Patna High Court
Ram Padarath Singh vs Baidyanath Prasad And Ors. on 22 January, 1973
Equivalent citations: AIR1973PAT389, AIR 1973 PATNA 389
ORDER B.D. Singh, J.
1. This application by Ram Padarath Singh the sole petitioner, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, is directed against the order of the Election Tribunal, dated the 10th October, 1972. setting aside the election of the petitioner as Mukhiya of Khartari Gram Panchayat under Chiraiya Anchal in the district of Champaran.
2. In order to appreciate the point involved in this application it will be necessary to state briefly the facts. The election of the said Panchayat was held on the 29th April. 1970. and the petitioner was elected as Mukhiya defeating Baidyanath Prasad. respondent No. 1, by a margin of 223 votes, the latter be-ins the only other candidate for the office of the Mukhiya. Dissatisfied with the result of the election respondent No. 1 filed an election petition before the Election Tribunal (Respondent No. 21 for setting aside election of the petitioner on various allegations mentioned in the election petition. One of the allegations was :
"The respondent possesses ieep car No. 3259 and two tyre carts which were seen being freely used to bring voters from their house to the polling booths and from one polling booth to another polling booth for the purpose of bogus votes."
In the said election petition he prayed for setting aside the election of the petitioner and for declaring him as duly elected Mukhiya.
3. The petitioner, who was respondent No. 1 in the court below, filed his written statement denying those allegations. The Election Officer also on his part submitted parawise report regarding those allegations.
4. On the pleadings of the parties the Election Tribunal framed as many as five issues, which are as follows :--
(I) Whether the election petition is maintainable on the points of limitation and proper verification?
(II) Whether respondent used corrupt practices of using his ieep No. WGS-3259 and tyre-carts to cast votes and bogus votes in favour?
(III) Whether the respondent No. 1 indulged in corrupt practices by distributing money and grains to the poor voters to purchase their votes in his favour?
(IV) Whether a case for re-counting has been made out as prayed by the petitioner in a separate petition filed on 23-5-72?
(V) Whether the election is fit to be set aside and the petitioner is entitled to be declared to have received the majority of votes and is fit to be declared as Mukhiya of Khartari Gram Pancha-yat?
5. After hearing the parties and considering the evidence on the record the Tribunal held that the election petition was not barred by limitation and it Was maintainable and it was not necessary to order recounting. It, however, set aside the election of the petitioner, Ram Padarath Singh on the ground that he carried voters in his ieep and tyre-carts as alleged in the election petition. However, it did not declare Baidyanath Prasad as duly elected Mukhiya in place of the petitioner by the impugned order.
6. Mr. Thakur Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has assailed the impugned order and submitted that the Tribunal has erred in not setting aside the election petition filed by respondent No. 1 under the mandatory provisions of Rule 77 of the Bihar Panchayat Elections Rules, 1959, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules') due to non-compliance of the provisions contained in Rule 75 of the Rules. He referred to the relevant provision of Rule 75 which reads as :
"(1) An election petition shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies and shall, where necessary, be divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively. It shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 for the verification of pleadings.
(2) (a) The petition shall be accompanied by a list signed and verified in like manner setting forth full particulars of any corrupt or illegal practice which the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible as to the names of the parties alleged to have committed any corrupt or illegal practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice.
...... ....... .......
Learned counsel submitted that the above provisions under Clause (1) clearly require that the election petition shall contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies. It requires the election petition to be signed and verified in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Clause (2) (a), quoted above, requires that the election petition shall be accompanied by a separate list setting forth full particulars of any corrupt or illegal practice, which the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible as to the names of the parties and various other details mentioned therein. Learned counsel emphasised that according to the said clause, the said list has to be signed and verified in the same manner as the election petition itself. If that is not done, the Election Tribunal has no option but to summarily dismiss the election petition even suo motu under Rule 77. which reads as :
"If there is any failure to comply with the provisions of Sub-rules (2) and (3) of Rule 72. Rule 73. Sub-rule (1) and Clause (a) of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 75, the Election Tribunal shall summarily dis--miss the election petition :
Provided that the petition shall not be dismissed without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard."
He urged that the above Rules 75 and 77 have been held to be mandatory by this Court.
7. In order to substantiate his contention he relied on Ram Narayan Yadav v. Garib Yadav. 1972 BLJR 80 = (AIR 1972 Pat 164) where I myself had an occasion to interpret those two rules. He drew my attention to paragraphs 7 to 9 of the said judgment. Relying on the various decisions of this Court I had held that the election Tribunal ought to dismiss the election .petition summarily under Rule 77 of the Rules for non-verification of the petition and the list as required by law. U. N. Sinha, J, on the 19th December, 1966. in the case of Upendra Jha v. Kinu Khan. C. W. J. C, 28 of 1965 disposed of on 19-12-1966 (Pat) had held in paragraph 4 of the judgment that although the elected Mukhiya had not taken any preliminary objection, challenging the verification of the election petition, nevertheless, on the election petition, as it stood, the election petition ought to have been summarily dismissed. It was the duty of the Election Tribunal to summarily dismiss the election petition for non-compliance of the requirements of Rule 75 (1). In an earlier case in Phani Bhusan Singh v. The Election Tribunal Dhanbad C. W. J. C. 98 of 1971. disposed of on 28-6-1971 (Pat) I also came to the same conclusion, and observed that reading Rules 75 and 77 together, the intention of the rule-
making authority was clear that if the election petition was not verified in accordance with the provisions contained under Rule 75 read with Order VI. Rule 15 of the Code, no discretion is left with the Tribunal, who. is duty bound to dismiss the election petition summarily. On that point the provisions contained under the Representation of the People Act are not pari materia with the provisions contained in Rules 75 and 77 of the Rules. No question of substantial compliance arises under Rules 75 and 77.
8. In Ram Narayan Yadav's case, 1972 BLJR 80 = (AIR 1972 Pat 164) another unreported judgment of G. N. Prasad J. in C. W. J. C. 549 of 1966 (Ku-sum Lal Yadav v. Sihip Lal Yadav), disposed of on 7-2-1967 (Pat), was referred. His Lordship had also observed that so far as the Representation of the People Act is concerned, it is now well settled that the provision as to verification of the election petition is directory and not mandatory. Therefore, it must follow as a necessary corollary that the Election Tribunal has power to allow appropriate amendment in the verification. The same principle cannot be engrafted upon Rules 75 and 77 of the present Rules, because the view which has consistently been held in this Court is that Rule 77 is mandatory and not merely directory, and the failure to comply with the provisions of Rule 75 must necessarily have the consequence of summary dismissal of the election case.
9. Armed with the above observations in various cases of this Court Mr. Thakur Prasad contended that in the present case the election petition filed by respondent No. 1 suffers from two major defects, namely, (i) it does not contain concise statement of material facts on which respondent No. 1 relies as required under Clause (1) of Rule 75 and (ii) the election petition is not accompanied by a list signed and verified setting forth full particulars of any corrupt and illegal practice as required under Clause (2) (a) of Rule 75. In this connection he referred to sub-para, (i) of paragraph 15 of the original election petition. filed by the respondent no. 1 before the Election Tribunal, in which allegation has been made that the petitioner possessed jeep car No. 3259 and two tyre carts, which were seen being freely used to bring voters from their house to the polling booths and from one polling booth to another polling booth for the purpose of bogus votes. Learned counsel urged that that was all which was stated by respondent No. 1 about the material facts which formed the basis of setting aside the election of the petitioner. In accordance with Clause (1) of Rule 75 it was mandatory on respondent No. 1 to mention in his petition various details as to who were the persons who were carried into the ieep and the two tyre carts. He ought to have given their names and the name of the booth to which they were carried. Learned counsel also pointed out that even the verification of the election petition is not in accordance with the provision contained under Order VI. Rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The verification in the instant case simply reads as "I Baidyanath Prasad, petitioner do hereby most solemnly declare that the contents of the above election petition are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. Verified at Motihari. this the 27th day of May. 1970".
Learned counsel submitted that the defect in the verification itself was fatal which enjoined upon the Election Tribunal a duty to dismiss the election petition summarily under Rule 77. In order to substantiate his contention he relied on a Bench decision of this Court in Satyanand Singh v. Bujhlal Singh. 1967 BLJR 439. where Narasimham. C. J. and A. B. N. Sinha J. were considering the provisions contained under Rules 75 and 77 of the Rules. In that case also verification was to this effect:
"I Bujhlal -Singh son of Bihari Lal Singh resident of village Seapore do hereby verify the contents of the aforesaid petition at Patna on the 29th day of August, 1962....."
In that case the respondent had filed a list of particulars of corrupt practice and verified the list also in the same manner as he had done in the election petition. Their Lordships held that the verification was not on solemn affirmation or on oath and consequently it was in contravention of the provisions under Order VI, Rule 15 (as amended in Patna) of the Code of Civil Procedure. There was no discretion left with the Election Tribunal where there is non-compliance with the provisions of Rule 75 (1) and (2) (a) of the Rules. According to their Lordships the Tribunal ought to have dismissed the election petition summarily under Rule 77 for non-verification of the petition and the list as required by law. Learned counsel also pointed out that Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') also provides that the High Court shall dismiss the election petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or Section 82 or Section 117 of the Act. It may be noticed that it does not include Section 83 whereas Rule 77 includes Rule 75. Therefore, provision under Rule 77 is much wider than the provision contained in Section 86 of the Act.
10. The said verification accompanied by the affidavit is also not in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, since the affidavit, which is simply a repetition of the verification, says : "That the contents of the election petition are true to my knowledge." Mr. Thakur Prasad contended that that is not in consonance with the requirement of Order 19, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In a Full Bench decision of this Court in Dipendra Nath Sarkar v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 Pat 101 (FB) it was held that if there is violation of Order 19, Rule 3. the affidavit cannot be accepted. In that case it has been pointed out that if the deponent of an affidavit did not state clearly as to how much of the statement was a statement of the knowledge of the deponent and how much of it was a statement of his belief, there was violation of provision of Order 19. Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
11. Mr. Prasad further contended that the election petition was not accompanied by a separate list mentioning about the corrupt practice giving full particulars as required under Clause (2) (a) of Rule 75 of the Rules. Since a separate Clause (2) (a) has been inserted, the intention of the rule-making authorities is clear that they insisted that a separate list giving full particulars of corrupt practice verified in the same manner as the election petition Is required. In the present case there is complete absence of such a list. Hence, on that account also the Election Tribunal was under duty bound, in view of the provisions contained in Rule 77 of the Rules, to dismiss the election petition summarily.
12. Mr. Prasad pointed out that the provision of Rule 75 is similar to the provision under Section 83 of the Act, which reads as :
"(1) An election petition -
(a) shall contain a concise statement Of the material facts on which the petitioner relies;
(b) shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice that the petitioner alleges, including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice, and
(c) shall be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908 (5 of (1908) for the verification of pleadings :
Provided that where the petitioner alleges anv corrupt practice the petition shall also be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof.
(2) Any schedule or annexure to the petition shall also be signed by the petitioner and verified in the same manner as the petition."
In M. J. C. No. 36 of 1954 (Chandre-shwar Narain Prasad Sinha v. Basu Prasad, decided on 12-4-1955 (Pat.)). S. N. Imam, J. and S. K. Das. Chief Justice (as he then was) were dealing with the provisions contained in Section 83 of the Act. The case had come before their Lordships under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order of the Chairman of the Election Tribunal directing Chandreshwar Narain Prasad Sinha, petitioner of that case to furnish further and better particulars. The petitioner was one of the candidates for the bye-election from the Muzaffarpur North-West Parliamentary Constituency of the House of the People. In that bye-election Thakur Jugal Kishore Sinha who was opposite party No. 4. was declared to have secured the maximum number of votes among the candidates at the election. The petitioner had challenged the validity of the election on the grounds of major corrupt practices of bribery, undue influence and hiring or procuring of motor trucks by opposite party No. 4, namely, the successful candidate. In the opinion of the Tribunal it was necessary for the petitioner to furnish the names of the persons to whom the bribe was offered as also the names of the electors who were carried on trucks to various polling stations. In that case their Lordships observed that the Chairman of the Tribunal was perfectly justified in asking for further particulars. It was necessary to state who had taken the bribe, for it would not give the opposite party a fair chance to meet those allegations in the absence of furnishing such particulars. Similar was the case regarding the taking of voters by truck to the polling stations. Order 6. Rules 2 and 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires statement of material facts. In the election proceedings the charges are. more or less, in the nature of criminal charges, inasmuch as allegations of bribe taking and offering etc. have been made and the opposite party No. 4, in the circumstances is fully justified in asking the petitioner to furnish what the facts are upon which he intends to rely, not by way of evidence but in the nature of facts, that is to say who offered the bribe and who took the bribe, though it is not necessary to state in whose pre-sence the bribe was taken; similar is the case of voters being taken to the polling stations etc. In that case their Lordships observed : "what are 'material facts' and what is 'evidence' must vary with reference to the nature of claim and the allegations made: for example, material facts with misrepresentation etc. are not exactly the same as with regard to other claims". In the particular case under consideration before their Lordships two important allegations were made by the petitioner. One was that certain voters were taken on motor trucks to polling stations, and the other was that the votes of certain voters had been obtained on payment of money etc. It was obvious that the expression 'material facts' with regard to such allegations must include the names of the persons who committed the fraud as also the names of the persons who were the subject of the fraud. In other words, it was necessary to ensure a fair and effectual trial of the election petition that the names of the persons who carried the voters in the motor trucks as also the names of the persons who were so carried, should be mentioned. Mr. Thakur Prasad has emphasised on this part of the judgment. He submitted that in the instant case also there was allegation against the petitioner that he had taken the voters in his jeep and two tyre carts. Therefore it was incumbent upon respondent No. 1 to have given names of the persons who carried the voters in those vehicles as also the names of the persons who were so carried.
13. In this connection he also referred to the judgment of Chandrashe-khar Singh v. Sarjoo Prasad Singh. AIR 1961 Pat 189. In that case also Kamla Sahai and Untwalia, JJ. (now Chief Justice) were considering among others the provision under Section 83 of the Act. Their Lordships observed that the particulars of corrupt practices necessarily include the names of the electors alleged to have been subjected to such corrupt practices. Therefore, the election petition which does not set out the names of such voters suffers from an incurable infirmity in this regard, and the charge is bad on this ground alone. Their Lordships also placed reliance on the un-reported judgment in M. J. C. 36 of 1954 (Pat.) (supra).
14. On the other hand. Mr. N. P. Agarwala. learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 supporting the impugned order contended that the petitioner having submitted to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and after having taken part in the determination of the final order, it is not open to him to challenge its final decision on a preliminary point. If he was aggrieved and if he wanted better particulars he ought to have asked the Tribunal for direction to respondent No, 1 for furnishing further particulars. If the Tribunal would have rejected his prayer, it was then open to him to come to this Court under writ jurisdiction. In order to find support to his contention he relied on Bindhyachal v. S. C. Mukherji, (1954) ILR 33 Pat 905. where Ramaswami and Ahmad. JJ. were dealing with the provisions of the Patna Municipal Corporation Act 1951, as amended by Bihar Ordinance 4 of 1954, in relation to election. Ramaswami, J_. delivering the judgment for the Court observed at page 925 as:
"..... Applying the principle to the present case it is clear that the petitioner must be taken to have been aware of the illegality of the appointment of the District Magistrate even before the election of the Municipal Councillors and in view of their conduct acquiescing in the election and acquiescing in the proceedings that had taken place prior to the election I am of opinion that this application for a writ in the nature of a quo warranto or for a writ in the nature of mandamus cannot be entertained."
In this connection learned counsel also relied on a Bench decision of this Court in Sukhdeo Prasad Singh v. Jagarnath Singh. 1966 BLJR 1004, where Untwalia and S. N. P. Singh. JJ., while dealing with the election case under the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act and its rules observed that the petitioner in the election petition was a person who had taken part in the election, and had contested it as a candidate for the office of Mu-khiya. After having lost election, it was not open to him to take the point for non-compliance of the provisions contained in Section 3 (3) of the Bihar Pan-chayat Raj Act and to challenge the election. He had no right to challenge the election on the ground of allegedly illegal constitution of the Gram Panchayat.
15. In my opinion, the above observations of their Lordships in the two cases, referred to above, are not applicable to the facts of the instant case. It may be noticed that the principles of estoppel their Lordships have applied in the case of a party taking part in the election knowing the defects and. therefore their Lordships observed that he had no right to challenge those very defects in the writ application. In the instant case the petitioner no doubt was aware of the defect when the matter was before the Tribunal; but since Rule 77 enjoins a duty upon the Election Tribunal to dismiss the election petition summarily even suo motu. the principle of acquiescence, and estoppel would not apply in the case of the petitioner, who can challenge the final order of the Tribunal on that ground because the Tribunal has failed to exercise jurisdiction imposed upon it under Rule 77. In 1972 BLJR 80 = (AIR 1972 Pat 164) (supra) in which I had referred to the judgment of U N. Sinha, J. (now Chief Justice) dated the 19th December. 1966, in the case of C. W. J. C. 28 of 1965 (Pat.) where his Lordship held in paragraph 4 of the judgment that although the elected Mukhiya had not taken any preliminary objection, challenging the verification of the election petition, nevertheless, on the election petition, as it stood, the election petition ought to have been summarily dismissed. It was the duty of the Election Tribunal to summarily dismiss the election petition for non-compliance of the requirements of Rule 75 (1).
16. Mr. Agarwala then contended that in the instant case the petitioner had not raised any objection regarding those defects in the election petition before the Election Tribunal either in his written statement or in a subsequent petition. Therefore, it was not open to the petitioner to raise those objections in this Court under writ jurisdiction. In order to substantiate his contention he relied on an unreported judgment dated the 10th February. 1966. of Tarkeshwar Nath. J. in the case of Panchu Prasad Bhagat v. Mohammad Ali (M. J. C. No. 402 of 1963) the note portion of which is published at p. 27 in 1967 BLJR. In that case also his Lordship was dealing with the provision contained under Rules 75 (1) and 77 of the Rules and Order VI, Rule 15 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure. His Lordship observed that if an objection was not taken before the Election Tribunal, it cannot be raised for the first time in an application for writ and his Lordship was pleased to dismiss the application. With due respect I beg to differ from the observation made by his Lordship in view of my own judgment in 1972 BLJR 80 = (AIR 1972 Pat 164) and that of U. N. Sinha, J. in C. W. J. C. 28 of 1965 (Pat), which have been referred to in the preceding paragraph of this judgment. In Raj Krushna Bose v. Binod Kanungo. AIR 1954 SC 202. their Lordships have disapproved any decision on preliminary point by the Election Tribunal. Reference may be made to paragraph 17 of their judgment which is to this effect:
"We wish to record our disapproval of the way in which this Tribunal shirked its work and tried to take a short cut. It is essential that these Tribunals should do their work in full. They are 'ad hoc' bodies to which remands cannot easily be made as in ordinary courts of law. Their duty under Section 99 is.
'where any charge is made in the petition of any corrupt or illegal prac-
tice having been committed at the election' to record 'a finding whether any corrupt or illegal practice has or has not been proved to have been committed ..... and the nature of that corrupt or illegal practice ' Also,
'to give the names of all persons, if any, who have been proved at the trial to have been guilty of any corrupt or illegal practice and the nature of that practice'."
A further reference may be made to Rohtas Industries Ltd v. Jagarnath Sahai Verma. 1966 BLJR 225. where Narasimham, C. J. and Bahadur. J., while dealing with an interlocutory order passed by the Sub-divisional Officer in a proceeding under the Payment of Wages Act. 1936, in an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, observed that the question whether a preliminary issue as regards the maintainability of an application, should be tried separately in the first instance or else whether it should be tried along with the other issues, will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no uniform rule can be laid down. But normally it will not be proper for a court whose orders are subject to ap-peal or control by a superior court to split up the several issuer arising out of a proceeding and try separately a preliminary issue regarding the maintainability of the petition. The danger of try-Ing such a preliminary issue separately is that if the view taken by the trial Court is reversed by superior court the whole case will have to be remanded for trial of other issues and there would be much harassment, delay and expense to all concerned. Hence, generally courts of the first instance are required to try all the issues including the preliminary issue as regards the maintainability of the application, so that whatever view may be taken by the superior court on the question of maintainability there will be no necessity for remand and the litigation can be finally closed. Even in ordinary civil suits, regulated by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is now well settled notwithstanding the provisions of Order 14. Rule 2, that in appealable cases the trial Court should pronounce its opinion on all the issues as to avoid a remand if the appellate Court differs from the trial Court on the preliminary issue. In that case their Lordships have also relied on, AIR 1954 SC 202 (supra).
17. Mr. Agarwala then submitted that if the particulars regarding the names of various persons, who were car-
ried in the ieep and two tyre carts were not given in the election petition, those details could have been available to the petitioner from the witnesses examined on behalf of respondent No. 1. He drew my attention to issue No. 12. which was suggested on behalf of the petitioner before the Tribunal in his application dated the 12th September. 1970. Issue No. 12 reads as:
"Whether any conveyance or cart was supplied to carry voters and, if any, at whose instance?"
In my opinion, that will not in any way absolve the responsibility of respondent No. 1 from giving particulars in the election petition and a separate list signed and verified in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure as contemplated under Rule 75 (1) and (2) fa) of the Rules. I have already observed that the provision under the said rule is mandatory so also the provision contained in Rule 77. Therefore, this submission of Mr. Agarwala also fails,
18. Lastly he submitted that the Tribunal had set aside the election of the petitioner on finding of fact that the petitioner had carried voters in his ieep and two tyre carts as alleged in the election petition. Under writ jurisdiction this Court would not interfere with the finding of fact. In support of his contention he relied on a Judgment of this Court in Sular Mahto v. Basudeo Modi. 1966 BLJR 167 = (AIR 1966 Pat 289). where Narasimham, C. J. and Bahadur, J. while dealing with Rule 82 (1) of the Rules, observed that an order of the Tribunal is a quasi-judicial order and this Court's power of interference is limited to jurisdictional matters only or to errors of law apparent on the face of the record. The finding that some of the voters were carried by the petitioner in his jeep and that consequently he was guilty of an illegal practice as described in paragraph 6 of Part I of Schedule 1 of Election Rules is a pure finding of fact based on evidence on record. Hence it cannot be interfered with in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction. In my view the above observation of their Lordships does not lend any assistance to the contention of the learned counsel. In the instant case, the interference is being made due to error of Jurisdiction of the Tribunal, which it had failed to exercise as bestowed upon it under Rule 77 read with Rule 75. Since the provisions contained under these rules have been held to be mandatory, no question of substantial compliance can arise. It may prima facie appear as harsh to dismiss an election petition on the ground of mere technicality but in reality it is not so. since it is grounded on certain principle of law. In the case of Jagan Nath v. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1954 SC 210, Mahaian C. J., who delivered the Judgment for the Court, observed at page 212 that.
"the general rule is well settled that the statutory requirements of election law must be strictly observed and that an election contest is not an action at law or a suit in equity but is a pure-ly statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and that the Court pos-sesses no common law power. It is also well settled that it is a sound principle of natural justice that the success of a candidate who has won at an election should not be lightly interfered with and any petition seeking such interference must strictly conform to the requirements of the law....."
19. After careful consideration from different aspects I am unable to uphold the impugned order.
20. In the result, the impugned order of the Election Tribunal is quashed, and the application is allowed with a cost of Rs. 100/-.