Allahabad High Court
Ramhet vs Deputy Director Of Consolidation / ... on 2 September, 2025
Author: Alok Mathur
Bench: Alok Mathur
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC-LKO:52051 HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD LUCKNOW WRIT - B No. - 847 of 2025 Ramhet .....Petitioner(s) Versus Deputy Director Of Consolidation / Addl. District Magistrate (F/R), Sitapur And Others .....Respondent(s) Counsel for Petitioner(s) :
Mohiuddin Khan Counsel for Respondent(s) :
C.S.C. Court No. - 5 HON'BLE ALOK MATHUR, J. 1. Heard Sri Mohiuddin Khan, learned counsel for the petitioner, Dr. Krishna Singh, learned Standing counsel for the State - respondents and Sri Dilip Kumar Pandey for the Gaon Sabha.
2. The dispute in the present case pertains to gata No.660 area 1.13 hectare and gata No. 659 area 1.64 hectare totaling to 2.77 hectare situated in Village - Musepur Mutwalli, Pargana Khairabad, Tehsil and District Sitapur. It has been submitted that name of petitioner's father was recorded over the land in question in khatauni 1356 falsi and during the consolidation proceedings Assistant Consolidation Officer found the petitioner in possession of the land in question. The Consolidation Officer passed an ex-parte order on 30.9.1993 and when the petitioner came to know about the said order he filed an appeal before Settlement Officer of Consolidation and the matter as remanded back to the Consolidation Officer to decide the matter again after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.
3. In the remand proceedings, the Consolidation Officer afforded full opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The petitioner had stated that he is in possession of the disputed land for nearly 20 to 25 years and evidence in this regard was also given by the Pradhan in the said proceedings. No documentary evidence was filed by the petitioner nor any revenue record was filed by him in support of his contentions. It is only on the basis of the aforesaid material that the Consolidation Officer allowed the objections filed by the petitioner and held that the petitioner has right to the said property and the authorities itself moved evidence in support of his adverse possession and accordingly directed that name of the petitioner be recorded in the revenue records deleting the name of Gaon Sabha in whose favour the land was previously recorded.
4. Against the order dated 21.3.2003 the State had filed an appeal on 17.5.2018 after lapse of nearly 15 years. In the appeal, it was stated that in the revenue records the said land was recorded as pasture land which is a State land owned by the Gaon Sabha and erroneously the Consolidation Officer has returned a finding in favour of the petitioner and consequently prayed for setting aside of the order dated 21.3.2003. In the said appeal an application for condonation of delay was also filed.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has fairly submitted that he did not file any objection against the application for condonation of delay nor against the appeal preferred by the State. The Settlement Officer of Consolidation by means of order dated 26.9.2022 had allowed the revision preferred by the State.
6. The appellate authority duly noticed the fact that the appeal was filed on 17.5.2018 by Government Advocate but permission to file the said appeal was only given on 1.11.2021. He further found it proper to condone the delay and proceeded to decide the appeal on merits. He had noticed that in the revenue records the disputed land was shown as pasture land which is land of public utility and no rights on the basis of possession could accrue to any individual on such land. He further noticed that the said land is protected under Section 132 of U.P. Revenue Code and the Consolidation Officer by means of order impugned dated 21.3.2003 has deleted the name of Gaon Sabha and directed the authorities to record name of the petitioner. He further noticed that report in this regard was given by Assistant Consolidation Officer on 31.7.2017 and subsequent records were looked into and the manner in which the order has been passed by the Consolidation Officer looks suspicious and the report in this regard was submitted and thereafter decision was taken to file the appeal. He further looked into the revenue records and found that there has been lot of fabrication and manipulations in the records and was of the view that in such a situation where order has been obtained fraudulently the same will be non-est and contrary to law and can be set aside either by the authorities itself or any superior authority in appeal.
7. The petitioner in the appellate proceedings had repeatedly sought time to file his objection as well as written submissions but despite sufficient time having been granted to him he did not file any objection and consequently the appellate authority proceeded to decide the matter on the basis of the material brought on record by the State and returned a finding that the land which is gaon sabha land as provided for under Section 132 of U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act, no rights could accrue to any individual in any manner as has been granted by the Consolidation Officer and proceeded to allow the appeal and accordingly set aside the order of Consolidation Officer dated 21.3.2003.
8. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order of Settlement Officer of Consolidation dated 26.9.2022 preferred a revision before Deputy Director of Consolidation who also looked into the entire records and confirmed the findings recorded by the appellate court and thereby rejected the revision.
9. The petitioner being aggrieved by the order of Settlement Officer of Consolidation dated 26.9.2022 as well as order dated 30.1.2024 passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation have preferred the present writ petition.
10. It has been argued by the petitioner that firstly the appellate order is illegal and arbitrary because no permission was granted to the Government Advocate to file appeal and in absence of any proper sanction the appeal itself was defective and any order passed from a defective appeal would itself be non-est and contrary to law and submits that both the impugned orders are illegal and arbitrary and without jurisdiction and are liable to be set aside.
11. The next ground raised by the petitioner is that the appellate court has illegally condoned the delay of 15 years and, therefore, the appellate order is illegal and arbitrary and deserves to be set aside and consequently revisional order passed by Deputy Director of Consolidation.
12. It was lastly urged that the appeal was not supported by any affidavit and even condonation application was not supported by any affidavit and this was an infirmity which goes to the root of the matter and, therefore, the appeal preferred by the petitioner was itself not maintainable and, therefore, the order of Settlement Officer of Consolidation deserves to be set aside and similarly the revisional order was also liable to be set aside and prayed or allowing the writ petition.
13. In order to appreciate the contentions of the petitioner the original records was produced by learned Standing counsel. It is noticed that in form 28 which had been prepared by the authorities during the consolidation proceedings we find that there has been manipulation in entries pertaining to gata No.s 215, 285, 72, 85 in the right written in red ink. It is stated that possession of the petitioner remained upto Settlement Officer Consolidation whole or in part till date. In fact, the report as already stated is supposed to be right as possession of Ram Het has not been found while on half part that has been deleted. This fact is, however, verified when the said order passed by Settlement Officer of Consolidation dated 26.9.2022 clearly indicates that possession of the petitioner has not been found. We further found that Settlement Officer of Consolidation firstly has not looked into any of the revenue records and the impugned order dated 26.9.2022 has been passed only on the basis of the oral evidence tendered by the petitioner and the Gram Sabha has even accepted the said evidence only the possession of the petitioner has been proved and there is no material on record that the said possession was adverse to the revenue authority or to gaon sabha in order to bring home the point pertaining to adverse possession it was necessary for the petitioner to indicate that the said possession was adverse and once it has been found to be adverse the same possession shall be substantial for a long time so that the rights and interests of such a land could have been made out in favour of the petitioner.
14. Accordingly, we find that very basic ingredients of an adverse possession where possession was not proved by the petitioner before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation and Consolidation Officer and we find that the appellate authority has failed to record that the revenue records have been forged and fabricated to support the case of the petitioner.
15. We also find that records have been tampered with. It is in aforesaid circumstances that they dealt with the question of delay. It is noticed that any order which has been procured on the basis of false and fabricated acts committed at any point of time that will not be sworn off by limitations provided for under the Limitation Act. This Court in the case of Keshav Prasad and others Vs. Consolidation Commissioner, Lucknow and others passed in Writ B No.853 of 2024 on September 23, 2024 (neutral citation 2024:AHC-LKO:65819) has held as under:-
"26. This Court had the opportunity to examine such an issue in Bhagwan Das Chela Balram Das Vs. District Magistrate Ambedkarnagar and others, 2023 (1) ADJ 342 [LB] wherein this Court with the aid of decision rendered by the Apex Court relating to the issue of concealment of material facts had noticed as under:-
"In Ram Chandra Singh Vs. Savitri Devi and others; (2003) 8 SCC 319 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"15. Commission of fraud on court and suppression of material facts are the core issues involved in these matters. Fraud as is well-known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwells together.
16. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person, or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of former either by word or letter.
17. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentations may also give reason to claim relief against fraud.
18. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by willfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations which he knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad.
19. In Derry v. Peek, [1889] 14 A.C. 337, it was held:
In an 'action of deceit the plaintiff must prove actual fraud. Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, without caring whether it be true or false.
A false statement, made through carelessness and without reasonable ground for believing it to be true, may be evidence of fraud but does not necessarily amount to fraud. Such a statement, if made in the honest belief that it is true, is not fraudulent and does not render the person make it liable to an action of deceit."
20. In Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, at page 23, it is stated:
"The true and only sound principle to be derived from the cases represented by Slim v. Croucher is this: that a representation is fraudulent not only when the person making it knows it to be false, but also when, as Jessel, M.R., pointed out, he ought to have known, or must be taken to have known, that it was false. This is a sound and intelligible principle, and is, moreover, not inconsistent with Derry v. Peek. A false statement which a person ought to have known was false, and which he must therefore be taken to have known was false, cannot be said to be honestly believed in. "A consideration of the grounds of belief", said Lord Herschell, "is no doubt an important aid in ascertaining whether the belief was really entertained. A man's mere assertion that he believed the statement he made to be true is not accepted as conclusive proof that he did so."
21. In Bigelow on Fraudulent Conveyances at page 1, it is stated:
"If on the facts the average man would have intended wrong, that is enough."
It was further opined:
"This conception of fraud (and since it is not the writer's, he may speak of it without diffidence), steadily kept in view, will render the administration of the law less difficult, or rather will make its administration more effective. Further, not to enlarge upon the last matter, it will do away with much of the prevalent confusion in regard to 'moral' fraud, a confusion which, in addition to other things, often causes lawyers to take refuge behind such convenient and indeed useful but often obscure language as 'fraud upon the law'. What is fraud upon the law? Fraud can be committed only against a being capable of rights, and 'fraud upon the law' darkens counsel. What is really aimed at in most cases by this obscure contrast between moral fraud and fraud upon the law, is a contrast between fraud in the individual's intention to commit the wrong and fraud as seen in the obvious tendency of the act in question."
22. Recently this Court by an order dated 3rd September, 2003 in Ram Preeti Yadav vs. U.P. Board of High School & Intermediate Education & Ors. reported in JT 2003 (Supp. 1 ) SC 25 held:
"Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person, or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of former either by words or letter. Although negligence is not fraud but it can be evidence on fraud. (See Derry vs. Peek [1889] 14 A.C. 337 ) In Lazarus Estate vs. Berly [1971] 2 W.L.R. 1149 the Court of Appeal stated the law thus:
"I cannot accede to this argument for a moment "no Court in this land will allow a person to keep an advantage which he has obtained by fraud. No judgment of a Court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything". The Court is careful not to find fraud unless it is distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved it vitiates judgments, contracts and all transactions whatsoever."
In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath 1994 (1) SCC 1 this Court stated that fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal."
23. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous.
24. In Arlidge & Parry on Fraud, it is stated at page 21:
"Indeed, the word sometime appears to be virtually synonymous wit "deception", as in the offence (now repealed) of obtaining credit by fraud. It is true that in this context "fraud" included certain kind of conduct which did not amount to false pretences, since the definition referred to an obtaining of credit "under false pretences, or by means of any other fraud". In Jones, for example, a man who ordered a meal without pointing out that he had no money was held to be guilty of obtaining credit by fraud but not of obtaining the meal by false pretences: his conduct, though fraudulent, did not amount to a false pretence. Similarly it has been suggested that a charge of conspiracy to defraud may be used where a "false front" has been presented to the public (e.g. a business appears to be reputable and creditworthy when in fact it is neither) but there has been nothing so concrete as a false pretence. However, the concept of deception (as defined in the Theft Act 1968 ) is broader than that of a false pretence in that (inter alia) it includes a misrepresentation as to the defendant's intentions; both Jones and the "false front" could now be treated as cases of obtaining property by deception."
25. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application f any equitable doctrine including res-judicata.
26. In Smt. Shrisht Dhawan vs. M/s. Shaw Brothers 1992 AIR(SC) 1555 ], it has been held that:
"Fraud and collusion vitiate even the most solemn proceedings in any civilized system of jurisprudence. It is a concept descriptive of human conduct.27. In S.P. Chengalvaraya vs. Jagannath [ 1994 (1) SCC 1 ] this Court in no uncertain terms observed:
"...The principles of "finality of litigation" cannot be passed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not process of the Court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court- process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.... A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of security something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage... A litigant, who approaches the Court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him, which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposite party."
28. In Indian Bank vs. Satyam Fibers (India) Pvt. Ltd. [ 1996 (5) SCC 550 ], this Court after referring to Lazarus Estates (supra) and other cases observed that 'since fraud affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the proceedings of the Court it also amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court, that the Courts have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by practising fraud upon the Court, and that where the Court is misled by a party or the Court itself commits a mistake which prejudices a party, the Court has the inherent power to recall its order".
It was further held:
"The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 CPC, to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers, which are resident in all Courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the constitution of the tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court's business."
29. In Chittaranjan Das vs. Durgapore Project Limited & Ors. 99 CWN 897, it has been held:
"Suppression of a material document which affects the condition of service of the petitioner, would amount to fraud in such matters. Even the principles of natural justice are not required to be complied within such a situation.
It is now well known that a fraud vitiates all solemn acts. Thus, even if the date of birth of the petitioner had been recorded in the service returns on the basis of the certificate produced by the petitioner, the same is not sacrosanct nor the respondent company would be bound thereby.""
In A.V. Papayya Sastry and others Vs. Government of A.P. and others; (2007) 4 SCC 221 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
21. Now, it is well settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed; "Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal".
22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the Court, Tribunal or Authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of law. Such a judgment, decree or order by the first Court or by the final Court has to be treated as nullity by every Court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any Court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.
23. In the leading case of Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley, (1956) 1 All ER 341 : (1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 2 WLR 502, Lord Denning observed:
"No judgment of a court, no order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand, if it has been obtained by fraud."
24. In Duchess of Kingstone, Smith's Leading Cases, 13th Edn., p.644, explaining the nature of fraud, de Grey, C.J. stated that though a judgment would be res judicata and not impeachable from within, it might be impeachable from without. In other words, though it is not permissible to show that the court was 'mistaken', it might be shown that it was 'misled'. There is an essential distinction between mistake and trickery. The clear implication of the distinction is that an action to set aside a judgment cannot be brought on the ground that it has been decided wrongly, namely, that on the merits, the decision was one which should not have been rendered, but it can be set aside, if the court was imposed upon or tricked into giving the judgment.
25. It has been said; Fraud and justice never dwell together (fraus et jus nunquam cohabitant); or fraud and deceit ought to benefit none (fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent).
26. Fraud may be defined as an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing some unfair or undeserved benefit by taking undue advantage of another. In fraud one gains at the loss of another. Even most solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether in rem or in personam. The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be stretched to the extent of an absurdity that it can be utilized as an engine of oppression by dishonest and fraudulent litigants.
27. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. V. Jagannath (dead) by LRs. & Ors. (1994) 1 SCC 1 : JT 1994 (6) SC 331, this Court had an occasion to consider the doctrine of fraud and the effect thereof on the judgment obtained by a party. In that case, one A by a registered deed, relinquished all his rights in the suit property in favour of C who sold the property to B. Without disclosing that fact, A filed a suit for possession against B and obtained preliminary decree. During the pendency of an application for final decree, B came to know about the fact of release deed by A in favour of C. He, therefore, contended that the decree was obtained by playing fraud on the court and was a nullity. The trial court upheld the contention and dismissed the application. The High Court, however, set aside the order of the trial court, observing that "there was no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence". B approached this Court.
28. Allowing the appeal, setting aside the judgment of the High Court and describing the observations of the High Court as 'wholly perverse', Kuldip Singh, J. stated:
"The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean-hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax- evaders, bank-loan- dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court - process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation".
(emphasis supplied)
29. The Court proceeded to state: "A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would he guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party".
30. The Court concluded: "The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants".
31. In Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 550 : JT 1996 (7) SC 135, referring to Lazarus Estates and Smith v. East Elloe Rural District Council, 1956 AC 336 : (1956) 1 All ER 855 : (1956) 2 WLR 888, this Court stated;
"22. The judiciary in India also possesses inherent power, specially under Section 151 C.P.C., to recall its judgment or order if it is obtained by Fraud on Court. In the case of fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court may direct the affected party to file a separate suit for setting aside the Decree obtained by fraud. Inherent powers are powers which are resident in all courts, especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring not from legislation but from the nature and the Constitution of the Tribunals or Courts themselves so as to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure obedience to its process and rules, protect its officers from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly administration of the Court's business".
(emphasis supplied)
32. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajendra Singh and others., (2000) 3 SCC 581 : JT 2000 (3) SC 151, by practising fraud upon the Insurance Company, the claimant obtained an award of compensation from the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. On coming to know of fraud, the Insurance Company applied for recalling of the award. The Tribunal, however, dismissed the petition on the ground that it had no power to review its own award. The High Court confirmed the order. The Company approached this Court.?
In K.D. Sharma Vs. Steel Authority of India Limited and others; (2008 12 SCC 481, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:
34. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32 and of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is extraordinary, equitable and discretionary. Prerogative writs mentioned therein are issued for doing substantial justice. It is, therefore, of utmost necessity that the petitioner approaching the Writ Court must come with clean hands, put forward all the facts before the Court without concealing or suppressing anything and seek an appropriate relief. If there is no candid disclosure of relevant and material facts or the petitioner is guilty of misleading the Court, his petition may be dismissed at the threshold without considering the merits of the claim.
35. The underlying object has been succinctly stated by Scrutton, L.J., in the leading case of R.V. Kensington Income Tax Commissioners, (1917) 1 KB 486 : 86 LJ KB 257 : 116 LT 136 in the following words:
"...it has been for many years the rule of the Court, and one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an applicant comes to the Court to obtain relief on an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the material facts- it says facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if he can help it; the Court is supposed to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts; and the penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly stated to it the Court will set aside any action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect statement".
(emphasis supplied)
36. A prerogative remedy is not a matter of course. While exercising extraordinary power a Writ Court would certainly bear in mind the conduct of the party who invokes the jurisdiction of the Court. If the applicant makes a false statement or suppresses material fact or attempts to mislead the Court, the Court may dismiss the action on that ground alone and may refuse to enter into the merits of the case by stating "We will not listen to your application because of what you have done". The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it.
37. In Kensington Income Tax Commissioner, Viscount Reading, C.J. observed:
"...Where an ex parte application has been made to this Court for a rule nisi or other process, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the affidavit in support of the applicant was not candid and did not fairly state the facts, the Court ought, for its own protection and to prevent an abuse of its process, to refuse to proceed any further with the examination of the merits. This is a power inherent in the Court, but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the Court that it has been deceived. Before coming to this conclusion a careful examination will be made of the facts as they are and as they have been stated in the applicant's affidavit, and everything will be heard that can be urged to influence the view of the Court when it reads the affidavit and knows the true facts. But if the result of this examination and hearing is to leave no doubt that this Court has been deceived, then it will refuse to hear anything further from the applicant in a proceeding which has only been set in motion by means of a misleading affidavit".
(emphasis supplied)
38. The above principles have been accepted in our legal system also. As per settled law, the party who invokes the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32 or of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is supposed to be truthful, frank and open. He must disclose all material facts without any reservation even if they are against him. He cannot be allowed to play `hide and seek' or to `pick and choose' the facts he likes to disclose and to suppress (keep back) or not to disclose (conceal) other facts. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true and complete (correct) facts. If material facts are suppressed or distorted, the very functioning of Writ Courts and exercise would become impossible. The petitioner must disclose all the facts having a bearing on the relief sought without any qualification. This is because, "the Court knows law but not facts".
In Dalip Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and others; (2010) 2 SCC 114 Hon"ble the Supreme Court has held as under:
1. For many centuries, Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e., `Satya' (truth) and `Ahimsa' (non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of justice delivery system which was in vogue in pre-independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has over-shadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings.
2. In last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.
3. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das AIR 1963 SC 1558, this Court adverted to the aforesaid rule and revoked the leave granted to the appellant by making the following observations:
"It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave made under Article 136 of the Constitution, care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue and misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. Thus, if at the hearing of the appeal the Supreme Court is satisfied that the material statements made by the appellant in his application for special leave are inaccurate and misleading, and the respondent is entitled to contend that the appellant may have obtained special leave from the Supreme Court on the strength of what he characterizes as misrepresentations of facts contained in the petition for special leave, the Supreme Court may come to the conclusion that in such a case special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked."
4. In Welcome Hotel and others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and others etc. AIR 1983 SC 1015, the Court held that a party which has misled the Court in passing an order in its favour is not entitled to be heard on the merits of the case.
5. In G.Narayanswamy Reddi and other v. Governor of Karnataka and another AIR 1991 SC 1726, the Court denied relief to the appellant who had concealed the fact that the award was not made by the Land Acquisition Officer within the time specified in Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act because of the stay order passed by the High Court. While dismissing the special leave petition, the Court observed:
"Curiously enough, there is no reference in the Special Leave Petitions to any of the stay orders and we came to know about these orders only when the respondents appeared in response to the notice and filed their counter affidavit. In our view, the said interim orders have a direct bearing on the question raised and the non-disclosure of the same certainly amounts to suppression of material facts. On this ground alone, the Special Leave Petitions are liable to be rejected. It is well settled in law that the relief under Article 136 of the Constitution is discretionary and a petitioner who approaches this Court for such relief must come with frank and full disclosure of facts. If he fails to do so and suppresses material facts, his application is liable to be dismissed. We accordingly dismiss the Special Leave Petitions."
6. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by L.Rs. v. Jagannath (dead) by L.Rs. and others JT 1993 (6) SC 331, the Court held that where a preliminary decree was obtained by withholding an important document from the court, the party concerned deserves to be thrown out at any stage of the litigation.
7. In Prestige Lights Ltd. v. State Bank of India (2007) 8 SCC 449, it was held that in exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the High Court is not just a court of law, but is also a court of equity and a person who invokes the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is duty bound to place all the facts before the court without any reservation. If there is suppression of material facts or twisted facts have been placed before the High Court then it will be fully justified in refusing to entertain petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. This Court referred to the judgment of Scrutton, L.J. in R v Kensington Income Tax Commissioners (1917) 1 K.B. 486, and observed:
"In exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court will always keep in mind the conduct of the party who is invoking such jurisdiction. If the applicant does not disclose full facts or suppresses relevant materials or is otherwise guilty of misleading the Court, then the Court may dismiss the action without adjudicating the matter on merits. The rule has been evolved in larger public interest to deter unscrupulous litigants from abusing the process of Court by deceiving it. The very basis of the writ jurisdiction rests in disclosure of true, complete and correct facts. If the material facts are not candidly stated or are suppressed or are distorted, the very functioning of the writ courts would become impossible."
In Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav and others Vs. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society and others; (2013) 11 SCC 531 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
42. While dealing with the conduct of the parties, we may also notice the submission of learned counsel for respondent No.1 to the effect that the petitioners are guilty of suppression of a material fact from this Court, namely, the rejection on 2nd May 2003 of the first application for extension of time filed by the trustees and the finality attached to it. These facts have not been clearly disclosed to this Court by the petitioners. It was submitted that in view of the suppression, special leave to appeal should not be granted to the petitioners.
43. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that no material facts have been withheld from this Court. It was submitted that while the order dated 2nd May 2003 was undoubtedly not filed, its existence was not material in view of subsequent developments that had taken place. We cannot agree.
44. It is not for a litigant to decide what fact is material for adjudicating a case and what is not material. It is the obligation of a litigant to disclose all the facts of a case and leave the decision making to the Court. True, there is a mention of the order dated 2nd May 2003 in the order dated 24th July 2006 passed by the JCC, but that is not enough disclosure. The petitioners have not clearly disclosed the facts and circumstances in which the order dated 2nd May 2003 was passed or that it has attained finality.
45. We may only refer to two cases on this subject. In Hari Narain v. Badri Das, AIR 1963 SC 1558 stress was laid on litigants eschewing inaccurate, untrue or misleading statements, otherwise leave granted to an appellant may be revoked. It was observed as follows:
It is of utmost importance that in making material statements and setting forth grounds in applications for special leave, care must be taken not to make any statements which are inaccurate, untrue or misleading. In dealing with applications for special leave, the Court naturally takes statements of fact and grounds of fact contained in the petitions at their face value and it would be unfair to betray the confidence of the Court by making statements which are untrue and misleading. That is why we have come to the conclusion that in the present case, special leave granted to the appellant ought to be revoked. Accordingly, special leave is revoked and the appeal is dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the respondent.
46. More recently, in Ramjas Foundation vs. Union of India, (2010) 14 SCC 38 the case law on the subject was discussed. It was held that if a litigant does not come to the Court with clean hands, he is not entitled to be heard and indeed, such a person is not entitled to any relief from any judicial forum. It was said:
The principle that a person who does not come to the court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but also to the cases instituted in others courts and judicial forums. The object underlying the principle is that every court is not only entitled but is duty bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have any respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or by making misstatement or by suppressing facts which have a bearing on adjudication of the issue(s) arising in the case."
16. Accordingly, we find that there is no material at all existing in favour of the petitioner to claim rights on the basis of adverse possession of delay of 15 years which was noticed by the Assistant Consolidation Officer who submitted his report on 31.7.2017and it is on the basis of his report that original record was examined and the appeal filed in 17.5.2018.
17. Accordingly, it is a fit case where the land of the State is being usurped by the private individual in clear collusion with the revenue authorities and even the said proceedings has been discussed after 15 years but the said proceedings cannot be thrown out only on the basis of limitation and accordingly in view of the consistent law laid down by the Supreme Court this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellate authority had condoned the delay in a most illegal and arbitrary manner
18. Lastly, we further find that once it has been found that order has been procured fraudulently then the appeal filed by Government Advocate in 2018 and the sanction for filing the same was given on 1.11.2021. In case, the sanction was declined the sanctioning authority could not have held that the appeal was field without any delay. Be that as it may it is clear that the sanction has been given after filing of the appeal and in view of these facts and circumstances I do not find any infirmity in the sanction having been granted to government Advocate three years after filing the said appeal was filed. Accordingly, once sanction has been granted therefore, sanction cannot be challenged on the ground that it has been granted for condonation of delay. This Court also is not inclined to accept the arguments of the petitioner.
19. We further find that in the appeal only the grounds of appeal have to be filed and accordingly there is no requirement of filing affidavit along with the ground of appeal in the application for condonation of delay for which appeal has been filed by the State and reasons were provided for in the application itself.
20. We have found that in the appeal various grounds were raised before the appellate authority and accordingly the defects in any case are curable defects and should be raised before the appellate court itself but by not raising the said objection before the appellate authority this Court is of the considered opinion that the said objection cannot be considered subsequently and it is for this reason that even in case the said fact was not supported by an affidavit and the same was noticed by the appellate authority then full opportunity should have been granted to the petitioner but at this stage non filing of the affidavit is a curable defect and the same should be rectified at the appellate stage itself and accordingly by not taking the said ground before the appellate authority, the petitioner cannot be restricted from raising the grounds in revision or subsequently in the writ proceedings. Accordingly, this ground also is not tenable and is accordingly rejected.
21. For the aforesaid reasons, we are not inclined to interfere in the writ petition which is devoid of merits and is accordingly dismissed.
(Alok Mathur,J.) September 2, 2025 RKM.