Bangalore District Court
Mahesh H.Melwani S/O H.D.Melwani vs Hussain Ali N.Damani S/O Late Nisar on 30 March, 2016
1 O.S.No:2834/2009
IN THE COURT OF THE III ADDL.CITY CIVIL & SESSIONS
JUDGE, BENGALURU CITY (C.C.H.No.25).
Dated: This the 30th day of March 2016
Present: Sri.Ron Vasudev, B.Com. LL.B, (Spl),
III Addl.City Civil & Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru.
O.S.No:2834/2009
Plaintiff Mahesh H.Melwani S/o H.D.Melwani, Aged
about 37 years, R/at No.37, 22nd Main,
Banashankari 2nd Stage, Bangalore-560
070.
(By Sri.SAS, Advocate)
V/S
Defendant Hussain Ali N.Damani S/o Late Nisar
Hussain, Aged about 54 years, R/at
No.5/6, Dispensary Road, Bangalore,
Carrying on business at No.17/131, 9th
Main Road, 3rd Block, Jayanagar,
Bangalore-560 011.
(By Sri.SZAK, Advocate)
Date of Institution : 22.4.2009
Nature of Suit : For ejectment
Date of Commencement of : 12.1.2011
evidence
Date of pronouncement of : 30.3.2016
Judgment
Total Duration : Year/s Month/s Day/s
6 11 8
(Ron Vasudev),
III Addl.City Civil & Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru.
2 O.S.No:2834/2009
JUDGEMENT
This is a suit for ejectment.
2. The suit schedule property is ground floor of premises bearing No.17/131 situating at 9th Main Road, 3rd Block, Jayanagar, Bangalore-11 measuring East-West 30 ft and North- South 20 ft minus 2 ft x 10 ft passage for staircase meant for upper floors and consisting of a toilet room and bounded by:
East - 9th Main road West - Private property North - Property no.18/132 South - Property no.16/130
3. The summary of the plaintiff's case is that; he is the absolute owner of the property bearing no.17/131, 9th Main Road, 3rd Block, Bangalore consisting of ground floor and first floor and the ground floor is a commercial property and it is the suit property. That he leased the schedule property to the defendant for a period of three years as per agreement of lease dt.14.8.2005 on rent of Rs.9,500/- per month and the tenancy commenced on every first day of the calendar month and ending on the last day of it. That the defendant has paid security deposit of Rs.7 lakhs in pursuance to the lease agreement and it is agreed that it shall be repaid at the time of vacating the schedule property. That on expiry of the lease period i.e. after 31.7.2008 the plaintiff requested the defendant to quit, vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the 3 O.S.No:2834/2009 schedule property for his bonafide use and occupation, but the defendant went on seeking time on one or the other reason, though he agreed to vacate initially, wherefore the plaintiff got issued legal notice on 2.9.2008 terminating the tenancy by giving 15 days time. Though the said notice was duly served, the defendant did not bother to reply it. However after few days of service of notice the defendant met the plaintiff and requested six months time to vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the schedule property, as such the plaintiff waited, but all of a sudden to the shock and surprise of the plaintiff, the defendant sent D.D's for Rs.50,000/- and Rs.10,000/- and M.O. for another sum Rs.10,000/- i.e. in all Rs.70,000/- stating that the said amount covers rent for the period August 2008 to February 2009 and thereby declined to vacate the schedule property. Therefore the plaintiff was compelled to cause one more legal notice on 2.4.2009 clarifying that he is receiving the said amount and adjusting it towards damages and not as rent. Inspite of it again the defendant sent another sum of Rs.10,000/- stating that it is a rent for the month of March 2009, as usual the plaintiff adjusted the same towards damages in terms of his earlier notice dt.2.9.2008. Hence plaintiff submits that since the defendant has failed to vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the schedule property, he is liable to be evicted as his possession subsequent to the termination amounts to unauthorized occupation. In addition to that he also seeks for payment of damages at the rate of Rs.40,000/- per month from the date of 4 O.S.No:2834/2009 termination of tenancy till possession is delivered to him. Thus judgment and decree is sought for eviction as well as for costs of the suit.
4. In response to the suit summons the defendant appeared and filed written statement denying that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the schedule property and he took that property under lease agreement. He denied that as per the lease agreement he is liable to pay Rs.9,500/- per month as rent to the plaintiff and that the lease agreement expired on 31.7.2008 and he is expected to quit, vacate and deliver vacant possession of the said property. It is his case that schedule property was leased to him by plaintiff's father H.D.Melwani under verbal lease dt.14.8.2005 and tenancy commenced from 14th of every month ending on 13th of succeeding month and this plaintiff was authorized to collect the rent as his father was unable to collect on his own because of his old age, so the plaintiff is only a rent collector and there is no jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant. It is true that legal notice was issued by the plaintiff since it was misplaced, the defendant could not reply it. It is denied that the amount of Rs.70,000/- sent by him was adjusted towards damages as tenancy was terminated and he specifically alleges that he has paid that amount as rent and not as damages. He has also denied his liability to pay Rs.40,000/- per month as damages from the date of termination of tenancy till possession is delivered. He contends that in addition to Rs.7 lakhs he has paid another sum of Rs.8 lakhs as goodwill and said amount is 5 O.S.No:2834/2009 liable to be returned by the plaintiff at the time of vacating the schedule property. Thus alleging that no proper court is paid and there is no cause of action for the suit, he prays to dismiss the suit with costs.
5. Based on the said pleadings my predecessor in office has framed the following issues;
ISSUES
1. Whether the plaintiff proves that there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between himself and defendant as alleged?
2. Whether the quit notice is in accordance with law?
3. Whether the court fee paid is sufficient?
4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief as sought?
5. What order or decree?
6. In order to prove his case plaintiff examined himself as PW1 and got exhibited ten documents. On the other hand the defendant examined himself as DW1 and person by name M.Abdul Khader as DW2. In all 18 documents are marked on his behalf. Heard arguments of Sri.SAS, Advocate for the plaintiff and Sri.SZAK, Advocate for defendant. Perused the 6 O.S.No:2834/2009 decisions relied by the defendant and the written arguments of the plaintiff.
7. My findings on the above issues are as under:
Issue No.1 - In the affirmative Issue No.2 - In the affirmative Issue No.3 - In the affirmative Issue No.4 - In the affirmative Issue No.5 - As per final order, for the following:
REASONS Issue No.1 & 2:
8. Since these issues are co-related, I have taken them simultaneously.
9. In the written arguments as well as in his oral submission Sri.SAS, Advocate canvassed that since the defendant has taken inconsistent pleas and evidence adduced by him is contrary to the pleadings on record, including that of DW2, court has to hold that that the plaintiff has proved the existence of jural relationship of landlord and tenant. He also drew my attention to the expiry of the written lease agreement and payment of penalty stamp duty thereon. Then referring to the legal notice he canvassed that since lease is validly terminated the defendant has no manner of right to continue in the occupation of the schedule property.
7 O.S.No:2834/200910. On the other hand Sri.SZAK, Advocate vehemently submitted that as admitted by the plaintiff and also as could be seen from the records, before filing this suit and during the pendency of the suit, the defendant has paid the "rent" regularly and when no part of rent is due, as held in the decisions reported at AIR (36) 1949 Federal Court 124 in the case of Kai Khushroo Bezonjee Capadia Vs Bai Jerbai Hirijibhoy Warden and AIR 2015 KARNATAKA 128 in the case of M/s Auto World, Bangalore Vs Smt.K.V.Sathyavathi, it has to be held that the plaintiff has waived the termination notice, therefore suit for ejectment is not maintainable. In support of his submission learned counsel invited my attention to the letters written by the defendant periodically with the cheques towards payment of so-called rent.
11. In reply to the said argument Sri.SAS, Advocate canvassed that the facts and circumstances prevailing in the Capadia and M/s Auto World Case are totally different as compared to the case in hand. It was his submission that in Capadia's case the sub-tenants and tenant in M/s Auto World's Case had admitted the jural relationship of landlord and tenant, which is a basic and distinguishable feature of those cases and this case. He urged that in the case in hand according to the defendant the plaintiff is only a rent collector and not a landlord. Wherefore he submitted the ratio laid down in those cases is inapplicable to the present case. In this background I have gone through the pleadings and evidence made available by the parties.
8 O.S.No:2834/200912. As rightly pointed out by Sri.SAS, Advocate in the case in hand the defendant squarely denies that the plaintiff is his landlord and is the owner of the schedule property. Infact according to the defendant his landlord is one H.D.Melwani and there is oral lease between him and the said person and this plaintiff is only a rent collector. Whereas in the M/s Auto World's case the tenant/defendant had admitted the jural relationship between himself and the plaintiff and as noted by the Hon'ble High Court at Para-3 and the existence of written lease dt.21.5.2004 was also conceded by the tenant. Moreover as borne from the facts of that case earlier notice of termination issued by the plaintiff on 21.8.2008 stood waived by virtue of second notice of termination dt.12.5.2009 issued by him. In addition to that noticing the receipt of rent from the sub-tenants in Capadia's case initially "without any demur and unconditionally", at Para-36 of it's judgement, Hon'ble Court held that when the rents were received over the years during the pendency of the suit and the same having been received without any demur and unconditionally, it would be nothing but waiver of notice as provided U/Sec.116 of T.P. Act and in the facts and circumstances of that case it was held that suit for eviction is not maintainable. However in the instant case it is not the allegation of the defendant that he is the tenant of the plaintiff and earlier notice of termination was waived by the plaintiff and one more notice was issued terminating the tenancy and the payment made by him were received without any demur and unconditionally. The very fact that this 9 O.S.No:2834/2009 defendant kept quite without replying to the termination notice produced at Ex.P9 would show that this defendant had no grievance against the termination of tenancy. His contention that since he misplaced that notice so he could not reply it is only an afterthought and not convincing one. Even if he had misplaced that notice, that cannot be a ground to say that, because of it's misplace he could not reply it. It is not that said notice was sent by RPAD alone even it was sent by under certificate of posting also and same is demonstrated by producing the postal window receipt and Certificate of Posting along with Ex.P9. It is not his case that he misplaced both copies.
13. In the Ex.P9 the plaintiff explicitly stated that he is the absolute owner of the property bearing no.17/131 and this defendant is the tenant in respect of the ground floor, a commercial portion, on rent of Rs.9,500/- per month leased for a period of three years, which expired on 31.7.2008. If at all this defendant had any grievance against the said notice claim and even if he had misplaced one copy, he could have replied it with the help of another copy. Regarding his alleged misplacing of notice he did not cross-examine the plaintiff, therefore his said contention cannot be accepted.
14. I would demonstrate how this plaintiff proves the jural relationship of landlord and tenant between himself and the defendant by producing the one more document viz; the lease agreement dt.14.8.2005, which is at Ex.P10. The contents 10 O.S.No:2834/2009 of the said document, on which the penalty stamp duty of Rs.60,500/- was paid as per the order of this court, show that the defendant is the tenant and plaintiff is the landlord, however the contents of said lease deed were not touched in the cross-examination of plaintiff. In turn at the very beginning of his cross-exam the defendant/Dw1 admitted that there is a written lease agreement between himself and the plaintiff and he has also entered into another lease agreement with the plaintiff's father H.D.Melwani towards hiring of furniture fixed in the said property. The defendant himself produced the said "furniture rental" agreement dt.5.8.2002 at Ex.D17. Apart from that the plaintiff has also produced the certified copy of the sale deed dt.23.11.1998 at Ex.P1, the BBMP khatha certificate and khatha extract of the schedule property at Ex.P2 and P3. All these documents cumulatively show that this plaintiff purchased the schedule property from Shariyar Khan S/o Rehamthulla Khan of Jayanagar for consideration in the year 1998 and was put in possession of the same. That being the case it is too much for the defendant to allege that there is "verbal lease" between him and H.D.Melwani and this plaintiff is only a rent collector. The cross-examination of DW1 totally washes out his written statement.
15. It is significant to note that throughout in his cross- exam the defendant/DW1 did not dispute the validity of the termination notice nor denied his liability to vacate the schedule property. Only his grievance was that in addition to paying Rs.7 lakhs deposit he has also paid Rs.8 lakhs as goodwill and 11 O.S.No:2834/2009 unless that amount is repaid to him, he is not liable to vacate the schedule property. Thus the argument canvassed by Sri.SZAK and evidence of DW1 are diametrically opposite. Merely on the reason that in the letters produced by defendant at Ex.D2, D5, D8, D11 and D14 there is recital that he is paying the said amounts as "rent" it does not mean that tenancy was revived and termination notice was waived.
16. It is crucial to note that the plaintiff as well as the defendant have produced the second legal notice dt.2.4.2009 at Ex.P4/D1. In that notice soon after this defendant sent Rs.50,000/- under Ex.D2 claiming that it is arrears of rent from August 2008 to December 2009, as the tenancy was terminated through the legal notice dt.2.9.2008/Ex.P9, without loss of any time, the plaintiff sent that written reply stating that he is receiving that amount, including another Rs.20,000/- which he paid, towards damages and without prejudice to his right to evict him on the strength of earlier termination notice dt.2.9.2008. If this defendant had any reservation with the contents of the second legal notice viz; Ex.P4/D1, atleast at that time he should have replied it by stating that the plaintiff has waived the earlier termination notice and still he continues as a tenant. Without doing so he simply went on paying the amount thinking unilaterally that it is the "rent" and not "damages". Such an imagination on his part cannot be accepted. The assumption of the defendant that ratio laid down in M/s Auto World's case would come to his rescue is only an illusion. It may be noted that even the ratio laid down in 12 O.S.No:2834/2009 Capadia's case will not come to his help. As could be seen from the facts of that case there tenanted premises was a "residential" building, therefore the Hon'ble Federal Court held that the said tenants were protected under the Rent Restriction Act, which was applicable to the "dwelling house". In so far as M/s Auto World's case is concerned I have already explained how the facts of that case and this case are drastically different. In that case rent was received by the landlord without any demur and unconditionally whereas in this case from the beginning the plaintiff made his stand very much clear. At this juncture I am reminded of the beautiful observation of the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Narmada Bachao Andolan Vs State of M.P. reported at AIR 2001 SUPREME COURT 1989 (G), wherein at head note-'G' explaining the doctrine of precedent, it was held as under:
" the court should not place reliance upon a judgment without discussing how the factual situation fits in with a fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed, as it has to be ascertained by analyzing all the material facts and the issues involved in the case and argued on both sides. A judgment may not be followed in a given case if it has some distinguishing features. A little difference in facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference to the precedential value of a decision. A judgement of Court is not to be 13 O.S.No:2834/2009 read as a statute, as it is to be remembered that judicial utterances have been made in setting of the facts of a particular case. One additional or different fact may make a world of difference between the conclusions in two cases. Disposal of cases by blindly placing reliance upon a decision is not proper".
According to me, the said decision is an eye opener to the trial courts as to how to apply the doctrine of precedent and under what circumstances. It would be incorrect to follow the observations made in a case in the context of facts and circumstances prevailing in that case and apply it ignoring the facts of a given case, wherefore I once again hold that the ratio laid down in M/s Auto World's and Cabadia's cases is not applicable to the case in hand.
17. As noted by the Full Bench of our Hon'ble High Court reported at ILR 2011 KAR 229 in the case of Abdul Wajid Vs A.S.Onkarappa at Para-52, in the case of "non-statutory tenant", whose tenancy has been determined, continues to be in possession as erstwhile tenant and would not fall within the definition of "tenant", but would only be protected from unlawful eviction. His possession after determination of tenancy would be wrongful possession without independent right to continue whereas "tenant" under the Rent Act has a right to continue as protected under the Act. Admittedly the defendant in this case is not a "tenant" under the provisions of the Rent 14 O.S.No:2834/2009 Act so his possession is not protected. From the date of termination of the tenancy he is only a trespasser having only right to be evicted with due process of law. I would support this finding with the observations made in the decision reported at AIR 1998 SC 3085 in the case of M/s Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd., Vs Ganesh Property. In that case at Para-26 the Hon'ble Court held that when there is no further locus poeneteatiae given to the tenant to continue to remain in possession after the determination of lease by efflux of time on the basis of any such contrary express term in the lease, consequently, it is legal obligation flowing from Section 108(q) of the Act which would get squarely attracted. I would further buttress this view with the Division Bench decision of our Hon'ble High Court reported at ILR 2006 KAR 4584 (B) in the case of M.C.Mohammed Vs Gowramma and others, in that case the Hon'ble Court was pleased to hold that tenant continuing as a statutory tenant after expiry of the contractual period, does not require another notice of termination of his tenancy. When such an observation was made in respect of a "statutory tenant" whose possession is protected under the provisions of Rent Act, in respect of tenant governed by the provisions of T.P. Act, the condition would be still more worser. Therefore it is obligation on the part of the defendant to vacate the schedule premises after lapse of the lease agreement.
18. His contention that the plaintiff has waived the termination notice on account of payment of alleged rent by him cannot be accepted at the stage of his arguments on 15 O.S.No:2834/2009 merits of the case. It may be noted that after filing of written arguments on merits of the case this defendant instead of arguing on the matter, filed I.A.No.10 U/O 6 Rule 17 of CPC to incorporate the plea of waiver of notice. The said I.A. was came to be dismissed vide order dt.25.2.2016. Now the question is whether the defendant can raise such plea at such highly belated stage. In order to answer this I refer to the decision of Hon'ble Supreme court reported at AIR 2003 SC 3995 in the case of Parwati Bai Vs Radhika. In that case at Para-6 coming across similar such contention of the defendant of that case regarding the validity of the notice and it's effect, at Para-6 the Hon'ble Court was please to hold that when the defendant has not raised any specific objection as to the validity of the notice, an objection to its invalidity or infirmity of notice U/Sec.106 of T.P. Act cannot be permitted to be raised unless it was sought at the earliest point of time, otherwise it shall be deemed to have been waived even if their exists one. So I hold that now it is not open to the defendant to contend that the plaintiff has waived the termination notice. It is true that while dismissing the application I.A.No.10 this court held that it is a legal plea, even then in the light of the discussion made with reference to the cross-examination of DW1, now it is not open to the defendant to go against his own oral evidence.
19. According to me the one more decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court which touches the point in hand and reflect the concern of the Highest Court of the land can be seen in the decision of Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd., Vs Federal Motors (P) 16 O.S.No:2834/2009 Ltd. The facts of that case show that the respondent - tenant was directed to deposit the rent as well as the damages during the pendency of the petition before the Rent Control Tribunal. The legality of the said order was questioned to the extent of directing to deposit the damages in addition to the admitted rent. The Hon'ble High Court set aside the order of the tribunal to the extent of depositing of damages. Feeling aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner/landlord approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Then setting aside the order of the Hon'ble High Court at Para-4, the Hon'ble Supreme court was pleased to make the following observation, which is illustrative of the current trend of the "landlord and tenant litigation". For the sake of convenience I have extracted the same as under:
"Ordinarily, this Court does not interfere with discretionary orders, more so when they are of interim nature, passed by the High Court or subordinate courts/tribunals. However, this appeal raises an issue of frequent recurrence and therefore, we have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. Landlord- tenant litigation constitutes a large chunk of litigation pending in the courts and tribunals. The litigation goes on for unreasonable length of time and the tenants in possession of the premises do not miss any opportunity of filing appeals or revisions so long as they can thereby afford to perpetuate the life of litigation and 17 O.S.No:2834/2009 continue in occupation of the premises. If the plea raised by the learned Senior Counsel for the respondent was to be accepted, the tenant, in spite of having lost at the end, does not lose anything and rather stands to gain as he has enjoyed the use and occupation of the premises, earned as well as a lot from the premises if they are non-residential in nature and all that he is held liable to pay is damages for use and occupation at the same rate at which he would have paid even otherwise by way of rent and a little amount of costs which is generally insignificant".
In the conspectus of said observations and Sec.45 of The Karnataka Rent Act, which prohibits the tenant from filing revision petition unless he deposits the arrears of rent up to date, it can hardly be said that even for payment of damages during the currency of the litigation or prior to it amounts to waiver of the termination notice. It is true that in his cross- exam the plaintiff has stated that he has received rent during the pendency of the suit and even prior to it. Similarly a suggestion to that effect is also made by the plaintiff's counsel in the cross-examination of DW1. Merely for the use of term "rent" it does not mean that the said payments made by the defendant revived the tenancy, which did not existed once after termination and which is also not his defence.
18 O.S.No:2834/200920. His contention that he has paid Rs.8 lakhs as goodwill etc. is not supported by any document. The lease agreement/Ex.P10 do not speak regarding the said payment. When this defendant paid the deposit amount of Rs.7 lakhs by way of cheques as noted in Para-12 of Ex.P10, it is difficult to believe that he would have paid that Rs.8 lakhs entirely in cash. It is not his case that he paid that Rs.8 lakhs by way of negotiable instrument/s or through A/c Transfer. More so the defendant himself admitted that he has no document to prove the payment of said Rs.8 lakhs. Hence I out rightly reject his claim that he paid Rs.8 lakhs as goodwill. It is nothing but an afterthought story and to enrich illegally at the cost of plaintiff. Wherefore viewed from any angle I hold that there is no force in the arguments canvassed and the evidence let in by the defendant, hence I answer both these issues in the affirmative.
Issue No.3:
21. Half heartedly in Para-13 of the written statement the defendant contended that the court fee paid on the plaint is insufficient, except the said one line defence, no further averments can be seen. According to me this issue ought not to have framed by the court on such bare denial. Even then since the issue has been framed, I did go through the valuation slip filed herewith. It shows that on the basis of rate of rent at Rs.9,500/- p.m. which will become Rs.1,14,000/- p.a., the plaintiff has paid Rs.7,600/- as court fee, which is perfectly in accordance with the provisions of Sec.41 (2) of KCF & SV Act.
19 O.S.No:2834/2009It is not in dispute that before termination of tenancy rate of rent was Rs.9,500/- per month, hence I answer this issue in the affirmative.
Issue No.4:
22. In view of the findings on issue no.1 to 3, I find no impediment in granting the relief of ejectment and relief of damages which would automatically follow once the termination is terminated. Again adverting to the Ex.P9 dt.2.9.2008 which stipulated 15 days time from the date of receipt of said notice for termination of tenancy and as evident from the Ex.P8/postal acknowledgement the said notice having been served on the defendant on 5.9.2008, for the sake of brevity it can be said that by the end of September 2008 the tenancy if stood terminated and from 1.10.2008 the defendant is liable to pay damages till possession is delivered. As held in the decision reported at AIR 1977 SC 1120(I) in the case of Bhagawandas Agarwalla Vs Bhagwandas Kanu and others the notice of quit must be construed not with a desire to find faults in it, which would render it defective, but it must be construed but resmagis valeat quam pereat. The validity of a notice to quit, as pointed by Lord Justice Lindely, L.J. in Side Botham Vs Holland, (1895) 1 QB 378 ought not to turn on the splitting of a straw. It must not be read in a hyper-critical manner, nor must its interpretation be affected by pedagogic pendantism or over refined subtlety, but it must be construed in a common sense way. The entire defence of the defendant that too during the 20 O.S.No:2834/2009 argument hinges on the alleged waiver of termination notice and not on any other thing and that defence itself being negatived, once again I hold that there is no hurdle to go ahead in granting the reliefs as prayed for, accordingly I answer this issue also in the affirmative.
Issue No.5:
23. In the result, I proceed to make the following:
ORDER Suit is decreed with costs.
The defendant is directed to quit, vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the schedule property within two months from the date of this judgement.
There shall be a separate enquiry to determine the damages from the date of termination of tenancy i.e. from 1-10-2008 till possession is delivered.
Draw decree accordingly.
(Dictated to the Judgement Writer, transcription computerized, then corrected and pronounced by me in open court this the 30th day of March 2016) (Ron Vasudev), III Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru.
List of witnesses examined for the plaintiff side:
PW1 Mahesh H.Melwani 21 O.S.No:2834/2009 List of documents exhibited for the plaintiff side:
Ex.P1 Certified copy of the sale deed 23.1.98 Ex.P2 Khatha Certificate Ex.P3 Khatha extract Ex.P4 Legal notice 2.4.09 Ex.P5 & P6 RPAD receipts Ex.P7 & P8 Postal acknowledgements Ex.P9 Legal notice Ex.P10 Lease agreement List of witness examined for the defendant side:
DW1 Hussain Ali DW2 M.Abdul Khader
List of documents exhibited for the defendant side:
Ex.D1 Legal notice dt.2.4.09
Ex.D2 Letter 13.3.09
Ex.D3 Postal receipt
Ex.D4 Postal acknowledgement
Ex.D5 Letter
Ex.D6 Postal receipt
Ex.D7 Postal acknowledgement
Ex.D8 Letter 26.2.09
Ex.D9 Postal receipt
Ex.D10 Postal acknowledgement
Ex.D11 Letter 11.4.09
Ex.D12 Postal receipt
Ex.D13 Postal acknowledgement
Ex.D14 Letter 13.3.09
Ex.D15 Postal receipt
Ex.D16 Postal acknowledgement
Ex.D17 Furniture Rental Agreement 5.8.02
Ex.D18 A/c at Syndicate bank from 1.2.01 to 29.2.12
(Ron Vasudev),
III Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge,
Bengaluru.
22 O.S.No:2834/2009
Judgment pronounced in open court vide separate order ORDER Suit is decreed with costs.
The defendant is directed to quit, vacate and hand over the vacant possession of the schedule property within two months from the date of this judgement.23 O.S.No:2834/2009
There shall be a separate enquiry to determine the damages from the date of termination of tenancy i.e. from 1-10-2008 till possession is delivered.
Draw decree accordingly.
III Addl. City Civil & Sessions Judge, Bengaluru.