Patna High Court
Arvind Coal & Construction Co. vs Damodar Valley Corporation on 7 February, 1990
Equivalent citations: AIR1991PAT14, AIR 1991 PATNA 14
Author: S.B. Sinha
Bench: S.B. Sinha
JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J.
1. This First Appeal at the instance of the plaintiff arises out of a judgment and decree dated 23-3-1980 passed by Shri Jiwan Tigga, Subordinate Judge, 2nd Court, Dhanbad in Money Suit No. 56 of 1979 whereby and where under the said learned court dismissed the plaintiffs appellant's suit.
2. The plaintiff-appellant filed the aforementioned suit against the defendant for recovery of a sum of Rs. 21,000/- deposited by way of earnest money in terms of National Saving Certificate along with interest and costs.
3. The basic facts of the case are admitted and the other facts also are not much in dispute. The defendant called for a tender for transportation of coal from Nirs Raniganj coal fields to the defendants' power house Durgapur, Pursuant to the aforementioned notice inviting tender, the plaintiff submitted his tender dated 24-9-1975 and deposited a sum of Rs. 20,000/- in the shape of National Serving Certificates. The defendant corporation directed the plaintiff to submit its credentials which the plaintiff complied with on 1-10-1975. The plaintiff allegedly had given consent of granting rebate, if the defendants make fortnightly payment of the bills which were to be submitted by the plaintiffs, if their tender was accepted.
4. The plaintiffs contended that normally a truck carries 12 to 13 tonnes of coal and on this basis the plaintiff had quoted its rate but subsequently they came to learnt that the Coal Mines Authority Limited intended to impose restrictions on loading capacity of the truck and hence the plaintiff approached the General Superintendent of the defendant informing them that as they did not own any truck and the truck owners may ask for higher rate for transportation of coal and on that ground they requested for suitable revision of rate if the Coal Mines Authority Ltd. imposes such restriction.
5. It appears that on 22-10-1975 the General Superintendent of the defendant corporation asked the plaintiff for agreeing to grant the maximum rebate. It further appears from the record that the defendant corporation also started negotiations with various other persons with a view to pursue them to lower down their rates.
6. On 27-10-1975, the defendant Corporation issued the work order in favour of the plaintiff.
7. In the said work order, itself (which was marked as Ext. H) it was mentioned that if the said work order case not accepted within a period of three days, the same shall be withdrawn.
8. It appears that immediately upon receipt of the aforementioned work order, the plaintiffs by their letter dated 27-10-1975 and 28-10-1975 (Ext. 5/F and Ext. 5/H) imposed certain condition upon the respondent Corporation for acceptance of the work order. Finally, by a letter dated 4-11-1975 which has been marked as Ext. 5/H; the plaintiffs sought to clarify that they may accept the work order subject to the condition that if, in the event, the Coal Mines Authorities Limited imposes restriction with regard to loading of trucks with reference to their capacity, in that event, the plaintiff may be allowed to revise the rate.
By a letter dated 11-10-1975 the work order was cancelled by the defendant and the earnest money was forfeited.
In the aforementioned premises, the plaintiffs filed a suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 20,000/- which sum, as noticed hereinbefore, was deposited by them in the shape of National Savings Certificates.
9. In the aforementioned suit, the defendant appeared and filed written statements alleging inter alia therein that the deposit of Rs. 20,000/- by the plaintiff in the shape of National Savings Certificate was by way of earnest money.
According to the defendant, the plaintiff was not anxious to execute the work. The defendant further denied that the loading capacity of a truck was restricted by Coal Mines Authorities Ltd. According to the defendant, it issued the work order as a matter of course, the plaintiffs rate being the lowest. It was further alleged that as the plaintiff committed a breach of contract, by not starting the work in terms of the work-order, the earnest money was forfeited in terms of the general conditions of the contract which was a concluded one.
10. On the aforementioned pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed the following issues:--
a) Is the suit maintainable?
b) Has the plaintiff got valid cause of action?
c) Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree or compensation as claimed?
d) To what relief of reliefs, if any, is the plaintiff entitled to?
11. The learned trial court took up issue Nos. 1 and 2 together and upon consideration of the documents on records came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has failed to start the work as per the work order and they violated the terms and condition of the contract, and hence the defendant had a right to forfeit the amount of earnest money deposited by them.
12. With regard to the question as to whether the defendant was entitled to forfeit the aforementioned sum of Rs. 20,000/- or not, it was held that as the plaintiff has failed to turn up for starting the work within the period stipulated in the work order (Ext. 5/ A, which has also been marked as ext. H), the same was liable to be forfeited.
13. The learned trial court further held upon distinguishing a decision of the Supreme Court in Maulabux v. Union of India reported in, AIR 1970 SC 1955; that as the amount was pre-estimated by way of earnest money and the same was deposited in terms of (sic) for tender and further in view of the fact that the losses suffered by the defendant, by reason of breach of contract on the part of the plaintiffs, was higher than the aforementioned sum of Rs. 20,000/- the defendant corporation was entitled to forfeit the aforementioned amount.
14. Mr. P.K. Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant firstly submitted that a sum of Rs. 20,000/- which was deposited in the shape of National Savings Certificate not by way of earnest money. He, in this connection, has placed strong reliance upon a decision of the Privy Council in Kunwar Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swarup reported in AIR 1926 PC 1 as also the decision of the Supreme Court referred to hereinabove i.e., Maula Bux v. Union of India. He further submitted that in view of the fact that before and after issuance of the work order dated 27-10-1975 (Ext. H) the plaintiff had issued the letters dated 27-10-1975 and 28-10-1975 (Exts. 5/T and 5/G) whereby the plaintiff accepted the conditions of grant of rebate but as in terms of its letter dated 4-11-1975 (Ext, 5/ H) they clarified their stand that they were willing to accept the work order subject to the condition that if the Coal Mines Authority Ltd. restricts the loading capacity of Coal on the truck contrary to the prevalent practice; it would be open to them to revise the rate.
15. Mr. Rajnandan Sahay, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that in view of provisions contained in the General Conditions of Contract as also the Special Conditions of contract, the contract become concluded as soon as the work order was issued. The learned counsel further submitted that in view of Clause 2(b) of the General Condition of Contract, a tenderer would be deemed to have 'failed to turn up' unless an intimation to withdraw its offer is conveyed within 24 (twenty fourt) hours of opening of the tender.
The learned counsel further submitted that sofar as the question of restriction on loading of Coal on a truck is concerned, the same is provided for under the Motor Vehicles Rules. He further drew my attention to Clause 4(b) of the General Condition of Contract for the purpose of showing that even therein it has been provided that all the trucks should be loaded up to the brim and flushed to the top level.
16. The learned counsel, therefore, submitted that in this situation, the question of any subsequent event occurring by a proposed imposition of restriction of loading of truck by the Coal Mines Authority Ltd. did not arise.
The learned counsel in the alternative submitted that as the parties had already arrived at a concluded contract, any breach thereof on the part of the plaintiffs entitled the defendant Corporation to recover damages suffered by it and in such a situation, it was entitled to invoke Section 74 of the Contract Act by forfeiting the amount which was deposited with it, in view of the fact that the defendant Corpration had suffered a higher amount of loss than the amount deposited by the plaintiffs by way of earnest money.
17. In view of the rival contentions of the parties, as referred to hereinbefore, the following questions arise for consideration in this appeal:
a) Whether the deposit of a sum of Rs. 20,000/ - was by way of earnest money or by way of security?
b) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties arrived at a concluded contract?
c) Whether the defendant was entitled to forfeit the sum of Rs. 20,000/- which the plaintiff deposited in the shape of National Saving Certificates?
18. Re-question (a) : The question as to whether a particular amount deposited by way of earnest money or a security deposit guaranteeing due performance of contract is no longer res-integra.
The Privy Council in Kunwar Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swarup reported in AIR 1926 Privy Council held that the earnest money is part of the purchase price when the transaction goes forward; it is forfeited when the transaction falls through, by reason of the fault or failure of the vendee.
This aspect of the matter has been considered by the Supreme Court in Maula Bux case, (AIR 1970 PC 1955) (supra) where it has been held as follows:--
"Under the terms of the agreements the amounts deposited by the plaintiff as security for due performance of the contracts were to stand forfeited in case the plaintiff neglected to perform his part of the contract. The High Court observed that the deposits to be made may be regarded as earnest money, but that view cannot be accepted. According to Earl Jowitts in" the Dictionary of English Law" at page 689" Giving an earnest or earnest money is a mode of signifying assent to a contract of sale or the like by giving to the vendor a nominal sum (e.g. a shilling)as a token that the parties are in earnest or have made up their minds". As observed by the Judicial Committee in Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swarup, AIR 1926 PC 1.
"Earnest-money is part of the purchase price when the transaction goes forward, it is forfeited when the transaction falls through by reason of the fault or failure of the vendee".
In the present case the deposit was made not of a sum of money by the purchaser to be applied towards part payment of the price when the contract was completed and till then as evidencing an intention on the part of the purchaser to buy property or goods. Here the plaintiff had deposited the amounts claimed as security for guaranteeing due performance of the contracts. Such deposits cannot be regarded as earnest money".
19. This aspect of the matter has again been considered by the Supreme Court in Shree Hanuman Cotton Mills v. Tata Air Craft Ltd., reported in AIR 1970 SC 1986. In the aforementioned decision, the Supreme Court took into consideration various authorities including the above referred cases and laid down the following principles for the purpose of coming to a conclusion as to what is an earnest:--
"From a review of the decisions cited above, the following principles emerge regarding "earnest".
(1) It must be given at the moment at which the contract is concluded, (2) It represents a guarantee that the contract will be fulfilled or, in other words" earnest" is given to bind the contract.
(3) It is part of the purchase price when the transaction is carried out.
(4) It is forfeited when the transaction falls through by reason of the default of failure of the purchaser.
(5) Unless there is anything to the contrary in the terms of the contract, on default committed by the buyer, the seller is entitled to forfeit the earnest".
20. In the instant case, the term and conditions with regard to the deposit of the amount as also the nature of contract is not disputed.
21. By reason of the notice inviting tender dated 28-8-1975 (Ext.C) the defendant Corporation invited tender for transportation of 3,60,000,000 M.T. of R.O.M. Coal (30,000,000 M.T. approx. per month) from Ranigunj, Nirsa and Mugma Coal Fields to D.T.P.S., DVC, Waria, District Burdwan, West Bengal Coal Yard by road transport.
It is, therefore, clear that the contract which was to be entered into by and between the plaintiff and the defendant is not a contract of sale of goods.
22. Clause 5 of the Special Terms and Conditions for transportation of Coal as contained in Ext. D/1 reads as follows : --
"The amount of Earnest Money deposited by the successful tenderer as per Challan/ Receipt etc. enclosed with the Tender will be adjusted towards security Deposit as provided in Clause (3) hereunder. The amount will, however, be forfeited in case the successful tenderer fails to turn up to take up the work within 15 days from the date of Work Order or such earlier period as may be determined by the General Superintendent. Intimation of inability to take up the work even before issuance of the Work Order will amount to "failure to turn up" unless such intimation is conveyed with (within) 24 (Twenty four) hours of opening of the tenders".
Clause (5) of the special conditions reads as follows :--
"No tender could be considered to be valid, unless the tenderer has deposited a sum of Rs. 20,000/- (Twenty thousand) only as earnest money, in any one of the form prescribed in clause No. 2 in General Terms and Conditions and produced the deposit receipt along with the tender."
23. In the general terms and conditions which is contained in Ext.D, the following covenants appear in Clause 2(d) thereof with regard to the manner in which the earnest money deposited by the successful tenderer, if (be) accepted, which is in the following terms:--
"The amount of earnest money deposited by the successful tenderer as per challan/ receipt etc. enclosed with the tender will be adjusted towards the security deposits as provided under Clause (3) hereinunder. The amount will, however, be forfeited in case the successful tenderer fails to turn up to take up the work within 15 days from the date of work order or such earlier period as may be determined by the General Superintendent, intimation of inability to take up the work even before issuance of work order will amount to "failure to turn up" unless such intimation conveyed within 24 (twenty four) hours of opening of tenders".
24. By reason of Clause 3 of the aforementioned general conditions of contract, the amount of earnest money deposited at the time of tender was to be treated as secutiry deposit and was to be refunded only with the final payment.
25. From the aforementioned provisions in the special conditions of contract read with the general condition of contract as also the nature of job which was to be undertaken by the plaintiff, there cannot be any doubt that in view of the decision of the Privy Council as also the Supreme Court referred to hereinbefore, the sum of Rs. 20,000/- which was to be deposited was to become a security deposit after conclusion of a contract and same was not an earnest money.
26. Re-Question No. (b) and (c): The question as to whether there had been a concluded contract between the parties or not is the main issue.
According to Mr. P. K. Sinha, the parties did not arrive at a concluded contract inasmuch as prior to or after the issuance of work order dated 27-10-1975, the parties were at variance regarding the terms conditions and covenants of the agreement.
27. Mr. Sinha further drew my attention to Clause 14 of the general condition of the contract, in terms whereof all the successful tenderers were required to enter into an agreement within one month from the date of issue of the work order. According to Mr. Sinha, unlesa an agreement in writing as provided in Clause 14 of the aforementioned general condition of contract is executed by and between the contracting parties and or on their behalf, no concluded contract can be said to have been arrived at and thus there could be no breach of any condition of contract on the part of a plaintiff, and as such the question of suffering of damages or losses on the part of the defendant did not arise.
Mr. Sinha further submitted that in this situation, the forfeiture of a sum of Rs. 20,000/- from the security amount deposited by the plaintiff on the alleged ground of the breach on the part of the plaintiff to perform their part of contract did not and could not arise.
28. Mr. P. K. Sinha, in this connection has drawn my attention to the letter dated 25-10-1975 (Ext.5/B).
The learned counsel further drew my attention to the work order dated 27-10-1975 (Ext. H) and submitted that even in terms of Clause 8 thereof the offer was to be accepted. The rule reads as follows :--
"Please signify your willingness to accept this Work Order within 3 (three) days from the date of issue and in that case you will have to start regular supply to DTPS within a week".
29. Mr. Sinha further drew my attention to a letter dated 1-11-1975 (Ext. 5/T) issued by the General Superintendent of D.T.P.S. to the plaintiff whereby the plaintiff was directed to accept the offer within three days from the date of issue of the letter as made out in the work order failing which the Damodar Valley Corporation will have no alternative but to withdraw the offer, On the strength of the letter dated 1-11-1975, the learned counsel submitted that as in terms of the said letter itself the defendant corporation threatened to withdraw the offer contained in the works order unless the same was accepted within a period of three days from the receipt of the work order and as such the question of there having been any concluded contract by and between the parties did not arise.
30. The learned counsel further drew my attention to the fact that the plaintiff had never hesitated to accept the conditions as imposed but by reason of their letters dated 14-11-1974 (Ext.5/H), they (1) reminded remained the defendant that in the event of the unforeseen circumstances namely in the event the Coal Mines Authority Limited did not allow the truck to be loaded more than the permissible limits contrary to the usual practice a provision relating to revision of rate should specifically be mentioned in order to avoid any future complication.
31. In short, the learned counsel submitted that no concluded contract was arrived at principally on the three reasons :--
(a) No agreement in writing was entered into between the parties in terms of the General Condition of contract.
(b) The work order although issued after negotiation held by and between the plaintiff and the defendant on the other, as in the work order itself, the plaintiff was asked to abide by the terms of the work order, the work order amounted to counter-offer and not acceptance of the offer of the defendant-companies.
(c) In any event as by reason of the letter dated 4-11-1975, the plaintiff intended to get a clause with regard to revision of rate included, it cannot be said that a concluded contract was arrived at.
32. Mr. Rajnandan Sahay, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the defendants-respondents, on the other hand, submitted that in view of the terms and conditions incorporated in the notice inviting tender, a concluded contract was arrived at by and between the parties. He submitted that in view of Clause 2(b) of the General Condition of Contract, in the event, the plaintiff intended to revise the rate than submitted by them in the tender order withdraw therefrom, it could do so only within twenty four hours from the opening of the said tender.
He, further submitted that by reason of a letter dated 24-9-1975 which is contained in Ext. E, it was categorically stated by the plaintiff that they had gone through the relevant terms and conditions of the contract and declared that they would abide by the terms and conditions stipulated therein. By reason of the aforementioned proposal, the plaintiff quoted a rate of Rs. 20.74 paise per tonne for transportation of Coal from Nisa Colliery to D.V.C.'s Durgapur Thermal Power Station, a sum of Rs. 20.20 paise for transportation of Coal from Mugma field and a sum of Rs. 12/ - per tonne for transportation of Coal from Raniganj Coal field to D.V.C.'s Durgapur Thermal Power up to a distance of 25 K.M. and beyond the same @Rs. 16/- per tonne. The plaintiff further submitted necessary certificates and also signed the pro forma of the agreement which was required to be signed by both the parties.
33. As noticed hereinbefore, in terms of Clause 2(b) of the General Condition of Contract as quoted hereinbefore, the amount deposited by the plaintiff was to be forfeited if the successful tenderers fail to turn up to 15 days from the date of work order or such earlier period as may be determined by the General Superintendent.
34-35. The said Clause 2(b) provided for the following: --
"Intimation of inability to taken up the work even before the issuance of the work order will amount to (failure to turn up) unless such limitation is conveyed within twenty four hours on opening of the tenders".
Admittedly, the plaintiff did not revoke the offer made by it in terms of the aforementioned Exts. In fact, on 26-9-1976 (Ext. A/1) it forwarded itself Income-tax clearance certificate.
36. The respondent, however, by its letter dated 20-10-1975, requested the plaintiff to quote the maximum rebate per tonne to be allowed by the plaintiff, in the event of (1) Fortnightly payment (2) Restricting recovery of security deposit to the extent of Rs. 5,00,000.
By reason of a letter dated 3-10-1975, the plaintiff intimated that all the partners are brothers and all trucks are in their own names. By a letter dated 25-10-1975 Ext.5/T, the plaintiff made a protest that the defendant was negotiating with others. In the said letter, however, the plaintiff categorically stated that the rebate asked for by the defendant was agreed to by the plaintiff. In its letter dated 25-9-1975 also, the plaintiff gave out its mind that it was earnest and fully prepared to take up the works.
37. By a letter dated 27-10-1975 Ext.5/F it was stated that the plaintiff was ready to accept the offer, if, it contains a stipulation that in the event restriction on the loading of the trucks is placed by C.M.A. the rates will be suitably revised. This letter dated 27-10-1975 is Ext.5/F. This was also reiterated by a letter dated 28-10-1975. As noticed hereinbefore, the work order is also dated 27-10-1975.
38. Further, it is also not in dispute that the plaintiffs offer in toto as submitted by it in the notice inviting tender and the subsequent discussions were accepted by the defendants corporation, but evidently the condition of the plaintiff that a suitable term relating to revision of rate be inserted in the agreement was not acceded to by the defendant.
39. From the tender of the letter dated 27-10-1975 (Ext.5/F) it is evident that the plaintiff came to learn that the work order was going to be issued. They sent their re-
presentative to receive the same, but as indicated hereinbefore, they insisted on their earlier stand with regard to incorporation of a clause relating to revision of rate in the event of restriction which might be put by the Coal Mines Authority Ltd. imposing a condition with regard to the loading of Coal in the trucks with reference to their loading capacity.
40. The question as to whether any concluded contract has been arrived at or not is essentially a question of fact.
In terms of the provisions of Indian Contract Act, a concluded contract is arrived at only when the offer made by one of the contracting parties is accepted by the other. A contracting party, however, can, before the acceptance of his proposal by the other side is communicated to him, may withdraw his offer.
" Sections 3 and 5 of the Contract Act read as follows:--
"3. Communication, Acceptance and Revocation of Proposals. The communication of the proposals, the acceptance of proposals, and the revocation of proposals and acceptance, respectively, are deemed to be made by any act or omission of the party proposing, accepting or revoking, by which he intends to communicate, such proposal, acceptance or revocation, or which has the effect of communicating it.
5. Revocation of Proposals and Acceptances. A proposal may be revoked at any time before the communication of its acceptance is complete, as against the proposer, but not afterwards.
An acceptance may be revoked at any time before the communication of the acceptance is complete as against the acceptor, but not afterwards".
41. It is true, as has been contended by Mr. Sahay that in terms of Clause 2(b) of the General Conditions of Contract (Ext. 5/A), the tenderer has to withdraw the offer within 24 hours of the date when the tenders were opened. But the aforementioned clause has to be read in the context for which the provision has been made, namely forfeiture of the earnest money deposited by the tenderer.
As noticed hereinbefore, it has already been held that the deposit of Rs. 20,000/- by the plaintiff-appellant in the shape of National Saving Certificates was not by way of earnest. It was thus open to the tenderer to withdraw its offer before the communication of acceptance was made by the defendant respondent by it.
42. From the discussions made hereinbefore, it is evident that even after opening of the tender, the parties entered into negotiations and during the aforementioned negotiations, the plaintiff brought the proposed changes with regard to the loading capacity of the truck by the Coal Mines Authority of India Ltd. to the knowledge of the defendants , and asked the defendant to insert a suitable provision in this regard in the agreement.
43. From the letter of the plaintiff-appellant dated 27-10-1975 (Ext. 5/E) as well as the letter dated 28-10-1975 (Ext. 5/F) it became evident that the plaintiff clearly contended therein that their representative would accept the work-order only if a term relating to the revision of rates is incorporated in the agreement i.e. in the event of an unforeseen circumstance, namely imposition of restriction of loading of trucks by the Coal Mines Authorities of India Ltd. takes place.
Even in the work order dated 27th October, 1975 (Ext.H) it had specifically been mentioned in Clause 8 thereof that the plaintiff was to start work within seven days from the date of receipt of the said order in the event it indicates its acceptance within three days therefrom.
44. This conduct on the part of the defendant-respondent goes to show that it was also aware of the fact that by issuance of the work order alone, a concluded contract would not be arrived at but the same would be subject to acceptance thereof by the plaintiff-appellant.
It is true, that the plaintiff must be deemed to be aware of the provision of the Motor Vehicles Act and Rules framed thereunder with regard to fixation of loaden weight of a truck and in this view of the matter, in law, the plaintiff could not have based their decision on the basis of alleged prevailing practice of over loading.
But, as indicated hereinbefore, in view of the conduct of the parties it must be held that the parties did not arrive at a concluded contract.
45. The question which, therefore, arises for consideration at this stage is as to whether the defendant could take recourse to Section 73 or Section 74 of the Contract Act or not.
A contracting party is entitled to recover damages suffered by it by reason of the breach committed by the other side.
Section 74 of the Contract Act, however reads as follows :--
"Compensation for breach of contract where penalty stipulated for. When a contract has been broken, if a sum is named in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach, or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled, whether or not actual damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or, as the case may be, the penalty stipulated for".
46. In Maula Bux v. Union of India reported in AIR 1970 SC 1955, the Supreme Court has categorically held that the quantum of penal damages specified by contract in terms of Section 74 of the Contract Act becomes payable only when the conditions precedent therefor are satisfied. The Supreme Court in the aforementioned decision clearly held that Section 74 was enacted upon taking into consideration various circumstances which may lead a contracting party to recover the penal damages. It is, therefore, clear from the judgment of the Supreme Court that the defendant respondent could take recourse to the provision of Section 74 of the Contract Act only in the event of a breach on the part of the plaintiff-appellant.
As no concluded contract was arrived at between the plaintiff and the defendant, the question of the defendant's taking recourse to the provision of Section 74 of the Contract Act did not arise.
47. In my opinion, therefore, the defendant's attempt to prove the alleged damages suffered by it in excess of the aforementioned stipulated sum of Rs. 20,000/- was futile.
However, there cannot be any doubt that if the defendant had not entered into further negotiations with the plaintiff or would have accepted its tender as it was, the matter would have been otherwise.
48. For the reasons aforementioned, the judgment and decree passed by the learned court below cannot be sustained.
In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the learned court below is set aside. However in the facts and circumstances of this case, and in absence of any contract it is held that the plaintiff is not entitled to any interest on the aforementioned sum of Rs. 20,000/-.
49. The plaintiff is also not entitled to any interest on the aforementioned amount pendente lite and future. The suit filed by the plaintiff is, therefore, decreed only to the extent of Rs. 20,000/ - which sum the plaintiff deposited in the shape of National Saving Certificates.
50. The parties are also directed to bear their own costs throughout.