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[Cites 14, Cited by 0]

Delhi District Court

Sh. Sandeep Kumar vs Smt. Joginder Kaur on 13 July, 2007

                                                                         1

         IN THE COURT OF SH. GIRISH KATHPALIA,
            ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, DELHI


SUIT NO.100/06

              SH. SANDEEP KUMAR
              S/O SH. MAHENDER SINGH
              R/O WZ-52, VIRENDER NAGAR,
              NEW DELHI.                                  ....PLAINTIFF

versus
            SMT. JOGINDER KAUR
            W/O SH. DALIP SINGH
            R/O WZ-22, CHAUKHANDI ROAD,
            TILAK NAGAR,
            NEW DELHI.                                  ....DEFENDANT


                              DATE OF INSTITUTION: 24/04/06
                         ARGUMENTS CONCLUDED ON: 03/07/07
                                DATE OF DECISION: 13/07/07

                  Counsel for Plaintiff: Sh. Jai Prakash, Advocate
                 Counsel for defendant: Sh. M.S. Yadav, Advocate

                              JUDGMENT

1. Plaintiff seeks a decree of specific performance of agreement to sell dated 20/01/06 with relief of possession of LIG flat bearing no.259, ground floor, pocket/block-B, situated at Hastsal, Uttam Nagar, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as "the suit property") as well as permanent injunction.

2. As pleaded by plaintiff, the suit property was purchased by the defendant in the year 1997 from original CS 100/06 Page 1 of 27 pages 2 DDA allotee Dev Raj by way of Agreement to Sell, General Power of Attorney, Special Power of Attorney and Will etc. all dated 26/08/97 and possession of the suit property was handed over to the defendant as a part of transaction on 26/08/97 itself.

3. In the month of January 2006, Sh. Dalip Singh proprietor of M/s Matharo Properties, who is husband of the defendant approached the plaintiff and represented that the defendant is owner in possession of the suit property and willing to sell the same. Plaintiff, who had also been looking for some property in the locality started negotiating for purchase of the suit property.

4. Upon negotiations, the defendant agreed to sell and plaintiff agreed to purchase the suit property for a total consideration of Rs.9,50,000/- and parties executed an Agreement to Sell/Receipt dated 20/01/06, in pursuance whereof plaintiff paid a sum of Rs.50,000/- to the defendant towards earnest money, receipt whereof was acknowledged by the defendant. The said Agreement to Sell/Receipt dated 20/01/06 was duly witnessed by son as well as husband of CS 100/06 Page 2 of 27 pages 3 the defendant.

5. Although as per policy of the DDA a purchaser on the basis of Agreement to Sell and Power of Attorney etc. is entitled to get the leasehold property converted into freehold, suit property is yet to be converted. As per terms of the Agreement to Sell it is the plaintiff who had to bear the expenses of conversion of the suit property. As such, after getting the conversion application signed from the defendant, the plaintiff filed the same with DDA and deposited Rs.27,933/- towards conversion charges on 10/02/06. Plaintiff also submitted the requisite documents with DDA for conversion.

6. As per agreement between the parties, plaintiff was to pay the balance sale consideration of Rs.9,00,000/- to the defendant within a period of three months from the date of agreement. However, it was also clarified between the parties that since the suit property was a leasehold property, the period of three months was to commence from the date of sale permission by competent authority.

7. As per plaintiff, he approached the defendant in first week of April 2006 and requested the defendant to execute CS 100/06 Page 3 of 27 pages 4 sale deed in his favour after receiving Rs.9,00,000/-. Defendant sought time till 18/04/06 to execute necessary documents and handover possession of the suit property. But on 18/04/06 when plaintiff again approached for completing the sale transaction, the defendant flatly refused to execute sale deed. Even husband of the defendant backed out of the deal and refused to complete the sale transaction.

8. As per plaintiff, he has always been ready and willing to perform his part of agreement by paying the balance sale consideration of Rs.9,00,000/-. Hence, this suit.

9. In her written statement, the defendant admitted having executed the Receipt/Agreement to Sell dated 20/01/06 with the plaintiff whereunder the defendant had received a sum of Rs.50,000/- towards earnest money but pleaded that it is the plaintiff only who committed default in performing his part of the agreement.

10. Defendant denied that the plaintiff contacted her on 18/04/06 and pleaded that on 20/04/06 she went to the office of Sub-Registrar, Janakpuri and even made telephonic call to the plaintiff but the latter did not turn up and rather CS 100/06 Page 4 of 27 pages 5 told the defendant on telephone that he had not been able to arrange the balance consideration.

11. Since the plaintiff did not pay the balance sale consideration within time stipulated by the agreement between the parties, the defendant forfeited earnest money of Rs.50,000/- paid by the plaintiff.

12. Defendant also pleaded that plaintiff himself could not get the suit property converted into freehold and as such did not get bank loan to pay the balance sale consideration in time.

13. Since plaintiff did not pay the balance sale consideration in time, as per defendant the agreement dated 20/01/06 has become infructuous and suit deserves to be dismissed.

14. Plaintiff filed a detailed replication, denying the pleadings of the defendant and reaffirmed the plaint contents. Plaintiff pleaded that he had always been ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement and even deposited the conversion fees with the DDA but the defendant had been refusing to complete the transaction. Plaintiff also denied that CS 100/06 Page 5 of 27 pages 6 on 20/04/06 agreement between the parties stood automatically cancelled. Plaintiff denied having received telephonic call from the defendant on 20/04/06 and pleaded that the alleged inspection at the office of sub-registrar was done by the defendant to fabricate evidence.

15. On the basis of pleadings, following issues were framed:

1. Whether amount of double the earnest money mentioned in the agreement to sell was by way of penalty or liquidated damages or as substitute for performance of contract? OP Parties.
2. Whether plaintiff is entitled to decree of specific performance of agreement to sell against the defendant pertaining to the suit property? OPP.
3. Whether plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction as claimed? OPP.
4. Relief.

16. In support of their respective case, each side examined one witness. I have heard the ld. Counsel for parties and perused the record. My issuewise findings are as under:-

ISSUE NO.1:-

17. As reflected from record, vide order dated 22/05/06 a CS 100/06 Page 6 of 27 pages 7 following preliminary issue was framed:

"Whether in view of a specific stipulation in the agreement to sell as regards entitlement of purchaser to double the market price in the event the seller does not complete the transaction, the present suit is maintainable?"

18. Arguments were advanced by both the sides at length. Ld. Counsel for plaintiff placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.L. DEVENDER SINGH vs SAYED KHAJA, AIR 1973 SC 2457; MANZOOR AHMED vs MOHD. USUF, AIR 2000 SC 191 and P.C. VERGIS vs DEVKI AMMA, JT 2005 (10) SC 278. As per law settled by the apex court in these judgments, there are three kinds of contracts:

1. Where the sum mentioned is only a penalty to secure performance.
2. Where the sum mentioned is to be paid as liquidated damages for breach of contract and
3. Where the sum mentioned is an amount which may be substituted for performance of contract at the election of the person by whom money is to be paid or act is to be done.
4. Where the money has been mentioned as a substitute to performance of contract, suit for specific performance does not lie.
CS 100/06 Page 7 of 27 pages 8
19. Under the circumstances, argument of ld. Counsel for plaintiff that he must be given an opportunity to prove that money had been mentioned in the contract only to secure performance was upheld and hence the issue under consideration was framed as mixed question of law and fact.
20. In his chief examination, PW1 specifically deposed that the parties had agreed, if the defendant failed to fulfill her obligation under the agreement to sell, plaintiff would be entitled to get the sale transaction completed through court.

PW1 further deposed that the clause of payment of double the market price had been inserted in the agreement only as a penalty clause in order to secure the performance of the agreement and not as an option to the defendant to complete the sale transaction or pay double the market price. The clause was not as a substitute to performance of the agreement. Although PW1 was cross examined at length, his testimony as regards issue under consideration remains unshaken.

21. Although defendant did not step into the box, her son was examined as her solitary witness DW1. But even the said CS 100/06 Page 8 of 27 pages 9 witness in his testimony did not allege that the clause of payment of double the market price was as a substitute to performance of the agreement.

22. It would be pertinent to record that no arguments were advanced on the issue under consideration.

23. The relevant clause of the agreement is worded as under:

"All the expenses in connection with the transfer i.e. stamp paper registration fee shall be borne by the purchaser. If the seller does not get the papers completed by................... or he demand extra money he will have to return the advance at double of the market price. If the purchaser also does not get the papers completed by................ he will forfeit his advance. The seller will provide clearance certificate to the purchaser.
         And out of both the parties whosoever is
         defaulter   he    will   have    to   pay     double
         commission."

24. The relevant clause does not contemplate payment of double the "earnest money", it contemplates payment of double the "market price" of the suit property. Payment of CS 100/06 Page 9 of 27 pages 10 double the market price can by no means be taken to be a substitute for performance of agreement or even the liquidated damages on account of the substantial disproportionality of the amount.
25. As mentioned above, there is unchallenged evidence on record that the said clause was only a penal stipulation kept in the contract to secure performance.
26. It would be significant to note that on the printed agreement the parties also made a handwritten endorsement at portion F to the effect that the seller was liable to clear all the outstanding water and electricity charges while purchaser was liable to pay all other charges like conversion charges and penalty etc. In furtherance of this insertion, plaintiff also deposited the conversion fees with the authorities. Had there been a scope for non performance of agreement, such an insertion on agreement Ex.PW1/1 would not have been made. As reflected from testimony of witnesses of both the sides, defendant also signed the requisite conversion applications, which shows that the parties did not contemplate any scope for non performance of agreement.
CS 100/06 Page 10 of 27 pages 11
27. As reflected from agreement Ex.PW1/1, there was also a stipulation to the effect that whichever party is a defaulter in performance of agreement would be liable to pay double commission to the property dealer.
28. There is strong evidence to reflect that the condition of entitlement of purchaser to double the market price had been inserted only as a penal clause to secure performance of the agreement and the same does not reflect liquidated damages or a substitution for performance of the agreement.
29. In view of above discussion, issue no. 1 is decided in favour of plaintiff and it is held proved that the stipulation of liability to pay double the market price was only a penal clause and consequently the present suit is maintainable. ISSUE NO. 2
30. Plaintiff in his testimony as PW1 deposed on oath the above mentioned contents of his pleadings and proved on record the agreement to sell/receipt as Ex.PW1/1 and identified signatures of the defendant as well as her husband and son, besides the property dealer and other witness on the same. He also placed on record as Ex.PW1/2&3 copies of CS 100/06 Page 11 of 27 pages 12 receipts of deposit of conversion fee of the suit property by him with the DDA and stated that till date conversion has not been done. PW1 stated that he has always been ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement by paying the balance sale consideration of Rs.9,00,000/- but the defendant has flatly refused on 18/04/06 to complete the sale transaction.
31. In his cross examination PW1 admitted that Ex.PW1/D1 is the carbon copy of agreement Ex.PW1/1 and explained that since the size of the carbon paper was small, signatures of all the witnesses do not appear on the carbon copy Ex.PW1/D1. He denied the suggestion that the balance sale consideration had to be arranged by him from his bank by way of loan and his loan request had been rejected. He explained that since on 18/04/06 itself the defendant had flatly refused to complete the sale transaction, he did not deposit money in the treasury for purchase of stamp papers and filed the suit in urgency without issuing notice. He denied the suggestion that on 20/04/06 the defendant had called him up and requested to come for execution of sale deed. Presently he has Rs.3,00,000/- in his bank account but can arrange the CS 100/06 Page 12 of 27 pages 13 balance amount within 3-4 days from his relatives.
32. Son of the defendant appeared as DW1 and stated that the agreement Ex.PW1/D1 had been entered into by the plaintiff by paying Rs.50,000/- towards earnest money out of total sale consideration of Rs.9,50,000/- for the suit property. DW1 stated that the balance sale consideration of Rs.9,00,000/- had to be paid by the plaintiff within three months from the agreement dated 20/01/06 failing which the earnest money was liable to be forfeited. Till 20/04/06 plaintiff could not arrange the balance sale consideration and has falsely stated having met the defendant on 18/04/06 when she refused to execute the sale deed. DW1 stated that the defendant had contacted the plaintiff on his mobile phone on 20/04/06 and proved on record as Ex.DW1/B the PCO receipt thereof besides an affidavit Ex.DW1/C and receipt of Sub Registrar office Ex.DW1/D to show defendant's visit to the Sub Registrar's office. DW1 stated that since plaintiff replied to the defendant on telephone that he had not been able to arrange the balance payment, the earnest money was forfeited.
33. In his cross examination DW1 admitted that he had no CS 100/06 Page 13 of 27 pages 14 written authority of the defendant to appear and depose on her behalf in this case. He denied the suggestion that on 18/04/06 plaintiff contacted the defendant with the request to execute sale deed and she declined. Contrary to his chief examination, DW1 in cross examination stated that the telephone call on 20/04/06 had been made to the plaintiff by him only and not by the defendant. As per DW1 when he responded to the call, saying "Hello", plaintiff straight away said "paise nahin hain". He could not say as to for how long the phone call took. There is a telephone installed at his residence and the call to the plaintiff had been made from PCO outside office of Sub Registrar. DW1 stated that he does not know if the plaintiff is ready and willing to pay the balance sale consideration to complete the transaction.
34. As reflected above, execution of agreement to sell is not disputed by the defendant. The challenge of the defendant to the suit is two fold. It was argued that firstly since the plaintiff did not pay the balance sale consideration within stipulated period till 20/04/06, he cannot now seek specific performance of the agreement and the earnest money stands forfeited.
CS 100/06 Page 14 of 27 pages 15 Second prong of attack by the defendant is that since there is no registered conveyance deed in the name of defendant, she did not have marketable title and interest in the suit property which could be conveyed further to the plaintiff. It was also argued by ld counsel for defendant that plaintiff did not perform his part of agreement and no legal notice was issued before filing the present suit. In support of his arguments ld counsel for defendant placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of RAMBHAU NAMDEO GAJRE vs NARAYAN BAPUJI DHOTRA, (2004) 8 SCC 614.
35. Per contra, ld counsel for plaintiff argued that since defendant has not stepped into the witness box, adverse inference is to be taken against her in view of judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of VIDYADHAR vs MANKIKRAO, AIR 1999 SC1441. It was also argued that testimony of DW1 deserves to be discarded in view of judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of JANKI VASHDEO BHOJWANI vs INDUSIND BANK, AIR 2005 SC 439 and of Hon'ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of RAM PRASAD vs HARI NARAYAN, AIR 1998 Rajasthan 185.
CS 100/06 Page 15 of 27 pages 16
36. So far as readiness and willingness of plaintiff to perform his part of agreement and pay the balance sale consideration is concerned, I do not find any merit in the objection of the defendant. For, admittedly the plaintiff deposited a substantial amount of money with the DDA for conversion of the suit property to freehold and that too on the applications signed by the defendant only. Defendant herself did not come to the box to be confronted with the fact alleged by the plaintiff that the latter had contacted her on 18/04/06. Since the defendant had flatly refused to complete the sale transaction on 18/04/06, there was no occasion for the plaintiff to visit the office of Sub Registrar on 20/04/06.
37. Defendant also failed to bring any evidence to show that plaintiff had been informed by her that she would visit the office of Sub Registrar on 20/04/06 for executing sale deed. Merely because the defendant visited the office of Sub Registrar on 20/04/06 as reflected from Ex.DW1/C&D, it cannot be said that the same was after due intimation to the plaintiff and for the purposes of completing sale transaction. It is very convenient to visit the office of Sub Registrar, obtain a CS 100/06 Page 16 of 27 pages 17 receipt of visit and claim that the person had gone there with intent to complete the transaction. Such evidence lacks credence. Besides, as held in the case of VIDYADHAR (supra) failure on the part of defendant to step into the box and state her case on oath and subject herself to be cross examined raises a presumption against her.
38. A careful perusal of PCO receipt Ex.DW1/B would reveal that the telephonic call made thereunder lasted hardly for a second. Such a receipt is nothing but a concoction to somehow establish effort of the defendant to contact plaintiff. Above all, there is no evidence at all that the telephone number mentioned in the receipt is that of plaintiff. The receipt has been filed simply to mislead the court.
39. As such, it cannot be said that plaintiff himself was not ready and willing to perform his part of agreement. Plaintiff categorically deposed that he had arranged the money on 18/04/06 and there is no evidence to the contrary.
40. So far as issue of marketable title is concerned, ld counsel for defendant argues that since the suit property had been purchased by the defendant from the earlier owner Dev CS 100/06 Page 17 of 27 pages 18 Raj by way of agreement to sell, no interest was transferred in the suit property in favour of the defendant and consequently she cannot transfer what she does not have. Although this ground was neither pleaded nor any evidence was adduced on these lines, I have examined the issue.
41. Ld counsel for plaintiff cited the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of RAMBHAU(supra) in which it was held that a mere agreement to sell the immovable property does not lead to transfer of interest in favour of proposed transferee. In the said case, a suit for possession of agricultural land was filed with the averment that the plaintiff who was owner of the agricultural land had been wrongfully dispossessed by the defendant. Defence of the defendant was that under an agreement to sell the plaintiff and his brother had agreed to sell the suit land to one Pishorilal and the said Pishorilal had executed another agreement to sell the suit land in favour of the defendant who paid the entire consideration and was put in possession of the suit land by Pishorilal in part performance of agreement to sell. Ld trial court decreed the suit holding that a mere contract for sale does not create any CS 100/06 Page 18 of 27 pages 19 right or title in favour of the transferee, so Pishorilal did not have right, title or interest in the suit land by virtue of his agreement to sell with the plaintiff. First appellate court set aside the trial court judgment holding that the defendant had acquired an equitable possessory title to the suit land and was entitled to protect his possession under section 53 A, Transfer of Property Act. The second appellate court held that since title in the suit property had not been conveyed in favour of Pishorilal, he could not enter into an agreement to sell with the defendant nor transfer the possession in part performance. Hon'ble Supreme Court upheld the view taken by the ld second appellate court and held that an agreement to sell does not create an interest in favour of the proposed vendee in the suit property and as such Pishorilal did not have any conveyable interest which could be transferred to the defendant including possession of the property.
42. The ld counsel for plaintiff submits that the present case is not covered by the judgment cited above. For, the said case pertained to an agricultural land in the state of Maharashtra while the suit property involved in this case is in CS 100/06 Page 19 of 27 pages 20 Delhi, which owing to its peculiar set up deserves a differential treatment. It was argued that in Delhi, transfer of immovable property by way of agreement to sell is very common and recognized as valid.
43. In the case of ASHA M JAIN vs CANARA BANK, 94(2001) DLT 841 DB a Division Bench of Hon'ble Delhi High Court explained the legal position of power of attorney sales in Delhi and held that these transactions in Delhi are different from mere agreement to sell since such transactions are accompanied with other attendant documents as well and complete payment of consideration is made. Hon'ble High Court held as under
"The power of attorney sales and their effect has been considered in KULDIP SINGH vs. SURINDER SINGH, 76(1998) DLT 236 1999 Rajdhani Law Reporter 20. The Ld Single Judge of this Court has observed that power of attorney sales in Delhi is the common mode of sale of immovable property to get over the legislative restrictions of transfer of properties. The power of attorney is for consideration and the bargain is followed by delivery of possession to complete the transaction.
CS 100/06 Page 20 of 27 pages 21 Further to prevent arbitrary cancellation, Will and affidavit about renouncing rights are taken. The Court repelled the contention that since sub-lease with the Government prohibited transfer, such transfer was opposed to public policy, since in view of the Court, public policy gets modified with march of time. The Court recognized the fact that restrictions to sell made everyone dishonest and the power of attorney sale method was devised to get over the restrictions. In fact the Government has partially recognized this since even power of attorney buyers can apply for conversion into free hold on paying penalty. The Ld Single Judge relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. CHATTANATHA KARAYALAR vs CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA LTD AND OTHERS, AIR 1965 Supreme Court 1856 and SMT. INDIRA KAUR AND OTHERS vs SHRI SHEO LAL KAPOOR, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 1074, where it was held that in order to arrive at a real nature of transaction, it is open to the Court to look into the attendant and surrounding circumstances and contemporary documents. The Ld Single Judge also relied upon the observations in the case of USHA MALHOTRA vs G.S. UPPAL in 1991 Rajdhani CS 100/06 Page 21 of 27 pages 22 Law Reporter 223, dealing with the issue of construction agreement which are camouflage for agreement to sell.
We have considered this aspect taking into consideration these judgments and we are in agreement with the view that the concept of power of attorney sales have been recognized as a mode of transaction. These transactions are different from mere agreement to sell since such transactions are accompanied with other documents including General Power of Attorney, Special Power of Attorney and Will and affidavits and full consideration is paid. This is what also has happened in the present case. There are two General Power of Attorneys, Special Power of Attorney and the Will apart from the agreement to the sell. One of the General Power of Attorney is registered. Further the Will is also registered. Thus there are two contemporaneous documents which are registered and they lend authenticity to the date of execution of documents. The power of attorneys are for consideration within the meaning of section 202 of the Contract Act, 1872. Thus there is no doubt that interest has been created in the property in favour of the appellant. Possession has also been CS 100/06 Page 22 of 27 pages 23 handed over. Thus the provisions of section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act would also come into play. The Bank is debarred from enforcing any right qua the property other than the right conferred by the agreement to sell. The agreement to sell has nowhere reserved any right on the transferor either for resuming the property or payment of any additional money. The transferor is debarred from claiming back the property from the appellant. The net result of all this is that the rights have been created in favour of the appellant which cannot be defeated by the attachment order." (emphasis supplied)
44. In the present case also, the suit property was purchased by the defendant not just by way of an agreement to sell, which was in the case of RAMBHAU(supra). Rather, as reflected from documents on record the suit property was purchased by the defendant from Dev Raj by way of an agreement to sell, registered general power of attorney, registered special power of attorney and registered will. After execution of these documents the defendant was put in possession of the suit property. In the case of RAMBHAU(supra) there was only an agreement to sell without CS 100/06 Page 23 of 27 pages 24 any attendant document. These two types of transactions have to be treated in a differential manner. Hence, there is no doubt that interest had been created in favour of the defendant in the suit property and the same is conveyable.
45. As held by a division bench of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of M.K. SEHGAL vs SMT. MOHINDER KAUR {2006 V AD (Delhi) 473} it is settled principle of law that it is not mandatory for a court to grant the decree of specific performance simply for the reason that the plaintiff has proved his case and it is lawful to do so. But this discretion vested in the court is not arbitrary and can be exercised only for sound and reasonable grounds under the guidance of judicial norms.
Hon'ble Delhi High Court, after an elaborate discussion on the basis of various judicial pronouncements held:
"The discretion of the court is a judicial discretion and must have a plausible reasoning which can be sustained in law. The reasoning is the soul of any judgment and reasoning ought to be within the four corners of the statute. A reason which is alien to the provisions of law where the legislature has opted to provide such limitations illustratively, would hardly stand the CS 100/06 Page 24 of 27 pages 25 scrutiny of law. ....... the discretion must be exercised within in circumscribed limits of the dos and don'ts enumerated by the legislature in section 20 of the Specific Relief Act."

46. Falling back to the present case, it cannot be said that agreement to sell Ex.PW1/1 gives an unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the defendant or if the specific performance is granted to the plaintiff, it would cause any hardship to the defendant since what has happened could be foreseen by the parties at the time of executing Ex.PW1/1. Defendant even did not appear to depose in the suit. The jurisdiction vested in court to decline specific performance being a jurisdiction of equity and good conscience, I fail to find any circumstances in this case tilting the equity in favour of the defendant. In my opinion, plaintiff has succeeded in establishing that he is entitled to decree of specific performance of the agreement to sell coupled with a decree for possession of the suit property.

47. In view of above discussion issue no. 2 is decided in favour of plaintiff and I accordingly hold it proved that plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of agreement to sell against the defendant pertaining to the suit property.

CS 100/06                                        Page 25 of 27 pages
                                                                   26

ISSUE NO.3

48. In view of above findings, plaintiff is also entitled to the relief of permanent injunction against the defendant, thereby restraining the defendant from alienating the suit property and accordingly issue no. 3 is decided in favour of plaintiff. ISSUE NO. 4(RELIEF)

49. In view of above findings, the suit succeeds and is decreed with cost against the defendant for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 20/01/06 pertaining to the suit property, being LIG flat bearing no.259, ground floor, pocket/block-B, situated at Hastsal, Uttam Nagar, New Delhi and for possession thereof upon payment of the balance sale consideration. Also the defendant, her servant, attorney and agent etc. are restrained from selling, alienating, transferring and/or creating third party interest in any manner in favour of any third person in respect of the suit property.

50. Within a period of 30 days from the date of decree, the plaintiff shall deposit the balance sale consideration of Rs.9,00,000/- by way of demand draft in favour of the defendant. After the said deposit, within 30 days the defendant CS 100/06 Page 26 of 27 pages 27 shall execute sale deed in respect of suit property in favour of plaintiff, failing which plaintiff shall be at liberty to approach this court for appointment of court official to execute the sale deed in furtherance of the said agreement to sell.

51. Decree sheet be accordingly drawn up and file be consigned to record room after the needful is done. ANNOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 13th July 2007 (GIRISH KATHPALIA) ADDL. DISTRICT & SESSIONS JUDGE DELHI CS 100/06 Page 27 of 27 pages