Madhya Pradesh High Court
Bhoni Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 5 May, 2017
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RP No.176/2017
05-05-2017
Parties through their counsel.
The petitioner before this court has filed the present review
petition against the order dated 24-04-2017 passed in Writ
Petition No. 3032/2016.
In the aforesaid case, the petitioner was claiming appointment
on the post of Constable. This court has relied upon the
judgment delivered in the case of Dinesh Singh Parihar Vs. State
of M.P and other and has allowed the writ petition.
Learned counsel has argued before this court that the judgment
delivered in the case of Dinesh Singh Parihar (supra) was
subjected to appeal and the writ appeal preferred by the State
Government i.e Writ Appeal against the order dated
08-06-2011 has been allowed by the Division Bench i.e Writ
Appeal No. 724/2014 meaning thereby the judgment relied by
this court was not in existence, which has been relied upon in
the case of Dinesh Singh Parihar (supra).
It is true that this court has taken into account the judgment
delivered in the case of Dinesh Singh Parihar(supra), but the
fact remains that other cases were also decided by this court.
The judgment delivered in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Manish
Verma in Writ Appeal No. 73/2015 has affirmed the judgment
delivered by the Single Judge in similar circumstances and the
SLP preferred against the judgment delivered by Division Bench
in the case of State of M.P Vs. Manish Verma has been
dismissed by Hon'ble Supreme Court. Resultantly, the paragraph
in order dated 24-04-2017 starting from :-
"The respondents are heavily place reliance upon
the judgment delivered by the HonâbleApex Court in the case of Mehar Singh (supra). This Court in almost all similar circumstances has -2- considered the judgment delivered in the case of Mehar Singh, by deciding the petition filed by one Dinesh Singh Parihar. This Court in the case of Dinesh Singh Parihar Vs. State of MP and Others passed in Writ Petition No.896/2014 dated 18.06.2014 has held as under:-
"The petitioner before this Court has filed this present petition being aggrieved by an order dated 11.11.13 by which the petitioner has been declined an appointment to the post of Constable, General Duty in the services of Home Department (Police). In the present case, the petitioner was subjected to prosecution in respect of offences under Section 324/34 IPC read with section 3(1)(10) of The Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 registered at Crime No.44/2012 and he has been acquitted vide acquittal order dated 3.8.10. He was selected for the post of Constable, General Duty in the year 2013, however an order has been passed declaring him to be unfit for appointment solely on the ground that a criminal case was registered against him, in which he has been acquitted by giving the benefit of doubt. The contention of the petitioner is that he is entitled for appointment as he has been acquitted by the trial Court, irrespective of the fact whether it is on technical ground or whether it is on account of giving the benefit of doubt.
On the other hand a detailed and exhaustive reply has been filed in the matter and it has been stated that the petitioner has not been honourably acquitted by the Trial Court and as the acquittal is not an honourable acquittal and as he has to be appointed as a member of police force, the question of appointing the petitioner does not arise. The respondents have also stated that they have rightly passed the impugned order dated 11.11.13 and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. Heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record.
In the present case, the petitioner has never at any point of time suppressed the factum of criminal case, which was registered at Crime No.44/2012 and he has been honourably acquitted. A similar controversycame up before this Court and this Court in the case of Rakesh Sharma Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & 5 Ors. (WP No.9913/2012) and in the aforesaid case this Court has held as under :-
"The petitioner before this Court has filed this -3- present writ petition for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondents to appoint the petitioner on the post of Constable General Duty. Petitioner is also aggrieved by order dated 13/7/12 by which the Inspector General of Police has rejected the claim of the petitioner. In the present case, the petitioner has participated in the process of selection for the post of Constable in the year 2012 and has also submitted a police verification form stating categorically therein that he has been acquitted in S.T. No. 196/2007 on 14/2/2008. The petitioner by virtue of his merit was selected for the post of Constable, however, the appointing Authority as well as the Inspector General of Police have rejected the petitioner's claim for appointment even though he is more meritorious and persons who are less meritorious have been appointed to the post of Constable General Duty. The only reason assigned in the return is that the petitioner as he has been acquitted by giving benefit of doubt in respect of Crime No. 126/2006, cannot be appointed to the post of Constable General Duty. Learned counsel for the respondents - State has drawn attention of this Court towards paragraphs 53 of the M.P. Police Regulations and his contention is that a person who is seeking appointment on the post of a Constable should bear a good moral character and therefore, as the petitioner was prosecuted for an offence u/S. 302, 147, 148 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, he does not bear good moral character, hence the order passed by the Inspector General of Police does not warrant any interference.
This Court is of the considered opinion that once the petitioner has been acquitted, the entire crime registered against him stands wiped out. An acquittal is an acquittal whether it is a "clean acquittal", whether it is "honourable acquittal" or "acquittal based on giving benefit of doubt". The "clean acquittal", the "honourable acquittal" or "acquittal based on giving benefit of doubt" has not been distinguished in the Code of Criminal Procedure. This court in the case of Smt Panna Mehta Vs. State of M.P. reported in 2002(4) M.P.H.T. 226 in paragraph 11 and 12 held as under :-
"11. In the Code of Criminal Procedure, Indian Penal Code, Evidence Act or any other enactment, the word, "acquittal" has not been defined. As per the Law Lexicon, the Encyclopaedic Law Dictionary -4- (Edn. 1992) "Acquittal" defined, Act X of 1882, Section 403, "the word acquittal is verbum equivocum , and may in ordinary language be used to express either the verdict of a jury, or the formal judgment of the Court, that the prisoner is not guilty". (Per Tindal, C.J., Burgess Vs. Boetefeur, 13 LJMC 126 : 135 ER 193). It is generally said that a party is acquitted by the jury, but in fact, the acquittal is by the judgment of the court (ibid). According to the Oxford Dictionary, "acquittal"
means that a person is not guilty of a crime, with which he has been charged. So in a criminal jurisprudence there is no difference between "clean acquittal", "honourable acquittal" or "acquittal based on giving benefit of doubt". When the accused is acquitted by giving benefit of doubt means the prosecution was not able to prove its case beyond doubt.
12. As ruled by the SUPREME court in case of Manni Lal Vs. Parmai Lal (AIR 1971 SC 330) and Dilip Kumar Sharma and others Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1976 SC 133), order of acquittal means a person concerned, has not committed the offence for which he was charged and tried. Criminal Courts are recording acquittal when the prosecution fails to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt and benefit of doubt given to the accused does not mean that the accused was involved in the case but the same could not be proved by the prosecution. In Criminal Law, words "beyond reasonable doubt" cannot be termed as stigma or proof of any criminal charge against acquitted accused. Therefore, petition for expunging the same is not maintainable under Section 482, Cr.PC and the same is misconceived." Keeping in view the aforesaid judgment, as the prosecution was not able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, it cannot be termed as stigma or proof of any criminal charge against the acquitted person. Resultantly, there is no other material available against the petitioner and as there was no suppression on the part of the petitioner, the criminal case which is no longer in existence and in which the petitioner has been acquitted will not come in way of the petitioner in the matter of appointment.
Resultantly, in the light of the judgment delivered in the case of Smt. Panna Mehta (supra) as the petitioner has been acquitted, he is certainly entitled for appointment for the post of Constable -5- General Duty. The Writ Petition is allowed with the following directions:
(1) Respondent Superintendent of Police, Dewas is directed to issue an appointment order in respect of the petitioner forthwith on the post of Constable General Duty by virtue of his placement in the merit list and the criminal case in which the petitioner has been acquitted will not come in way of the petitioner.
(2) The petitioner shall be entitled for the seniority from the date other persons have been appointed on the basis of same examination and shall be entitled for all consequential benefits except back- wages.
(3) The exercise of appointing the petitioner and granting all consequential benefits be concluded within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order." It is pertinent to note that the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court delivered in the case of Commissioner of Police, New Delhi Vs. Mehar Singh in Civil Appeal No.4842/2013 decided on 2.7.2013 relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents was relating to appointment under the Delhi Police Establishment and there was a Standing Order i.e. Standing Order 398, which was applicable in the aforesaid case, whereas in the present case there is no such Standing Order in existence, on the contrary the Madhya Pradesh Manual and Regulations under the regulation-54, even provides for appointment of a person, who has been convicted with the approval of Inspector General of Police on the post of Constable and therefore, in light of the aforesaid Regulations and also in light of the fact that there is no such Standing Order in existence in the present case, which has been considered by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case, the writ petition deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed.
Resultantly, the impugned order dated 11.11.13 is hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to take appropriate steps for issuance of appropriate orders for appointment of the petitioner within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order keeping in view his placement in the merit list. The petitioner shall not be entitled for back wages, however he shall be entitled for seniority and all other consequential benefits.
With the aforesaid, the writ petition is allowed. No order as to costs."
-6-The aforesaid judgment has dealt with the regulation 54 of the Police Regulation in the State of Madhya Pradesh Police Manual, which provides for appointment of a person who has been convicted with the approval of Inspector General of Police on the post of Constable, whereas in the present case the petitioner was acquitted from all the charges, therefore, the judgment delivered by the Apex Court in the case of Mehar Singh cannot be applied in the petitioner'ss case. The further important aspect of this case is that the process of selection has been made in the year 2005. The respondents have committed a mistake in not considering the case of the petitioner for appointment to the post of Constable, even though the height of the petitioner was 1.69 metres, the respondents have forced the petitioner to file the writ petition earlier in the year 2006 i.e. the Writ Petition No.3795/2006 which was ultimately decided on 07.03.2013. The mistake was committed by the State Government in not granting appointment to the petitioner inspite of his having the requisite height and the petitioner was compelled to file the writ petition. The petitioner would have been appointed prior to year 2006 itself and now because of a criminal case registered against him, the respondents have denied the appointment to him."
stands deleted and following is hereby substituted :-
"The respondents have placed upon the judgment delivered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mehar Singh (supra). The judgment delivered has been considered by the Division Bench of this court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Manish. The judgment delivered by the Division Bench in the aforesaid case dated 28-07-2015 reads as under :-
"By this writ appeal under Section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyapith Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 the appellants are aggrieved by the judgment dated 16.10.2014 -7- passed in W.P. No.3560/14(S) whereby the petition has been allowed.
02. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the respondent Manish Verma had applied for the post of Police Constable and participated in the Police Constable Recruitment Test of 2012 conducted by respondent M.P. Professional Examination Board and he had stated on affidavit that there was a matter for offence under Section 498-A of IPC pending before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ujjain. He qualified for the second round and passed the medical test. In the meantime he was acquitted from the case pending against him and hence he filed another affidavit to the concerned authority that he had been acquitted but the respondent Professional Board depending on Government Circular No.F.17-74/2002/C-a dated 5th June, 2003 rejected his appointment since he was involved in an offence of moral turpitude. Being aggrieved by the non-selection respondent Shri Verma filed a WP bearing No.3560/14(S) whereby it was vehemently urged that a character verification was given by the committee constituted as per guidelines prescribed in the Supreme Court judgment in the matter of Civil Appeal no.4842/13 SLP No.38886/12 Commissioner of Delhi Vs. Meharsingh which had held that if the acquittal in a criminal case was not honourable only then the eligibility would be affected and that the candidate would not be eligible for the police service in which high level of morality is essential.
03. Counsel for the appellant/State has contended that despite having considered the said case, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition and directed the Professional Board to issue the consequential appointment order if he was otherwise eligible according to the merit list and the respondent Board could not deny appointment to the petitioner only because he was involved in the criminal case as he has been acquitted vide judgment of acquittal dated 09.12.2013. Counsel submitted that such a finding was contrary to the facts of the case and Counsel placed reliance on Commissioner of Delhi (supra) as well as the another judgment by the Apex Court in the matter of State of MP and others Vs. Parvez Khan [Civil Appeal No.10613 of 2014] to bolster his submissions. Counsel vehemently urged the fact that the respondent was charged with offence -8- under Section 498-A of the IPC and the acquittal was not honourable and the police service is a unit force which requires a high degree of morality and integrity and hence the petitioner cannot be considered for appointment.
04. Moreover Counsel submitted that the case of the respondent has been considered by a duly constituted screening committee and a full opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner and it was the ground of moral turpitude that he is not eligible for the police service. Counsel placed reliance on a Circular of the Govt. dated 05.06.2003 whereby there is a bar for consideration of such person and offence under Section 498-A of IPC has been included in the scheduled offences of moral turpitude at Sl. No.11 and the Circular has been filed as Annexure A/2 along with the present appeal and Counsel prayed that the learned Single Judge had erred in coming to the conclusion that the acquittal was honourable and that the petitioner was entitled to the appointment. The findings of the Screening Committee were final in this regard and placing reliance on Meher Singh (supra) Counsel submitted that there was no malafides in the proceedings of the Screening Committee and it cannot be assailed in the light of Meher Singh. The Apex Court had also held that the High Court was not justified in interfering while the order of rejecting of the respondent of recruitment of the police service and in this light also Counsel prayed that the judgment of the learned Single Judge be set aside.
05. Per Contra Counsel for the respondent Manish Verma has vehemently urged the fact that in the matter of Rakesh Sharma Vs. State of MP in WP No.9913/2012 considered by the learned Single Judge and other cases it was considered that nothing has been suppressed by the respondent Shri Verma and in the police verification form also quite categorically stated that the case was pending against him and subsequently it has resulted in an acquittal. The acquittal is a clean acquittal and hence no interference is called for in the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Moreover Counsel submitted that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case the wife had also stated that she had no objection if the applicant was considered for the -9- appointment primarily since the matrimonial dispute had been compromised and they were now living together as man and wife, Counsel prayed that the appeal was without merit and the same be dismissed.
06. On considering the above submissions, we find that the proceedings of the Screening Committee are not barred from judicial scrutiny. The learned Single Judge has come to the conclusion that the proceedings were arbitrary and the acquittal has been honourable. Then under these circumstances we do not find any good ground to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge. Moreover even if the testimony of the wife is considered she has categorically stated in trial Court during the trial that at the time of marriage no dowry was demanded and she has also admitted in impugned para - 12 & 13 of her deposition that the applicant was without a job and she wanted to reside separately with him and the compromise had been arrived at during the period of trial itself. Moreover she has stated so before this Court also. Then under these circumstances, we find that only question that remains to be considered is whether offence under Section 498-A of the IPC would be one of moral turpitude and the acquittal of the accused has been honourable ?
07. On considering the above submissions and the record we find that the Counsel for the appellants has very vehemently urged the fact that the findings of the Screening Committee could not have been assailed in the writ petition since it was specially constituted body and had considered the case in accordance with the provisions of law. And he relied on the cases of Pervez Khan and Mehar Singh (supra), however we find that even in the said case, the Court had held in impugned para-29 that the Screening committee's proceedings have been assailed as being arbitrary, unguided and unfettered. The Apex Court had also considered the fact that the acquittal of Mehar Singh was based on the compromise, however, disclosure was not made in the said case regarding the enmity and other important facts i.e. Mehar Singh had other criminal cases also recorded against him and in this regard the Apex Court had come to the conclusion that the acquittal was not honourable. Whereas in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, it would be difficult to hold that the acquittal of the respondent Shri Verma was
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otherwise. On scrutinising the evidence available on record, we find that in the judgment of acquittal, the learned Judge of the trial Court has categorically stated that the demand was not for dowry but a loan had been availed by the respondent and hence the prosecution case had not been established and the accused had been acquitted since the ingredients of offence under Section 498-A of the IPC were not fulfilled; then under these circumstances it would be difficult to hold that the acquittal was not honourable.
08. Consequently we find that the findings of the Screening Committee are open to scrutiny and the learned Single Judge has very correctly considered the evidence on record and to do substantial justice between the parties arrived at the conclusion that the acquittal was not tainted. Moreover the respondent's wife Smt. Verma has also appeared before this Court as well as the trial Court and stated that she was now amicably residing with the respondent Shri Verma and the criminal cases had been compromised and withdrawn. Considering the fact that the compromise was also before the Screening Committee, it ought to have properly interpreted the principles laid down by the Apex Court. Undoubtedly the Screening Committee had to carry out the object of the comprehensive policy of the State and the scheme referred to above and since admittedly the police services demand a high standard of morality; but in the present case to our mind it would be improper to hold that the acquittal was not honourable since there is categoric finding by the trial Court that the respondent Shri Verma was not guilty of the offence of demand of dowry. In these circumstances, we do not find any good ground to interfere in the judgment of the learned Single Judge since in the present case the husband and wife have reconciled each other after being estranged over matrimonial disputes and it was also in the interest of general public that the matrimonial disputes are required to be settled amicably and the judgment of the learned Single Judge directing the appointment if the respondent Shri Verma is otherwise eligible would go a far way in cementing the matrimonial chords and strengthening the institution of marriage. In this light also no fault can be found with the judgment impugned and it does not call for any interference.
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The appeal is without merit and the same is dismissed as such."
The aforesaid judgment was also in respect of police personnel and it has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The petitioner was acquitted in respect of all the charges and the petitioner has participated in the process of selection in the year 2005 and it was the action of the respondent which has deprived from appointment in the year 2006. The question of considering the criminal case which took place in the year 2011 does not arise, specially in light of the petitioner's acquittal.
Resultantly, the criminal case will not come in way of the petitioner as the petitioner has been acquitted and has been given a clear cut acquittal. Not only this, there was no suppression on the part of the petitioner, at any point of time before any authorities.
The aforesaid paragraph shall be the part of the judgment delivered by this court on 24-04-2017 in Writ Petition No. 3032/2016 and resultantly, the review petition stands allowed.
The present order shall be read conjointly with the earlier order passed by this court dated 24-04-2017.
Certified copy as per rules.
(S. C. SHARMA) JUDGE Rashmi