral testimony of PW1, it is clear that apart from constructing a pond for drawing water for agricultural purposes, the plaintiffs have not made any constructions of permanent nature. In support of his contention relied on the decision of this Court in O.P. Prakash v. M.U. Chacko and Others [2016 (1) KLJ 404] and also the decision of the Division Bench in Geetha Varma 2025:KER:91764 R.S.A No.1076 of 2011 9 v. Amminikutty [1995 (1) KLT 525].
8. Per contra, Shri.M.Narendra Kumar, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents/plaintiffs supported the findings rendered by the First Appellate Court and contended that as and when the licensees /plaintiffs put up the construction of permanent nature, they are entitled for the benefit of Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act. It is further contended that Ext.A3 has to be read independently and it must be construed to have granted permission to put up structures in the licensed property and thus would necessarily mean that the licensor had acquiesced to the continuation of the licensees in the licensed premises, thereby leading to a case of irrevocable licence. It is further pointed out that the report of the Advocate Commissioner would clearly indicate the nature of construction made by the plaintiffs in the plaint schedule property. Therefore, it is pointed out that the First Appellate Court was justified in granting the decree of injunction by which the licensor is restrained from revoking the licence. In support of his 2025:KER:91764 R.S.A No.1076 of 2011 10 contention relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by LR s v. Bishun Narain Inter College and Others [1987 (2) SCC 555] and the decision of the Bombay High Court in M.F. De Souza v. Children's Educational Uplift Society [1958 SCC OnLine BOM 239] and also the Division Bench Decision of this Court in Indian Molasses Co. Ltd. v. Kerala State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. [2001 KHC 519].
9. I have considered the rival submissions raised across the Bar, perused the judgments rendered by the courts below and also the records of the present case.
10. In order to answer the substantial questions of law framed by this Court, one needs to interpret Ext.A1 document. Admittedly, the plaintiff came into possession of the plaint schedule property by virtue of Ext.A1 licence deed. It is expedient to extract the relevant clauses under Ext.A1, which would enable this Court to conclude all the substantial questions framed as above.
13. The Licensees confirm that the Licensees will put up no permanent structures on the lands 2025:KER:91764 R.S.A No.1076 of 2011 11 allotted herein. However, if required, the Licensees will be permitted to use the existing curing shed of the Licensor on paying the lease rent which will be fixed by the Licensor. So also, if available, the Licensor shall permit the Licensees to use one vacant junior staff quarters in the estate on a rent fixed by the Manager of the Estate. It is hereby clarified that these arrangements will be valid only for the period during which this contract is in force and the Licensees undertake that the curing shed and the staff quarters will be used only for the operations covered herein.
15. The Licensor shall be at liberty to terminate this arrangement forthwith any time if it is found that any terms contained herein is violated or if the actions of the Licensees or any one of their persons are found to be detrimental to the interest of the Licensor and on such termination, the Licensees shall remove all their things from the Licensor's Estate and settle the accounts without raising any objections whatsoever.
17. Subject to Clause15 above, on the expiry of the one year period provided herein the Licensees shall remove the ripe crop and all other things belonging to them from the areas allotted and, after the said period of one year, the Licensees shall not have any right to operate on the lands whatsoever.
11. A reading of the above clauses would no doubt indicate that the licence is liable to be terminated on expiry of the period mentioned in the licence agreement, which is 01.02.2005. At this point, it is important to mention that on 2025:KER:91764 R.S.A No.1076 of 2011 12 request of the plaintiffs, the defendant-company had allowed the plaintiffs to put up structures in the plaint schedule property. This was by a letter dated 20.04.2004. The contents of the letter is extracted for reference:-
As per your request, you are allowed to construct a building and also ponds for the agricultural purpose. You are also allowed to draw electrical lines at your expense, for which necessary application will be filled before K.S.E.B.
12. The grant of permission as above would clearly indicate that the licensees were permitted to construct a building and pond for the agricultural purpose. Therefore, this Court is inclined to think that Ext.A3 cannot be read in isolation and must be read along with clauses 13, 15 and 17 of the licence agreement. The purpose of the licence agreement is for enabling the plaintiffs to carry out the agricultural operations in the licensed premises. The permission, if any, granted under Ext.A3 can only be viewed for the purpose of carrying out the agricultural operations and not intended to convey an absolute right over the property. Such permission even if granted can operate only 2025:KER:91764 R.S.A No.1076 of 2011 13 during the currency of license agreement and not for perpetuity.
13. Next this Court must consider as to whether the plaintiffs have done any overt act in pursuance to the said agreement. The evidence in the present case consists of the oral testimony of the plaintiffs and the defendants and also the reports of the Advocate Commissioner. In this context it is pertinent to mention two reports. Ext.C1 is the report of the Advocate Commissioner, who inspected the property in the present suit. In the second paragraph of page 3 of the Advocate Commissioner report, the Advocate Commissioner has clearly mentioned the nature of the construction made by the plaintiffs in the plaint schedule property. The findings are extracted as under:-
അന്യായ പട്ടികയുടെ വടക്ക് - കിഴക്കായി മേൽക്കൂര ആസ്ബസ്റ്റ ോസ് മേഞ്ഞ ഒരു മുറി ഭിത്തി കെട്ടി മറച്ച ഒരു ഷെഡ്ഡും കാണുന്നു. ടി ഷെഡിൽ വാദിയുടെ ജോലിക്കാർ താമസിച്ചു വരുന്നതായും കാണപ്പെട്ടിട്ടുള്ളതാണ്. ടി ഷെഡിനു സമീപം കൂട് നിർമിച്ച് 10 ഓളം ആടുകളെ വളർത്തുന്നതായും കാണപ്പെട്ടിട്ടുള്ളതാണ്.
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14. Ext.A13 is yet another report solicited in a subsequent suit filed by the appellants for mandatory injunction requiring the defendants to vacate the plaint schedule property. In the said report, the Advocate Commissioner, who inspected the property was directed to specifically point out the nature of permanent structures in the plaint schedule property. In Ext.A13, the Advocate Commissioner has concluded as under :-
അന്യായ പട്ടിക വസ്തുവിൽ ഏലം കൃഷി ചെയ്തിട്ടുള്ള ഭാഗത്തിന്റെ വടക്ക് പടിഞ്ഞാറായി ഉദ്ദേശം 86 അടി നീളവും 80 അടി വീതിയുമുള്ള ഒരു കുളം ഉളളതാണ്. ടി കുളത്തിന് ഉദ്ദേശം 2 വർഷത്തെ പഴക്കമുള്ളതാണ്. ഏലച്ചെടികൾ നനയ്ക്കുന്നതിനു വേണ്ടി നിറയെ വെള്ളമുള്ള പ്രസ്തുത കുളത്തിനുള്ളിൽ സ്ഥാപിച്ചിട്ടുള്ള മോട്ടോറിൽ നിന്നും വെള്ളം പമ്പ് ചെയ്യുന്നതിനു വേണ്ടി കുളത്തിന് സമീപം ഒരു പമ്പ് ഹൗസ് ഉള്ളതും ആയതിന് വൈദ്യുതി കണക്ഷനുള്ളതും അനുബന്ധ സ്വിച്ചുകളും സാമഗ്രികളും സ്ഥാപിച്ചിട്ടുള്ളതും കുളത്തിൽ നിന്നും പൈപ്പ് കണക്ഷൻ ഉള്ളതുമാണ്. കൂടാതെ പട്ടിക വസ്തുവിന്റ തെക്ക് വടക്ക് ഭാഗത്തും ഒരു ചെറിയ കുളമുള്ളതും ഉദ്ദേശം 3 വർഷം പഴക്കം തോന്നിക്കുന്ന പ്രസ്തുത കുളത്തിന് സമീപം ഒരു മോട്ടർ ഷെഡ് സ്ഥാപിച്ചിട്ടുള്ളതും ടിയിൽ ഡീസൽ മോട്ടോർ ഫിറ്റ് ചെയ്ത് ആയതിന് 4 വാട്ടർ ടാങ്കുകൾ സ്ഥാപിച്ച് പൈപ്പ് കണക്ഷൻ മുഖേന ഏലച്ചെടികൾ നനച്ചു വരുന്നതുമാണ്. പട്ടിക വസ്തുവിലെ റോഡിൽ നിന്നും പട്ടിക വസ്തുവിലേക്ക് പ്രവേശിക്കുന്നതിന് ഒരു ഗേറ്റ് ഉള്ളതും ഗേറ്റ് കടന്ന് പട്ടിക വസ്തുവിൽ ഒരു ഷെഡ് സ്ഥാപിച്ചിട്ടുള്ളതുമാണ്. രണ്ടു മുറികൾ ഉള്ളതും ആസ്ബറ്റോസ് ഷീറ്റ് മേഞ്ഞിട്ടുളളതുമായ പ്രസ്തുത ഷെഡിൽ 3-ാം പ്രതി താമസിച്ച് പട്ടിക വസ്തുവിൽ കൃഷി പണികൾ ചെയ്യിച്ച് വരുന്നതാണെന്ന് പറഞ്ഞിട്ടുള്ളതാണ്. ടിയിൽ പണി ആയുധങ്ങളും മറ്റും സൂക്ഷിച്ചിട്ടുള്ളതാണ്.
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15. A combined reading of Ext.A13 and Ext.C1 would definitely indicate the nature of construction carried out by the plaintiffs in the plaint schedule property. The nature of construction as revealed from the above reports clearly indicate that the plaintiffs have not constructed any permanent structures and they had used the shed with two rooms roofed with asbestos which was already in existence at the time of execution of the agreement. Moreover, the quality of evidence adduced by the plaintiffs in this case is not sufficient to hold that they had constructed any structures of permanent nature. Therefore, the contention that the licensees had put up permanent structures, so as to make the licence irrevocable has not impressed this court.
16. That apart, in order to gain the benefit of Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, the construction ought to have been made by the licensees in pursuance to the licence agreement. In the present case, it is pertinent to mention that going by Ext.A1 licence deed, no structures were permitted to be put up by the licensees. The licensees 2025:KER:91764 R.S.A No.1076 of 2011 16 were also put on notice that the licence would expire on the expiry of the period mentioned therein. With open eyes, the licensees requested the licensor to permit him to put up construction for the purpose of enabling him to carry out the agricultural operations in the plaint schedule property. If that be so, it is inevitable for this Court to conclude that the permission granted by the appellant-company under Ext.A3 can only be viewed for the purpose of carrying out the agricultural operation and not intended to make any permanent structure.
17. Coming to the precedents cited by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents, in support of his plea that the plaintiffs are entitled to get protection of Section 60(b) of the Easements Act, this Court is of the considered view that the proposition canvassed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents cannot be disputed. But then, the question is whether the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by L.Rs.
(supra) could be applied to the facts of the present case. The 2025:KER:91764 R.S.A No.1076 of 2011 17 reading of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court shows that the Supreme Court was called upon to consider a case of a licence of a land and a building and further that in pursuance to the said licence, the school had put up a building for additional accommodation. It is in that context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a case of irrevocable licence under Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act has been made out. A similar situation arises in the case of the Bombay High Court in M.F De Souza (supra) and also the Division Bench Decision of this Court in Indian Molasses Co. Ltd (supra). Therefore, on a cumulative reading of the decision cited across the Bar by the learned counsel for the respondents, this Court is inclined to think that the decisions may not apply to the facts of the present case.
18. In O.P.Prakash v. M.U.Chacko and Others [2015 SCC OnLine Ker. 37113], the learned Single Bench of this Court held as follows:-
10. In the case Ulahannan v. George, reported in 1988 (1) KLT 335, this Court dealt with a case where the agreement provided that the licensee has to vacate the premises after demolishing the same, even if he is 2025:KER:91764 R.S.A No.1076 of 2011 18 permitted to execute construction of permanent character in the land in question. It was contended therein that as and when the requirements of Sec.60(b) are satisfied, the said provision comes into operation, even if there is a contract, which says that the licence is revocable under the circumstances, which would otherwise satisfy the requirements under Sec.60(b) of the Easements Act. The said contention made on behalf of the licensee was repelled by this Court in Ulahannan's case supra, by relying on the decision of the ruling of the Allahabad High Court in the case in Ganga Sahai v. Badrul Islam reported in AIR 1942 All.330, wherein it was held while considering the scope of Sec.60 of the Easements Act that,"a condition in the licence that the landlord would have the right to get the site vacated whenever he so chose by the licensee deprives the licensee of the benefit of S.60...... A contract to the contrary disentitles the licensee from deriving advantage conferred by S.60. There is nothing to preclude a party from binding himself to surrender land, although there may be a construction of a permanent character standing thereon..." This Court relied on the ruling of the Ghotey Lal v. Durga Bal reported in AIR 1950 All.
661, wherein it was held that "where a licensee executes a work of a permanent character under a clear understanding that he or his heirs may be called upon after certain time to leave the land, it is not open to him to plead such work as a bar against his eviction on a suit brought by the plaintiff in pursuance of the solemn undertaking given by him." In the light of this aspect, this Court held that the agreement therein stipulated a clear provision that at the time of surrender of possession, the defendant should dismantle the structures put up by him in the land in question and that such clear contract would disentitle 2025:KER:91764 R.S.A No.1076 of 2011 19 the appellant licensee from claiming the benefit under Sec.60(b) of the Easements Act and accordingly, dismissed the Second Appeal preferred by the licensee therein.
19. In Geetha Varma v. Amminikutty [1995 (1) KLT
525) the Division Bench held as follows:-
7. S.60(b) can have operation only if the licensee has acted upon the licence and erected structures or constructions of permanent character. " Acting upon licence" means the state of mind of the licensee at the time when he constructed the structure or building. In a case where the licensee has considered himself to be a lessee or mortgagee and has constructed the building or erected other structures in the property he would not be entitled to get the benefit under S.60(b). 7th defendant in its written statement stated that it is as a lessee that it has effected improvements in the property. If that be so 7th defendant cannot claim the benefit under S.60(b).
20. The reading of aforesaid decisions would indicate that the conclusion reached by this Court as regards the interpretation of Section 60(b) of the Indian Easements Act is correct. The word 'acting upon the licence' certainly means the mind of the licensees at the time when he constructed the structures of the building or the building. In the present case, when we read the terms and conditions of Ext.A1 2025:KER:91764 R.S.A No.1076 of 2011 20 licence deed, it becomes explicitly clear that the licence agreement is for perpetuity. It is an admitted case that after 01.02.2005, the period of Ext.A1 expired. Though the plaintiffs initially claimed that they were on an oral lease in respect of the plaint schedule property after the expiry of period of licence, midway the suit, they had given up the said plea and confined their plea to the irrevocability of the licence based on the putting up off permanent structures in the plaint schedule property. Admittedly, no agreement exists between the parties by which the period of licence is extended. Though the parties are in unison on the point that the period of licence was extended from time to time, the plaintiffs have got a case that because of the constructions made in the property, a case of irrevocability of the licence is made. Admittedly, the continuation of the plaintiff in the licensed property after expiry of the period of licence is purely on consent by the appellants, no permanency would be attached to the occupation of the plaintiffs.
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21. Coming to the findings rendered by the First Appellate Court, it appears that the First Appellate Court was thoroughly misguided while appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties. The reading of the judgment of the First Appellate Court indicates the total non-application of the mind by the First Appellate Court on to the evidence adduced by the parties. It is expedient to extract the relevant findings of the First Appellate Court.
15. Now I may examine the nature of the construction made in this case applying the above principle laid in the cases of the Hon'ble High Court of Alahabad referred to above. The fact that, the plaintiffs/appellants have constructed a building with two rooms roofed by asbestos sheets is proved by Ext. A13 commission report in O.S.210/08. It is also reported that, the plaintiffs/appellants and their workers are residing in this building. In addition to the above, they have constructed three ponds in this property. One of the ponds is having 86 feet length and 80 feet width. They have erected electric motor and pump sets for irrigation purpose. Electric lines were also drawn by them for the operation of motor and pump sets. In my view, the above said construction cannot be said to be a temporary in nature as observed by the lower court. The lower court found that, such constructions have made by the plaintiffs/appellants for the purpose of cardamom cultivation and so it cannot be considered as permanent in nature. I cannot agree with the above said findings of the lower court. To attract Sec.60(b) of Easement Act, 2025:KER:91764 R.S.A No.1076 of 2011 22 three conditions must be fulfilled.
1. The licensee executed a work of permanent character.
2. He did so acting upon the license and.
3. He incurred expenses in the execution. The above said three conditions have been fulfilled in this case. Hence, I find that, the license granted to the plaintiffs/appellants is an irrevocable license coming within the perview of 60(b) of Easement Act.
22. This Court has already found that evidence adduced in this case does not indicate any permanent structure being put up by the plaintiffs in pursuance to the licence agreement. If that be so, there was no occasion for the plaintiffs to seek permission from the 1 st defendant- company. Even if the 1st defendant-company had granted such permission, that by itself cannot lead to an irrevocability of the licence, because, admittedly no permanent structures exists in the plaint schedule property.
23. Resultantly, this Court is inclined to conclude that the findings rendered by the First Appellate Court is certainly perverse. Consequently, the substantial questions of law framed by this Court is answered as follows:-
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(i) Since Ext.B1 / Ex.A1 licence shows a building existing on the date of execution and going by Ext.C1 and Ext.A13 reports of the Advocate Commissioner, only a temporary structure has been put up by the plaintiff, the First Appellate Court was not justified in granting protection under Sub-Section (b) to the Section 60 of the Easements Act.
24. Accordingly, the appeal stands allowed by reversing the judgment and decree in A.S No.7/2010 on the files of Sub Court, Kattappana, and restoring the judgment and decree in O.S. No.188/2008 on the files of the Munsiff's Court, Peermade. Considering the nature of contentions raised by the parties, cost made easy.
It is brought to the notice of this Court that O.S No.210/2008 is instituted by the 1 st appellant-company seeking for a mandatory injunction, directing the plaintiffs/respondents in this case to vacate the premises. The learned counsel for the appellants fairly submitted that unless and until a decree is passed in that suit, the appellants 2025:KER:91764 R.S.A No.1076 of 2011 24 will not forcefully evict the plaintiffs from the plaint schedule property. The said submission is recorded.
Sd/-
EASWARAN S. JUDGE AMR