Punjab-Haryana High Court
Baru Ram vs Surinder Singh And Others on 5 February, 2026
Author: Amarinder Singh Grewal
Bench: Amarinder Singh Grewal
RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT
CHANDIGARH
102 RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M)
Date of Decision:
Decision:05.02.2026
Baru Ram (since deceased) through LRs ... Appellant
Versus
Surender Singh and others ... Respondents
Respondent
2. RSA No.2531 of 1995 (O&M)
Baru Ram (since deceased) through LRs ... Appellant
Versus
Surender Singh and another ... Respondents
Respondent
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL
Present: Mr. Pardeep Solath, Advocate
Mr. Satbir Mor, Advocate
for the appellant in both cases.
Mr. S.M. Sharma, Advocate
for respondent No.1.
Respondents No.2 to 9, service dispensed with.
***
AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL, J. (ORAL)
1. This order of mine shall dispose of two regular second appeals bearing Nos.55 of 1995 and 2531 of 1995 as they arise out of same cause of action. Both the appeals have beenn preferred by the appellant appellant-defendant defendant No.1.
No.1 challenging the concurrent findings finding of fact rendered by both the learned Courts below whereby the suit of respondent No.1-plaintiff No.1 plaintiff seeking possession by way of pre-emption emption has been decreed.
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2. For the sake of convenience, facts are being enumerated from RSA No.55 of 1995 95 and the parties are being described as per their status before the learned trial rial Court.
3. In brief, the facts are that the plaintiff filed the suit for possession by way of pre-emption emption in respect of the suit land measuring 16 kanals 3 marlas of land i.e. 323/364 323/364 share of land measuring 18 kanals 4 marlas, comprised in Killa No.88/11(8-0), No.88/11(8 89//14/1(2-4), 89//15(8-0),
0), Khewat and Khata No.61/86 to 88 situated in village Sainthali, as per jambandi for the year 1984 1984-85 85 by pleading therein that defendants No.2 to 9, being owners in possession over the suit land, sold the same to defendant No.1 vide registered sale deed 15.05.1989 for a consideration of Rs.28,000/-, Rs.28,000/ , while mentioning a fictitious consideration of Rs.60,000/- in the sale deed, without any notice of aforesaid sale to the plaintiff.
plaintiff The plaintiff claimed his superior/preferential superior right of pre-emption emption being a co-
co sharer and asked defendant No.1 to acknowledge his right and when he denied to do so, suit was filed.
4. The subject matter of challenge in R RSA SA No.2531 of 1995 is the suit property admeasuring 2 kanals 1 marla i.e. 41/364 share in the total land measuring 18 kanals 4 marlas comprised in comprised in Killa No.88/11(8 No.88/11(8-0),
0), 89//14/1(2-4),
4), 89//15(8-0), 89//15(8 Khewat and Khata No.61/86 to 88 situated in vil village lage Sainthali, Tehsil Narwana, as per jambandi for the year 1984 1984-85 with respect to which possession was sought by plaintiff by way of pre pre-emption emption on the ground that defendant No.2 therein, being a co-sharer co sharer in the entire land had sold the suit property for a consideration of Rs.5000/- vide registered sale deed No.631 dated 09.06.1989 to defendant No.1 without notice.
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5. Both the suits were contested by defendant No.1 by denying the status of the plaintiff as a co-sharer co and further asserting that defendant No.2 had sold specific numbers (86 to 88) out of khata No.61. It was also asserted in the written statement that the suits were filed by the plaintiff in collusion with defendant Nos.2 .2 to 9.. The consideration of Rs.60,000/ Rs.60,000/- was actually paid to the vendor as well as the stamp and registration expenses were borne by defendant No.1 at the time of registration of sale deed. Further, it was stated that the plaintiff had purchased specific killa numbers number from other co co-sharer and as such, ch, vendee cannot become co-sharer co sharer along with other co co-sharers.
6. On appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence, the learned trial Court decreed the suit and in appeal preferred by defendant No.1, the findings rendered by the learned trial Court stand affirmed.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the plaintiff had purchased the land in some other khata/khewat with specific killa numbers and thus, he could not be a co-sharer co sharer in the suit land. In the absence of any cogent evidence, much less, any sale deed to show that the plaintiff was a co co-sharer in the suit land, the findings rendered by both the learned Courts below are perverse. A pre-emptor pre emptor must step into the shoes of the original vendee and acquired the entire property sold, not just a portion, meaning thereby, partial pre-
pre emption is impermissible. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment passed by a Coordinate Bench Bench of this Court in Ajit Singh Vs. Waryam Singh passed in RSA No.218 of 1992 decided on 27.02.2025 (2025 NCPHHC 27624).
8. It is further contended that respondent No.1 No.1-plaintiff plaintiff has already withdrawn the amount of Rs.48,000/-
Rs.48,000/ deposited by him in terms of the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court as is evident from order dated 3 of 15 ::: Downloaded on - 12-02-2026 20:39:12 ::: RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -4- 11.01.1996 passed by this Court and thus, he has lost the right of pre pre-emption.
emption.
In support of his contention, he relies upon the judgment passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Bachan Singh (deceased) through his Legal Representatives Vs. Chuhar Singh alias Ajmer Singh (since deceased) through his Legal Representatives 2022 (3) RCR (Civil) 584. It is also contended that the status of the vendee was changed as a to a co co-sharer sharer before filing of the suit owing to subsequent sale deed dated 09.06.1989 vide which he had purchased another parcel of the land, land, as the suit was filed thereafter on 09.05.1990.
Reliance is placed upon the judgments rendered by Coordinate Benche Benchess of this Court in Bagha Ram Vs. Vidya Devi passed in RSA No.2495 of 1988 on 04.09.2025 and Jagdish Kumar and another Vs. Lachhman passed in RSA No.2006 of 1989 on 30.04.2019.
9. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 No.1-plaintiff plaintiff submits that the respondent No.1-plaintiff No.1 plaintiff duly proved vide jamabandi for the year 1984-85 that he was a co-sharer sharer and thus, being a co co-sharer, sharer, had a preferential right over the suit land. It is further contended that a co-sharer sharer has interest in every parcel pa of the joint property and possession of joint property by one co-owner owner is possession of all in the eye of law, even if all but one are actually out of possession. What a vendee gets in the transfer from a co co-sharer sharer is i the right of that co-sharer co and not exclusive ownership of any portion of joint land. It is also contended that the right of pre pre-emption emption is available not only when a co-sharer sharer sells the whole of his share but also when sells a portion thereof. In support of his contention, he relies up upon on the judgment passed by a Full Bench of this Court in Bhartu Vs. Ram Sarup 1981 PLJ 204 to contend that the sale of a specific portion of land described by particular khasra numbers 4 of 15 ::: Downloaded on - 12-02-2026 20:39:12 ::: RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -5- by a co-owner owner out of the joint khewat would be a sale of share out of th thee joint land and pre-emptible emptible under Section 15(1) (b) of the Punjab Pre Pre-emption Act.
10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the paper book as well as the case laws cited with their able assistance.
11. Historically, istorically, the right of pre-em pre emption ption traces its origin to the Mohammedan rule, where it emerged from customary practices that were later recognized and enforced by courts, particularly in northern India. Judicial decisions have consistently held that a pre-emptor pre emptor possesses two distinct rights.
The first is the inherent or primary right, namely the right to receive an offer of property before it is sold. The second is the secondary or remedial right, which allows the pre-emptor emptor to follow the property after it has been sold and to te himself in place of the original vendee. This secondary right is substitute essentially a right of substitution, and its exercise requires the pre pre-emptor emptor to demonstrate that his right is not only equal to, but superior to, that of the vendee at the time the right is asserted. The pre-emptor emptor must establish the existence of the right to pre--empt on three crucial dates; (i) the date of the sale sale, (ii) the date of filing the suit and (iii) the date on which the court of first instance passes its decree. Additionally, the the claimant must prove that this right subsisted continuously from the date of sale until the passing of the decree. If, during the pendency of the suit, the claimant loses this right or the vendee acquires an equal or superior right before adjudication, the the suit for pre pre-emption is liable to fail.
12. In the judgment passed in Bishan Singh and others vs. Khazan Singh & another AIR 1958 SC 838, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has set-forth forth the contours of the right of pre-emption pre emption as under:
under:-
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11.....To summarize: (1) The right of pre pre-emption emption is not a right to the thing sold but a right to the offer of a thing about to be sold.
This right is called the primary or inherent right. (2) The pre-
pre emptor has a secondary right or a remedial right to follow the thing sold. (3) It It is a right of substitution but not of re re-purchase purchase i. e., the pre emptor takes the entire bargain and steps into the shoes of the pre-emptor original vendee. (4) It is a right to acquire the whole of the property sold and not a share of the property sold. (5) Prefer Preference ence being the essence of the right, the plaintiff must have a superior right to that of the vendee or the person substituted in his place. (6) The right being a very weak right, it can be defeated by all legitimate methods, such as the vendee allowing the claimant of a superior or equal right being substituted in his place."
13. Admittedly, as per jamabandi for the year 1984 1984-85, 85, respondent No.1-plaintiff plaintiff had purchased 169/578 share in the land comprising khewat and khatauni No.61/90 and Khasra No.89//18/1, 19/2/1, 20/1 from Pritam Singh etc. along long with other co-sharers co sharers and thus, the vendor ha had not ceased to be co-sharer sharer at the time of transferring the land in favour of the plaintiff. In other words, the respondent-No.1 No.1-plaintiff by purchasing a fraction of share of vendor (though a specific portion of land described by particular khasra numbe numbers),, who was still a co-sharer, sharer, had also stepped into the shoe of the co-sharer (vendor). A Full Bench of this Court in Bhartu's case (supra) while answering the question posed "whether whether the sale of a specific portion of land described by particular khasra numbers by a co-owner owner out of the joint khewat would be a sale of share out of the joint land and pre-emptible pre emptible under Section 15(1)(b) of the Punjab Pre-
Pre emption Act?"has held as under:-
"6.
6. Take another example where 'A' and 'B' jointly own a khewat in equa shares measuring 200 bighas equal bighas.. 'B' is in separate possession of 6 of 15 ::: Downloaded on - 12-02-2026 20:39:12 ::: RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -7- 100 bighas of land comprised of specific khasra numbers and transfers it to 'C'. This is not disputed that in spite of this sale, 'A' continues to be a co-sharer co sharer in the land transferred by 'B' 'B'.. If that is so how can it be disputed that 'C' would necessarily be a co co-sharer sharer in the remaining 100 bighas of land in possession of 'A' as otherwise it would mean that 'A' is exclusively owner of 100 bighas of land in his possession and also a co co-sharer with 'C' in the remaining 100 bighas which obviously is not possible. The matter can further be illustrated by another example. 'A' and 'B' are co--sharers in the joint khewat,, say of 100 bighas of land in equal shares. 'B' who is in exclusive possession of land measuring 40 bighas of land comprised of khasra Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 transfers two khasra numbers, that is, 1 and 2 measuring 20 bighas to 'C' specifically stating in the deed that he is in possession of these khasra numbers as a co-sharer sharer and is trans transferring ferring his interest as such. Can it be said on these facts that 'C' had purchased anything except a co-sharer's co sharer's interest in khasra Nos.1 and 2 in spite of the fact that the sale is of specific numbers and of the specified area. The answer obviously would be in the negative and if so then the sale is obviously of a share by the co co-sharer sharer out of the joint land and nothing else.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
8. The learned counsel for the appellant, on the other hand, relying on Radhakrishan Laxminarayan Toshniwal v. Shridhar Ramchandra Alshi and others, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 1368, and Bishan Singh and others v. Khazan Singh and another, AIR 1958 Supreme Court 838, contended that the right of pre-
pre emption being piratical in nature is a very weak right and can be defeated by all legitimate means. He, therefore, argued that the defeated interpretation of the said clause as enunciated in Mst. Gurnam Kaur's case (supra) cannot be rejected on the ground that the rights of the co-sharer co sharer can be defeated by describing the land purchased purchase in terms of specific khasra numbers because the vendee would have 7 of 15 ::: Downloaded on - 12-02-2026 20:39:12 ::: RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -8- certainly a right to do so and he cannot be denied this right on the consideration that it would defeat the purpose of the Legislature. The argument, on the face of it, is quite attractive but has, in fact, no substance. What has been accepted by the Courts is the right of the vendee to defeat the claim of pre pre-emption emption of an individual but not the purpose of the Legislature. The purpose of the Legislature in accepting the right of a co-share co sharerr obviously is to prevent the fragmentation of the holding, preserve the harmony amongst the co-
co sharers and avoid introduction of an undesirable person as a co-
co sharer. The legitimate means of a vendee to defeat the right of pre-
pre emption of a co-sharer co so farr recognised by the Courts is that he may transfer the land purchased by him prior to the suit to another co--sharer sharer having an equal right of pre pre-emption emption with the pre-
pre emptor. By doing so, no doubt, the right of the pre pre-emptor emptor is defeated but not the purpose of the Legislature because the land reverts back to another co-sharer co sharer in the joint khewat and it serves all the purposes referred to above. Consequently, howsoever weak the right of pre-emption pre emption may be, it cannot be accepted that it is so illusory that it can be defeated simply by describing the land purchased in terms of specific khasra numbers instead of fractional share. We, therefore, answer the question in the affirmative and hold that the sale of a specific portion of land described by particular khasra numbers by a co co-owner owner out of the joint khewat would be a sale of share out of the joint land and pre-
pre emptible under section 15(1)(b) of the Punjab Pre Pre-emption emption Act. As the learned counsel for the appellant intends to argue the appeal on other points, this this case would now go back to the learned Single Judge for final disposal."
14. The argument of learned counsel for the appellant with respect to partial pre-emption emption and reliance on the judgment passed by this Court in Ajit Singh's case (supra) has no merit. In the he said case, the plaintiff had excluded 8 of 15 ::: Downloaded on - 12-02-2026 20:39:12 ::: RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -9- certain khasra numbers from the suit land while claiming his pre pre-emptory emptory rights and thus, it was held by this th Court that the suit was bad for partial pre-emption.
emption.
Secondly, the argument that respondent No.1-plaintiff plaintiff has already withdrawn the decretal amount vide order dated 11.01.1996 and reliance upon judgment passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Bachan Singh's case (supra) has also no merit. In the case of Bachan Singh, the plaintiff did not depo deposit sit the decretal amount as directed by the learned trial Court on or before 01.04.1969 and the learned 1st Appellate Court had extended the time for payment till 02.08.1969 without granting stay in favour of the plaintiffs plaintiffs-respondents respondents therein. However, in the present case, it is nowhere the case of the appellant appellant-defendant defendant No.1 that respondent No.1-plaintiff No.1 plaintiff had not deposited the decretal amount as directed by the learned trial Court. Rather, the amount so deposited was allowed to be withdrawn by orders of of this Court, keeping in view the fact that execution of the judgment and decree was stayed and the appeal, being admitted, was not likely to be heard in near future.
15. Lastly, the argument of learned counsel for the appellant that the status of the appellant ppellant-defendant defendant No.1 (vendee) was changed as to a co co-sharer sharer owing to subsequent sale deed dated 09.06.1989 vide which he had purchased another parcel of the land, much prior to the filing of the suit on 09.05.1990, 09.05.1990 though at the first blush seems impressive impressive but ultimately, falls flat. The judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Jagdish Kumar (supra) as relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in support of the aforesaid argument is also distinguishable distinguish on the facts of the present cas case. In the case of Jagdish Kumar, the vendee before filing of the suit seeking pre pre-emptory emptory rights by the plaintiff therein had purchased another parcel of the land out of the joint 9 of 15 ::: Downloaded on - 12-02-2026 20:39:12 ::: RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -10- holding from the original vendor and thus, improved his status as equal to that of a co-sharer.
sharer. In the said judgment, reliance was placed upon the observation made by a Coordinate Bench (see Krishan Lal and another v. Himta Ram 2006 (3) RCR (Civil) 117), 117 , based on a Full Bench judgment of this Court in Garib Singh v. Harnam Singh 1971 PLJ 578 wherein provisions of Section 21 21-A A of the Punjab Pre-emption Pre emption Act, 1913 were interpreted, to hold that a vendee acquiring land prior to institution of a 'pre-emptory 'pre emptory suit' by a co co-sharer, sharer, would be deemed to have improved his status equal to th that of the co-sharer, sharer, thereby defeating the co-sharers' co right of pre-emption.
emption. However, the Coordinate Bench in the judgment passed in Krishan Lal's case (supra) has observed as under:-
"10. The facts as have been noticed by the two Courts below clearly show that the sale which is sought to be pre pre-empted empted by the plaintiff is dated December 15, 1988, vide which Shakuntla had sold 32 kanals of land in favour of the defendant defendant-appellants for a sale consideration of Rs.1,17,000/-
Rs.1,17,000/-.. It also emerges from the record that through a sale deed Ex.D3 Shakuntla had sold some other land on May 2, 1989 to the defendant-
defendant-appellants ants for a consideration of Rs.
Rs.1,21,312/-, , therefore, it is undisputed that the def defendants endants had become co-sharers co sharers alongwith other co co-sharers sharers in the joint khata and khewat. Their rights in the joint khata and khewat have become equal to that of the plaintiff. It is also apparent that they had acquired the aforesaid status much prior to the filing of the present suit by the plaintiff-respondent.
plaintiff . Therefore, the only question which arises for consideration is as to whether the aforesaid improvement in the status of defendants was liable to be ignored.
ignored Prior to the year 1944, there was some con confusion fusion as to the stage upto which the vendee-defendant vendee defendant could improve his status for defeating the claim of a pre-emptor.
pre emptor. However, Vide Punjab Act 1 of 1944, an amendment was made in the Principal Act and Section 21 A was inserted to the following effect :
21-A 10 of 15 ::: Downloaded on - 12-02-2026 20:39:12 ::: RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -11-
"21-A. A. Any improvement, otherwise than through inheritance or succession, made in the status of a vendee defendant after the institution of a suit for pre pre-emption, emption, shall not affect the right of preemption of plaintiff in such suit."
A perusal of the aforesaid esaid provision would show that the legislature provided that any improvement, otherwise than through inheritance or succession made in the status of a vendee vendee-defendant defendant after the institution of a suit for pre pre-emption emption was liable to be ignored and could not affect the right of pre pre-emption emption claimed by the plaintiff. The said provision came to be interpreted by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Garib Singh v. Harnam Singh and others, 1971 PLJ 579. It was held by the Full Bench as follows :
"Prior to the introduction of Section 21 21-A A by Amending Act 1 of 1944, there was an unhealthy race going on the part of vendee to defeat the right of preemption by making improvement in his position by voluntary and volitional efforts upto the date of getting decree. By introducing this new provision the scope of the race to improve his status on the part of the vendee was circumscribed upto the date of institution of the suit and not thereafter except where the improvement in the status of the vendee is not a result of hhis is efforts or volition but because of inheritance or succession. Section 21 21-A A was added to counter-act act the view taken in ILR 1942 Lahore 15 and ILR 1942 Lahore 190 and 473. Because of the amendment of the Punjab Pre Pre-emption emption Act by introduction of Section 221-A, A, the authorities in which it had been ruled that a vendee by voluntary acquisition can improve his position even after the institution of the suit are no longer good law. Section 21 21-A A specifically prohibits such voluntary improvements after the suit, aand nd it was enacted to nullify the effect of those authorities.
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By introducing Section 21
21-A
A by the Amending Act 1 of
1944, the Legislature clearly intended to recognise no voluntary improvement in the status of a vendee after the institution of the suit, but only those resulting from inheritance or succession."
In view of the provisions of Section 21 21-A A and in view of interpretation thereof in Garib Singh's case (supra), it is clear that any improvement of the status of a vendee after the institution of the suit uit was liable to be ignored ignored and the claim of a plaintiff/ plaintiff/pre-emptor emptor could not be defeated by any such improvement. In these circumstances, the natural corollary would be that if an improvement had been made in the status of vendee prior to the institution of the suit, then the vendee defendant would always be entitled to take protection of the aforesaid improvement. Ignoring the aforesaid improvement, even if made prior to the filing of the suit, would be contrary to the spirit of Section 21 21-A. A similar view iew was taken in the case of Mala Ram v. Subash Chander and others, 1990(1) RRR 72 : 1989 PLJ 445.
11. The question which now arises is as to whether the provisions of Section 28-A 28 A of the Act come to the rescue of the plaintiff to claim that since the sale dated May 21, 1989 was subject matter of a pre-
pre emption suit, therefore, improvement in status was liable to be ignored because of the aforesaid provisions. In my considered opinion, the answer has to be in the negative.
12. Provisions of Section 28-A 28 A have already been reproduced above. A bare reading thereof would show that the aforesaid provision is only attracted to non--suit suit the plaintiff/preemptor when he bases his claim on the strength of some sale deed in his favour to claim that he had acquired a right of co co-sharer-ship ship when the aforesaid sale deed itself is still liable to be pre pre-empted.
empted. The aforesaid provisions, by any stretch of imagination, cannot be aforesaid interpreted to defeat the claim of a defendant who has improved his status by a subsequent sale deed and has acquired the right of co-
co
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sharership, similar to that of the plaintiff. Even if the subs subsequent equent sale deed is subject of any pre pre-emption emption suit, the rights of a defendant do not fall within the parameters of Section 28 28-A A of the Act and such the defence of improvement of status cannot be denied to him. As a matter of fact, the question of any impr improvement ovement or otherwise of the status of the defendant defendant-vendee vendee has to be examined in the light of Section 21-A 21 A only and the provisions of Section 28 28--A of the Act are not attracted at all to the case.
13. Faced with the aforesaid difficulty, the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent has relied upon a judgment in Smt. Maya Devi plaintiff-respondent and another v. Rameshwar, Rameshwar, 1992(2) RRR 623 : 1992(1) PLR 688 On the first impressions the said judgment seems to support
688. the case of the plaintiff. As a matter of fact, the said judgment has been relied upon by both the Courts below. However, on a deeper consideration of the aforesaid aforesaid authority, it is apparent that in Maya Devi's case (supra) the sale was sought to be pre pre-empted empted by the pre-emptor pre emptor on the basis of his co co-sharership.
sharership. Prior to the date of filing of the suit, the vendee defendants had acquired the right of co-sharership co ip in the suit property through a subsequent sale. The subsequent sale in favour of vendee vendee-defendants defendants was also sought to be pre-empted pre empted by the preemptor by filing a separate suit. Both the said suits were heard together by the trial Court. The appeals arising arising out of the said litigation were also heard together by the Appellate Court. Two Regular Second Appeals arising out of the aforesaid two suits were also being heard together by the High Court. It was in these circumstances that this Court came to the conclusion conclusion that the new status acquired by the vendee after the first sale, which was sought to be pre pre-empted, empted, would not improve the status of the vendee in any manner, since the subsequent sale itself was subject matter of a pre pre-emption emption suit, which was being decided together with the first suit. Because of the aforesaid peculiar facts, the improved status of the vendee was ignored and the claim of the preemptor was upheld.
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14. However, the facts in the present case are totally distinguishable. It is apparent that the sale which was sought to be pre pre-empted by the pre-emptor emptor Himta Ram is dated December 15, 1988. The vendees had improved their status vide a subsequent sale deed dated May 2, 1989. In these circumstances, the controversy in the present case is only with regard to the status of the vendees vis-
vis a-vis vis the pre-emptor pre qua the sale deed dated December 15, 1988. It has to be examined as to whether the vendee vendee-defendants defendants had acquired the right of co-sharership co sharership and, therefore, Himta Ram, plaintiff who was also als a co-sharer sharer could not be treated to have any preferential right to file the present suit in question. I am fully supported by the judgment rendered in Mala Ram's case (supra). In these circumstances, it has to be held that the vendee vendee-defendants defendants had improved improved their status through the subsequent sale deed dated May 2, 1989, when Shakuntla had sold some other land to them and the vendee-defendants vendee defendants had become co co-sharers sharers in the joint khata and khewat and had acquired the status similar to the plaintiffs. The ratio tio of the judgment in Garib Singh's case (supra) is also fully attracted to the present case and, therefore, the plaintiff plaintiff-pre-emptor emptor cannot claim any right of pre-
pre-emption emption against the defendant-
defendant vendee.
(emphasis supplied)
16. In the case in hand, the subsequent sale deed dated 09.06.1989 on the basis of which, a contention was raised by learned counsel for the appellant qua acquisition of status of the vendee/appellant vendee/appellant-defendant No.1 as a co-sharer sharer before filing of the suit for pre-emption pre hass also been challenged by respondent No.1-plaintiff plaintiff by way of separate suit and both suits were decided by the learned trial Court vide judgments and decrees dated 20.08.1992 and 22.07.1992.
Appeals against the aforesaid judgments and decrees of the learne learned d trial Court filed by the appellant-defendant appellant No.1 were registered on the same day i.e. 14 of 15 ::: Downloaded on - 12-02-2026 20:39:12 ::: RSA No.55 of 1995 (O&M) -15- 07.10.1994 and the regular second appeals filed by him before this Court are also being disposed of together. Thus, improved status of the vendee/appellant-
vendee/appellant defendant No.1 as a co-sharer co sharer is liable to be ignored in terms of observations made by this Court in para 13 of the judgment passed in Krishan Lal's case (supra) .
17. In view of the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pankajakshi (Dead) through Legal Representatives and others Vs. Chandrika and others (2016) 6 SCC 157, Randhir Kaur Vs. Prithvi Pal Singh and others (2019) 17 SCC 71 and Gurbachan Singh (dead) through LRs Vs. Gurcharan 875, questions of Singh (dead) through LRs and others (2023) SCC Online SC 875 law are not required to be framed in second appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court whose jurisdiction is circumscribed by provisions of Section 41 of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918.
18. As an upshot of above, this this Court finds no illegality and infirmity in the concurrent findings of fact rendered by both the Courts below and the same are hereby upheld.
upheld The amounts withdrawn by the respondent No.1 No.1-plaintiff plaintiff vide orders passed by this Court in both the appeals sha shall ll be deposited by him within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order, as was done in compliance of judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court. Resultantly, both the regular second appeals are dismissed.
19. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(AMARINDER AMARINDER SINGH GREWAL GREWAL) JUDGE February 05,, 2026 Pankaj* Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes Whether reportable : Yes 15 of 15 ::: Downloaded on - 12-02-2026 20:39:12 :::