Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Nidhi Kesarwani vs Department Of Personnel And Training on 30 May, 2023
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench
New Delhi
OA No.2450/2022
Order reserved on : 13.04.2023
Pronounced on : 30.05.2023
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ranjit More, Chairman
Hon'ble Mr. Mohd. Jamshed, Member (A)
Ms. Nidhi Kesarwani D/o Rajendra Kesarwani,
Aged 43 years,
R/o D-1/61, Bharti Nagar, Maharshi Raman Marg,
New Delhi-110003,
Presently posted as:
Deputy Director.
National Institute of Halth & Family Welfare,
M/o Health & Family Welfare, Govt. ofIndia,
New Delhi. ... Applicant
( By Mr. Ankur Chhibber with Mr. H. S. Tiwari and Mr. Nikunj
Arora, Advocates )
Versus
1. Union of India through
Secretary,
Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms,
Ministry of Personnel, PG and Pensions,
North Block, New Delhi-110001.
2. Government of Manipur
through its Chief Secretary,
Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms
(Personnel Division),
Imphal, Manipur-795001.
3. Government of Uttar Pradesh
through its Chief Secretary,
Department of Appointment and Personnel,
Lal Bahadur Shastri Bhawan
(Annexy Building), Sarojini Naidu Marg,
Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh-226001. ... Respondents
OA-2450/2022
2
( By Mr. Hanu Bhaskar, Advocate for respondent No.1; Mr. Rakesh
Tiku, Sr. Advocate, assisted by Ms. Arpan Wadhawan and Mr.
Sandeep Kumar, Advocates for respondent No.2; Mr. Nikhil Majithia,
Advocate for respondent No.3 )
ORDER
Justice Ranjit More, Chairman :
The applicant joined the Indian Administrative Service on 06.09.2004 and was allocated the Manipur State cadre. The applicant was timely granted higher grades and was promoted from time to time. On 13.10.2011, the applicant went on inter-cadre deputation to the State of Uttar Pradesh from her parent cadre Manipur.
2. On 07.08.2012, the Government of Uttar Pradesh issued notification under Section 3D of the National Highways Act, 1956 for development of the proposed Delhi-Meerut Expressway. On 29.04.2015, the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (MORTH), Government of India, as well as the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) on 12.05.2015, issued orders/notifications relating to grant of compensation to the farmers as per the First Schedule of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short, the Land Acquisition Act, 2013).
3. On 20.07.2016, the applicant joined as District Magistrate, Ghaziabad, UP, and worked their till 28.04.2017. The applicant in her OA-2450/2022 3 capacity as Arbitrator, appointed by the Central Government, passed the arbitration awards on 17.12.2016, 26.12.2016, 06.02.2017 and 22.04.2017 respectively.
4. Prior to joining of the applicant as District Magistrate, Ghaziabad, certain complaints were made by the farmers against the then Additional District Magistrate (Land Acquisition), Ghaziabad, Shri Ghanshyam Singh, alleging that he purchased land in the name of his relatives at lower price and got higher land compensation after the arbitration awards thereby making huge financial gains. The then Divisional Commissioner, Meerut directed the then District Magistrate, Ghaziabad vide letter dated 17.08.2017 to conduct an inquiry. The Divisional Commissioner, Meerut, submitted his preliminary inquiry report dated 29.09.2017 to the Government of Uttar Pradesh, where under he recommended conducting an inquiry against the applicant. An FIR bearing case No.1586/2017 dated 16.10.2017 was instituted against ADM Ghanshyam Singh, and investigation was conducted by SIT, Ghaziabad and thereafter by the Economic Offences Wing (EOW), Meerut. The applicant, however, was not named in the said FIR as an accused.
5. On 17.10.2017, the applicant was repatriated and consequently reported back to her parent cadre Manipur, and is presently posted as Deputy Director, National Institute of Health and OA-2450/2022 4 Family Welfare, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, government of India.
6. In the year 2017 itself, a disciplinary inquiry was initiated against Ghanshyam Singh by issuing charge-sheet for the charges more or less similar to the ones levelled against the applicant, which is subject matter of the present Application.
7. The EOW, Meerut, which investigated the FIR referred to above against Ghanshyam Singh, submitted its closure report before the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ghaziabad on 25.09.2021 with the approval of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. On 14.10.2021, the Trial Court accepted the closure report submitted by the EOW. Thereafter, the disciplinary authority by a specific order dated 31.12.2021 exonerated Ghanshyam Singh after holding a full-fledged departmental inquiry, and he was subsequently inducted into IAS from the State Civil Service of Uttar Pradesh.
8. Vide letter dated 04.05.2022, the Government of Uttar Pradesh requested the DoP&T to immediately suspend the applicant and initiate disciplinary proceedings against her. Similar letter was also addressed to the Government of Manipur to suspend the applicant and to immediately start disciplinary action against her. Vide letter dated 11.05.2022, the DoP&T sought necessary clarification from the Government of Uttar Pradesh, regarding certain OA-2450/2022 5 irregularities observed. On the very same date, the DoP&T sent a proposal to the Government of Manipur asking to consider the request of the Government of Uttar Pradesh. The DoP&T thereafter by issuing letter dated 03.06.2022 observed that under Rule 7(1)(b) of the All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules of 1969), the Government of Uttar Pradesh is the competent authority to initiate disciplinary action against the applicant.
9. In response to the letter dated 11.05.2022 written by the DoP&T, the State of Manipur sought for reply from the applicant, and after examining the reply and documents submitted by her, the Government of Manipur communicated its considered reply/decision dated 27.06.2022 to the DoP&T informing that in the light of the facts and records available with the State and the opinion of the learned Advocate General, Manipur, it had been decided to close the case against the applicant.
10. Despite the State of Manipur having communicated to the DoP&T that the case against the applicant had been closed, the State of Uttar Pradesh issued a charge-sheet dated 27.07.2022 to the applicant in respect of the same allegations on which the Government of Manipur had already decided to close the case in pursuance of the opinion of the learned Advocate General, Manipur. For ready OA-2450/2022 6 reference, the charges levelled against the applicant are reproduced hereunder:
"Charge-1 According to sub-section (2) of Section 3D of the National Highways Act, 1956, after publication of the Notification of Section 3D, all the land mentioned in the Notification "shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances". However, after the publication of Section 3D, the land was sold by the land owner whereas after the Notification of Section 3D of N.H. Act, 1956, any kind of transfer of the concerned land is illegal. After the publication of Notification of Section 3D, no action was taken by you to stop the sale of such land and to stop the mutation after the sale, while it was your responsibility as the District Magistrate to prohibit the sale and purchase of the land vested in Central Government after publication of Section 3D of N.H. Act, 1956. On the contrary, the rate of the compensation has been increased by you while disposing of the arbitration suit filed by a person i.e. buyer other than the land owner of the land published in Section 3D.
So, a conspiracy was made by you to give irregular and illegal benefit to the buyer by ignoring the transfer done contrary to the provisions of Section 3D (2) of N.H. Act, 1956 and by determining more compensation in the arbitration case, for which you are guilty.
Therefore, you are guilty of the said irregularities and violation of Rule 3(1) and 3(2) of All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968.
Charge-2 Settlement of arbitration claims planned under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 in relation to the land acquired for the projects of National Highways Authority of India in the district of Ghaziabad has been done by you according to Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act - under Section 26 of 2013 (which has come into force on 01.01.2015 in context of NH act) and by giving 4 times OA-2450/2022 7 compensation, while the land was acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956. There was no justification for paying 4 times compensation by implementing New Land Acquisition Act, 2013. According to rules, this rate should have been determined under the National Highways Act, 1956 on the basis of the then circle rate and sale deed.
So you have given more compensation benefit to the concerned person by not following the National Highways Act, 1956, by conspiring to give irregular and illegal benefits to the concerned person by setting higher rates in the arbitration suits under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, for which you are guilty.
Therefore, you are guilty of the said irregularities and violation of Rule 3(1) and 3(2) of the All India Services (Conduct) rules, 1968.
Charge-3 The arbitration award was done by you on 06.02.2017 in respect of Shrimati Divya Singh in village Nahal, in which the rate of compensation was fixed at Rs.6515/- per square meter whereas the rate of award in this village was Rs.1235.18 per square meter. In the village Nahal itself, the rate of compensation was fixed at Rs.6515/- per square meter whereas the rate of award was Rs.1235.18 per square meter in respect of Shri Deepak Singh. Similarly, in the village Rasulpur, Sikrod, in the case of Sarvshree Fater Mohammad S/o Mustajab, Taj Mohamman S/o Samrej Khan and Idris S/o Yusuf, the rate lf award has been fixed at Rs.6500/- per square meter opposite to the arbitration rate Rs.1235.18 per square meter. The arbitration award made by you has been done under Section 26 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, for which there is no justification as the land was acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956 and the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 came into force from 01.01.2015. It is clear that you have entered in conspiracy to give irregular and illegal benefits to the concerned person by fixing the rate in the OA-2450/2022 8 arbitration under the new Land Acquisition Act, 2013, which clearly indicates your involvement.
So, you have given more compensation benefit to the concerned person by not following the National Highways Act, 1956, by conspiring to give irregular and illegal benefits to the concerned person by setting higher rates in the arbitration suits under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, for which you are guilty.
The act done by you is not in accordance with the duties/responsibilities of the District Magistrate and the Arbitrator. Therefore, you are charged for not discharging your duties and responsibilities properly.
Therefore, you are guilty of the said irregularities and violation of Rule 3(1) and 3(2) of the All India Services (Conduct) Rules, 1968.
By Order of the Governor."
11. It is the case of the applicant that once the disciplinary authority of the applicant, i.e., State of Manipur, had decided not to initiate any disciplinary proceedings against her, then the Government of Uttar Pradesh, which was not even her disciplinary authority, had no authority or competence to issue any charge-sheet to her. According to the applicant, she gave her reply on 10.08.2022, specifically stating that once an officer has come back from the deputationist department, then it is the parent department which can take action against such officer, and that since the applicant had returned to her parent cadre long back, it was only her parent cadre which could have taken any action against her. It is accordingly stated that once the parent cadre of the applicant had taken a decision OA-2450/2022 9 not to proceed against her, then the State of Uttar Pradesh had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned charge-sheet, and the same would be without competence and jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed and set aside.
12. Despite this, the Government of Uttar Pradesh insisted on continuing with the disciplinary proceedings, and at this stage the applicant approached this Tribunal by filing the present OA, seeking the following relief:
"i. Quash and set aside the impugned actions of the Respondents of holding the Government of Uttar Pradesh to be the Competent Authority to initiate disciplinary Proceedings against her as learnt vide letters dated 03.06.2022 and 15.06.2022 (copy not provided to the Applicant) and thereafter issuing impugned Charge Memorandum dated 27.07.2022 issued by Govt. of Uttar Pradesh imposing three charges/allegations against the Applicant on the basis of the Preliminary enquiry Report of Dr. Prabhat Kumar, the then Divisional Commissioner, Meerut;
ii. Direct the respondents to exonerate the Applicant of all the Charges levelled against her and drop the proceedings, if any pending against the Applicant in the interest of justice."
13. The applicant's challenge to the impugned charge-sheet is two-fold - firstly, on the ground of competence of the Uttar Pradesh Government to issue the charge-sheet; and secondly, on merits, i.e., the same does not disclose any misconduct on the part of the OA-2450/2022 10 applicant, and/or the charge-sheet has been issued without application of mind.
14. Mr. Ankur Chhibber, learned counsel appearing for the applicant, took us through the provision of Rule 7(1)(b) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, and submitted that if any act or omission which would render an officer liable to any penalty under the said Rules, is committed by the officer after his appointment to the Service, then the State Government to which the officer belongs will be the competent disciplinary authority to initiate any disciplinary action against such officer. The learned counsel further submitted that it is very clear from the provision of the Rules that it is the parent cadre of the officer who is competent to initiate disciplinary proceedings, and that in the present case, it is the State of Manipur alone, who could have initiated any disciplinary proceedings against the applicant, and once the charge-sheet has not been issued by the State of Manipur, the same would be deemed to have been issued by an authority having no power to do so, and, therefore, the charge-sheet is void ab initio. In support of his submission, the learned counsel relied on a decision of the Guwahati Bench of this Tribunal in OA No.272/2017 - Shri M. Balakrishna Reddy, IFS v Union of India and others, decided on 02.01.2020; and a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in B. L. Satyarthi v The OA-2450/2022 11 State of Madhya Pradesh & another [W.A. No.1058/2009, decided on 29.09.2014].
15. On the merits of the matter, Mr. Chhibber, learned counsel for the applicant, would submit that the arbitral awards passed by the applicant has never been declared illegal by any competent court/appellate forum, and the applicant had passed the arbitral awards as per the relevant rules and orders. He would further submit that in the preliminary inquiry report dated 29.09.2017, the main allegation relating to sale/purchase of 3D land and mutation of the same was, specifically, against the then ADM (Land Acquisition), Shri Ghanshyam Singh, who has already been exonerated of similar charges in the disciplinary inquiry, and subsequently has also been inducted into the IAS. It is submitted that the events which occurred subsequent to the preliminary inquiry report, were not taken into consideration by the respondent No.3, State of Uttar Pradesh, while issuing the charge-sheet to the applicant, and, therefore, the authority while framing the charges against the applicant, has acted with pure non-application of mind inasmuch as no materials and documents available on record appear to have been considered.
16. Regarding article of charge-1, Mr. Chhibber submitted that the same pertains to the applicant allegedly having allowed OA-2450/2022 12 sale/purchase of the notified land in contravention of the rules. The learned counsel submitted that as per the guidelines of the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, Government of India, such sale/purchase of land is permissible, and the same has already been recognised by the High court of Allahabad in Writ C. No.2213 of 2018
- Surendra Nath Singh Yadav v Union of India & others, decided on 18.01.2018.
17. As regards the article of charge-2, Mr. Chhibber would submit that the alleged charge was drawn by stating that the applicant had awarded four times compensation in contravention of the National Highways Act, 1956. The learned counsel submitted that the then Divisional Commissioner, Meerut, while submitting his preliminary inquiry report, completely ignored the notifications and relevant orders issued by the NHAI and MoRTH, and has questioned the arbitral awards passed by the applicant on the presumption that the First Schedule of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, would not be applicable in this case. He further submitted that from various letters of NHAI, it would be clear that the then Divisional Commissioner, Meerut, was not having the knowledge regarding the policy-based decision of the MoRTH, and, thus came to a wrong conclusion. The learned counsel also submitted that the OA-2450/2022 13 applicability of the Act of 2013 was already established in the year 2015, i.e., much before the posting of the applicant as District Magistrate, Ghaziabad.
18. Insofar as the article of charge-3 is concerned, Mr. Chhibber would submit that the compensation awarded by the applicant was duly approved by the NHAI Board and then by the Government of Uttar Pradesh. He also submitted that similar rates were awarded by the successive District Magistrates, Smt. Ministhy S., and Smt. Ritu Maheswari; the Divisional Commissioner, however, in his preliminary inquiry report has not named them for the reasons best known to him.
19. In order to substantiate his argument regarding non- application of mind on the part of the respondent No.3 while issuing the charge-sheet, Mr. Chhibber relied upon a decision of the Principal Bench of this Tribunal in Vijay Kumar v Union of India & others [OA No.2362/2009, decided on 17.02.2010]; and a decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in D. Ramesh Sinha v Cadre Authority for Key Personnel of Co-operative Central Banks/Apex Bank [2001 SCC OnLine AP 1206 : (2002) 1 SLR 93 (DB)].
20. Learned counsel for the applicant, lastly submitted that in the light of the facts narrated hereinabove and the proposition of law OA-2450/2022 14 advanced by him, the impugned charge-sheet deserves to be quashed and set aside.
21. Mr. Nikhil Majithia, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3, State of Uttar Pradesh, vehemently contested the Application. He submitted that the argument of the learned counsel for the applicant that it is only the State of Manipur which would have the exclusive jurisdiction to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant, since the State of Manipur is her parent cadre, and that there can be only one disciplinary authority with respect to an officer, especially after the cadres are allocated to All India Services officers, runs counter to the scheme of the 1969 Rules, more particularly Rule 7(1)(b). The learned counsel submitted that the reliance by Mr. Chhibber on the decision of the Guwati Bench of this Tribunal in Shri M. Balakrishna Reddy, IFS v Union of India (supra); and that of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in B. L. Satyarthi v The State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) in this regard is misplaced.
22. Mr. Majithia would submit that the disciplinary proceedings contemplated against the applicant are at a nascent stage, which are being conducted in compliance with the Rules of 1969. He submitted that the disciplinary authority is yet to examine any material in respect of the charges levelled against the applicant, and, therefore, it would not be open to this Tribunal to proceed into OA-2450/2022 15 detailed examination as to how the charges are not made out against the applicant. The learned counsel also submitted that it is settled law that disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to be taken to their logical conclusion, and it would not be proper to interfere with the issuance of the show cause notice. In this regard, the learned counsel relied upon the following decisions:
(1) State of U.P. v Brahmdatt Sharma [(1987) 2 SCC 179];
(2) Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v Ramesh Kumar Singh & others [(1996) 1 SCC 327];
(3) Union of India v Kunnisetty Satyanarayana [(2006) 12 SCC 28];
(4) Chairman, LIC v A. Masilamani [(2013) 6 SCC 530].
23. Mr. Majithia, further submitted that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against Ghanshyam Singh resulting in his exoneration of the charges levelled against him, and the EOW, U.P. Police having submitted a closure report in the FIR filed against him, would not be grounds to quash and set aside the charges levelled against the applicant, inasmuch as the charges levelled against Ghanshyam Singh were in respect of the land acquired in a different village. In this regard, the learned counsel relied upon the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in - (1) Indian Overseas Bank, Annasalai v P. Ganesan & others [(2008) 1 SCC 650]; and (2) Shashi Bhushan Prasad v Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force & others [(2019) 7 SCC 797].
OA-2450/2022 16
24. Mr. Majithia, lastly submitted that the OA is devoid of any substance and, therefore, it deserves to be dismissed.
25. Mr. Hanu Bhaskar, learned counsel appearing for DoP&T, respondent No.1, opposed the Application. He also relied upon the provisions of Rule 7(1)(b) of the Rules of 1969, coupled with the letter dated 03.06.2022 issued by the respondent No.1, and submitted that the State of Uttar Pradesh is the competent authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant.
26. Mr. Rakesh Tiku, learned Sr. Advocate, appearing on behalf of respondent No.2, State of Manipur, filed separate reply. He acknowledged receipt of the letter dated 04.05.2022 from the Government of Uttar Pradesh, and the letter dated 11.05.2022 from DoP&T. In pursuance of these letters, the respondent No.2, asked the applicant to submit her explanation. After receipt of the applicant's explanation, the respondent No.2 obtained opinion of the learned Advocate General, Manipur, and the said opinion was conveyed to the respondent No.1, DoP&T, with the remark that case against the applicant may be closed. The learned Sr. Advocate submitted that the findings of the State of Manipur wherein it was held that no charge is made out against the applicant and consequently the proceedings against her may be closed, have never been disputed or challenged before any forum. He also submitted that the proposal of OA-2450/2022 17 the Government of Manipur to close the proceedings against the applicant was prior in point of time than the action taken by the Government of Uttar Pradesh, and, therefore, one set of allegations against an officer being inquired into by two different State Governments, cannot be allowed. Mr. Tiku, thereafter supported the arguments of Mr. Ankur Chhibber, learned counsel for the applicant.
27. We have gone through the Application, the documents annexed thereto, as well as the counter-affidavits filed by the respective respondents, the rejoinders thereto by the applicant, and the case law cited by the learned counsel for the parties. Having considered the respective arguments by the learned counsel for parties, we would firstly deal with the argument regarding competency of the respondent No.3, State of Uttar Pradesh, to initiate the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. In this regard the claim of the applicant and the respondent No.2 is that the State of Manipur is the disciplinary authority. On the contrary, respondent Nos.1 and 3 asserted that it would be the State of Uttar Pradesh which has the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. In order to deal with this argument, we must go through the provisions of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, and especially Rule 7 thereof, which deals with OA-2450/2022 18 the authority to institute proceedings and to impose penalty. For ready reference, Rule 7 is reproduced below:
"7. Authority to institute proceedings and to impose penalty--
(1) Where a member of the Service has committed any act or omission which renders him liable to any penalty specified in rule 6--
(a) if such act or omission was committed before his appointment to the Service--
(i) the State Government, if he is serving in connection with the affairs of that State, or is deputed for service in any company, association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, which is wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the Government of that State or in a local authority set up by an Act of the Legislature of that State;
or
(ii) the Central Government, in any other case, shall alone be competent to institute disciplinary proceedings against him and, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), to impose on him such penalty specified in rule 6 as it thinks fit;
(b) If such act or omission was committed after his appointment to the Service--
(i) while he was serving in connection with the affairs of a State, or is deputed for service under any company, association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, which is wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the Government of a State, or in a local authority set up by an Act of the Legislature of that State, the Government of that State; or
(ii) while he was on training, the Central Government, unless the selection for the training was done by the State Govt. and the OA-2450/2022 19 cost of the training was entirely borne by the State Government.
(iii) while he was on leave, the Government which sanctioned him the leave; or
(iv) while he was under suspension, the Government which placed him or is deemed to have placed him under suspension; or
(v) if such act or omission is willful absence from duty after the expiry of leave, the Government which sanctioned the leave; or
(vi) while he was absent from duty otherwise than on leave, the Government which would have been competent to institute disciplinary proceedings against him, had such act or commission been committed immediately before such absence from duty; or
(vii) the Central Government, in any other case, shall alone be competent to institute disciplinary proceedings against him and, subject to provisions of sub-rule (2), to impose on him such penalty specified in rule 6 as it thinks fit, and the Government, company associations, body of individuals or local authority, as the case may be under whom he is serving at the time of institution of such proceedings shall be bound to render all reasonable facilities to the Government instituting and conducting such proceedings. Explanation.-- For the purposes of clause (b) of sub- rule (1) where the Government of a State is the authority competent to institute disciplinary proceedings against a member of the Service, in the event of a reorganisation of the State, the Government on whose cadre he is borne after such reorganisation shall be the authority competent to institute disciplinary proceedings and, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), to impose on him any penalty specified in rule 6.
(1A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- rule (1) the Director, Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of administration, the Director, Sardar OA-2450/2022 20 Vallabhbhai Patel National Police Academy or the President, Forest Research Institute and Colleges, shall be empowered to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a probationer who is undergoing training at the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel National Police Academy or Forest Research Institute and Colleges, as the case may be, in respect of any misconduct or misbehavior during the period he spends at the said Academy/Institute in accordance with the prescribed procedure laid down in rule 10 of these rules. Thereafter the Director/President shall refer the case to the Central Government with the relevant records for passing orders under rule 6 in consultation with the Commission.
(1B) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- rule (1), if in any case, a question arises as to the Government competent to institute disciplinary proceedings, it shall be decided by the Central Government and the Government so decided by the Central Government, as being competent to institute disciplinary proceedings (which may include the Central Government also), shall alone be competent to institute disciplinary proceedings against him and, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), to impose on him such penalty specified in rule 6 as it thinks fit, and Government, company association, body of individuals, or the local authority, as the case may be, under whom he is serving at the time of the institution of such proceedings shall be bound to render all reasonable facilities to the Government instituting and conducting such proceedings.
(2) The penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement shall not be imposed on a member of the Service except by an order of the Central Government.
(3) Where the punishing Government is not the Government on whose cadre the member is borne, the latter Government shall be consulted before any penalty specified in rule 6 is imposed:
OA-2450/2022 21 Provided that in relation to the members of the Service borne on a Joint Cadre, the punishing Government shall consult the Joint Cadre Authority:
Provided further that where the Government concerned are the Central Government and the State Government or two State Governments and there is a difference of opinion between the said Government in respect of any matter referred to in this rule, the matter shall be referred to the Central Government for its decisions, which shall be passed in consultation with the Commission."
28. A perusal of Rule 7 of the 1969 Rules indicates demarcation of the disciplinary authorities with respect to act or omission committed by an officer belonging to All India Services in different roles, such as probation, deputation, training etc. The Rule makes it abundantly clear that the disciplinary proceedings may be required to be initiated against an officer in respect of different roles performed by him, and accordingly the Rule confers jurisdiction upon the authority which has direct role with respect to the acts and omissions, which may render an officer liable to any penalty, being attributed to the officer concerned for which disciplinary proceedings are contemplated. For the purpose to decide the controversy raised in the present OA, Rule 7(1)(b)(i) and Rule 7(1B) are important. The Rule consciously uses the expression "that State" as opposed to "parent State" or "State cadre", to emphasise the link between the misconduct alleged against an officer while discharging an official role and the factum of his belonging to certain State cadre. Rule OA-2450/2022 22 7(1)(b), in our considered opinion, envisages that if an act or omission, which renders an officer of the All India Services liable to any penalty, was committed after his appointment to the Service, the Government of the State in connection with the affairs whereof he was serving at the relevant time, would be the authority competent to institute proceedings and to impose penalty specified under the Rules. The impugned disciplinary proceedings have been initiated by the respondent No.3, State of Uttar Pradesh, in respect of the acts or omissions committed by the applicant while she was on deputation with the Government of Uttar Pradesh, and, therefore, in terms of the provisions of Rule 7(1)(b), the State of Uttar Pradesh, in our considered opinion, would be the competent authority to initiate such proceedings. Be that as it may, in terms of Rule 7 (1B), power has been conferred upon the Central Government, which shall be the final authority to decide as to the competence of a Government to institute disciplinary proceedings against an All India Services officer in the event any dispute arises. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the DoP&T, Government of India, has decided vide letter dated 03.06.2022 that it would be the Government of Uttar Pradesh which shall be competent to initiate and conduct disciplinary proceedings against the applicant. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the submissions of the learned counsel for the applicant in this regard.
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29. At this stage, reliance of Mr. Chhibber, learned counsel for the applicant on the decision of the Guwahati Bench of this Tribunal in Shri M. Balakrishna Reddy, IFS v Union of India (supra); and that of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in B. L. Satyarthi v The State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) deserves to be dealt with. In Shri M. Balakrishna Reddy's case, the issue was whether the Central Government was right and competent authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings and impose penalty as provided in Rule 6 of the Rules of 1969. The applicant therein belonged to the Assam and Meghalaya joint cadre of the Indian Forest Service of 1993 batch. He was convicted in a criminal case in connection with appearing in the Civil Services Examination in 1996 at Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh. The Division Bench of this Tribunal at Guwahati, observed that the applicant had already been in service and belonged to the Assam and Meghalaya joint cadre of Indian Forest Service, and that for the purpose of appearing in the Civil Services Examination in 1996, he must have been either on pre or post sanctioned leave, as there would be no situations or provisions to appear in the Civil Services Examination. It was further observed that the applicant must have been under the State Government of Meghalaya in the absence of any information to the contrary. The Division Bench finally concluded that if that be so, the applicant therein would be squarely covered by Rule 7 (1) (b) (iii) of the rules of 1969, and thereafter held that it is the OA-2450/2022 24 State Government of Meghalaya who could initiate disciplinary proceedings under Rule 14 of the Rules of 1969. In short, resorting to Rule 7(1)(b)(iii), the Guwahati Bench of the Tribunal held that since the applicant belonged to the joint cadre of Indian Forrest Service and the misconduct was committed while he was on leave, the competent Government to initiate disciplinary proceedings would be the Government which sanctioned the leave. This decision, therefore, cannot come to the rescue of Mr. Chhibber, learned counsel for the applicant.
30. Insofar as the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in B. L. Satyarthi v The State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) is concerned, same is also not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court was considering the provisions of Rule 20 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966. The issue before the Hon'ble High Court was whether after the appellant was repatriated from Madhya Pradesh Rajya Van Vikas Nigam, the disciplinary authority in the said Nigam, i.e., the Managing Director, could initiate the departmental inquiry, and whether Rule 20 of the said Rules permits so. The Division Bench observed that when power is given to any authority to suspend or initiate disciplinary action against a Government servant, an assumption has to be drawn OA-2450/2022 25 that the power can be exercised so long as the relationship of master and servant, employer and employee subsists or the contract or employment is in existence. Once the relationship of master and servant or employer and employee or the contract of service itself comes to an end, the question would be as to how disciplinary action or power to suspend can be exercised by an authority with whom the contract of employment of the employee concerned is no more in existence. In the light of these observations, the Division Bench held that Rule 20 of the said Rules has to be interpreted by holding that the power conferred under Rule 20 to the borrowing department or authority to suspend a Government servant or to take a disciplinary action against him can be exercised only if the relationship of master and servant or the contract of employment between the borrowing department and the deputationist employee subsists.
31. In our considered view, the above decision of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court cannot be made applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case, for more than one reason. Firstly, the provisions of Rule 20 of the MP Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1966 and the provisions of Rule 7(1)(b) of the 1969 Rules are entirely different. Secondly, Rule 7(1)(b) envisages that if an act or omission, which renders an officer of the All India Services liable to any penalty, was committed after his appointment OA-2450/2022 26 to the Service, the Government of the State in connection with the affairs whereof he was serving at the relevant time, would be the authority competent to institute proceedings and to impose penalty specified under the Rules. Thirdly, under Rule 7(1B) higher powers have been conferred upon the Central Government, which is empowered to decide the competence of the State Government to initiate disciplinary proceedings, in case any dispute arises between to State Governments.
32. In the light of the discussion made hereinabove, we are of the opinion that the Government of Uttar Pradesh and not Manipur has the authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the applicant, since the allegations levelled against the applicant pertain to a period she was on deputation with the Government of Uttar Pradesh.
33. This takes us to consider the challenge to the charge- sheet. We have already reproduced the charges against the applicant, and the arguments of the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties. Before going into merits of the challenge to the charge-sheet, we would like to take a survey of the case law regarding the scope of interference in disciplinary proceedings, relied upon by the learned counsel for respective parties.
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34. In Vijay Kumar v Union of India (supra), a Division Bench of this Tribunal, in paras 4 and 6, held as follows:
"4. It is trite that in judicial review intervention at the interlocutory stage is in very rare and exceptional circumstances. This is because, at this stage, no rights of the applicant can be said to have been adversely affected. However, among the few grounds on which such intervention has been upheld includes non- application of mind and non-disclosure of any misconduct. The chargesheet in this case was issued after the repatriation of the applicant to his parent department. The fact that he was charged for something for which the competent authorities during the period of deputation had appreciated him and rewarded by conferring financial benefits in the form of honorarium clearly shows a non-application of mind. It also reveals as there being no misconduct. Besides, the ground of delay is also taken as one of the pleas. The charge memorandum in this case was issued in 2008 with regard to the events happening in 2005 and 2006. Since the applicant had been repatriated at the time of initiation of the disciplinary proceeding, the plea of want of jurisdiction in this case would not hold ground."
"6. Considering the facts of the case, we find it an appropriate one for quashing the disciplinary proceeding initiated vide the impugned charge memorandum and the inquiry-at whatever stage it may be held thereafter. Needless to say, the applicant would be entitled to consequential service benefits in accordance with law. No costs."
35. In D. Ramesh Sinha (supra), a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court made following observations in para 14:
"14. Having regard to the aforementioned notings in the records, we have no doubt whatsoever that the impugned orders of suspension have been passed pursuant to and in furtherance of the directions issued by the State Government. Power to initiate disciplinary OA-2450/2022 28 proceedings against an employee or place him under suspension emanates from a statute. While exercising such statutory power, the competent authority, must therefore, apply its mind independently as to whether the conditions precedent for exercising such power exist. It is now trite if a statutory authority acts at the behest of some other authority, however, high he may be, who has no statutory role to play in the matter, then such action or any order passed by him, would be a non- est in the eye of law. It is also well settled that while passing an order, if the statutory authority ignores the relevant factors or takes into considerations, factors not germane for the passing of the order, then such action or the order flowing from such action, would be vitiated in law. Equally well settled is the principle that the statutory authority while exercising statutory powers, must pose correct questions so as to apply correct legal principles and arrive at correct conclusions basing on the actual and exact state of affairs, and if he fails to do so, the same would amount to misdirection in law. Although decisions on this score are galore, suffice it to refer to the decision of the apex Court in. Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas, 1951 SCC 1088 : AIR 1952 SC 16 and the decision of the Court of Appeal. Civil Division in Secretary of State v. Tameside, (1976) 3 All ER 665."
36. In Brahm Datt Sharma (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 9 held as follows:
"9. The High Court was not justified in quashing the show cause notice. When a show cause notice is issued to a government servant under a statutory provision calling upon him to show cause, ordinarily the government servant must place his case before the authority concerned by showing cause and the courts should be reluctant to interfere with the notice at that stage unless the notice is shown to have been issued palpably without any authority of law. 'The purpose of issuing show cause notice is to afford opportunity of hearing to the government servant and once cause is shown it is open to the Government to consider the matter in the light of the facts and submissions placed by the government servant and only thereafter a final OA-2450/2022 29 decision in the matter could be taken. Interference by the court before that stage would be premature, the High Court in our opinion ought not have interfered with the show cause notice."
37. In Ramesh Kumar Singh (supra), the 1st respondent therein assailed the show cause notice dated 16.12.1992 issued to him by the 3rd respondent under Section 59 of the Bihar State Housing Board Act, 1982, by filing CWJC No.82 of 1993 in the High Court at Patna. Vide judgment dated 10.02.1993, the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court quashed the show cause notice and also the eviction proceedings pending before the 3 rd respondent. Challenging this decision, the appellant, Bihar State Housing Board, approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Apex Court in para 11 held as follows:
"11. On the facts of this case, we hold that the first respondent was unjustified in invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, without first showing cause against Annexure Ext. P-4 before the third respondent. The appropriate procedure for the first respondent would have been to file his objections and place necessary materials before the third respondent and invite a decision as to whether the proceedings initiated by the third respondent under Section 59 of the Bihar State Housing Board Act, 1982, are justified and appropriate. The adjudication in that behalf necessarily involves disputed questions of fact which require investigation. In such a case, proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution can hardly be an appropriate remedy. The High Court committed a grave error in entertaining the writ petition and in allowing the same by quashing Annexure Ext. P-4 and also the eviction proceedings No. 6 of 1992, without proper and OA-2450/2022 30 fair investigation of the basic facts. We are, therefore, constrained to set aside the judgment of the High Court of Patna in CWJC No. 82 of 1993 dated 10-2-1993. We hereby do so. The appeal is allowed with costs."
38. In Kunnisetty Satyanarayana (supra), the Ape Court made following observations in paras 14 and 16:
"14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge- sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ petition lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance."
"16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show- cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter."
39. In A. Masilamani (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 18 held as follows:
"18. The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary OA-2450/2022 31 proceedings, as such a power is dehors the limits of judicial review. In the event that the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show-cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by the court. The same principle is applicable in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question have to be examined taking into consideration the gravity/magnitude of charges involved therein. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration all relevant facts and to balance and weigh the same, so as to determine if it is in fact in the interest of clean and honest administration, that the judicial proceedings are allowed to be terminated only on the ground of delay in their conclusion. (Vide State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma [(1987) 2 SCC 179 : (1987) 3 ATC 319 : AIR 1987 SC 943] , State of M.P. v. Bani Singh [1990 Supp SCC 738 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 638 : (1991) 16 ATC 514 : AIR 1990 SC 1308] , Union of India v. Ashok Kacker [1995 Supp (1) SCC 180 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 374 :
(1995) 29 ATC 145] , Prohibition & Excise Deptt. v. L. Srinivasan [(1996) 3 SCC 157 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 686 :
(1996) 33 ATC 745] , State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan [(1998) 4 SCC 154 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1044 :
AIR 1998 SC 1833] , M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India [(2006) 5 SCC 88 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 919 : AIR 2006 SC 3475], Union of India v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana [(2006) 12 SCC 28 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 304] and Ministry of Defence v. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha [(2012) 11 SCC 565 :
(2013) 1 SCC (L&S) 121 : AIR 2012 SC 2250] .)"
40. The above decisions lay down the proposition that ordinarily, the writ petition/proceedings before the High Court/Tribunals impugning the show cause notice or charge-sheet would not be maintainable. However, in some very rare and exceptional cases, the High Court/Tribunals can quash the charge- sheet or show cause notice, if it is found to be wholly without OA-2450/2022 32 jurisdiction or otherwise illegal. The courts and tribunals in this regard should exercise the power sparingly. However, a few grounds on which intervention is permissible, includes non- application of mind, and non-disclosure of misconduct. The above decisions would also hold that if the statutory authority ignores the relevant factors or take into consideration factors not germane for passing the order, then such action or order would be vitiated in law.
41. In the light of above proposition, now we will proceed to examine the challenge to the charge-sheet.
42. The first charge against the applicant is about illegal transfer of the land included in the 3D notification by the land owner. The land was sold by the land owner subsequent to publication of 3D notification, while it was allegedly the responsibility of the applicant as District Magistrate to prohibit sale/purchase of such land; however, no action was taken by the applicant, and this was done in conspiracy with the buyer to confer illegal and irregular benefits. It is worth mentioning at this stage that Section 3D notification under the National Highways Act, 1956 was issued for acquisition of land for the proposed Delhi-Meerut Expressway on 07.08.2012, i.e., about four years prior to joining of the applicant as District Magistrate, Ghaziabad, and, therefore, allegation relating to conspiracy hatched by applicant has no basis, inasmuch as the sale/purchase of the 3D OA-2450/2022 33 land was already going on. At this stage it is also relevant to refer to the Manual of Guidelines on Land Acquisition for National Highways under the National Highways Act, 1956, published by the Government of India, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways in the month of December 2018, for acquisition of land for National Highways. Clause (i) of para 3.5.6 of the said Guidelines reads as follows:
"(i) Another issue has cropped up regarding the change of ownership of land during the process of acquisition. Though Section 11(4) of the RFCTLARR Act places a restriction on any transaction of the land subsequent to the Preliminary Notification, it is not applicable to the NH Act, 1956. Further, since the proceedings of Land Acquisition continue for some time, the possibility of a landowner deciding to sell or transfer his/her land during these proceedings cannot be ruled out. It is on this account that the law recognises the landowner or the person interested therein. As such, the successor-in-
interest, whether by way of inheritance or by way of sale/purchase of the subject land, remains entitled to receive the compensation in respect of such land subject to such person being a bona-fide successor- in-interest."
It is also worth mentioning that the only and the sole authority for processing of the land acquisition, as per the Act of 1956 is the CALA (Competent Authority for Land Acquisition) appointed by the State government, which in the present case was ADM (LA) Ghaziabad. The District Magistrate had no role or control over sale/purchase of the land included in the 3D notification as per provisions of the Act OA-2450/2022 34 of 1956. The preliminary inquiry report, on the basis of which the disciplinary inquiry has been initiated against the applicant, does not show that the applicant had any written information/knowledge with regard to sale/purchase of the 3D land during her tenure as District Magistrate, Ghaziabad.
43. At this stage, reference is required to be made to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Abdul Rajjak & another v State of U.P. & others [Writ-C No.54407 of 2016, decided on 17.11.2016]. Petitioner Abdul Rajjak, the owner of the land included in 3D notification, approached the Hon'ble High Court seeking a declaration that the sale deed of the land sold by him after publication of 3D notification was void ab initio, and the compensation ought to be recovered from the subsequent purchaser and paid to the petitioner. The Hon'ble High Court dismissed the petition, thereby maintaining the legality of the sale deed entered into after publication of the 3D notification.
44. In Surendra Nath Singh Yadav v Union of India & others [Writ-C No.2213/2018, decided by the Allahabad High Court on 18.01.2018], the notification under Section 3D was published on 24.09.2015, and the petitioner purchased the notified land from the erstwhile landowner vide sale deed dated 22.07.2016. The claim of the petitioner on the basis of the sale deed was that he was entitled OA-2450/2022 35 for compensation for the said land. The Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court observed that it is well settled proposition of law that purchaser of the land subsequent to initiation of the acquisition proceedings has no locus standi to challenge the acquisition proceedings, but certainly he is a person interested in the compensation. The Division Bench, relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V. Chandrasekaran v Administrative Officer [(2012) 12 SCC 133] held that subsequent purchaser is a person interested only to the extent of making a claim of compensation of the land, subject matter of acquisition. Consequently, the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court held that right of compensation being claimed by the petitioner was worthy of being considered, and directions were issued to the Land Acquisition Officer to consider the representation made by the petitioner, in accordance with law.
45. One Jai Bhagwan, subsequent purchaser of land after publication of 3D notification, approached the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad by filing Writ-C No.35270 of 2018, making a grievance that despite making an award and deciding the compensation at the rate of Rs.4405.00 per square meter, the amount was not being released in his favour. The Division Bench allowed the said writ petition, and OA-2450/2022 36 the 3rd respondent, the Land Acquisition Officer, was directed to release the compensation in terms of the award.
46. The facts mentioned hereinabove and the decisions of the Allahabad High Court, if considered in proper perspective, then, to our mind, there is no merit in the allegation against the applicant, who was the District Magistrate at the relevant time, that she failed to prohibit sale/purchase of the land in question after publication of 3D notification. What we find is that there is nothing in the National Highways Act, 1956, which casts a duty upon the district Magistrate to prohibit sale/purchase of the land included in the 3D notification. As a matter of fact, the applicant as the District Magistrate had no control over the landowners, who effected the sale/purchase agreements after publication of 3D notification. The applicant, in our considered view, therefore, cannot be blamed in this regard.
47. The second article of charge is that the applicant had no justification for paying four times compensation by implementing the new Act of 2013, and the rate of compensation for the land included in the 3D notification had to be decided under the Act of 1956. This allegation/charge is contrary to the communication dated 05.11.2019 from Dr. Sukhbir Singh Sandhu, IAS, Chairman, NHAI, to shri Sanjiv Ranjan, Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways, Government of India. This communication is in respect of the land OA-2450/2022 37 acquisition for Delhi-Meerut Expressway. Para 6 of the said communication reads as follows:
"6. MoRTH has issued "A Manual of Guidelines on Land Acquisition for National Highways under the National Highways Act, 1956" in the month of December, 2018 for processing of land acquisition for National Highways. As per these guidelines, the following is the settled proposition that the First, Second and Third Schedule of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 shall be applicable to the NH Act, 1956 w.e.f. 01.01.2015 on following cases
(a) All cases of land acquisition where the Awards had not been announced under Section 3G of the NH Act till 31.12.2014 or where such awards had been announced but compensation had not been paid in respect of majority of the land holdings under acquisition as on 31.12.2014, the compensation would be payable in accordance with the First Schedule of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.
(b) In cases where the land acquisition process was initiated and award of compensation under Section 3G had also been announced before 01.01.2015 but the full amount of Award had not been deposited by the acquiring agency with the CALA, the compensation amount would be liable to be determined in accordance with the First Schedule w.e.f. 01.01.2015.
(c) In cases, where the process of acquisition of land stood completed (i.e. Award under Section 3G announced by CALA, amount deposited by the acquiring agency with the CALA, and compensation paid to the landowners in respect of majority of the land under acquisition) as on or before 31.12.2014, the process would be deemed to have been completed and settled. Such cases would not be re-opened.
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(d) The case of DME falls under (a) category and, therefore, applying First Schedule of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 is justified."
In this regard, letter dated 06.11.2019 issued by the Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Road Transport and Highways (Land Acquisition Division), to the Additional Chief Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh, Lucknow, is also relevant. The letter refers to the guidelines dated 28.12.2017, which were issued in consultation with the learned Attorney General of India, under which procedure is prescribed to be followed for determining the compensation in land acquisition cases initiated prior to 01.01.2015. Sub-para (iii) of para 4.6 of the said Guidelines, is reproduced in the letter, which reads as follows:
"(iii) By now, it is also a settled proposition that the First, Second and Third Schedule of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 shall be applicable to the NH Act, 1956 with effect from 01.01.2015. As such, the following is clarified:
(a) All cases of land acquisition where the Awards had not been announced under Section 3G of the NH Act till 31.12.2014 or where such awards had been announced but compensation had not been paid in respect of majority of the land holdings under acquisition as on 31.12.2014, the compensation would be payable in accordance with the First Schedule of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.
(b) In cases where the land acquisition process was initiated and award of compensation under Section 3G had also been announced before 01.01.2015 but the full amount of Award had not been deposited by the acquiring agency with the CALA, the OA-2450/2022 39 compensation amount would be liable to be determined in accordance with the First Schedule w.e.f. 01.01.2015.
(c) In cases, where the process of acquisition of land stood completed (i.e. Award under Section 3G announced by CALA, amount deposited by the acquiring agency with the CALA, and compensation paid to the landowners in respect of majority of the land under acquisition) as on or before 31.12.2014, the process would be deemed to have been completed and settled. Such cases would not be re-opened."
The allegation against the applicant that she should have followed the NH Act, 1956 to decide compensation of the land in question, and not the Act of 2013 runs counter to the above communications. Probably, the Divisional Commissioner, Meerut, who prepared the preliminary report on the basis of which disciplinary proceedings have been initiated against the applicant, was not aware that the compensation for the land acquired under the NH Act, 1956 is to be decided in accordance with the Act of 2013. Under First Schedule of the Act of 2013, procedure is laid down as to how compensation is to be determined, and that comes to four times the market rate. In the light of this, in our considered view, allegation against the applicant that she ought to have awarded compensation in accordance with the Act of 1956, is baseless and rather, result of non-application of mind.
48. The third charge against the applicant is more or less similar to the second charge, i.e., the applicant had awarded more OA-2450/2022 40 compensation to the concerned persons, by not following the Act of 1956. It is also alleged that the applicant conspired to give irregular and illegal benefits to concerned persons by setting higher rates in the arbitral award passed by her under the Act of 2013. The applicant in this regard relied upon the comparative statement of arbitration awards passed by different officers of Delhi-Meerut Expressway project. The chart showing comparative statement is annexed with the OA as Annexure A-21, p.604. This chart is not disputed by the respondent No.3. Having perused the said comparative statement, we find that the predecessor of the applicant, Shri vimal Kumar Sharma, and the successor of the applicant, Smt. Ministhy S., awarded compensation at the similar rates in respect of land acquired in various villages in question. The respondent No.3, however, has not proceeded either against Shri Vimal Kumar Sharma or Smt. Ministhy S., and the applicant has been singled out to face disciplinary proceedings. It is worth to mention that none of the authorities, including the NHAI, ever questioned or challenged the arbitral awards passed by the applicant before any forum. NHAI, on the contrary accepted the awards in question and paid compensation to the concerned landowners, including the subsequent purchasers of the land notified under Section 3D. The respondent No.3, in our considered opinion, overlooked this aspect and made allegations OA-2450/2022 41 against the applicant, which is a clear display of non-application of mind.
49. Before parting with the discussion regarding challenge to the charge-sheet on the ground of non-application of mind, we must make a reference to the allegations against Shri Ghanshyam Singh, the then ADM (Land Acquisition), Ghaziabad. These allegations were made by some farmers and in pursuance thereof, an inquiry was carried out by a committee, and simultaneously a preliminary inquiry report was also submitted by Shri Prabhat Kumar, the then Divisional Commissioner, Meerut. In pursuance thereof, an FIR was registered against the said Ghanshyam Singh. Investigation into the FIR was conducted by the SIT and subsequently by EOW. However, a closure report came to be filed, which was accepted by the trial court. Not only this, even in the departmental inquiry initiated against Ghanshyam Singh, he was exonerated, and subsequently inducted into the IAS from the State Civil Service. The applicant was not even named in the FIR in question. It is not the case of the respondents that the applicant through her relatives, purchased the land included in the 3D notification, and thereafter awarded higher compensation. This allegation was against Shri Ghanshyam Singh. However, he was exonerated in both criminal and departmental proceedings. The allegations against the applicant are that she did OA-2450/2022 42 not prohibit transfer of the land under 3D notification and awarded higher compensation in respect of the said land by applying the provisions of the Act of 2013 and not the Act of 1956. These allegations, we find, cannot be sustained. Rather the levelling of charges against the applicant is pure non-application of mind on the part of the respondent No.3.
50. We are conscious that normally the Tribunal should not interfere in the charge-sheet, and the interference should only be in exceptional and rare cases. We, however, find that this is a case where interference is warranted, inasmuch as we find that the allegations in the impugned charge-sheet have been made without application of mind. The impugned charge-sheet deserves to be quashed and set aside. We accordingly allow the present Original Application, and quash and set aside the impugned charge-sheet dated 27.07.2022. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
( Mohd. Jamshed ) ( Justice Ranjit More ) Member (A) Chairman /as/