Patna High Court
Hindustan Steel Limited vs The Secretary-Cum-Commissioner, ... on 10 May, 2005
Equivalent citations: 2005(2)BLJR1544, 2006 (2) AKAR (NOC) 195 (PAT), 2005 A I H C 4109, 2005 BLJR 2 1544, (2006) 3 CIVILCOURTC 517, (2005) 3 PAT LJR 703, (2006) 2 CIVLJ 238, (2006) 4 RECCIVR 156, (2006) 2 CURCC 481
JUDGMENT S.N. Hussain, J.
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The petitioner is a defendant in Money Suit No. 7 of 1996, which was filed by the plaintiffs-opposite parties in the Court of the learned Subordinate Judge-l, Supaul for realisation of certain amounts from the defendant. The petitioner is aggrieved by order dated 25.3.2000 passed in the aforesaid suit, by which the learned Subordinate Judge I, Supaul rejected the defendant's petition for returning the plaint to the plaintiffs after holding that the suit was not maintainable at Supaul.
3. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the defendant-petitioner is a Government of India Enterprise having its office at Calcutta and its branch offices at Dhanbad and Patna. He further contends that an order was placed by the Director, Purchase and Transport, Government of Bihar to the defendant in 1973 for supply of 4,600 metric tonnes steel sheet piles, out of which 1200 metric tonnes was for Supaul as detailed in the plaint. It was further stated that in 1976 also order was placed for supply of 375 metric tonnes of steel rods for Supaul. He further claimed that the said suit was filed for a money decree with respect to short supply of 133.038 metric tonnes regarding the first order of 1973 and 36.100 metric tonnes with regard to second order of 1976 and hence a money decree of Rs. 23,32,097.10 was claimed alongwith some cost etc.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he filed a petition dated 27.5.1997 for returning the plaint to the plaintiffs as the suit was not maintainable at Supaul. He further contends that the agreement took place at Dhanbad and delivery of goods to the carrier was also made at Dhanbad, whereas payment was made at Calcutta head office of the defendant. He also claimed that there is no office of the defendants at Supaul, rather branch office with which the arrangement was made was at Dhanbad. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that Section 39 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, specifically provides that the delivery of goods to a carrier or a wharfinger is delivery of goods to the buyer and hence the goods were delivered to the carrier at Dhanbad. In this connection he relies upon several decisions of this Court as well as of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Privy Council, namely, , , and AIR 1938 Privy Council 152, which held that the goods passes from consigner to the consignee as soon as goods are loaded for consignment. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contends that without considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances as also provisions of law the learned Court below passed the impugned order, which is illegal, arbitrary and perverse.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the opposite parties vehemently opposes the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that paragraph 23 of the plaint specifically shows that the cause of action arose at Supaul where the goods were to be delivered and furthermore the payments for the goods were made from Supaul by the Executive Engineer and the materials were also to be delivered at Supaul. Hence, he submits that the suit was rightly filed at Supaul and the Court below had full jurisdiction to decide the suit. He further submits that the defendant-petitioner deals with the business all over the country and hence it cannot be said that his place of business is in a particular town or city. He further contends that Section 39(1) of the Sale of Goods Act clearly shows that responsibility of the seller is not over by loading the goods for consignee. Further contention of the learned counsel for the opposite parties is that after Amendment of 2002 in the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code' for the sake of brevity) this civil revision is not maintainable. Hence, he submits that the impugned order of the learned Court below is legal and proper and needs no interference.
6. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the materials on record, it is quite apparent that the head office of the defendant-petitioner is Calcutta, whereas its branch office is at Dhanbad.
Admittedly, the defendant has got no office at Supaul. Section 20 of the Code specifically provides that every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant at the time of commencement of the suit resides or carries on business there. The explanation of the said section also provides that a corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in India or in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office at such place.
7. In the aforesaid circumstances it is quite apparent that only those Courts have territorial jurisdiction to hear the suit where either the defendant resides or the cause of action has arisen or where the agreement had taken place. Here it is an admitted fact that the defendant neither resides, nor has any branch office at Supaul. Furthermore, it is also apparent that although the decision was taken by the authorities concerned at Patna but the agreement took place at Dhanbad and the delivery of goods were made by the defendant to the carrier at Dhanbad. Since the matter is well settled that the possession of goods passes from consigner to consignee as soon as goods are loaded, hence in the said circumstances, the delivery of goods had taken place at Dhanbad. So far other responsibilities of the defendant-petitioner are concerned, they cannot affect the specific provisions of Section 20 of the Code. Furthermore, although the payments were made by the Executive Engineer, Supaul but the said payments were made at Calcutta as is apparent from the plaint itself. Therefore, the suit was clearly not maintainable at Supaul and the learned Subordinate Judge I, Supaul had no territorial jurisdiction to hear the said suit. The learned Court below has completely overlooked the said facts and circumstances as well as provisions of law and has rejected the defendant's petition merely by holding that the said issue will be decided at the time of final adjudication. In my view, there is no occasion for continuing the suit as the Court had no territorial jurisdiction to hear it and the learned Court below itself has held that the suit is concerned with the interest of public at large, therefore, it requires more attention of the Court and hence in the interest of public at large the learned Court below should not have allowed the suit to continue knowing full well that it was not maintainable there.
8. In the said circumstances, the impugned order is set aside and the learned Court below is directed to return the plaint to the plaintiffs for filling it before a Court of appropriate territorial jurisdiction.
9. With the aforesaid direction this civil revision is allowed.