Delhi District Court
Neeraj Piplani vs State on 19 February, 2024
IN THE COURT OF MS AMBIKA SINGH, ASJ-02/ WEST
DISTRICT, TIS HAZARI COURTS, NEW DELHI
Criminal Revision No. 497/2023
1. Sh. Neeraj Piplani
S/o Lt. Sh. Roshan Lal Piplani
Proprietor
M/s Marine India,
R/o 7/23, Second Floor,
Kirti Nagar Industrial Area,
New Delhi-110015.
.....Revisionist
Versus
1. State (NCT of Delhi)
Through its Secretary
New Secretariat, I.T.O,
New Delhi.
2. Rajan Syal,
S/o Shri Joginder Kumar Syal,
R/o House NO. A-76, Karampura,
New Moti Nagar, New Delhi-110015.
.....Respondents
Date of institution of the cases : 02.09.23
Date when the cases reserved for order : 19.02.24
Date of announcement of order : 19.02.24
JUDGMENT
19.02.24
1. This criminal revision petition assails the summoning order dated 18.01.2023 (hereinafter to be referred as CR No. 497/2023 Neeraj Piplani Vs. State and Anr. Page No 1 of 16 the impugned order) and the proceedings emanating out of the same passed by the Ld. MM, N.I. Act (Digital Court) in case CC No. 238/2023. A prayer has been made to set aside the said impugned order.
2. The Ld. Trial court vide order dated 18.01.2023 has passed the summoning order. Briefly stated by the revisionist that the respondent no. 2/complainant has filed the case against the accused/revisionist Neeraj Piplani. It is alleged that the respondent no. 2 was employed as Hardware System Engineer in the business of the accused/revisionist in the year 2002. It is further alleged that the accused/revisionist promised him to offer a good salary package alongwith with high incentives, however, he failed to pay the remuneration on fixed time basis, instead carried forward the balance of unpaid remuneration for the last several months/years with the assurance of clearing the same at the earliest. It is further alleged that during the month of January, 2020, the accused/revisionist requested the respondent no.2/complainant for grant of additional extension of time to clear the past outstanding dues, citing some difficulties to arrange the sufficient funds. The accused/revisionist further requested the respondent no.2/complainant to take the consolidated amount of monthly pay with added incentives after the span of few months so as to overcome the precarious financial situation. The respondent no. 2 acceded to such requests of the accused/revisionist keeping in mind his long standing relationship with him. It is further alleged that finally, the CR No. 497/2023 Neeraj Piplani Vs. State and Anr. Page No 2 of 16 respondent no.2/complainant quit the job. On 01.08.2022, a total amount of Rs.39,92,324/- was found to be outstanding due and payable by the accused/revisionist to the respondent no.2/complainant. It has been alleged in the criminal complaint case that the revisionist in the partial discharge of the above said legal debt and liability to pay the due amount to the Respondent no. 2/complainant, issued three postdated cheques bearing nos, 661197 dated 05-10-2022 for Rs. 5,00,000/- (Rupees Five lakhs only), cheque bearing no. 661199 dated 12-10-2022 for Rs. 6,00,000/- (Rupees Six lakhs only) and cheque bearing no. 661200 dated 19-10-2022 for Rs. 18,27,392/- (Rupees Eighteen Lakhs Twenty Seven Thousand Three Hundred and Ninety Two only) all of them drawn on STATE BANK OF INDIA, Jawalaheri Village, Paschim Vihar Branch, New Delhi-110063 in the name and favour of the Respondent no.2, with an assurance of clearing the remaining dues at the earliest and respondent no.2/complainant, finally presented the aforesaid cheques for encashment with his bankers BANK OF BARODA, Karampura Branch, New Delhi-110015 but the same were returned unpaid as dishonoured vide cheque return memos dated 28-11-2022 for the cheque no. 661197 and return memos dated 07-11-2022 for the remaining two cheques nos. 661199 & 661200 with the remarks "FUNDS INSUFFICIENT". Respondent no.2/complainant sent a legal notice dated 03.12.2022 through his counsel by way of the Speed Post and Courier to the revisionist. The notice issued and dispatched on 05.12.2022 was duly served upon the revisionist at his given addresses on 06.12.2022 and Ld. M.M. took CR No. 497/2023 Neeraj Piplani Vs. State and Anr. Page No 3 of 16 cognizance on the complaint filed by the respondent no. 2/complainant and issued summons to the revisionist vide order dated 18.01.2023.
3. It is stated by the revisionist in the present revision that the cheque amount which was allegedly credited to the account of respondent no. 2 was Rs.29,27,392/-, however, the total amount paid to the respondent no. 2 by him is Rs.48,94,808/- by crediting his account on various occasions, which adds up to be more than the actual salary. It is further stated that he is feeling cheated by the illegal attempt of respondent no.2/complainant to defraud him through duly signed cheques given by him to the respondent no.2/complainant as security cheques.
4. Having aggrieved by the impugned order of summoning by the Ld. Trial Court, the revisionist is preferring the present revision for quashing the complaint and the relevant proceedings emanating out of the summoning order dated 18.01.2023 on the ground that firstly, the impugned summoning order of the Ld. Trial Court is illegal, contrary to facts and bad in law. Secondly, the respondent no. 2 has filed false and frivolous case by misusing the security cheques of revisionist which is not actually due and liable to be paid by the revisionist and in fact, it is the respondent no. 2 who has a liability towards the revisionist as surplus amount has been credited in the account of respondent no.2/complainant. Thirdly, the respondent no. 2 in order to extort CR No. 497/2023 Neeraj Piplani Vs. State and Anr. Page No 4 of 16 money and with malafide intention has not shown the payments which were made in his account in surplus by the revisionist. Fourthly, Ld Trial Court while passing the impugned summoning order has failed to appreciate that the legal notice dated 03.12.2022 sent to the accused is not a valid notice under Section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instrument Act since the due amount has already been credited in the account of the complainant/respondent no. 2 and is much more than the amount demanded in the notice. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the case law titled as M/s Rahul Builders Vs. Arihant Fertilizers 2008(2) SCC 321, wherein it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that "unless a notice is served in conformity with proviso
(b) appended to Section 138 of the Act, the complaint petition would not be maintainable". Fifthly, the Ld. Trial Court has failed to appreciate that a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act is not maintainable without serving upon the accused a valid legal notice and that no case is under Section 138 of the NI Act is made out against the accused. Sixthly, the Ld. Trial Court has further failed to appreciate that the respondent no. 2 in order to extort money from the revisionist has filed the false and frivolous complaint of the whole of the cheques amount without acknowledging the payments already made by the revisionist in the favour of the respondent before presentation of the cheques.
5. Notice of the Revision petition was issued to the respondents on which the respondents entered their appearance. TCR was also summoned.
6. On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for respondent no.
CR No. 497/2023Neeraj Piplani Vs. State and Anr. Page No 5 of 16 2/complainant has argued that the present revision petition is not maintainable as the revisionist has failed to point out any infirmity in the impugned order dated 18.01.2023. The allegations are full of falsehood and it is not permissible under the law to look into the evidence of the revisionist at the stage of summoning. The revisionist is at liberty to prove the same by leading evidence in defence at the appropriate stage.
7. I have heard the arguments and perused the record carefully.
8. The revisionist/accused has also filed an application for condonation of delay alleging that vide the impugned summoning order dated 18.01.2023, appellant was directed to appeared before the trial court on 18.04.2023 and the next date was fixed as 11.08.2023; however, in the meanwhile, he approached the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi for quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C, read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India, vide Diary no. E-1458721/2023 and hence, could not pursue the present matter before the Ld. Trial Court because of the order passed by the Hon'ble High Court in another similar petition vide CRL MC 5965/2023 between the present revisionist and the other complainant namely Vipin Kumar. Therefore, the revisionist could not approach this court to present the revision petition within the stipulated period of 90 days, however, the present petition was filed with the delay of approximately 37 delay.
9. The Ld. Counsel for the respondent has argued on the application for condonation of delay and the same has been CR No. 497/2023 Neeraj Piplani Vs. State and Anr. Page No 6 of 16 strongly opposed and he has argued that no grounds are made out for condonation of delay.
10. I have heard the arguments of both the parties and perused the record carefully. I have also gone through the authorities as placed on record by both the parties. First of all, I shall deal with the application for condonation of delay filed by revisionists/accused persons.
11. In case titled Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs. Mst. Kathiji, AIR 1987 SC 1353: (1987) 2 SCC 107, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the following principles for the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act:-
(i) Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by the lodging an appeal late.
(ii) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condones the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
(iii) "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pendantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.
(iv) When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
(v) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.
(vi) It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."
12. In view of the above guiding principles regarding condonation of delay in view of the reasons as stated by the revisionists/accused persons in their application for condonation CR No. 497/2023 Neeraj Piplani Vs. State and Anr. Page No 7 of 16 of delay, the delay in filing the present revision is condoned.
13. Coming now to the merits of the present revision petition. In Subramanium Sethuraman vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 17.09.2004, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has held as under:-
"In Mathew's case this Court held that consequent to a process issued under Section 204 by the concerned Magistrate it is open to the accused to enter appearance and satisfy the court that there is no allegation in the complaint involving the accused in the commission of the crime. In such situation, this Court held that it is open to the Magistrate to recall the process issued against the accused. This Court also noticed the fact that the Code did not provide for any such procedure for recalling the process. But supported its reasoning by holding for such an act of judicial discretion no specific provision is required. In Adalat Prasad's case, this court considered the said view of the court in K.M.Mathew's case and held that the issuance of process under Section 204 is a preliminary step in the stage of trial contemplated in Chapter XX of the Code. Such an order made at a preliminary stage being an interlocutory order, same cannot be reviewed or reconsidered by the Magistrate, there being no provision under the code for review of an order by the same Court. Hence, it is impermissible for the Magistrate to reconsider his decision to issue process in the absence of any specific provision to recall such order. In that line of reasoning this Court in Adalat Prasad's case held :
"Therefore, we are of the opinion that the view of this Court in Mathew's case (supra) that no specific provision is required for recalling and issuance order amounting to one without jurisdiction, does not laid down the correct law".
From the above, it is clear that the larger Bench of this Court in Adalat Prasad's case did not accept the correctness of the law laid down by this Court in K.M.Mathew's case. Therefore, reliance on K.M.Mathew's case by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant cannot be accepted nor can the argument that Adalat Prasad's case requires reconsideration be accepted. The next challenge of the learned counsel for the appellant made to the finding of the High Court that once a plea is recorded in a summons case it is not open to the CR No. 497/2023 Neeraj Piplani Vs. State and Anr. Page No 8 of 16 accused person to seek a discharge cannot also be accepted. The case involving a summons case is covered by Chapter XX of the Code which does not contemplates a stage of discharge like Section 239 which provides for a discharge in a warrant case. Therefore, in our opinion the High Court was correct in coming to the conclusion once the plea of the accused is recorded under Section 252 of the Code the procedure contemplated under Chapter XX has to be followed which is to take the trial to its logical conclusion. As observed by us in Adalat Prasad's case the only remedy available to an aggrieved accused to challenge an order in an interlocutory stage is the extraordinary remedy under Section 482 of the Code and not by way of an application to recall the summons or to seek discharge which is not contemplated in the trial of a summons case".
14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India further clarified the situation in so moto writ petition In Re Expeditious Trial Of Cases Under Section 138 OF N.I. Act 1881.
"In K. M. Mathew v. State of Kerala & Anr.8, this Court dealt with the power of the Magistrate under Chapter XX of the Code after the accused enters appearance in response to the summons issued under Section 204 of the Code. It was held that the accused can plead before the Magistrate that the process against him ought not to have been issued and the Magistrate may drop the proceedings if he is satisfied on reconsideration of the complaint that there is no offence for which the accused could be tried. This Court was of the opinion that there is no requirement of a specific provision for the Magistrate to drop the proceedings and as the order issuing the process is an interim order and not a judgment, it can be varied or recalled. The observation in the case of K. M. Mathew (supra) that no specific provision of law is required for recalling an erroneous order of issue of process was held to be contrary to the scheme of the Code in Adalat Prasad v. Rooplal Jindal and Others9. It was observed therein that the order taking cognizance can only be subject matter of a proceeding under Section 482 of the Code as subordinate criminal courts have no inherent power. There is also no power of review conferred on the Trial Courts by the Code. As there is no specific provision for recalling an erroneous order by the Trial Court, the judgment in the case of K. M. Mathew CR No. 497/2023 Neeraj Piplani Vs. State and Anr. Page No 9 of 16 (supra) was held to be not laying down correct law. The question whether a person can seek discharge in a summons case was considered by this Court in Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.10. The law laid down in Adalat Prasad (supra) was reiterated.
18. It was contended by learned Amici Curiae that a holistic reading of Sections 251 and 258 of the Code, along with Section 143 of the Act, should be considered to confer a power of review or recall of the issuance of process by the Trial Court in relation to complaints filed under Section 138 of the Act. He referred to a judgment of this Court in Meters and Instruments Private Limited and Another v. Kanchan Mehta11 which reads as follows:
"While it is true that in Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra this Court observed that once the plea of the accused is recorded under Section 252 CrPC, the procedure contemplated under Chapter XX CrPC has to be followed to take the trial to its logical conclusion, the said judgment was rendered as per statutory provisions prior to the 2002 Amendment. The statutory scheme post-2002 Amendment as considered in Mandvi Coop. Bank and J.V. Baharuni has brought about a change in law and it needs to be recognized. After the 2002 Amendment, Section 143 of the Act confers implied power on the Magistrate to discharge the accused if the complainant is compensated to the satisfaction of the court, where the accused tenders the cheque amount with interest and reasonable cost of litigation as assessed by the court. Such an interpretation was consistent with the intention of legislature. The court has to balance the rights of the complainant and the accused and also to enhance access to justice. Basic object of the law is to enhance credibility of the cheque transactions by providing speedy remedy to the complainant without intending to punish the drawer of the cheque whose conduct is reasonable or where compensation to the complainant meets the ends of justice. Appropriate order can be passed by the court in exercise of its inherent power under Section 143 of the Act which is different from compounding by consent of parties. Thus, Section 258 CrPC which enables proceedings to be stopped in a summons case, even though strictly speaking is not applicable to complaint cases, since the provisions of CrPC are applicable "so far as may be", the principle of the said provision is applicable to a complaint case covered by Section 143 of the Act which CR No. 497/2023 Neeraj Piplani Vs. State and Anr. Page No 10 of 16 contemplates applicability of summary trial provisions, as far as possible i.e. with such deviation as may be necessary for speedy trial in the context."
19. In Meters and Instruments (supra), this Court was of the opinion that Section 143 of the Act confers implied power on the Magistrate to discharge the accused, if the complainant is compensated to the satisfaction of the court. On that analogy, it was held that apart from compounding by the consent of the parties, the Trial Court has the jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders under Section 143 in exercise of its inherent power. Reliance was placed by this Court on Section 258 of the Code to empower the Trial Courts to pass suitable orders.
20. Section 143 of the Act mandates that the provisions of summary trial of the Code shall apply "as far as may be" to trials of complaints under Section 138. Section 258 of the Code empowers the Magistrate to stop the proceedings at any stage for reasons to be recorded in writing and pronounce a judgment of acquittal in any summons case instituted otherwise than upon complaint. Section 258 of the Code is not applicable to a summons case instituted on a complaint. Therefore, Section 258 cannot come into play in respect of the complaints filed under Section 138 of the Act. The judgment of this Court in Meters and Instruments (supra) in so far as it conferred power on the Trial Court to discharge an accused is not good law. Support taken from the words "as far as may be" in Section 143 of the Act is inappropriate. The words "as far as may be" in Section 143 are used only in respect of applicability of Sections 262 to 265 of the Code and the summary procedure to be followed for trials under Chapter XVII. Conferring power on the court by reading certain words into provisions is impermissible. A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration. He must not read in by way of creation12. The Judge's duty is to interpret and apply the law, not to change it to meet the Judge's idea of what justice requires13. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there.
21. A close scrutiny of the judgments of this Court in Adalat CR No. 497/2023 Neeraj Piplani Vs. State and Anr. Page No 11 of 16 Prasad (supra) and Subramanium Sethuraman (supra) would show that they do not warrant any reconsideration. The Trial Court cannot be conferred with inherent power either to review or recall the order of issuance of process. As held 12 J. Frankfurter, "Of Law and Men: Papers and Addresses of Felix Frankfurter".
14 Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal 1992 Supp (1) SCC 323 above, this Court, in its anxiety to cut down delays in the disposal of complaints under Section 138, has applied Section 258 to hold that the Trial Court has the power to discharge the accused even for reasons other than payment of compensation. However, amendment to the Act empowering the Trial Court to reconsider/recall summons may be considered on the recommendation of the Committee constituted by this Court which shall look into this aspect as well...
6. Judgments of this Court in Adalat Prasad (supra) and Subramanium Sethuraman (supra) have interpreted the law correctly and we reiterate that there is no inherent power of Trial Courts to review or recall the issue of summons. This does not affect the power of the Trial Court under Section 322 of the Code to revisit the order of issue of process in case it is brought to the court's notice that it lacks jurisdiction to try the complaint.
7. Section 258 of the Code is not applicable to complaints under Section 138 of the Act and findings to the contrary in Meters and Instruments (supra) do not lay down correct law. To conclusively deal with this aspect, amendment to the Act empowering the Trial Courts to reconsider/recall summons in respect of complaints under Section 138 shall be considered by the Committee constituted by an order of this Court dated 10.03.2021.
15. Applying the aforesaid principals of law on the facts and circumstances of the case, it is crystal clear that the Ld. Trial Court has passed the summoning order dated 18.01.2023 correcttly and there is no infrimity in the said order. In the case u/s 138 NI Act, the summary trial procedure has been adopted and in such kind of cases, the trial court has no power to review or recall the order of the issue of the summons to the accused CR No. 497/2023 Neeraj Piplani Vs. State and Anr. Page No 12 of 16 persons or discharge the accused persons. In the summary trial cases, there is no power with the court to review the order or recall the order. Accused persons can not seek discharge in a summary triable case, it has been specifically held in Subramanium Sethuraman's case as discussed in preceding paragraphs.
16. Further, the present court have to keep in mind that revisional jurisdiction is normally to be exercised in exceptional cases where there is a glaring defect in procedure or there is manifest error of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. In Taron Mohan v. State & Anr, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 312, Hon'ble Delhi High Court has observed as under:-
"9. The scope of interference in a revision petition is extremely narrow. It is well settled that Section 397 CrPC gives the High Courts or the Sessions Courts jurisdiction to consider the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding inter se an order and as to the regularity of the proceedings of any inferior court. It is also well settled that while considering the legality, propriety or correctness of a finding or a conclusion, normally the revising court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case. A court in revision considers the material only to satisfy itself about the legality and propriety of the findings, sentence and order and refrains from substituting its own conclusion on an elaborate consideration of evidence."
17. Further, Hon'ble Apex Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan vs. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke and others, 2015 (3) SCC 123 wherein it has been observed as under :
"14.....Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate CR No. 497/2023 Neeraj Piplani Vs. State and Anr. Page No 13 of 16 court.The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction."
18. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is crystal clear that in revisionist powers, the present court can only see that whether the order is illegal or it has led to miscarriage of justice or has been passed without any jurisdiction. As I have discussed earlier, it was held in Adalat Prasad Case's that order of taking cognizance, issuance of summons and the discharge of accused can only be subject matter of a proceedings under section 482 of the code as the district courts do not have the inherent power. The contention that the revisionist/accused has actually paid more amount than his liability is the matter of Trial. Similarly, the cheques were given as a security can be proved by the revisionist during the trial. The revisionists/accused persons cannot be discharged only on hearing argument on the stage of serving upon notice under Section 251 of the Cr.P.C. Similarly, the summoning order can be recalled by this court and no proceeding against the accused persons can be dropped under Section 258 of the Cr.P.C. As discussed, the law of land on this aspect is quite clear. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Subramanium Sethuraman vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors (2004) 13 SCC 324 has categorically ruled that "issuance of CR No. 497/2023 Neeraj Piplani Vs. State and Anr. Page No 14 of 16 process under Section 204 is a preliminary step in trial contemplated in Chapter 20 (Section 251 to 259) Cr.P.C and is, therefore, an interlocutory order, the same cannot be reviewed, reconsidered or recalled by the Magistrate. Only remedy available to an aggrieved accused is the extraordinary remedy under Section 482 and not by way of application to recall the summons or to seek discharge. The later not to be contemplated in the trial of a summon case. (Adalat Prasad's case (2004) 7 SCC 338). Once plea of accused is recorded under Section 252, the procedure contemplated under Chapter 20 has to be followed which is to take the trial to its logical conclusion. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases under Section 138 of the NI Act suo moto writ petition (Crl. No. 2/2020) decided on April 16, 2021 has also categorically ruled that the judgements of the court in Adalat Prasad (supra) and Subramanium (supra) had interpreted law correctly and reiterated that there is no inherent power of the trial courts to review or recall or to reviews the order of summoning in the accused. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Court on its own motion vs. State judgment delivered on 20.04.2022 has categorically ruled that 'the Court of a Magistrate do not have the power to discharge the accused upon his appearance in the court in a summoned trial case based upon complaint in general and particularly in a case under Section 138 of the NI Act, once cognizance has already been taken and process under Section 204 issued.
19. The present Court is of the opinion that the Ld. Trial Court CR No. 497/2023 Neeraj Piplani Vs. State and Anr. Page No 15 of 16 has rightly taken into consideration the law on the issue and has applied its judicial mind while passing the impugned order, taking into consideration, the material on record, while coming to the conclusion of issuance of summons against all the accused persons. The present court has the highest regard to the authorities filed but they do not apply to the facts and circumstances of the case.
20. It cannot be said at this stage that the conclusion arrived at by the Ld. Trial Court is unreasonable or unjustified calling for the interference by the present Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. I do not find any infirmity or flaw in the impugned order passed by the Trial Court. Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed.
21. Revision is accordingly disposed of as dismissed.
22. Nothing said herein shall tantamount to have effect on the merits of the case. Trial Court record be sent back alongwith the copy of this judgment.
23. After necessary formalities, revision file be consigned to Record Room. AMBIKA Digitally signed by AMBIKA SINGH SINGH 14:05:59 +0530 Date: 2024.02.19 Announced in the open court (Ambika Singh) on 19.02.24 ASJ-02/THC, West/Delhi 19.02.24 CR No. 497/2023 Neeraj Piplani Vs. State and Anr. Page No 16 of 16