Delhi High Court
Inderjeet Kaur Raina vs Harvinder Kaur Anand on 11 January, 2018
Author: Prathiba M. Singh
Bench: Prathiba M. Singh
$~2
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision : 11th January, 2018
+ RFA 112/2017
INDERJEET KAUR RAINA ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Tuhin Batra, Advocate.
versus
HARVINDER KAUR ANAND ..... Respondent
Through: None.
CORAM:
JUSTICE PRATHIBA M. SINGH
Prathiba M. Singh, J. (Oral)
CM No.47520/2017 (Refund of court fee) in RFA 112/2017
1. On 4th December, 2017, the Appellant withdrew the present appeal as the matter has been settled between the parties. The present application has been moved seeking refund of the court fee of Rs.8,000/- deposited with this appeal.
2. Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 states as under:
"16. Refund of fee - Where the court refers the parties to the suit to any one of the mode of settlement of dispute referred to in Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 the plaintiff shall be entitled to a certificate from the court authorising him to receive back from the collector, the full amount of the fee paid in respect of such plaint."
3. This Court had the occasion to address the scope of Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 read with Section 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in J.K. Forgings v. Essar Construction India Ltd. & Ors. (2009) 113 DRJ 612 (hereinafter, 'J.K. Forgings'), where it held as under:
"11. The laudable object sought to be achieved by inserting and amending these sections seems to be speedy disposal. The policy behind the statute is to reduce the No. of cases by settlement. Section 89 of the CPC and Section 16 of the Court Fees Act are welcome steps in that direction, as the No. of cases has increased, it is the duty of the court to encourage settlement. In present scenario of huge pendency of cases in the courts a purposive and progressive interpretation is the requirement of present hour. The intention of the Legislature is primarily to be gathered from the objects and the words used in the material provisions. The statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning.
12. It is very clear that the Legislative intent of Section 16 of the Court Fees Act was made broad enough to take cognisance of all situations in which parties arrive at a settlement irrespective of the stage of the proceedings. It is also obvious that the purpose of making this provision was in order to provide some sort of incentive to the party who has approached the court to resolve the dispute amicably and obtain a full refund of the court fees. Having regard to this position, the present application will have to be allowed. .............
17. Settlement of dispute only through any of the modes prescribed under Section 89 of CPC is not sine qua non of Section 89 of the CPC rather it prescribes few methods through which settlement can be reached, sine qua non for applicability of Section 89 is settlement between the parties outside the court without the intervention of the courts.
18. It is also not the requirement of the section that the court must always refer the parties to Dispute Resolution Forum. If parties have arrived at out of court settlement it should be welcomed subject to principles of equity.
19. Court Fees Act is a taxing statute and has to be construed strictly and benefit of any ambiguity if any has to go in favour of the party and not to the state.
20. Ex debito justitiae impels me to direct the Registry to refund the court fees to the applicant and the requisite certificate be issued to the applicant."
4. A Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in A. Sreeramaiah v. South Indian Bank Ltd. ILR 2006 Kar 4032, held as follows:
"6. Considering the object behind the Amendment Act, 1999 inserting section 89 of CPC and also the insertion of Section 16, it is clear that the object of providing of refund of Full Court Fees, is to encourage the settlement of the disputes in terms of section 89 of CPC. In this case, the parties agreed for settlement in terms suggested by the Court and accordingly, they have settled their dispute outside the Court. The judicial settlement is also one of the alternative method of settlement of the disputes. As such, in our considered view, in any settlement arrived in terms of section 89 of CPC including the judicial settlements at the intervention and on terms suggested by the Court, the appellant is entitled for refund of Full Court Fees, as otherwise, it would be meaningless if the provisions of section 16 are not applied for settlement of dispute by the parties under section 89. Section 89 does provide for settlement of dispute at any stage of the proceeding, whether it is by way of method referred to therein or by judicial settlement as contemplated under section 89 sub-section (1). As such, we are of the opinion that if the parties come forward to settle their dispute before the Court itself, they should not be denied of refund of Full Court Fees on the ground that they have not settled the dispute before any of the four methods provided under section 89 of CPC. The object behind section 89 is to encourage the parties to arrive at settlement and if that object is sought to be achieved by means of referring the matter to any of the four methods mentioned in section 89, then even the settlement arrived at the earliest stage before the Court would also be one of the method provided under section 89 sub-section (1). Hence, we feel it as just and appropriate to order for full refund of Court Fees in the case of parties settling their dispute before the Court as well as before any of the Forum mentioned under Section 89 of the CPC. No party should be discriminated in the matter of refund of Court Fees mainly on the ground that they have settled the dispute at the earliest stage before the Court without recourse to any of the methods mentioned under section 89 of the CPC. Hence, appellant is entitled for refund of Full Court Fees."
5. This view has been upheld by the Karnataka High Court, in Kamalamma v. Honnali Taluk Agricultural Produce Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd. 2010 (4) KCCR 3211 where, again referring to provisions of Section 89 of CPC and Section 16 of the Act, it was observed as under:
"7. Whether the parties to a suit or appeal or any other proceeding get their dispute settled amicably through Arbitration or meditation or conciliation or in the Lok Adalat, by invoking provisions of Section 89, C.P.C, or they get the same settled between themselves without the intervention of any Arbitrator/ Mediator/ Conciliators or in Lok Adalat etc., and without invoking the provisions of S. 89, Civil Procedure Code, the fact remains that they get their dispute settled without the intervention of the court. If they get their dispute settled by invoking S. 89, C.P.C, in that event the State may have to incur some expenditure but, if they get their dispute settled between themselves without the intervention of the Court or anyone else, such as arbitrator/mediator etc., the State would not be incurring any expenditure. This being so, I am of the considered opinion that whether the parties to a litigation get their dispute settled by invoking Section 89, C.P.C or they get the same settled between themselves without invoking S. 89, Civil Procedure Code, the party paying Court Fees in respect thereof should be entitled to the refund of full Court Fees as provided under Section 16 of the Court Fees Act, 1870. Therefore, the contention of the learned Government Pleader that the principles laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the said case cannot be made applicable to the facts of the present case does not deserve acceptance."
6. In the present case, the appeal was withdrawn in view of the settlement. The counsel for the appellant submits that the settlement was entered into between the parties before the trial court in the Execution proceedings. In view of the fact that the matter has been settled between the parties, the application is allowed and the court fee deposited with this appeal by the Appellant be refunded to the Appellant.
7. Application is disposed of in the above terms.
PRATHIBA M. SINGH, J.
Judge JANUARY 11, 2018/dk