Allahabad High Court
Ghaziabad Development Authority vs District Judge And Another on 25 July, 2022
Author: Saral Srivastava
Bench: Saral Srivastava
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
AFR
Reserved on 08.04.2022
Delivered on 25.07.2022
Case :- MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 5135 of 2016
Petitioner :- Ghaziabad Development Authority
Respondent :- District Judge And Another
Counsel for Petitioner :- Mahendra Pratap,Mahesh Narain Singh
Counsel for Respondent :- Rajesh Srivastava,Himanshu Tiwari,Kashif Zaidi
Hon'ble Saral Srivastava,J.
1. Heard Sri Mahesh Narain Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Kashif Zaidi, learned counsel for the respondents.
2. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed by the petitioner-Ghaziabad Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as 'G.D.A.') challenging the order dated 14.04.2016 passed by the Additional District Judge, Court No.1, Ghaziabad by which he has allowed the appeal of the respondent no.2 under Section 18(6) of U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act, 1973') and directed the petitioner to reconsider the case of respondent no.2 under Section 18(4-A) of the Act, 1973.
3. The facts, in brief, are that G.D.A. floated a scheme for allotment of plots to Creche/Nursery/Primary/High School/Degree College, Educational Institutions and invited application for the same. The G.D.A. issued a brochure containing terms and conditions of registration and allotment of plots.
4. Under the scheme floated for allotment of plots, respondent no.2 applied for allotment of a plot alongwith the registration amount. The G.D.A. informed respondent no.2 vide letter dated 24.06.2008 that the plot situated at Indirapuram, Nyay Khand-1, Ghaziabad has been allotted to the society with the approval dated 20.06.2008 of State of U.P. The Vice Chairman of the G.D.A. issued a consequential order dated 24.06.2008.
5. The rate of the plot was Rs.3600/- per sq. meter and the area of the plot was 7363.96 per sq. meter. The total value of the plot was Rs.2,65,10,256/-. Respondent no.2 was also directed to pay a sum of Rs.53,02,052/- towards the location charge and Rs.31,81,231/- as lease rent.
6. On depositing the aforesaid amount as well as fulfillment of terms of allotment, the G.D.A. executed an agreement dated 31.08.2008 titled as 'आवासीय क्षेत्र में स्कूल के निर्माणार्थ गाज़ियाबाद विकास प्राधिकरण की भूमि का संविदा' (hereinafter referred to as 'agreement') in favour of the respondent no.2.
7. The agreement was registered in the office of Sub-Registrar, Ghaziabad on the payment of stamp duty of Rs.24,50,000/-. The G.D.A., thereafter, delivered the possession of the said plot to respondent no.2 on 30.09.2008. Thereafter, respondent no.2 submitted a plan for the construction of the building on the said plot, but the plan submitted by respondent no.2 was not approved by the G.D.A.
8. The record reflects that a notice under Section 111 (g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act, 1882') was issued by G.D.A. calling upon respondent no.2 to show cause as to why the agreement be not cancelled for non-construction of building over the said plot within five years from the date of allotment which is a breach of the condition of the agreement. The reply was submitted by respondent no.2, but G.D.A. being dissatisfied with the reply of respondent no.2 cancelled the aforesaid agreement on 30.06.2014. Accordingly, a communication was sent to respondent no.2 vide letter dated 02.07.2014 informing about the cancellation of the agreement.
9. Feeling aggrieved by the order of cancellation of agreement and allotment of plot, respondent no.2 preferred an appeal bearing Appeal No.55 of 2014 under Section 18(6) of the Act, 1973 on the ground that respondent no.2 is entitled to benefit of Section 18 (4-A) of the Act, 1973 on payment of the surcharge.
10. The appeal was opposed by the petitioner contending inter-alia that respondent no.2 is not entitled to the benefit of Section 18(4-A) of the Act, 1973 as only an agreement has been entered into between the parties and the lease deed is yet to be executed between the parties. The said appeal was allowed by the Additional District Judge, Court No.1, Ghaziabad vide order dated 14.04.2016, which is impugned in the present writ petition.
11. The case of respondent no.2 is that the order of G.D.A. dated 02.07.2014 cancelling the allotment of plot for construction of schools was per se illegal and in the teeth of Section 18(4-A) of the Act, 1973. Further case of respondent no.2 is that stipulation contained in para 6.1 of the brochure, which is also part of the agreement, is binding upon the parties, therefore, respondent no.2 is entitled to the benefit of the said clause and Section 18(4-A) of the Act, 1973.
12. Respondent no.2 in the counter affidavit has averred that they are ready and willing to pay the additional surcharge as provided in Section 18(4-A) of the Act, 1973, and this aspect was not considered by the G.D.A. while cancelling the allotment of plot in favour of respondent no.2. The further case of the respondent no.2 was that though the agreement has been styled as 'आवासीय क्षेत्र में स्कूल के निर्माणार्थ गाज़ियाबाद विकास प्राधिकरण की भूमि का संविदा' but in fact, the agreement is lease deed as the terms and conditions stipulated in the agreement decipher that it has all the trappings of the lease.
13. The further case of respondent no.2 was that as per the stipulation contained in the agreement, the brochure is also part of the agreement, therefore, the stipulation contained in the brochure is binding upon the parties. Thus, respondent no.2 is entitled to the extension of time for a period of five years for raising construction over the said plot on payment of charges as prescribed under Section 18(4-A) of the Act, 1973.
14. Challenging the aforesaid order, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that it is evident from the agreement that agreement has been styled as 'आवासीय क्षेत्र में स्कूल के निर्माणार्थ गाज़ियाबाद विकास प्राधिकरण की भूमि का संविदा' and cannot be termed as lease deed, therefore, Section 18(4-A) is not attracted and thus, appeal under Section 18(6) of the Act, 1973 filed by the respondent no.2 was not maintainable. Accordingly, it is contended that the order impugned is illegal and without jurisdiction.
15. The further contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in view of the clear stipulation in the agreement that the construction has to be raised within five years from the date of agreement failing which the G.D.A shall have the right to cancel the agreement and re-enter in the said plot, so, it is submitted that on non-fulfillment of the said condition, the agreement stands cancelled. He contends that the appellate court has failed to appreciate the law correctly while holding that the agreement reflects that it has all the trappings of a lease deed, therefore, Section 18(4-A) of the Act, 1973 are attracted in the instant case and the G.D.A. had ignored this aspect of the matter while cancelling the allotment. In support of the case, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgement of Apex Court in the case of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority Vs. Ravindra Kumar Singhvi (Dead) through L.Rs passed in Civil Appeal No.382 of 2012.
16. Rebutting the aforesaid contention, Sri Shashi Nandan, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents has placed various stipulations of the agreement to contend that though the agreement may be titled as 'आवासीय क्षेत्र में स्कूल के निर्माणार्थ गाज़ियाबाद विकास प्राधिकरण की भूमि का संविदा' but the stipulation contained therein reflects clear intention of the petitioner that exclusive possession of plot has been delivered to respondent no.2 for enjoyment, thus, the agreement is a lease deed, therefore, the finding of the appellate court is correct and based upon proper appreciation of the law. He further contends that admittedly a notice under Section 111(g) of the Act, 1882 has been issued by the petitioner for cancellation of agreement which reflects that the petitioner has also treated the said agreement as a lease deed. Thus, it is contended that had the G.D.A. not treated the agreement to be a lease deed, it would not have issued a notice under Section 111(g) of the Act, 1882. In support of his argument, he has placed reliance upon the judgements of the Apex Court in the cases of C.M. Beena and Another Vs. P.N. Ramachandra Rao 2004(3) SCC 595 & Khalil Ahmed Bashir Ahmed Vs. Tufelhussein Samasbhai Sarangpurwala 1988 (1) SCC 155.
17. I have considered the rival submissions of the parties and perused the record.
18. The controversy in the present case revolves around the question whether the agreement has trapping of the lease or not.
19. If the answer to this question is 'yes', obviously Section 18(4-A) of the Act, 1973 would be applicable and respondent no.2 is entitled to consideration of its claim for extension of a further period of five years for raising construction over the plot on payment of charge as provided in Section 18(4-A) of the Act, 1973.
20. To appreciate the aforesaid question, it would be apt to reproduce the relevant clause of the agreement in which petitioner has been referred to as 'संविदाकर्ता' and respondent no.2 has been referred to as 'संविदाग्राहिता':-
"चूंकि संविदाकर्ता द्वारा विकसित योजना के अन्तर्गत स्कूल के निर्माण हेतु नियोजित भूखण्ड नियमानुसार योजना घोषित कर दिनांक 24.06.2008 को स्कूल भूखण्ड न्याय खण्ड-1 स्थित इन्दिरापुरम् योजना में इस कार्यालय के पत्र संख्या-915/व्य०अनु/08, दिनांक 24.06.2008 द्वारा आवंटित किया गया था। साईट प्लान के अनुसार भूखण्ड क्षेत्रफल 7363.96 वर्गमीटर है । जिसकी सीमायें इस विलेख के अन्त में अंकित हैं तथा संलग्न स्थल चित्र में भी स्पष्ट है, को अंकन रू. 3,18,12,308.00 (रूपये तीन करोड़ अट्ठारह लाख बारह हजार तीन सौ आठ मात्र) आंशिक प्रीमियम रू. 67,50,000.00 व 20 प्रतिशत लोकेशन चार्ज रू. 53,02,052.00कुल आंशिक प्रीमियम रू. 1,20,52,052.00 व लीज किराया रूपये 31,81,231.00 एवं कुल बकाया रू. 1,97,60,256.00 (रूपये एक करोड़ सत्तान्नबे लाख साठ हजार दो सौ छप्पन मात्र) का भुगतान निम्नानुसार 05 वर्ष वार्षिक किश्तों में 21 प्रतिशत ब्याज सहित किये जाने बाबत संविदाग्राहिता अदा करने हेतु सहमत हुए है। अतः किश्तों का विवरण निम्नानुसार हैः-
क्रम राशि ब्याज 21% कुल देय राशि देय तिथि
1. 39,52,052.00 41,49,655.00 81,01,,707.00 24-06-2009
2. 39,52,052.00 33,19,724.00 72,71,776.00 24-06-2010
3. 39,52,052.00 24,89,793.00 64,41,845.00 24-06-2011
4. 39,52,052.00 16,59,862.00 56,11,914.00 24-06-2012
5. 39,52,052.00 8,29,931.00 47,81,983.00 24-06-2013 देय तिथि पर भुगतान करने पर 3.5 प्रतिशत ब्यान में छूट दी जायेगी। देय तिथि पर भुगतान न करने पर देय राशि पर 21 प्रतिशत अतिरिक्त ब्याज देय होगा। भूखण्ड का कब्जा एग्रीमेन्ट कराने के उपरान्त हस्तान्तरित किया जायेगा। देय तिथि पर कब्जा न लेने पर रू. 500/- प्रतिमाह चौकीदार शुल्क जमा कराना होगा। भूखण्ड पर निर्माण एग्रीमेन्ट की तिथि से 05 वर्ष के अन्दर पूर्ण करना होगा। शेष नियम व शर्ते ब्रोशर के अनुसार होंगी।
अतः यह संविदा निम्न बातों का साक्षी हैः-
1. यह कि उपर्युक्त भूखण्ड जिसकी सीमाओं को संलग्न रेखाचित्र में दिखाया गया है और प्रश्नगत स्कूल भूखण्ड हाई स्कूल के निर्माण हेतु आवंटित किया गया है तो सभी भार व देनदारियों से मुक्त है तथा विवाद रहित सम्पदा है जिसे इस विलेख में आगे स्कूल के निर्माण हेतु संविदा भूखण्ड कह कर सम्बोधित किया गया है, संविदाग्राहिता को 90 (नब्बे) वर्ष की अवधि हेतु संविदा पर हस्तान्तरित किया जा रहा है किन्तु प्राधिकरण के पक्ष में निम्नलिखित अधिकार सदैव आरक्षित होंगेः-
(क) यदि प्राधिकरण उक्त क्षेत्र का विकास किया जाना आवश्यक समझे तो संविदा भूखण्ड के नीचे तथा ऊपर जल सम्बाहक, नालियों, सीवरों या बिजली के तारों को डालने, बनाने या बिछाने का अधिकार।
(ख) संविदा भूखण्ड या उसके किसी भाग में होने वाले सभी खानों और खनिजों के सम्पूर्ण अधिकार।
(ग) ...
(घ) ...
4. संविदाग्राहिता अपने खर्च से संविदा भूखण्ड पर प्राधिकरण द्वारा लिखित रूप से अनुमोदित रेखाचित्र वाह्य अद्विक्षेप तथा डिजाईन व स्थिति के अनुसार एक स्कूल के लिए भवन का सारभूत एवं शिल्प कौशल में निर्माण करायेगा, जिसमें स्कूल भवन, नालियों शौचालयों तथा संयोजनों के संबंध में विहित प्राधिकरण तथा नगर पालिका नियमावली तथा उपविधियों के अनुसार सभी आवश्यक सीवरों, नालियों तथा अनुसंलग्नकों का प्राविधान होगा।
15. संविदाग्राहिता को संविदा भूखण्ड पर संविदा की दिनांक से 05 वर्ष तक स्कूल भवन को निर्माण करना और उसे पूरा करना आवश्यक होगा समय पर निर्माण पूर्ण नहीं किया गया तो भूमि वापिस ले ली जायेगी।
16. और इस संविदा के पक्षों द्वारा उनके बीच एतद्द्वारा निम्नलिखित सम्बन्ध में सहमति और घोषणा की जाती हैः-
(क) इसके पूर्व किसी बात को अन्यथा होते हुए भी यदि प्राधिकरण के मतानुसार (जिसका अन्तिम तथा बाध्य होगा) संविदाग्राहिता अथवा उसके अधीन दावा करने वाले किसी भी व्यक्ति द्वारा पूर्व की शर्तों या प्रसंविदाओं में से किसी का उल्लंघन किया गया हो, जिनका पालन तथा सम्पादन किया जाना उनका कर्तव्य था तथा विशेषतया और इस उपखण्ड की व्यापकता पर प्रतिकूल प्रभाव डाले बिना, यदि संविदाग्राहिता पूर्ववत प्राविधानों के अनुसार सम्पूर्ण संविदा भूखण्ड पर स्कूल भवन निर्माण निर्धारित अवधि में पूर्ण करने में असफल रहता है या स्कूल भवन निर्माण करने से पूर्व संविदा भूखण्ड का अन्तरण परित्याग बंधक या अभ्यापर्ण करता है या अन्तरित भूखण्ड के सम्पूर्ण भाग से कम भाग का अन्तरण परित्याग बंधक का अभ्यापर्ण करता है या पूर्वाकित खण्ड -2 में उल्लिखित अवधि के भीतर इस संविदा में उल्लिखित प्रीमियम को किसी किश्त का भुगतान नहीं करता है या यदि संविदाग्राहिता या कोई ऐसा व्यक्ति जिसमें इस संविदा के अधिकार एतद्द्वारा निहित किये गये हों, दिवालिया निर्णीत हो गया है या प्राधिकरण के लिए वह वैध होगा कि (अनुबन्ध के उल्लघंन के सम्बन्ध में प्राधिकरण द्वारा कार्यवाही करने के लिए किसी अधिकार पर प्रतिकूल प्रभाव डाले बिना) वह संविदा या उसके किसी भाग पर अन्तरित सम्पूर्ण भूखण्ड के नाम पर पुनः प्रवेश कर लें और उक्त दशा में यह संविदा समाप्त हो जायेगा और तत्पश्चातः-
यदि पुनः प्रवेश के समय, संविदाग्राहिता द्वारा संविदा भूखण्ड पर स्कूल भवन का निर्माण किया गया हो तो संविदाग्राहिता पुनः प्रवेश के दिनांक से तीन माह की अवधि के भीतर उस पर से सभी निर्माण कार्य या स्कूल भवन जुड़नार तथा वस्तुएं जो किसी समय या उक्त अवधि के दौरान उक्त अवधि में भूखण्ड पर या उसमें जुड़ी या लगायी गयी हों, हटा लेगा और उक्त स्थान को ऐसी अच्छी दशा में लायेगा, जैसी कि संविदा देने के समय थी, पर उपरोक्त के सम्बन्ध में चूक किये जाने पर वे उक्त भूखण्ड और उस पर होने वाले आवश्यक जुड़नार और वस्तुओं के सम्बन्ध में संविदाग्राहिता को किसी प्रतिकर का भुगतान किये बिना प्राधिकरण की सम्पत्ति हो जायेगी। यदि संविदाग्राहिता निर्दिष्ट अवधि के भीतर निर्माण कार्यों स्कूल भवन, जुड़नारों और वस्तुओं को नहीं हटा लेता है तो संविदा भूखण्ड का पुनः आवंटन कर लिया जायेगा।
(ख) ..."
21. It is evident that respondent no.2 was directed to pay location charges to the tune of Rs.53,02,052/- and lease rent of Rs.31,81,231/-. It is also apt to refer to the letter of Executive Engineer (Expenditure) of the G.D.A. dated 29.08.2008 addressed to respondent no.2 stating therein that respondent no.2 had deposited Rs.67,50,000/-, 20% of location charge to the tune of Rs.53,02,052/- and 10% of the lease rent to the tune of Rs.31,81,000/-.
22. On depositing of the said amount, the agreement was executed on 31.08.2008 and possession memo was prepared, thereafter, the plot was delivered to respondent no.2. The contents of the possession memo are being reproduced herein below:-
मैने उपरोक्त प्लाट का अधिकार आज दिनांक .......... को ......... बजे मध्यान्ह पूर्व/पश्चात प्राप्त कर लिया है। प्लाट की पूर्ण पट्टे में दर्शायी गई/ नाप मेरे सामने की गई है, जिससे मैं पूर्णतः सन्तुष्ट हूँ।"
23. Perusal of the letter dated 29.08.2008 reveals that respondent no.2 after depositing the amount in compliance with the letter dated 29.08.2008 got the agreement dated 31.08.2008 executed. Stipulation under the agreement, extracted above, shows that construction was to be raised by respondent no.2 within a period of five years from the date of execution of the agreement. Further, clause 1 of the agreement stipulates that the plot is free from all encumbrances and has been allotted for 90 years and possession thereof has been delivered to respondent no.2.
24. At this stage, it would also be apt to refer to the language used in the possession memo, extracted above, which recites that respondent no.2 has obtained exclusive possession of the plot. The stipulation contained in the agreement as well as the reading of the possession memo clearly reflects that exclusive possession of the plot has been delivered to respondent no.2. It does not indicate that there was any intention on the part of the petitioner not to deliver the exclusive possession of the plot to the respondent no.2.
25. The aforesaid fact is further fortified from the stipulation in the agreement that the plot has been given to respondent no.2 for 90 years. The agreement does not stipulate any condition from which it can be inferred that there was any intention on the part of the petitioner to retain the exclusive possession of the plot with it and grant only a permissive right to respondent no.2 to run the school.
26. The aforesaid contention is further supported by the conditions contained in the brochure which is a part of the agreement. The fact that the brochure is treated to be a part of the agreement is also evident from the allotment letter dated 24.06.2008 and letter dated 29.08.2008 of the petitioner which states that ''नियम व शर्ते ब्रोशर के अनुसार होंगी'.
27. In this context, it would also be apposite to reproduce para 5, 6, 7, 10.10, and 10.11 of the brochure:-
5.0 भुगतान की प्रक्रिया तथा कब्जा हेतु शर्तें विद्यालयों/शैक्षिक संस्थाओं की भूमि के मूल्य के भुगतान की प्रक्रिया निम्नवत होगीः-
5.1 आवंटित भूखण्ड के मूल्य की 25 प्रतिशत धनराशि संस्था को आवंटन पत्र जारी होने की तिथि के 30दिन के अन्दर जमा करानी होगी, जिसमें पंजीकरण राशि समायोजित कर ली जायेगी।
5.2 25 प्रतिशत धनाराशि तथा लीज रेंन्ट एवं लोकेशन चार्जेज (यदि लागू हों) जमा होने के उपरान्त रजिस्टर्ड एग्रीमेंट कराकर ही कब्जा दिया जायेगा।
5.3 अवशेष 75 प्रतिशत धनाराशि पांच सालाना किश्तों में 21 प्रतिशत वार्षिक ब्याज सहित जमा करानी होगी। समय से किश्तों का भुगतान करने पर ब्याज में 3.5 प्रतिशत की छूट दी जायेगी। प्रथम किश्त आवंटन की तिथि से एक वर्ष के अन्दर देय होगी।
5.4 रजिस्टर्ड एग्रीमेंट से पूर्व भूखण्ड के कुल मूल्य का 10 प्रतिशत लीज रेन्ट जमा करना होगा।
5.5 समस्त भुगतान बैंक ड्राफ्ट/पे-आर्डर के माध्यम से गाजियाबाद विकास प्राधिकरण के कैस काउन्टर पर प्रत्येक कार्य दिवस में प्रातः 10.00 बजे से 2.00 बजे तक जमा किये जा सकते है। ड्राफ्ट/पे-आर्डर उपाध्यक्ष गाजियाबाद विकास प्राधिकरण के नाम एवं गाजियाबाद में भुगतान योग्य होने चाहिए।
5.6 निर्धारित तिथि तक कब्जा नहीं लेने पर नियमानुसार शुल्क देय होगा।
5.7 भूखण्डों का क्षेत्रफल अनुमानित है, जिसमें स्थल पर विचलन हो सकता है। क्षेत्रफल में कमी या बढ़ोत्तरी के लिए कोई आपत्ति मान्य नहीं होगी। वास्तविक क्षेत्रफल के आधार पर ही देय धनराशि की गणना आवंटित मूल्य पर की जायेगी।
5.8 भूखण्ड के क्षेत्रफल में स्थल के अनुसार परिवर्तन होने की दशा में यदि आवंटी द्वारा इस आधार पर भूखण्ड निरस्त करने/ परित्याग का अनुरोध किया जाता है तो उसकी जमा धनराशि बिना किसी ब्याज के वापस कर दी जायेगी।
5.9 भुगतान की समय सीमा आदि के विषय में प्राधिकरण/ शासन के आदेश मान्य होंगे।
6.0 भवन निर्माण अवधिः 6.1 आवंटी भवन मानचित्र सक्षम प्राधिकारी से स्वीकृत कराकर ही अपने व्यय पर निर्माण करेगा। भवन निर्माण की अवधि संविदा पंजीकरण की तिथि से 5 वर्ष की दी जायेगी। परन्तु आवंटी को तीन वर्ष के अन्दर अध्यापन कार्य प्रारम्भ करना होगा। निर्धारित अवधि के अन्दर निर्माण पूर्ण नहीं किया जाता है तो नियमानुसार सरचार्ज देकर यह अवधि बढ़ाई जा सकेगी किन्तु 5 वर्ष से अधिक समय के लिए अभिवृद्धि नहीं की जायेगी और दस वर्ष तक भी निर्माण न करने की दशा में संविदा निरस्त कर भंग कर दी जायेगी तथा अधिनियम के प्राविधान के अनुसार पुनः प्रवेश कर लिया जायेगा।
6.2 आवंटी आवंटित भूखण्ड का उपविभाजन अथवा संयोजन नहीं करेगा।
6.3 आवंटित भूखण्ड पर किया गया किसी भी प्रकार का अनाधिकृत निर्माण नियमानुसार ध्वस्त कर दिया जायेगा।
7.0 पट्टा विलेख 7.1 संस्था को भूखण्ड 90 वर्ष की अवधि हेतु पट्टे पर दिया जायेगा। संस्था द्वारा समस्त देय धनराशि जमा कराकर अन्तिम किश्त की निर्धारित तिथि से तीन माह में निर्धारित प्रोफार्मा पर अपने खर्चे पर पट्टा विलेख कराना होगा अन्यथा आवंटन/अनुबन्ध निरस्त कर दिया जायेगा।
7.2 आवंटित भूखण्ड के कुल प्रीमियम का 10 प्रतिशत लीज रेन्ट 90 वर्ष की लीज अवधि हेतु अग्रिम रूप से कब्जा प्राप्त करते समय देय होगा।
7.3 पट्टा विलेख तैयार करने में स्टाम्प, रजिस्ट्री, लीज डीड एवं उसकी प्रति तथा अन्य सभी खर्चे आवंटी को स्वयं करने होंगे।
10.10 संस्था को भूखण्ड या उस पर निर्मित किये गये भवन को प्राधिकरण की अनुमति के बिना किसी अन्य को स्थनान्तरित करने का अधिकार नहीं हैं। अगर आवंटी किसी अन्य समान कार्य करने वाले संस्था को उक्त सम्पत्ति स्थानान्तरित करने हेतु प्राधिकरण से अनुमति मांगता है तो प्राधिकरण के नियम एवं शर्तों के अधीन हस्तानान्तरण शुल्क के भुगतान पर आवंटी को सम्पत्ति स्थानान्तरण करने की अनुमति दी जा सकती है। इस संबंध में प्राधिकरण का निर्णय अन्तिम होगा, जो आवंटी को मान्य होगा।
10.11 संस्था को प्राधिकरण की पूर्ण सहमति से संस्था की स्थापना/निर्माण कार्य हेतु वित्तीय आवश्यकताओं की पूर्ति हेतु किसी सरकारी संस्था या सरकार द्वारा मान्यता प्राप्त किसी वित्तीय संस्था से ऋण के लिए भूखण्ड को संस्था के पक्ष में बंधक रखने हेतु अनुमति प्राधिकरण द्वारा निर्धारित नियम एवं शर्तों पर दी जा सकती है।"
28. Conjoint reading of Para 5.1 and Para 5.2 of the brochure suggests that on deposit of 25% price of the land and lease rent and location charge, the possession can be delivered after the execution of the agreement between the parties.
29. Para 5.4 of the brochure stipulates that 10% of the lease rent has to be deposited before the execution of the registered agreement.
30. Para 5.6 of the brochure provides that charges as per rules have to be paid if the possession of the plot is not taken within the stipulated time.
31. Para 6.1 of the brochure provides that in case the construction could not be raised within the stipulated period of five years, a further extension of five years can be granted for construction on payment of the surcharge as per rules. Para 7 of the brochure relates to the execution of the lease deed.
32. Para 10.10 of the brochure provides that the plot cannot be transferred by respondent no.2 without permission of the G.D.A. However if respondent no.2 wants to transfer the plot to any other society engaged in the same work, the same can be transferred after permission from the G.D.A. however, the decision of the G.D.A. in this respect shall be final.
33. Para 10.11 permits respondent no.2 to mortgage the property to any Government institution or any institution recognised by the Government after permission from the G.D.A.
34. The conditions detailed above from the brochure, which is a part of the agreement, also reveal that the agreement was to be executed after the deposit of 10% lease rent and in case, the possession is not taken within the stipulated time, respondent no.2 shall be liable to pay charges as per rules.
35. Further condition stipulated in para 6.1 of the brochure provides that five years period can be extended on payment of surcharge if the construction is not raised within the time stipulated in the agreement. Respondent no.2 in view of clause 10.10 of the agreement can transfer the plot after permission from the G.D.A. Respondent no.2 can also mortgage the property for any financial assistance to any Government institution or institution recognised by the Government after permission from the G.D.A. Thus, it is clear that there was a clear intention on the part of the G.D.A. to handover the exclusive possession of the plot, and perusal of the stipulation of the agreement and brochure and possession memo do not reflect or indicate in any manner that G.D.A. wanted to retain the possession of the plot and wished to grant only the permissive right to respondent no.2 to run the school.
36. The Apex Court in the case of Associated Hotels of India Ltd. Vs. R.N. Kapoor AIR 1959 SC 1262 has held that it is the substance of the agreement that matters and not the form, for otherwise clever drafting can camouflage the real intention of the parties. While considering the question as to whether the document is a licence or lease, it expounded four conditions in the judgment, on the existence of which a document can be termed as 'lease'. In the context of the present case, paragraph 27 of the said judgement is being reproduced herein below:-
"27.There is a marked distinction between a lease and a licence. S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act defines a lease of immoveable property as a transfer of a right to enjoy such property made for a certain time in consideration for a price paid or promised. Under S. 108 of the said Act, the lessee is entitled to be put in possession of the property. A lease is therefore a transfer of an interest in land. The interest transferred is called the leasehold interest. The lessor parts with his right to enjoy the property during the term of the lease, and it follows from it that the lessee gets that right to the exclusion of the lessor. Whereas S. 52 of the Indian Easements Act defines a licence thus:
"Where one person grants to another, or to a definite number of other persons, a right to do or continue to do, in or upon the immoveable property of the grantor, something which would, in the absence of such right, be unlawful, and such right does not amount to an easement or an interest in the property, the right is called a licence."
Under the aforesaid section, if a document gives only a right to use the property in a particular way or under certain terms while it remains in possession and control of the owner thereof, it will be a licence. The legal possession, therefore, continues to be with the owner of the property, but the licensee is permitted to make use of the premises for a particular purpose'. But for the permission, his occupation would be unlawful. It does not create in his favour any estate or interest in the property. There is, therefore, clear distinction between the two concepts. The dividing line is clear though sometimes it becomes very thin or even blurred. At one time it was thought that the test of exclusive possession was infalliable and if a person was given exclusive possession of a premises, it would conclusively establish that he was a lessee. But there was a change and the recent trend of judicial opinion is reflected in Errington v. Errington 1952-1 All. ER 149, wherein Lord Denning reviewing the case law on the subject summarizes the result of his discussion thus at p.155:
"The result of all these cases is that, although a person who is let into exclusive possession is, 'prima facie', to be considered to be tenant, nevertheless he will not be held to be so if the circumstances negative any intention to create a tenancy."
The Court of Appeal again in Cobb v. Lane, 1952-1 All ER 1199, considered the legal position and laid down that the intention of the parties was the real test for ascertaining the character of a document. At p. 1201, Somervell. L. J., stated:
"................ the solution that would seem to have been found is, as one would expect, that it must depend on the intention of the parties."
Denning, L. J., said much to the same effect at p. 1202:
"The question in all these cases is one of intention: Did the circumstances and the conduct of the parties show that all that was intended was that the occupier should have a personal privilege with no interest in the land ?"
The following propositions may, therefore, be taken as well-established: (1) To ascertain whether a document creates a licence or lease, the substance of the document must be preferred to the form; (2) the real test is the intention of the parties-whether they intended to create a lease or a licence; (3) if the document creates an interest in the property, it is a lease; but, if it only permits another to make use of the property, of which the legal possession continues with the owner, it is a licence; and (4) if under the document a party gets exclusive possession of the property, 'prima facie', he is considered to be a tenant; but circumstances may be established which negative the intention to create a lease. Judged by the said tests, it is not possible to hold that the document is one of licence. Certainly it does not confer only a bare personal privilege on the respondent to make use of the rooms. It puts him in exclusive possession of them, untrammelled by the control and free from the directions of the appellants. The covenants are those that are usually found or expected to be included in a lease deed. The right of the respondent to transfer his interest under the document, although with the consent of the appellants, is destructive of any theory of licence. The solitary circumstance that the rooms let out in the present case are situated in a building wherein a hotel is run cannot make any difference in the character of the holding. The intention of the parties is clearly manifest, and the clever phraseology used or the ingenuity of the document- writer hardly conceals the real intent. I, therefore, hold that under the document there was transfer of a right to enjoy the two rooms, and, therefore, it created a tenancy in favour of the respondent."
37. In the case of Khalil Ahmed Bashir Ahmed (supra), the Apex Court in paragraph 10 of the judgement held that if an interest in immovable property entitling the transferee to enjoyment was created, it was lease; if a permission to use land without exclusive possession alone was granted, a licence was the legal result. In the said case, the Apex Court was considering the effect of a document which according to the appellant was a lease while according to respondent/owner of the property, it was a licence. The Apex Court after considering the stipulations contained in the document and by applying the aforesaid principle of law found that document was a licence. Accordingly, it negated the contention of the appellant.
38. In the case of C.M. Beena and Another (supra), the Apex Court considered the effect of a document which according to the respondent was a licence whereas according to the appellant, it was a lease. The Apex Court held that in determining the question as to whether the document is lease or licence, an endeavour shall be made to find out as to whether the deed confers a right to possess exclusively coupled with the transfer of a right to enjoy the property or merely a right to use the property while possession is retained by the owner. It further held that in considering the said question, the conduct of the parties before and after the creation of the relationship is of relevance to find out the real intention of the parties. Paragraphs 9, 10, and 11 of the aforesaid judgement are being reproduced herein below:-
"9. A few principles are well settled. User of the terms like "lease" or "licence", "lessor", or "licensor", "rent" or "licence fee" is not by itself decisive of the nature of the right created by the document. An effort should be made to find out whether the deed confers a right to possess exclusively coupled with transfer of a right to enjoy the property or what has been parted with is merely a right to use the property while the possession is retained by the owner. The conduct of the parties before and after the creation of relationship is of relevance for finding out their intention.
10. Given the facts and circumstances of a case, particularly when there is a written document executed between the parties, question arises as to what are the tests which would enable pronouncing upon the nature of relationship between the parties. Evans & Smith state in The Law of Landlord and Tenant (Fourth Edition)-
"A lease, because it confers an estate in land, is much more than a mere personal or contractual agreement for the occupation of a freeholder's land by a tenant. A lease, whether fixed-term or periodic, confers a right in property, enabling the tenant to exclude all third parties, including the landlord, from possession, for the duration of the lease, in return for which a rent or periodical payment is reserved out of the land. A contractual licence confers no more than a permission on the occupier to do some act on the owner's land which would otherwise constitute a trespass. If exclusive possession is not conferred by an agreement, it is a licence......[The fundamental difference between a tenant and a licensee is that a tenant, who has exclusive possession, has an estate in land, as opposed to a personal permission to occupy. If, however, the owner of land proves that he never intended to accept the occupier as tenant, then the fact that the occupier pays regular sums for his occupation does not make the occupier a tenant."
11. In Hill and Redman: Law of Landlord and Tenant (Seventeenth Edn., Vol.1) a more detailed discussion also laying down the determinative tests, is to be found stated as follows:
"It is essential to the creation of a tenancy of a corporeal hereditament that the tenant should be granted the right to the exclusive possession of the premises. A grant under which the grantee takes only the right to use the premises without being entitled to exclusive possession must operate as a licence and not as a lease. It was probably correct law at one time to say that the right of exclusive possession necessarily characterized the grant as that of a lease; but it is now possible for a licensee to have the right to exclusive possession. However, the fact that exclusive possession is granted, though by no means decisive against the view that there is a mere licence, as distinct from a tenancy, is at all events a consideration of the first importance. Further, a grant of exclusive possession may be only a licence and not a lease where the grantor has no power to grant a lease. In deciding whether a grant amounts to a lease, or is only a licence, regard must be had to the substance rather than the form of the agreement, for the relationship between the parties is determined by the law and not by the label which they choose to put on it. It has been said that the law will not impute an intention to enter into the legal relation of landlord and tenant where circumstances and conduct negative that intention; but the fact that the agreement contains a clause that no tenancy is to be created will not, of itself, preclude the instrument from being a lease. If the effect of the instrument is to give the holder the exclusive right of occupation of the land, though subject to certain reservations, or to a restriction of the purposes for which it may be used, it is prima facie a lease; if the contract is merely for the use of the property in a certain way and on certain terms, while it remains in the possession and under the control of the owner, it is a licence. To give exclusive possession there need not be express words to that effect; it is sufficient if the nature of the acts to be done by the grantee require that he should have exclusive possession. On the other hand, the employment of words appropriate to a lease such as 'rent' or 'rental' will not prevent the grant from being a mere licence if from the whole document it appears that the possession of the property is to be retained by the grantor."
39. The similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of The New Bus Stand Shop Vs. Corporation of Kozhikode and Others 2009 (10) 455.
40. The principles propounded by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgements leave no manner of doubt that to ascertain as to whether a document is a lease deed or not, the title of the deed is not relevant and the only relevant point for consideration is the intention of the parties in executing the said deed. If the terms and conditions stipulated in the document principally satisfy the condition that exclusive possession of the plot has been delivered with the right to enjoy the property, it is a lease, and if only the right to use the property has been granted while the possession is retained by the owner, the document is not a lease deed.
41. Stipulations in the agreement leave no manner of doubt that exclusive possession of the plot has been handed over to respondent no.2 with an intention to use and enjoy the property. Further, the terms and conditions stipulated in the agreement as well in the brochure and recitation in the possession memo do not reflect that only a right to use the property has been given to respondent no.2 while the possession is retained by the G.D.A. Therefore, applying the principles laid down by the Apex Court in aforesaid cases, the only irresistible conclusion which can be arrived at in the facts of the present case is that agreement is a lease.
42. In such view of the fact, this Court finds the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that agreement is not lease is devoid of merit. Consequently, this Court does not find any illegality in the order passed by the court below.
43. So far as the judgement relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (supra) is concerned, the same is not applicable in the facts of the present case as it was not a case dealing with the issue as to whether the document in question was a lease or not, the facts in the said case are different and law enunciated, in that case, is not applicable in the facts of the present case.
44. It is also pertinent to mention that clause 6.1 of the brochure, which is part of the agreement, stipulates that in case of construction is not raised within the stipulated time provided in the agreement, a further period of five years can be extended to the respondent no.2 on payment of the surcharge as per rules.
45. Clause 6.1 of the brochure being part of the agreement is binding upon the parties, therefore, G.D.A. cannot resile from that. Further, the petitioner in paragraph 30 of the writ petition has admitted that G.D.A. has the power to recover 2% surcharge on the prevailing market value of the land, but to avail of the said benefit, respondent no.2 has to make an application.
46. In this respect, it is pertinent to reproduce paragraphs 9 to 13 of the reply of respondent no.2 dated 07.10.2013 to the show cause notice wherein respondent no.2 has prayed for the benefit of clause 6.1 of the brochure and Section 18(4-A) of the Act, 1973 which fact is also admitted by the Vice Chairman in the order dated/letter dated 02.07.2014.:-
9. As evident from the letter of allotment (ANNEXURE I) the allotment of the plot is subject to terms and conditions specified in the brochure. Clause 6 of the brochure stipulates conditions in regard to period for construction of the school as under:-
भवन निर्माण अवधि आवंटी भवन मानचित्र प्राधिकारी से स्वीकृत करा कर ही अपने व्यय पर निर्माण करेगा। भवन निर्माण की अवधि संविदा पंजीकरण की तिथि से 5 वर्ष की दी जायेगी परन्तु आवंटी को तीन वर्ष के अंदर अध्यापन कार्य शुरू करना होगा। निर्धारित अवधि के अंदर निर्माण पूर्ण नहीं किया जाता है तो नियमानुसार सरचार्ज दे कर यह अवधि बढ़ाई जा सकेगी किन्तु 5 वर्ष से अधिक समय के लिये अभिवृद्धि नहीं की जाएगी और दस वर्ष तक भी निर्माण न करने की दशा में संविदा निरस्त कर भंग कर दी जाएगी तथा अधिनियम के प्रावधान के अनुसार पुनः प्रवेश कर लिया जायेगा।
10. It is noted that the above stipulation is consistent with the following provisions of section 18(4A) of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning & Development Act 1973 as introduced in 1997:
18...
(4-A) Where a lessee fails to make construction within the stipulated time, and the extended time, if any, under Sub-section (4) so that the total period from the date of lease exceeds five years, a charge at the rate of two per cent of the prevailing market value of the concerned land shall be real be released every year from him by the lessor and if from the date of imposition of the said charge a further period of five years elapses the lease shall stand forfeited and the lessor shall re-enter upon the land.
11. The same stipulation exists in the lease deed.
.........भूखंड पर निर्माण एग्रीमेंट की तिथि से 05 वर्ष के अंदर पूर्ण करना होगा। शेष नियम व शर्ते ब्रोशर के अनुसार होगी।
12. The notice under reference seeks to cancel the allotment, without allowing the society to undertake construction of the school in the extended period, against payment of charge prescribed under section 18(4A) of the Act ibid. The proposed action is bad in law as it tends to curtail the statutory right of the Society vested under the Act under which the Authority is created.
13. A reference to clause 15 of the sale deed in, isolation, rendering other stipulations redundant and leading to an inference violative of section 18(4) of the Act ibid is not in conformity with the general principles of jurisprudence.
47. The fact that G.D.A. has treated the document to be a lease is also apparent from the fact that notice has been issued to respondent no.2 under Section 111(g) of the Act, 1882.
48. In such view of the fact, this Court does not find any illegality in the order impugned.
49. Thus, for the reason given above, the writ petition lacks merit and is accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.
Order Date:- 25.7.2022 Sattyarth