Delhi District Court
Devki vs M/S New Era Public School on 30 March, 2026
IN THE COURT OF SUJIT SAURABH, PRESIDING
OFFICER, LABOUR COURT-IX, ROUSE AVENUE
DISTRICT COURT, NEW DELHI
LIR No. 61/20
CNR No. DLCT13-000178-2020
DEVKI Vs. M/s NEW ERA PUBLIC SCHOOL & ANR.
Smt. Devki
W/o Sh. Ram Prakash
R/o B-128, Gali No.5, Balmiki Colony, Ranhola,
Delhi-110041.
Through,
Sh. Narain Singh, General Secretary,
Hindustan Engineering & General Mazdoor Union (Regd.4479),
Head Office - D-2/24,
Sultanpuri, New Delhi-110041
....... Workman
VERSUS
1.M/s New Era Public School, H-17, Hari Nagar, Maya Puri Road, New Delhi.
2. M/s Miraz Detectives and Security Services Pvt. Ltd. Through Sh. Atul Mahajan, Director, 82/1, Mini Market, Nanak Pura, Near Moti Bagh Gurdwara, New Delhi-110021 ...... Managements Date of Institution : 09.01.2020 Date of Award : 30.03.2026 LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 1 of 20 AWARD
1. This is a reference under Section 10(1)(c) read with Section 12 (5) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (in short, 'ID Act'). The reference has been sent to the court for adjudication by Joint Labour Commissioner, West District, Govt. of National Capital Territory of Delhi, vide reference order dated 12.12.2019, bearing endorsement No.F.3(630)/19/Ref./wd/Lab./2204. The reference arises from the industrial dispute between the workman namely Smt. Devki W/o Sh. Ram Prakash (hereinafter referred to as the 'Workman') and the management of (1) M/s New Era Public School (hereinafter referred to as the 'management No.1').and (2) M/s Miraz Detectives and Security Services Pvt. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the 'Management No.2'). The terms of reference read as follow:
"Whether the services of workman Smt. Devki W/o Sh. Ram Prakash have been terminated illegally and/or unjustifiably by the management; and if so, to what relief is she entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect"
2. Upon receipt of the reference, notice was issued to the workman. The workman appeared before the court and filed statement of claim.
3. Vide order dated 12.03.2020, notice of the statement of claim was issued to the managements.
The managements put up appearance through their Authorized Representative (in short, 'AR') and filed separate written statements.
Separate rejoinder to the written statement of management No.1 and management No.2 was filed on behalf of the workman.
LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 2 of 20STATEMENT OF CLAIM
4. Brief facts, as culled out from the statement of claim, are as follows:
Since 2001, the workman was working with the management No.1 at the post of 'Sweeper'. She had been employed through the management No.2. Her last drawn monthly wage was Rs.14,000/- (Rupees Fourteen Thousand only). The management No.1 had entered into a contract with the management No.2 for providing security guard/housekeeping services. The managements did not provide legal facilities available under various labour laws such as appointment letter, salary slip, Identity card, ESIC and PF to the workman. Though the managements were deducting ESI and PF contributions from her salary, she was not provided any regular benefit. When the workman demanded such benefits, the managements, acting under collusion, with the intention of revenge, forcibly got the workman signed on blank papers, vouchers, wage registers etc. and terminated her services on 06.02.2019. The workman lodged a complaint with P.S. Mayapuri, New Delhi on 12.02.2019 regarding forcible taking of her signature by the managements.
On 20.04.2019, the workman filed a complaint before Assistant Labour Commissioner. On 02.07.2019, she sent a joint demand letter/ notice to the managements through speed post demanding reinstatement with payment of earned wages, back wages etc. However, the managements did not reply to the notice.
The workman raised the dispute before Conciliation officer. However, conciliation proceeding could not succeed. Thereafter, the Labour Commissioner referred the dispute to the Court.
LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 3 of 20The workman has claimed that she is completely unemployed since the date of termination of her service.
WRITTEN STATEMENT
5. Both the managements have contested the matter by filing separate written statements.
5.1 The management no.1 has denied employer-employee relationship between the management and the workman. The management no.1 has stated that it had entered into an agreement with the management no.2 i.e. M/s Miraz Detectives and Security Services Pvt. Ltd., an independent contractor, to provide man power services and the management no.2 was employer of the workman. It has further stated that the workman was working under direct control and supervision of the management no.2. However, the management no.1 has admitted that the workman was employed in its establishment through management no.2 as House Keeping Staff.
5.2 The management no.2 has admitted employer-employee relationship. However, it has denied the plea of workman of termination of services. It has alleged misconduct against the workman and has stated that the workman had left the employment of the management on her own and did not report for duties w.e.f. 07.02.2019.
ISSUES
6. Vide order dated 19.09.2022, Ld. Predecessor of this court, framed following issues:
LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 4 of 201. Whether workman has worked continuously for 240 days in a year counting backward from the date of her termination with the management no.2? OPW
2. Whether the service of the workman were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the management on 06.02.2019 when she had demanded regular ESI and PF facilities?
OPW
3. Whether the workman has stolen rice, pulses and other housekeeping materials from management no.1 in the New Era Public School who after being caught on 05.02.2019 had abandoned the service of the management on 07.02.2019? OMM-1&2
4. Relief.
WORKMAN'S EVIDENCE (WE)
7. The workman led evidence in support of her claim.
Sole witness examined on behalf of the workman is workman herself. She stepped in the witness box as WW1 and tendered her affidavit in evidence Ex. WW1/A. She relied upon following documents:
i. Copy of demand notice dated 02.07.2019 Ex. WW1/1, ii. Copy of postal receipts Ex.WW1/2 and Ex.WW1/3, iii. Copy of statement of claim filed before Conciliation officer, Labour office, Karmpura, Delhi, Ex.WW1/4, iv. Copy of ESI card Ex.WW1/5 and v. Copy of complaint dated 12.02.2019 lodged with P.S. Maya Puri Ex.WW1/6 LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 5 of 20 MANAGEMENT'S EVIDENCE (ME)
8. No witness was examined on behalf the management No.1. The management No.1 failed to examine any witness in its favour despite granting several opportunities to do so.
8.1 The management no.2 examined only one witness in its favour.
Sh. Vishal Batra, Director of the management No.2 company i.e. M/s Miraz Detectives and Security Services Pvt. Ltd. stepped in the witness box as MW2 and tendered his affidavit in evidence Ex. MW2/A. He relied upon following documents:
i. Copy of Board resolution dated 01.08.2023 Ex.MW2/1, ii. Copy of letter dated 06.02.2019 Mark-M2X, iii. Copy of confession letter Ex.MW2/3 (already Ex.WW1/X8) and iv. Copy of FIR No.WD-HN-000276 dated 16.02.2019 PS Hari Nagar Ex.MW2/4 FINAL ARGUMENTS
9. I have heard arguments on behalf of both the parties. The parties have reiterated their pleadings.
ISSUE WISE FINDING
10. Employer-employee relationship is admitted by the management No.2. However, management No.1 has denied employer-employee relationship.
It is not in dispute that the managements are industries within the meaning of 'industry' under section 2(j) of the I.D. Act. It is also LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 6 of 20 not in dispute that the dispute is an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the I.D. Act. It is also not in dispute that the workman was in 'continuous service' within the meaning of section 25B of the I.D. Act for the for the purpose of effecting retrenchment under section 25F of the I.D. Act.
In the light of above noted facts, the issues shall be discussed and determined.
11. Issue No.1: Whether workman has worked continuously for 240 days in a year counting backward from the date of her termination with the management no.2? OPW Though it not specifically pleaded by either of the managements that the workman was not in continuous service, yet issue has been framed on this aspect. In view of settlement of issues vide order dated 19.09.2022, finding is returned on this issue.
11.1. The expression 'continuous service' is defined under section 25 B of the I.D. Act. It reads as follows:
25B. Definition of continuous service. --For the purposes of this Chapter, --
(1) a workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman;
(2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or six months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer--
(a) for a period of one year, if the workman, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 7 of 20 reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) two hundred and forty days, in any other case;
(b) for a period of six months, if the workman, during a period of six calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than--
(i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and
(ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case.
Explanation. --For the purposes of clause (2), the number of days on which a workman has actually worked under an employer shall include the days on which--
(i) he has been laid-off under an agreement or as permitted by standing orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (20 of 1946), or under this Act or under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment;
(ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous years;
(iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment; and
(iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so, however, that the total period of such maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks.
11.2. On plain reading of the provisions of section 25 B of the I.D. Act, it is clear that a workman shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer for a period of one year, if he , during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than one hundred and ninety days in the case he LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 8 of 20 was employed below ground in a mine; and in any other case, not less than two hundred and forty days.
11.3. Adverting to facts of the case, the workman has stated that she was working with the managements since year 2001 and her services were terminated on 06.02.2019. On the other hand, the management No.2 has disputed the time of commencement of employment of the workman. In the written statement, in para No.1 of reply on merit, it has stated that the workman had joined its services on 07 July 2008. Further, in para No.9-10 of the reply on merit, it has stated that the workman had left the employment and did not report for duties w.e.f 07.02.2019. For the sake of brevity, relevant portions of the aforesaid paragraphs are reproduced herewith:
"1. .... It is denied that the Claimant was appointed by the Management No.2 at the post of sweeper on 2001 and her last drawn wage was Rs. 14,000/- It is submitted the claimant joined the services of the Answering Management on 07-Jul-2008 as H/K Staff and her last drawn salary was Rs.14,000/-.
xxx xxx xxx "9-10. .... After knowing the intention of the Answering Management, the Claimant left the employment and did not report for her duties w.e.f. 07.02.2019."
11.3.I In para No.7 of the evidence by way of affidavit, MW2 Sh. Vishal Batra has also stated that the workman did not report for duties w.e.f. 07.02.2019.
11.3.II Thus, it is admitted position of the management No.2 that the workman was in its service since 07 July 2008 till 06.02.2019 i.e. a day before 07.02.2019 when the workman allegedly stopped reporting for duties.
LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 9 of 2011.4 From the above discussed facts, it is evident that the workman had worked for more than 240 days during the period of one year commencing from the alleged date of termination and hence she was in 'continuous service' of the management No.2. Accordingly, the issue is decided in favour of the workman and against the management No.2.
12. Determination of issue No.3 has a bearing on the issue No.2. Hence, issue No.3 shall be decided first.
13. Issue No.3: Whether the workman has stolen rice, pulses and other housekeeping materials from management no.1 in the New Era Public School who after being caught on 05.02.2019 had abandoned the service of the management on 07.02.2019? OMM- 1&2 13.1 It is plea of the management No.1 that on 05.02.2019 the workman had stolen rice, pulse and other housekeeping materials from the management No.1 School. She was caught by the security guard deputed at the gate of the school. The management No.2 had registered a FIR against the workman at P.S. Hari Nagar, Delhi.
Similar plea has been taken by the management No.2. The management No.2 has stated that it had received a written complaint against the workman regarding theft. The workman was enquired about the charges. On 06.02.2019, the workman admitted the charges against her and submitted a confession letter in which she unequivocally confessed her guilt. Since the misconduct committed by the workman was serious, the management decided to take LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 10 of 20 appropriate disciplinary action against the workman. After knowing the intention of the management, the workman left the employment and did not report for duties w.e.f. 07.02.2019. Thereafter, the management lodged a FIR No. WD-HN-000276 dated 16.02.2019 with the P.S. Hari Nagar, Delhi, against the workman.
13.2 Ex. WW1X/8, also Ex.M2/3, is alleged confession letter submitted by the workman. The workman has admitted her signature on Ex. WW1X/8 at point-A. 13.3 Though the workman has admitted her signature on Ex. WW1X/8 at point-A, she has not admitted its contents. No suggestion was put to the workman regarding contents of the alleged confession letter Ex. WW1X/8.
13.4 It is worth noting that the workman has alleged that her signatures were obtained by the management No.2 on blank papers, vouchers etc. on 06.02.2019 and she had lodged a complaint in this regard with P.S. Mayapuri, Delhi. Copy of the complaint dated 12.02.2019 is Ex.WW1/6.
13.5 From the testimony of MW2 Sh. Vishal Batra, it is clear that the alleged confession letter Ex. WW1X/8 was not written by the workman. In his cross-examination, MW2 has stated as follows:
"I do not know who had written the confession letter. Whatever the workman said, that was recorded in the confession letter. The confession letter was recorded inside the school premises of the management No.1 in presence of supervisor and other workers."LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 11 of 20
13.6 In the light of aforesaid facts, it can safely be said that the element of voluntariness is missing in the alleged confession letter Ex. WW1X/8 and hence, same cannot be relied upon.
13.7 It is also admitted position of the management No.2 that no disciplinary action was initiated against the workman for her alleged misconduct. In his cross-examination, MW2 has stated as follows:
"The management no.2 had not issued any charge-sheet for disciplinary action against the workman. (Vol. Disciplinary action was not taken by the management no.2 as FIR had been registered against the workman)."
13.8 In absence of any domestic enquiry, the allegation of misconduct remains to be proved.
14. Where an employer claims that the workman himself left his employment voluntarily, the employer must issue a notice to the workmen directing him to resume duties and in absence of such notice, plea of voluntary abandonment of employment cannot be accepted.
In M/s. Premsons Trading (P) Ltd. Versus Shri. Dinesh Chandeshwar Rai C/O. Maharashtra Employees Union Writ Petition No. 4616 of 2019, Hon'ble High court of Bombay has held as under:
"It is well settled law that to prove voluntary abandonment, the employer must issue a notice to the workmen directing him to resume duties and in absence of such notice, voluntary abandonment of employment cannot be accepted"LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 12 of 20
15. Intention of the workman to completely detach from the service is essential for abandonment. There must be total and complete giving up of duties so as to indicate an intention not to resume the same.
15.1. In G. T. Lad & Ors Vs. Chemicals & Fibres of India Ltd. 1979 SCC (1) 590, Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of abandonment. It has been held as follows:
In the Act, we do not find any definition of the expression 'abandonment of service'. In the absence of any clue as to the meaning of the said expression, we have to depend on meaning assigned to it in the dictionary of English language. In the unabridged edition of the Random House Dictionary, the word 'abandon' has been explained as meaning 'to leave completely and finally; for- sake utterly; to relinquish, renounce; to give up all concern in something'. According to the Dictionary of English Law by Earl Jowitt (1959 edition) 'abandonment' means' relinquishment of an interest or claim'. According to Blacks Law Dictionary 'abandonment' when used in relation to an office means 'voluntary relinquishment. It must be total and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment. The failure to perform the duties pertaining to the office must be with actual or imputed intention, on the part of the officer to abandon and relinquish the office. The intention may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the party, and is a question off act. Temporary absence is not ordinarily sufficient to constitute an abandonment of office'.
From the connotations reproduced above it clearly follows that to constitute abandonment, there must be total or complete giving up of duties so as to indicate an intention not to resume the same. In Buckingham Co. v. Venkatiah & Ors. it was observed by this Court that under common law an inference that an employee has abandoned or relinquished service is not easily drawn unless from the length of absence and from other surrounding circumstances an inference to that effect can be legitimately drawn and it can be assumed that the employee intended to abandon service. Abandonment or relinquishment of service is always a question of intention, and normally, such an intention cannot be attributed to an employee without adequate evidence in that behalf. Thus, whether there has been a voluntary abandonment of service or not is a question of fact which has to be determined in the light of the surrounding circumstances of each case.LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 13 of 20
In Vijay S. Sathaye Versus Indian Airlines Ltd. & Ors. SLP(C) Nos. 24220-24221 of 2007, at para no.12, Hon'ble Supreme Court has quoted with approval the observation made in Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. Venkatiah & Anr., AIR 1964 SC 1272 which is as follows:
"Abandonment or relinquishment of service is always a question of intention, and normally, such an intention cannot be attributed to an employee without adequate evidence in that behalf."
In M/s Engineers India Ltd versus Presiding Officer Labour Court W.P.(C) No.17858/2004 (Judgment dated 05.03.2018), Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has noted as follows:
"Intention, or animus, to abandon, is the necessary sine qua non, for any case of "abandonment" to be said to exist. In the absence of intention, there is no abandonment. Any clause contemplating "deemed abandonment", even if it exists, cannot be so interpreted as to deem abandonment to have taken place, even where intention to abandon is not apparent."
16. Adverting to facts of the case, there is nothing on record to suggest that the workman had an intention to abandon the services of the management. It is admitted position of the management No.2 that no notice was issued to the workman calling upon her to resume her work. In cross-examination MW2 as stated as follows:
"When the workman stopped reporting for work, the management no.2 did not issue any notice calling upon her to resume her work"
17. In the light of above discussed facts and enunciation of law, it is held that the managements have failed to prove that the workman had stolen rice, pulses and other housekeeping materials from the management no.1 in the New Era Public School and after being caught on 05.02.2019, she had abandoned the service of the LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 14 of 20 management on 07.02.2019. Accordingly, issue No.3 is decided against the managements.
18. Issue No.2: Whether the services of the workman were illegally and unjustifiably terminated by the management on 06.02.2019 when she had demanded regular ESI and PF facilities? OPW 18.1 The workman has not placed on record any document to indicate that she was under direct employment of the Management No.1. It is admitted position of the workman that she had been employed with the management No.1 through the management No.2 and her salary was paid by the management No.2. She has also admitted that ESIC Card Ex.WW1/5 had been issued by the management No.2.
18.2 During cross-examination of the WW1 i.e. workman, copy of identity card Ex. WW1X/7 was brought in evidence. The workman admitted that that the identity card was issued to her for entry in the premises of the management. The identity card Ex. WW1X/7 is stated to be issued by the management No.2.
18.3 It is specific plea of the management No.1 that the workman was working under direct control and supervision of the management no.2. However, the workman has not categorically denied the plea of the management No.1. In rejoinder to the written statement of management No.1, the workman has made statement of general denial only. Further, the examination in-chief of the workman by way of affidavit Ex-WW1/A, is silent about the plea of the management LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 15 of 20 No.1. The workman has not brought on record any document to controvert the plea of management No.1.
From the materials on record and evidences led by the parties, it is evident that the control and supervision of the workman was in the hands of the management no.2.
18.4 Since the workman was neither appointed by the management No.1 nor was she under the control and supervision of the management No.1, the management No.1, being principal employer, could not have been in a position to terminate her services, leave apart illegal or unjustified termination.
19. Since the plea of abandonment by the management No.2 has collapsed, circumstances surrounding the absence of the workman from duty since 07.02.2019, reinforce the conclusion that the services of the workman were terminated by the management No.2.
20. Termination of service of a workman by the employer is essentially a retrenchment unless it falls under any of the exceptions mentioned in section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act.
20.1 Section 2(oo) of the I.D. Act, reads as follows:
(oo) "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include--
(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 16 of 20 employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or
(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health 20.2 Hon'ble Supreme Court, in K.V. Anil Mithra & Anr. Versus Sree Sankaracharya University of Sanskrit & Anr. Civil Appeal No. 9067 of 2014 (Judgment dated 27.10.2021), has held as follows:
"22. The term 'retrenchment' leaves no manner of doubt that the termination of the workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action are being termed as retrenchment with certain exceptions and it is not dependent upon the nature of employment and the procedure pursuant to which the workman has entered into service...."
20.3 In absence of any plea by the management No.2, it cannot be said that the case of the workman falls under any of the exceptions under section 2(oo). Accordingly, the termination of services of the workman is held a 'retrenchment'.
20.4 Once a workman is in continuous service within the definition of section 25 B of the I.D. Act, he cannot be retrenched by the employer without following the conditions precedent for retrenchment as laid down in section 25F of the I.D. Act. Nature of employment or manner of employment is not material for invoking mandatory compliance of Section 25F of the I.D. Act.
LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 17 of 20In K.V. Anil Mithra (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:
"23. The scheme of the Act 1947 contemplates that the workman employed even as a daily wager or in any capacity, if has worked for more than 240 days in the preceding 12 months from the alleged date of termination and if the employer wants to terminate the services of such a workman, his services could be terminated after due compliance of the twin clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25F of the Act 1947 and to its non-observance held the termination to be void ab initio bad and so far as the consequential effect of non-observance of the provisions of Section 25F of the Act 1947, may lead to grant of relief of reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service in favour of retrenched workman, the same would not mean that the relief would be granted automatically but the workman is entitled for appropriate relief for non-observance of the mandatory requirement of Section 25F of the Act, 1947 in the facts and circumstances of each case.
24. The salient fact which has to be considered is whether the employee who has been retrenched is a workman under Section 2(s) and is employed in an industry defined under Section 2(j) and who has been in continuous service for more than one year can be retrenched provided the employer complies with the twin conditions provided under clauses (a) and (b) of Section 25F of the Act 1947 before the retrenchment is given effect to. The nature of employment and the manner in which the workman has been employed is not significant for consideration while invoking the mandatory compliance of Section 25F of the Act 1947".
20.5 There is nothing on record to show that any notice under Section 25F of the I.D. Act was issued to the workman before termination of her service or pay for the notice period and retrenchment compensation was paid to her before termination of her services.
Since the workman was in continuous service of the management No.2, termination of her services by the management LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 18 of 20 No.2 is held illegal. Accordingly, issue No.2 is decided in favour of the workman and against the Management No.2.
21. Issue No. 4: Relief The workman has stated that she was in the employment of the managements since 2001. On the other hand, the management No.2 has stated that the workman had joined its service on 07 July 2008.
21.1 The workman has not brought on record any documentary proof of her employment since 2001, as claimed by her. At the same time, the management No.2 has also not brought on record any document to prove employment of the workman commencing from 07 July 2008.
21.2 As per ESIC Card Ex.WW1/5, date of birth of the workman is 01 July 1965 and her date of appointment is 01 November 2004. Placing reliance upon ESIC Card Ex.WW1/5, it is held that the workman was in service of the management No.2 since 01 November 2004.
21.3. As per ESIC Card Ex.WW1/5, the workman has already attained the age of superannuation. She is above 60 years of age.
21.4 Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it would not be appropriate to apply ordinary principle of reinstatement with full back wages. In considered view of this court, it would be just and reasonable to award a lumpsum monetary compensation of Rs.
LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 19 of 20300,000/- (Rupees three lacs only) to the workman towards full and final satisfaction of the dispute. Accordingly, compensation of Rs. 300,000/- (Rupees three lacs only) is awarded to the workman. The compensation amount includes the litigation expenditure. The compensation amount shall be paid by the management No.2. i.e. M/s Miraz Detectives and Security Services Pvt. Ltd. The compensation amount shall be paid within four weeks from the date when the award becomes enforceable, failing which the same shall carry an interest @ 8% per annum.
Accordingly, the Issue No.4 is decided.
22. In terms of the issue wise finding, the reference stands answered.
23. Statement of claim stands disposed of. Pending miscellaneous application, if any, stands disposed of.
24. A copy of this Award be sent to the Competent Authority/ Govt. of NCT of Delhi for information and necessary action, if any, as per rules.
Digitally signed Pronounced in open Court today SUJIT by SUJIT SAURABH i.e. 30.03.2026 SAURABH Date: 2026.03.30 17:35:07 +0530 (Sujit Saurabh) Presiding Officer, Labour Court-IX Rouse Avenue Court Complex, Delhi LIR No. 61/20 Devki Vs. M/s New Era Public School & Anr. Page 20 of 20