State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Rajender Kumar Late Sh.Chander Bhan vs Tata Aig General Ins.Co.Ltd. on 19 December, 2025
FA/81/2025 MR. RAJENDER KUMAR VS. TATA AIG GEN. INS. CO. LTD. DOD:19.12.2025
IN THE DELHI STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL
COMMISSION
Date of Institution: 21.01.2025
Date of hearing : 21.11.2025
Date of Decision : 19.12.2025
FIRST APPEAL NO. 81/2025
IN THE MATTER OF
MR. RAJENDER KUMAR
S/O LATE MR. CHANDER BHAN
R/O HOUSE NO.168, DHAYA PANNA
VILLAGE NIZAMPUR, DELHI-110081
(Through Mr. Anuj Kumar, Advocate
Mob.7503380065)
...APPLICANT/APPELLANT
VERSUS
TATA AIG GENERAL INS. CO. LTD.
THROUGH ITS MANAGING DIRECTOR
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT
301-308, THIRD FLOOR, AGGARWAL PRESTIGE MALL
PLOT NO.2, ROAD NO.44, NEAR M2K CINEMA RANI BAGH
PITAMPURA, NEW DELHI-110034
ALSO AT REGISTERED OFFICE
PENINSULA CORPORATE PARK
PIRAMAL TOWER, 9TH FLOOR
FOR GANPATRAO KADAM MARG, LOWER PAREL
MUMBAI, MAHARASHTRA
....NON-APPLICANT/RESPONDENT
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. BIMLA KUMARI, MEMBER (FEMALE)
Present: Mr. Sambhav Chaudhary, proxy counsel for Mr. Anuj Kumar,
counsel for the appellant (Mob.7503380065).
None for the respondent.
PER: HON'BLE MS. BIMLA KUMARI, MEMBER (FEMALE)
DISMISSED Page 1 of 13
FA/81/2025 MR. RAJENDER KUMAR VS. TATA AIG GEN. INS. CO. LTD. DOD:19.12.2025
1.The present appeal has been filed on 21.01.2025 challenging the impugned order dated 28.06.2024 passed in Complaint Case No.541/2013 by the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission-V (North-West District), CSC, Block C, Pocket-C, Shalimar Bagh, Delhi-110088.
2. This order will dispose off an application bearing IA No.1609/2025 seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal, filed along with the appeal. Affidavit of the appellant has been filed along with this application.
3. Record has been carefully and thoroughly perused.
4. The application has been preferred under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, it is being considered under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 as it is arising out of Complaint Case No.541/2013.
5. A bare perusal of the application reflects that it has been moved under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. However, the entire proceedings of the present case took place according to the Old Act. Hence, before delving into the merits of the present application, it is imperative to ascertain whether the present application bearing IA No. 1609/2025 filed along with the appeal on 24.12.2024 is maintainable under the New Act/Old Act.
6. The repeal of a law shall not affect the previous operation of any enactment i.e. the proceedings under Consumer Protection Act, 1986 shall continue for cases which had been filed prior to the implementation of Consumer Protection Act, 2019 on 20.07.2020. The same can be gauged through the repeal and saving section (Section 107) of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 which has been reproduced below:
"107. (1) The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken under DISMISSED Page 2 of 13 FA/81/2025 MR. RAJENDER KUMAR VS. TATA AIG GEN. INS. CO. LTD. DOD:19.12.2025 the Act hereby repealed shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act.
(3) The mention of particular matters in sub-section (2) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 with regard to the effect of repeal."
7. I may also take the assistance of Section 6
(b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to further this view. Section 6
(b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 has been reproduced below:
"6 Effect of repeal. : Where this Act, or any 1 [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect; or
(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder"
8. Moreover, unless the legislature explicitly provides that the amendment is retrospective in nature, it will be considered prospective. The aforesaid view has been taken by the Apex Court in the case of CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd. reported in (2015) 1 SCC 1 wherein the Court discussed the proviso to Section 113 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and held that it was prospective and not retrospective. While deciding the case, the Constitution Bench laid down certain general principles which have been reproduced as under:
"28. Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a DISMISSED Page 3 of 13 FA/81/2025 MR. RAJENDER KUMAR VS. TATA AIG GEN. INS. CO. LTD. DOD:19.12.2025 contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation. The idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern current activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the events of the past. If we do something today, we do it keeping in view the law of today and in force and not tomorrow's backward adjustment of it. Our belief in the nature of the law is founded on the bedrock that every human being is entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the existing law and should not find that his plans have been retrospectively upset. This principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit: law looks forward not backward. As was observed in Phillips v. Eyre [Phillips v. Eyre, (1870) LR 6 QB 1] , a retrospective legislation is contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated when introduced for the first time to deal with future acts ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law.
29. The obvious basis of the principle against retrospectivity is the principle of "fairness", which must be the basis of every legal rule as was observed in L'OfficeCherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. [L'OfficeCherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd., (1994) 1 AC 486 : (1994) 2 WLR 39 : (1994) 1 All ER 20 (HL)] Thus, legislations which modified accrued rights or which impose obligations or impose new duties or attach a new disability have to be treated as prospective unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment a DISMISSED Page 4 of 13 FA/81/2025 MR. RAJENDER KUMAR VS. TATA AIG GEN. INS. CO. LTD. DOD:19.12.2025 retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation or to explain a former legislation. We need not note the cornucopia of case law available on the subject because aforesaid legal position clearly emerges from the various decisions and this legal position was conceded by the counsel for the parties. In any case, we shall refer to few judgments containing this dicta, a little later."
(emphasis in original)
9. Similarly, the Apex Court in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur vs State of Maharashtra reported in 1994 (4) SCC 602, the court has culled out the ambit and scope of an amending Act and its retrospective operation and has held the following:
"26. The Designated Court has held that the amendment would operate retrospectively and would apply to the pending cases in which investigation was not complete on the date on which the Amendment Act came into force and the challan had not till then been filed in the court. From the law settled by this Court in various cases the illustrative though not exhaustive principles which emerge with regard to the ambit and scope of an Amending Act and its retrospective operation may be culled out as follows:
(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible, is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits.DISMISSED Page 5 of 13
FA/81/2025 MR. RAJENDER KUMAR VS. TATA AIG GEN. INS. CO. LTD. DOD:19.12.2025
(ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal even though remedial is substantive in nature.
(iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law but no such right exists in procedural law.
(iv) A procedural statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively where the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations or to impose new duties in respect of transactions already accomplished.
(v) A statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary implication."
10. Taking into account the aforesaid discussion, I conclude that the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 is prospective in nature. Thus, the cases pending or adjudicated and rights/obligations created before the coming into effect of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 will continue to be adjudicated under the Old Act i.e. Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Hence, the applicant cannot resort to the provisions as inculcated in the New Act so far as the present case is concerned this case will be governed by the provisions of the Old Act.
11. Application for condonation of delay has been filed on various grounds. Para No. 3 to 5 of the application read as under:
"3. That the appellant had filed a complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, which was dismissed vide order dated 28.06.2024. However, the appellant was not informed about the dismissal of the complaint by the counsel previously engaged for the matter.
4. That in the month of October 2024, the appellant came to know about the dismissal of the complaint DISMISSED Page 6 of 13 FA/81/2025 MR. RAJENDER KUMAR VS. TATA AIG GEN. INS. CO. LTD. DOD:19.12.2025 through independent inquiry and immediately engaged a new counsel to proceed with the matter. The appellant also applied for the certified copy of the entire file from the District Consumer Forum. The new counsel assured the appellant that he would file an appeal before this Hon'ble Commission within the prescribed limitation period. However, despite repeated follow-ups, the said counsel failed to take the necessary steps to file the appeal.
5. That subsequently, in the second week of January 2025 the appellant engaged the present counsel and provided him with the certified copies of the file and the impugned order of the District Forum. The present counsel, upon receipt of the documents, promptly drafted and filed the present appeal without any further delay."
12. To adjudicate this issue, I deem it appropriate to refer to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which provides as under:-
"Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed.
Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:
[Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Forum, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent. of the amount or rupees twenty-five thousand, whichever is less]"
13. A perusal of the aforesaid statutory position reflects that the appeal against an impugned order should be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of such order. On perusal of record before us, it is clear that the impugned judgment was pronounced on 28.06.2024 and the DISMISSED Page 7 of 13 FA/81/2025 MR. RAJENDER KUMAR VS. TATA AIG GEN. INS. CO. LTD. DOD:19.12.2025 present appeal was filed on 21.01.2025 i.e. after a delay of 177 days.
14. In order to condone the delay, the appellant has to satisfy this Commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the appeal after the stipulated period. The term 'sufficient cause' has been explained by the Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 2014 SC
746. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive".
However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose."
15. I also deem it appropriate to refer to Anil Kumar Sharma vs. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors. Reported in IV(2015)CPJ453(NC), wherein the Hon'ble NCDRC held as under:-
"12. .........we are not satisfied with the cause shown to justify the delay of 590/601 days. Day to day delay DISMISSED Page 8 of 13 FA/81/2025 MR. RAJENDER KUMAR VS. TATA AIG GEN. INS. CO. LTD. DOD:19.12.2025 has not been explained. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment of Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes, will get defeated if the appeals and revisions, which are highly belated are entertained."
16. I further deem it appropriate to refer to Lingeswaran Etc. Versus Thirunagalingam in Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.2054-2055/2022 decided on 25.02.2022, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: -
"5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained and even there are no merits in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of PopatBahiruGoverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.
17. I deem it appropriate to refer to the broad principles pertaining to the laws of limitation as laid down in the latest decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal DISMISSED Page 9 of 13 FA/81/2025 MR. RAJENDER KUMAR VS. TATA AIG GEN. INS. CO. LTD. DOD:19.12.2025 No. 317 of 2025 titled as "H. GURUSWAMY & ORS. Vs. A. KRISHNAIAH SINCE DECEASED By LRS." decided on 08.01.2025, wherein the by the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of a litigant for an indefinite period of time."
18. Further, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Anshul Aggarwal vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has laid down that;
"It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of DISMISSED Page 10 of 13 FA/81/2025 MR. RAJENDER KUMAR VS. TATA AIG GEN. INS. CO. LTD. DOD:19.12.2025 limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer Foras."
19. From the aforesaid dicta of the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble National Commission, it is clear that 'sufficient cause' means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part and the applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.
20. Reverting to the material available before us, I find that the impugned order was passed on 28.06.2024 and the period of limitation starts from the date of order which had expired on 28.07.2024. However, the reasons stated for the delay are that his previous counsel did not inform the appellant about dismissal of his complaint on 28.06.2024. He came to know only in the month of October 2024 about the dismissal through independent inquiry and applied for the certified copy of the order and engaged new counsel who assured him that an appeal would be filed within prescribed limitation period. But despite repeated follow-ups, the new counsel did not file the appeal. Thereafter, in January, 2025, the appellant engaged another counsel, who promptly drafted and filed the appeal upon receiving the documents.
21. It is worth mentioning that the appellant has preferred not to mention the specific date as to when he came to know about passing of the impugned order; as to when he engaged a new counsel to proceed further with the matter; as to DISMISSED Page 11 of 13 FA/81/2025 MR. RAJENDER KUMAR VS. TATA AIG GEN. INS. CO. LTD. DOD:19.12.2025 when he applied for the certified copy of the entire record and as to when he engaged the present counsel and provided him the certified copy of the entire record. Further, the appellant has not mentioned the name and other details of the previous counsel who was representing him before the District Commission and of other counsel who was engaged by him after dismissal of complaint.
22. A perusal of record shows that the certified copy of the impugned order was issued to the appellant on 18.10.2024. Hence, the period of limitation will start from the date of order, which has expired on 17.11.2024. The present appeal has been filed on 21.01.2025. In these circumstances, there is delay of 95 days respectively in filing the appeal.
23. It is the duty of the appellant to be aware of statutory period of filing the appeal.
24. The applicant has abused the process of law and filed this appeal after immense delay without any reasonable ground.
25. As per the averments made in the application as well as the record, I am of the considered view that no cogent reason has been explained by the appellant to show the delay in filing the appeal.
26. Having regard to the statutory position discussed in para supra and the facts of the case, the applicant failed to show any sufficient cause for the delay in filing the present appeal. Therefore, the application filed by the appellant seeking condonation of delay cannot be admitted and accordingly, the same is dismissed on the above grounds.
27. Consequently, the present appeal filed beyond the statutory period also stands dismissed. However, in the facts of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.
DISMISSED Page 12 of 13FA/81/2025 MR. RAJENDER KUMAR VS. TATA AIG GEN. INS. CO. LTD. DOD:19.12.2025
28. The Order be uploaded forthwith on the website of the Commission for the perusal of the parties as well as forwarded to the corresponding E-mail address available on the record.
29. File be consigned to record room.
BIMLA KUMARI MEMBER (FEMALE) Pronounced on 19.12.2025.
DISMISSED Page 13 of 13