Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Adapa Venkateswara Rao And Ors. vs Y. Venkataramana Reddy And Ors. on 20 November, 1992
Equivalent citations: 1993(1)ALT333
Author: S.B. Majmudar
Bench: S.B. Majmudar
JUDGMENT
1. At the time of final hearing of the miscellaneous petition (W.A.M.P. No. 2270 of 1992), all the learned Advocates for the parties agreed that the hearing of the miscellaneous petition may be treated as final hearing of the main writ appeal. Accordingly, we have heard the learned Counsel for the contesting parties on the merits of the writ appeal itself and the same will be disposed of by this judgment.
2. A few relevant facts leading to these proceedings may be stated at the outset. The first respondent is the original writ petitioner while the original respondents 3 to 6 are the appellants in Writ Appeal No. 1306 of 1992, and the Regional Transport Authority, the original respondent No. 1 in the writ petition, is the second respondent in the appeal. Hereafter, we shall refer to the respective parties as original writ petitioner and the concerned original respondents in the writ petition for the sake of convenience.
3. The original writ petitioner is a Transport Operator. He sought for issuance of a Writ of Mandamus declaring the proceedings dated 1-7-1992 of the Regional Transport Authority, Guntur, the original 1st respondent, rejecting the application of the original writ petitioner for the grant of variation of the route seeking extension of the existing town service route of Guntur-Nallapadu leading to Perecherla junction, as illegal and void. The original writ petitioner was holding the existing town service permit for the route covering 7 Kms. from Guntur to Nallapadu. The said permit was granted to the original writ petitioner on 19-6-1990 and the variation sought for was for further 5 Kms. route beyond Nallapadu upto Perecherla making the total distance to 12 Kms. from the starting point at Guntur. The said request of the original writ petitioner was negatived by the Authority on the ground that, even though the original sanctioned route is 7 Kms. by clubbing the distance in the variation sought, the total route becomes 12 Kms. and that the same is hit by the Scheme framed under G.O.Ms.No. 363, Transport, Roads and Buildings, (Transport-IV) Department, dated 30th May, 1991, and as such, the variation could not be granted. Before the first respondent-Authority, objections were filed by the impleaded respondents 3 to 6 to the effect that the writ petitioner could not be granted such variation on the route sought for, in view of not only G.O.Ms.No. 363, but also earlier G.Os., bearing G.O.Ms.Nos. 317 and 318 containing similar schemes covering the route in question. Both the aforesaid G.Os., were issued on the same date, viz., 28-6-1990. It may be mentioned at this stage that the original writ petitioner was granted pucca permit for the town service route from Guntur to Nallapadu on 19-6-1990. Hence, even on the date of issuance of G.O.Ms.Nos. 317 and 318, the original writ petitioner was holding the pucca permit for the town service operating on the notified route. It is in the background of these facts that the original writ petitioner moved this Court for the aforesaid relief.
4. A learned Single Judge of this Court, B. Subhashan Reddy, J. after hearing the concerned parties, took the view that the variation sought for by the original writ petitioner was not hit by the provisions of the sanctioned Scheme, that even after the variation, the additional distance sought to be covered from Nallapadu to Perecherla was not more than 5 Kms. and that, therefore, the said variation could be validly granted. Accordingly, the order of the original first respondent-Authority, was set aside and it was declared that the original writ petitioner was entitled for the variation sought for from R.T.C. Bus-stand, Guntur, to Perecherla, via, Nallapadu, and the original first respondent was directed to issue pucca permit within a reasonable time, but not latter than fifteen days from the date of receipt of a copy of the order.
5. It is the aforesaid order of the learned Single Judge that is brought in challenge in this writ appeal by respondents 3 to 6. In the application for interim relief, status quo, as existing on the date of the order, was directed to be continued, and accordingly status quo is being continued.
6. Learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that any variation of the existing route would be deemed to be a demand for new permit as laid down in sub-section (3) of Section 80 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Reliance is also placed on Rule 180 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. Placing reliance on the relevant schemes in the field, it was submitted that under the scheme dated 28th June, 1990, the entire route from Guntur to Pedakurapadu, viz., Medikondur and Patibandla was notified as per Section 100 of the Act and when the scheme was for mofussil service/stage carriage on account of Clause (4) of the Scheme, the number of buses proposed to be run by the A.P.S.R.T.C. has to be operated to the complete exclusion of all other persons holding stage carriage permits on the routes overlapping completely or partially on the proposed routes, except to the extent specified in the note appended to the scheme. Placing reliance on the note, it was submitted that, save and except to the extent mentioned in the excluded categories, the total exclusion of all other persons plying vehicles on the notified routes would operate. The 'NOTE' to the Scheme mentioning the excepted categories reads as under:
"Note:- This scheme shall not affect:-
1. The State Transport Undertakings;
2. The Holders of stage carriage permits for a distance of not exceeding 5 Kms. on the notified route;
3. The existing town services operating on the notified route;
4. The existing services operating on the inter-state routes incorporated in the concluded inter-state agreements under Section 63(3-B) of the M.V. Act, 1939; and
5. The services operated by the Devasthanams."
It was submitted that, as per the note, two excluded categories, viz., Categories 2 and 3, can have relevance in the present case. So far as category No. 3 of the note is concerned, the existing town services operating on the notified route are saved. The original writ petitioner has, an existing town service, operating under the stage carriage permit granted to him which covered the distance of 7 Kms. from Guntur to Nallapadu, and because it was an existing town service, it was saved. Similarly, respondents 3 to 6 also were holding existing town service permits operating from Guntur to Perecherla and they were also saved. But, when the question of variation came up in respect of category No. 3 of the note, the excepted category would be only No. 3 of the note and, therefore, the holders of the existing stage carriage permits cannot be given any variation in their existing route so as to cover the distance exceeding 5 Kms. on the notified route, and as such, the variation was not granted to the original writ petitioner. The mofussil town service route would operate from Guntur to Perecherla and that can be 7 + 5 Kms., in all 12 Kms. Hence, such a variation was not covered by excepted category No. 2 of the note and, therefore, the general prohibition in Clause (4) of the scheme would get attracted and that is how the variation request was rightly turned down by the authority. Various decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court were relied upon in support of this contention. It was also submitted that, against the impugned order of the authority, there was a right of appeal available to the original writ petitioner under Section 89(a) of the Act and hence the learned Single Judge should not have interfered in writ proceedings. He should have relegated the original writ petitioner to the remedy under the Act.
7. On the other hand, the learned Counsel for the writ petitioner vehemently contended that the decisions rendered under the old Act of 1939 were no longer relevant, as the Act itself was repealed by the Act of 1988 and that as per Section 217(2) of the Act, only limited actions and orders passed under the earlier Act were saved. It was submitted that the old Act was a pre-Independence Act and it was passed during British rule with a view not to mobilize the citizens while the Act of 1988 was passed by the Parliament with a view to mobilize the citizens. It was further contended that under Article 19(1)(g) and under Article 19 sub-article (6), Clause (ii) of the Constitution, the writ petitioner was carrying on business plying motor vehicles under stage carriage town service permits granted to him and that the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, especially Section 100 found in Chapter VI permitting the Transport authority to run transport service, would not be covered by Article 19, sub-article (6), Clause (ii), as the term "service" is not covered by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Therefore, if the original writ petitioner's business is to be excluded on the notified route by a valid scheme framed under Section 100 of the Act, it should only be in the nature of business and not by way of 'service'. There is also discrimination made between the original writ petitioner and the other private operators while considering the question of variation. This aspect would assume importance in the light of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was further submitted, placing reliance on Sections 98 and 99 of the Act read with the definition clauses Section 2 sub-section (42) defining ' State Transport Undertaking', Section 2 Sub-section (40) 'stage carriage', Section 2 Sub-section (33) 'private service vehicle' and Section 2 Sub-section (47) 'transport vehicle' - that under the A.P. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 there are different types of services contemplated and that there are three types of such services - one service is run by the A.P.S.R.T.C. as contemplated by Sub-section (42) of Section 2, another service is 'stage carriage service' as defined by Section 2, Sub-section (40) which can be run either by a private transporter or by the State Transport Authority and the third is | 'private stage carriage' as defined by Section 2, sub-section (33), which can be run only by a private entrepreneure. It was submitted that Section 98 includes a limited non-obstante clause, and as per the said provision, Chapter VI of the Act can override Only those provisions in Chapter V which are inconsistent with what is provided in Chapter VI. It was, therefore, submitted that the operation of Section 98 should be read down accordingly. It was next contended that the Scheme, on which reliance has been placed, though is covered by the Act of 1988, it in terms excludes from the sweep of the Scheme of existing town services operating on the notified route. That the said provision does not deal with individuals but deals with services, that the Scheme itself is for provision of mofussil service route, as could be seen from clause No. 3 and when clause No. 3 of the note is properly read, all existing town services operating on the notified route are saved and that the original writ petitioner, who was also having an existing town serivce, though operating on a part of the notified route, from Guntur to Nallapadu covering the distance of 7 Kms. is also saved. If this town service is saved, any variation thereunder is also automatically saved under category No. 3 of the note and we need not go to category No. 2 of the note. It was alternatively contended that, even as per category No. 2 of the note, the variation would be saved, as the existing town service granted to the original writ petitioner from Guntur to Nallapadu covering the distance of 7 Kms. is already saved by category No. 3 of the note. Now, the variation sought for is for an extension of the said route from Nallapadu to Perecherla which covers the distance of not more than 5Kms. Therefore, the first overlapping of 7 Kms from Guntur to Nallapadu is saved by category No. 3 of the note and additional overlapping of 5 Kms. from Nallapadu to Perecherla is saved by category No. 2 of the note, as it does not exceed 5 Kms. and that the authorities were in error in clubbing both these routes totalling upto 12 Kms. from Guntur to Perecherla and, therefore, the learned Single Judge rightly set aside that order.
8. Having given our anxious consideration to these rival contentions, we have reached the conclusion that the decision rendered by the authority is unexceptionable and with respect to the learned Judge, he was not justified in holding otherwise. The reasons for our conclusion are obvious.
9. In the light of the admitted position, it must be stated at the outset that the original writ petitioner was holding stage carriage permit entitling him to carry on the town service operations on the notified route from Guntur to Nallapadu covering the distance of 7 Kms. on the date on which the Scheme in G.O.Ms. No. 318, Transport, Roads and Buildings (Transport-IV) Department, dated 28th June, 1990 from Guntur, Pedakurapadu, via., Medikundur and Patibandla, was sanctioned. It is not in dispute that the route from Guntur to Nallapadu and from Nallapadu to Perecherla overlaps the aforesaid notified route between Guntur and Pedakurapadu. Consequently, the writ petitioner's existing town service under the stage carriage permit can be validly operated from Guntur to Nallapadu even if it results in overlapping pf more than 5 Kms. on the notified route. That would be clearly saved by category No. 3 of the note.
10. Now the short question is whether the original writ petitioner can claim any variation for extension of the said town service permit for further 5 Kms. beyond Nallapadu to Perecherla. A mere look at Sub-section (3) of Section 80 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 shows that an application to vary the conditions of any permit, other than a temporary permit, by the inclusion of a new route or routes or a new area by altering the route or area covered by it, or in the case of a stage carriage permit by increasing the number of trips above the specified maximum or by the variation, extension or curtailment of the route or routes or the area specified in the permit, shall be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit. We are not concerned with the provisos to the sub- section. Hence, we need not refer to them. Therefore, the variation or extension in the existing stage carriage permit available to the petitioner has to be treated as an application for the grant of a new permit. Now, it must be stated that it is not the case of the original writ petitioner that he wants a separate permit from Nallapadu to Perecherla. AH he wants is extension of the original stage carriage permit starting from Guntur and he wants to get it extended upto Perecherla. Now, if, by Section 80, Sub-section (3) of the Act, such a request is to be considered as one for the grant of a new permit, the moot question arises is whether such a new permit from Guntur to Perecherla covering the distance of 12 Kms. which was overlapping on the notified route, can be validly granted in the face of the existing scheme which prohibits all others except the A.P.S.R.T.C. to ply its buses on the notified route. So far as that question is concerned, category No. 3of the note gets excluded having saved the original writ petitioner's existing town service operating from Guntur to Nallapadu covering the distance of 7 Kms. When an extension to this route beyond Nallapadu is prayed for and when it is to be treated as an application for a new permit, then the first terminus will be Guntur and the second terminus, which is sought to be extended, will be Perecherla. Between the two termini of the new route, as prayed for, the distance of overlapping on the notified route would be 7 Kms. + 5 Kms. in all 12 Kms. That is not saved by category No. 3 of the note; nor can it be saved by category No. 2 of the note, as it in terms restricts itself to only such stage carriage permits as are to be granted for a distance not exceeding 5 Kms. on the notified route. As the distance from Guntur to Perecherla is more than 5 Kms. the prayer for such an extension or variation cannot be granted in the face of category No. 2 of the-note. With respect, the learned Single Judge was in error in taking the view by dividing the request of the original writ petitioner for variation into two parts - first part to be covered under condition No. 3 of the note from Guntur to Nallapadu, and second part separately covered by condition No. 2 of the note from Nallapadu to Perecherla covering the distance of 5 Kms. That would amount to by passing the very nature of the violation and the amendment sought for by the original writ petitioner. Consequently, the said reasoning and the conclusion to which the learned Single Judge reached cannot be sustained on the very language of the relevant clauses of the Scheme and the conditions of the note appended thereto. Thus, on the clear language of the relevant provisions of the scheme, the original writ petitioner's contention is liable to be repelled.
11. We may now refer to a few decisions to which our attention was invited by the learned Counsel for the appellants. In the case of Pandiyan Roadways Corporation Limited v. Thiru M.A. Egappan, it was been clearly held by the Supreme Court in the light of a similar scheme of the 1939 Act, that "it cannot be said that an application for the variation of a permit held by the operator in question was not in fact an application for a permit and does not fall within the mischief of Section 68-F(l-D). In the context in which Section 68~F(1-D) appears it cannot be said that the application for variation of a permit by including the whole or any part of route in respect of which a scheme is published under Section 68-C can be treated as falling outside the mischief of Section 68-F(l-D). There is no justification to limit the application of Section 68-F(l-D) to only applications for fresh permits or their renewal and to leave out applications for variation of a permit by the inclusion of the route or a portion of the route in respect of which a scheme is published. The fact that the applicant is the holder of a permit to operate a stage carriage on another route whose variation he is seeking by the inclusion of a route or a part thereof in respect of which a scheme is published ought not to make any difference". In the case of Ram Krishna Verma v. State of U.P, ., the Supreme Court in terms ruled that "draft scheme under Section 68-C and approved under Section 68-D of Chapter IV-A of the Repealed Act (Chapter-VI of the Act) is a law and it has overriding effect over Chapter IV of the repealed Act (Chapter-V of the new Act of 1988). It operates against every one unless it is modified. It excludes private operators from the area or route or a portion thereof covered under the Scheme except to the extent excluded under that Scheme". The Supreme Court also in the said decision spoke on the scope and ambit of Act, 1988 and held that "Chapter-VI of the Act shall have overriding effect on Chapter-V notwithstanding any right given to private operators in Chapter-V of the Act. No corridor protection to private operators is permissible". In view of this decision of the Supreme Court, it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned Advocate for the original petitioner that Chapter-VI has a limited overriding effect. Learned Counsel for the appellants also invited our attention to the Full Bench decision of this Court in S. Vanaja v. Secretary, State Transport Authority, . In paragraph 32 of the report, it was in terms held by the Full Bench placing reliance on an earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Adarsh Travels Bus Service v. State of U.P., . that once a scheme is published under Section 68-A of the Act, the area to which it relates is called "notified area" and the route to which it relates is called "notified route". Sri G. Suryanarayana, learned counsel, who led the arguments on behalf of the private operators contended that what is prohibited by Section 68-FF of the Act is only 'granting of any permit' but not 'variations of the conditions of permit'. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the private operators. It is clear from the above that after the approved scheme is published the embargo under Section 68-FF of the Act operates even to the grant of variations of a permit in respect of any notified area or notified route, except in accordance with the provisions of the Scheme". Placing reliance on the Division Bench decision of this Court in APSRTC v. Secretary S.T.A.,1989 (1) ALT 723 it was submitted that a new entrant on the inter-state route was not entitled to permit partially overlapping nationalised routes; nor is entitled to counter-signature of STA for running his vehicle. Reliance was also placed on another Division Bench decision of this Court in A.P.S.R.T.C. v. S.T.A. Tribunal, 1988(1) ALT 825. B.P.jeevan Reddy, j. (as he then was) speaking for the Division Bench considered the fact of proposed variation in the permit and it was held that "what cannot be done in the name of permit cannot be allowed to be done in the name of variation. Having regard to the scheme and context of Sub-section (1-D), the expression 'permit' in the said Sub-section also takes in variation, which has the same effect as the grant of a permit - whether it be extension of the route or addition of the trips, whether by inclusion of an additional vehicle or without such addition". Reliance was also placed on another Division Bench decision of this Court in Writ Appeal No. 382 of 1984 decided on 4-7-1984. There also, the Division Bench in terms considered the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that although he may not be able to traverse the notified route for more than a distance of 8 Kms. by obtaining a stage carriage permit, he may do so by obtaining the variation of the conditions of the existing permit and rejected the same holding that "what a future stage carriage permit holder cannot do directly certainly he cannot be permitted to do indirectly. In that decision, the earlier decision of a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Rarnachandra Raju and Sardar Ali Khan, JJ., in Writ Petition No. 7101 of 1983 was also pressed in service. A similar view was taken by yet another Division Bench decision of this Court in Writ Petition No. 4790 of 1987 dated 19-10-1992. Our attention Was also invited to a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in K. Venkateswara Reddy v. S.T.A.T, 1990 (1) An. W.R.387. In that case, the learned Single Judge was concerned with the question whether extension of existing stage carriage permit overlapping more than 8 Kms. on the notified route would be permitted. Answering this question in the negative, it was held that the grant of variation in such cases would be illegal. The learned Single Judge placing reliance on three Supreme Court decisions in Shivchand Anolak Chand v. R.T, Authority, . Adarsh Travels Bus-Service v. State of U.P. (supra) and Pandiyan Roadways Corporation Limited v. Thiru M.A. Egnppan (supra), held as under:
"In the instant case, the route length before variation was 8.7 Kms. and after variation of permit, by extending the route, 7 Kms. are added to route length consequently the route overlaps more than 8 Kms. on the notified route. The variation of the route cannot, therefore, be said to be a short extension. At the extension of the route granted by the 1st respondent is substantial, it is not possible to say that after grating of extension it would remain the same route."
The aforesaid view taken by the learned Judge in the said decision is in consonance with the settled legal position flowing from various decisions of this Court as well as the decisions of the Supreme Court on the point.
12. It is now time for us to examine the contentions canvassed by the learned counsel for the original writ petitioner. It is difficult for us to appreciate his contention that Article 14 of the Constitution stands violated in the present case, as the contesting original respondents 3 to 6 are already plying their vehicles by way of town service between Guntur to Perecherla which covers the distance of 12 Kms. and that refusing such a coverage by extension, as prayed for by the original writ petitioner, would amount to discrimination. It is obvious that, as per condition No. 3 of the note appended to the relevant scheme, all existing town service operators on the notified route are saved. That saved the original respondents 3 to 6 on the one hand and the original writ petitioner on the other; thereby they formed one class covered by condition No. 3 of the note. So far as the extension question is concerned, the original respondents 3 to 6 have not asked for any variation or extension. If they had sought for such an extension or variation, they would have met the same fate the original writ petitioner is likely to meet. For the purpose of extension and variation beyond the existing town service route, the original writ petitioner forms a separate class and, therefore, he cannot claim any discrimination if he is to be treated alike Respondents 3 to 6 only sofar as condition No. 3 of the note is concerned. Sofar as condition No. 2 of the note is concerned, he stands entirely on a separate footing. Even this aspect is covered by the latest decision of the Supreme Court in APSRTC v. P. V. Ramamohan Chowdary, AlR 1992 SC 888. Hence, this contention cannot be accepted.
13. Sofar as the reading down of Section 98 of the Act is concerned, the learned Advocate for the original writ petitioner is not on a firm footing. It is true that A.P. Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 contemplates various types of services of transport vehicles which are made available to the public. It may be that the State Transport Undertaking can carry on one type of transport service while the private operator may carry on another type of service by the private stage carriage service, but that would make no difference. All the services are subject to the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules. Consequently, the submission that stage carriage service, which is run by private operators for business purposes cannot be overridden by the provisions under the Scheme for running the service exclusively by the State Transport Undertaking cannot be accepted, as it is contemplated by the very provisions of the Act, especially Chapter-VI which has overriding effect over Chapter-V. The contention of the learned counsel for the original writ petitioner that under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution the right to carry on business is a fundamental right and the same cannot be restricted by any legislation providing for transport 'service', cannot be accepted. When we go through clause (6) of Article 19, we find that, in terms, it provides that nothing in sub-clause (g) of Clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law insofar as it imposes or prevents the State from making any law; meaning thereby the right to carry on business by a citizen as a transport operator can be validly restricted or overridden by any law enacted by the Legislature in the interests of general public and it imposes reasonable restrictions on the fundamental right to carry on business by citizen as a private operator. The second part of clause (6) only deals, in particular, with such permissible restrictions, when it provides that nothing in sub-clause (g) shall affect the operation of any existing law insofar as it relates to, or prevents the State from. making any law relating to carrying on by the State, or by a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, of any trade, business, industry or service, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise. Thus, the right to carry on business as a Private Operator can be validly overidden by any statutory provision covered within the permissible limits of clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution which can legitimately provide for running of any transport service by authorities to the exclusion, complete or partial, of citizens or otherwise.
14. It is no argument to say that right to carry on business by private transport operators can be overridden only by the Act which provides for running of a parallel business by the State authorities as that would amount to ignoring the word 'service' as is employed by sub-clause (ii) of Clause (6) of Article 19 of the Constitution. Even this aspect is covered by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Kodali Kumaraswamy v. State, . Consequently, the submission of the learned counsel for the original writ petitioner about reading down the scope of Section 98 of the Act in the light of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution read with Article 14 cannot be accepted. Similarly, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that reliance on the earlier decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court rendered in connection with the Act of 1939 is irrelevant, cannot be accepted, as these decisions are rendered on the effect of almost parallel statutory Schemes under the Central Act on rights of private transport operators. Even though the old Act was repealed by Section 217 of the Act, as per Section 217 Sub-section (2)(a) and (e) the existing notifications covering the pre-existing schemes are saved and similarly even existing schemes have to be processed under Section 100. Therefore, it can be said that all earlier decisions are irrelevant. That takes us to the last contention canvassed by the learned counsel for the original writ petitioner. He submitted that the existing town services are also saved by condition No. 3 of the note and therefore what is saved cannot be re-considered for the purpose of computing the distance of overlapping as contemplated by condition No. 2 of the note. We have already discussed that aspect while considering the clear language of the scheme. To reiterate, once variation and extension of the existing stage carriage permit is sought and it is by the thrust of the statutory provision under Section 80 Sub-section (3) of the Act, to be treated as an application for a new permit, and once starting point is insisted upon as Guntur, the new route sought to be covered by an amendment of variation must be treated to have started from Guntur and to be ending at Perecherla, which will be clearly 12 Kms. and therefore it would be hit by condition No. 2 of the note of the Scheme. Therefore, the last contention of the learned counsel for the original writ petitioner cannot be accepted. It is true, as submitted by him, that the scheme itself is for mofussil service/stage carriage, while condition No. 3 of the note is for the existing town service operating on the notified route. But because of the thrust on Clause (4) on the notified route of the moffussil service, all other operators were excluded, save and except to the extent permitted by the note and that is why the existing town service operators, if seeking amendment or variation not permitted by condition No. 2 of the note, cannot be allowed such impermissible overlapping exceeding 5 Kms. on the notified route. Hence, the submission of the learned counsel for the original writ petitioner cannot be accepted. These were the only contentions raised by the learned counsel for the original writ petitioner. There is no substance in any one of them.
15. Before parting with this judgment we may mention that the objection put forward by the learned Counsel for the appellants on the ground of alternative remedy would not survive as the learned Single Judge has decided the matter on merits, and hence at this stage it would not be proper to dispose of the matter only on the ground of alternative remedy. Hence, we thought it fit to examine the case on merits and to render our decision.
16. The inevitable result is that the writ appeal succeeds and will stand allowed. The order of the learned Single Judge will stand set aside. There will be no order as to costs.
17. The ad interim relief granted earlier will not survive, as the writ appeal itself is disposed of by this judgment.