Gujarat High Court
Malavkumar Arunbhai Patel vs Sardar Patel University And 2 Ors. on 3 November, 2006
Author: Abhilasha Kumari
Bench: Abhilasha Kumari
JUDGMENT Abhilasha Kumari, J.
1. Mr. Baiju S. Joshi, learned Counsel for the petitioner, prays for leave to amend the memorandum of the petition and relief Clauses (A) and (D). Leave as prayed for is granted.
2. By filing the present petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate order or direction to quash and set aside the Notification dated October 4,2000 (Annexure 'E') whereby the petitioner has been permanently debarred from appearing in any subsequent examinations of the Sardar Patel University and from seeking admission into any of the courses to be conducted by the University. The petitioner has further prayed for the issuance of a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction directing the respondents to declare the result of the papers attempted by the petitioner in the Third Year B.Sc. Examination and further, to take appropriate action against respondent No. 3, who was the Observer appointed by the respondent No. 1 during the said examinations.
3. Rule was issued by this Court on November 15,2000 (Coram: R.P. Dholakia, J). Thereafter, this petition has been listed for final hearing before this Court today. I have heard Mr. Baiju S. Joshi for Mr. Shirish Joshi, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Mitul Shelat, learned Counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2. The Board shows that respondent No. 3 is duly represented by counsel but none appears on his behalf. With the consent of parties, the matter is finally heard today.
4. Briefly stated, the facts of the case giving rise to the instant petition, are that the petitioner was, at the relevant point of time, a student of Third Year B.Sc. in the M.P. Patel Science College, which is run by the Charotar Education Society, Anand and which is affiliated to the respondent No. 1 - University. It is averred that he is the General Secretary of the Students' Union for two successive years i.e. 1998-99 and 1999-2000. The petitioner appeared in the Third Year B.Sc. Examination for the academic year 1999-2000, which was held with effect from March 29,2000 to April 4, 2000. The Center for the examination was the M.P. Patel Science College, Anand. The petitioner was allotted seat No. 849 during the said examination. On 3rd April, 2000, the examination for the subject of Chemistry was taking place at the said Examination Center. The timing for the examination was from 3.0 P.M. to 6.0 P.M. The petitioner sat for the said examination on that day. It is stated in the petition that while the petitioner was attempting the examination paper, the respondent No. 3, who was the Observer appointed by the respondent No. 1 University, arrived at Block No. 5 and started disturbing the petitioner, as a result of which the petitioner got nervous and handed over his answer book to the Supervisor and went out of the examination room. This incident took place approximately at 4.0 P.M. on April 3, 2000. Immediately thereafter, the respondent No. 3 took the answer book of the petitioner and kept it in a sealed envelope, which was retained with him until the examination came to an end at 6.00 P.M. When the respondent No. 3 was leaving the Examination Center, eight or ten young persons, who looked like students manhandled him and snatched away the said envelope containing the answer-book of the petitioner from the respondent No. 3. Accordingly, a complaint was made by the respondent No. 3 to the Co-Ordinator of the Examination Center on the same day, i.e. April 3,2000. On the next day i.e. April 4, 2000, the respondent No. 3 submitted his report to the Vice Chancellor. Thereafter, the Registrar of the respondent No. 1 University made a complaint to the D.S.P., Anand on April 4, 2000. On April 6,2000, the F.I.R. regarding the incident was lodged at Anand Town Police Station. A copy of the same is annexed as Annexure 'A' to the petition.
5. The respondent No. 1 constituted an 'Unfair Means Committee' and the petitioner was served with a notice to remain present before the said Committee on June 22,2000 regarding the incident which took place on April 3, 2000. The petitioner submitted his explanation in writing to the Committee and left immediately thereafter. The same is annexed as Annexure 'H' with the reply filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2. Since the petitioner had only submitted his written explanation before the Committee on 22.6.2000 and did not remain present during the proceedings, a decision was taken by the said Committee to afford him another opportunity of hearing. This is clear from the Notification dated July 31,2000 annexed as Annexure 'B' to the petition. Thereafter, vide registered notice dated September 4, 2000 the petitioner was called at 10.0 A.M. on September 11,2000 at the office of the Registrar to present himself before the committee and answer the charge against him. This communication is to be found at Annexure 'C' to the petition. Admittedly, the petitioner did not present himself for personal hearing on September 11,2000. Consequently, the 'Unfair Means Committee' proceeded in the matter. The Minutes of the proceedings which took place on September 11,2000 are recorded on September 30,2000 and appended as Annexure SD' to the petition. A perusal of the document at Annexure 'D' reveals that the 'Unfair Means Committee' was headed by the Vice Chancellor and consisted of six other members. The report of the Observer i.e. respondent No. 3, the explanation offered by the petitioner and the communications exchanged between the respondent No. 1 and the M.P. Patel Science College were considered. The Committee came to the conclusion that the petitioner should be permanently debarred from appearing in any of the examinations conducted in the University and from seeking admission in any of the courses to be conducted by the University and further, the result of the petitioner for the Third Year B.Sc. Examination conducted in March-April, 2000 should be cancelled. The charge against the petitioner was that he was responsible for the manhandling of respondent No. 3 by some eight to ten unknown persons on April 3, 2000, during which the sealed answer-book of the petitioner was snatched away, and for creating an atmosphere of fear on the premises. On the basis of the proceedings as referred to above, the decision of the Unfair Means Committee was approved by the Syndicate of the University in toto, as a result of which the impugned Notification dated October 4,2000 was issued by the Vice Chancellor of the respondent No. 1 University, permanently debarring the petitioner as above.
6. An Affidavit-in-reply has been filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2. In addition to stating the admitted facts regarding the incident which took place on April 3,2000, the respondents have sought to defend the impugned decision of the respondent No. 1 on the ground that the petitioner did not appear before the Committee on September 11,2000, inspite of the opportunity of personal hearing being offered to him and since the decision was taken after considering all the material on record, as well as the statement of the petitioner, the action of the University does not suffer from any illegality or infirmity and, therefore, the same deserves to be upheld.
7. This Court has heard Mr. Baiju S. Joshi for Mr. Shirish Joshi, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Mitul K. Shelat, learned Counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 and has gone through the material on record. It is submitted by Mr. Baiju S. Joshi that although the incident took place on April 3,2000 at 6.0 P.M., the F.I.R. Was registered only on April 6,2000. Admittedly, the respondent No. 3 brought the incident to the notice of the Co-Ordinator, M.P. Patel Science College, Anand on the very same day i.e. April 3,2000 but even if the contents of that communication are perused it is clear that the name of the petitioner nowhere figures in the same. All that has been stated by the respondent No. 3 is that after the Examination was over, approximately eight to ten young persons who looked like students manhandled him and snatched away the answer book of the petitioner from him. This communication is to be found at Annexure 'B' to the reply filed by the respondents No. 1 and 2. Referring to Annexure 'C' to the reply filed by the respondents, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that this document dated April 4,2000 is the complaint made by the respondent No. 3 to the Vice Chancellor of the University. In this document as well, the incident has been narrated in the same fashion by the respondent No. 3 and he has not named the petitioner to be one of the eight to ten persons who appeared to be students and who snatched the answer book of the petitioner from him. Even in the FIR registered on April 6,2000 on the complaint of respondent No. 3, the petitioner has not been named. In fact the culprits are purported to be eight to ten youngsters whose names and where-abouts are unknown. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that had the petitioner been one of the persons who manhandled the respondent No. 3, he would have been named in the first instance and since the persons who were responsible for manhandling the respondent No. 3 have not been named and are unknown, it cannot be assumed that they had been sent by the petitioner or were acting on his behest.
8. The second ground taken by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the incident in question took place immediately after the Examination was over i.e. at 6.0 P.M. On April 3,2000. It is natural that after the conduct of the examination there will be many students who will be leaving the examination Center and, therefore, this incident is likely to have been witnessed by many persons. However, no witness has been examined, to the knowledge of the petitioner and he has not been apprised of any statement of any person, holding him responsible for the incident. The petitioner has not been supplied with any material, which could have formed the basis of the decision taken against him and was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine any person or defend himself. Therefore, although he did not appear before the Committee on September 11,2000, he should have been afforded another opportunity to be heard and apprised of the material used against him, before the impugned decision was taken.
9. The third ground urged by the petitioner is that no documents were supplied to him at any point of time on the basis of which the decision was taken. In fact, the impugned order dated October 4,2000 and the Minutes of the proceedings which took place on September 11,2000 do not disclose the material which incriminated the petitioner, leading to his being permanently debarred. Therefore, the impugned order dated October 4,2000 deserves to be set aside as being violative of the principles of Natural Justice.
10. The fourth ground taken by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the decision to permanently debar the petitioner from the examination conducted by the University or seeking admission to any of the courses conducted by the University is unduly harsh and that he has been condemned unheard. Since the impugned order results in serious civil consequences to the petitioner, a proper opportunity of hearing should have been afforded and the documents, which were incriminating to the petitioner should have been disclosed to him before such a harsh decision was taken.
11. Lastly, it was contended that the Syndicate of the respondent University has no power to appoint any 'Unfair Means Committee' since Ordinance 92 provides for the constitution of certain committees only, namely, (a) Publication Board, (b) Board for Sports and Welfare, (c) Library Committee, (d) Building Committee, (e) Finance and Establishment Committee, (f) College Development Council and(g) Selection Committee for Lectures in the University, P.G. Department. Therefore, since the committee has not been formed in accordance with the Ordinance 92, any proceedings undertaken by it are null and void.
12. Per contra, Mr. Mitul K. Shelat appearing for respondents No. 1 and 2 has vehemently argued that every year the University receives several complaints pertaining to indiscipline and malpractice, taking place during the examinations conducted at the Examination Centers. In order to check these malpractices it was resolved by resolution No. 24 dated May 29,1993 to appoint Full-time Observers at the Examination Centers and accordingly, the respondent No. 3 was appointed as an Observer at the M.P. Patel Science College, Anand where the Examination in which the petitioner appeared was held. It is further contended that after the respondent No. 3 left the Examination Center on the relevant date at 6.0 P.M. and proceeded towards the University, eight to ten students confronted and threatened him, and after physically manhandling him, forcibly snatched away the sealed cover containing the answer book of the petitioner. This incident was reported to the Co-ordinator of M.P. Science College on the very same day and to the Vice Chancellor of the University on the next day. The University lodged a complaint to the D.S.P., Anand as a consequence of which the F.I.R. dated April 6,2000 was registered. Although, it is admitted by the learned Counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 that the petitioner has not been named in any of the complaints made by the respondent No. 3 or in the FIR, it is contended that he alone would have benefitted by the incident and that the persons who snatched the answer book did so at his behest. It is submitted by Mr. Shelat that the petitioner was known to indulge in acts of indiscipline and the University had reason to believe that the answer books of the petitioner were being supplemented by the M.P. Science College authorities after being submitted to the Supervisor. In order to prevent the University authorities from comparing the hand-writing of the petitioner on his previous answer-books with the present answer book, the petitioner had the answer-book snatched forcibly from respondent No. 3.
13. It may be noted that this stand has not been taken by the respondents No. 1 and 2 either in the reply filed on its behalf by Dr. B. Natraj, Registrar of Sardar Patel University on November 24, 2000 or in the communications addressed by the respondent No. 3 to the Co-ordinator dated April 3,2000, to the Vice Chancellor of the University dated April 4,2000 or in the complaint dated April 4,2000 from the Registrar to the D.S.P., Anand. Neither do these allegations form part of the F.I.R. Since this stand has not been taken by the respondents in the afore-mentioned documents or in the affidavit-in-reply, this Court is of the firm opinion that any material which is extraneous to the pleadings and other material on record cannot be taken into consideration at the time of final hearing. This would amount to setting up a new case. Therefore, this Court does not propose to place any reliance on this particular submission made by the learned Counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2.
14. It has further been argued by Mr. Mitul K. Shelat that the Syndicate of the University, is empowered to appoint any committee as it deems fit under the provisions of Section 23(xxxii) of the Sardar Patel University Act, 1955 ("the Act" for short) and in practice the University has been appointing "Unfair Means Committee(s)" to prevent malpractices in the conduct of Examination over a long period of time. Moreover, the appointment of this Committee has not been challenged by the petitioner. Therefore, after having submitted his written explanation to the said Committee he cannot, at this point of time, turn around and say that the appointment of the Committee is contrary to the provisions of the Ordinance. Section 23 of the Act deals with the powers and duties of the Syndicate and Sub-section (xviii) of Section 23 gives the power to supervise and control the admission, conduct and discipline of the students of the University and to supervise and control their residence and to make arrangements for promoting their health and general welfare. Moreover, Sub-section (xxxii) of Section 23 gives the power to delegate any of its powers to the Vice Chancellor, or the Registrar or such other officer of the University for a committee appointed by it as it may deem fit. It is submitted that since there is a provision for delegation of power to the Vice Chancellor for appointment of the committee in the Act itself, the argument of the petitioner that the Committee has been appointed in contravention of the provisions of the Ordinance and Statute should not be accepted. Mr. Mitul K. Shelat has argued that the petitioner was afforded an opportunity of being heard on September 11,2000 but did not choose to be present on that date before the 'Unfair Means Committee'. Therefore, it can not be said that the principles of natural justice have been violated by the respondents No. 1 and 2. Had the petitioner been desirous of obtaining any document or examining any person he should have made such a request which he did not do. The petitioner was given an opportunity to be present on June 22,2000 but instead of participating in the proceedings he only submitted his written explanation in which he has stated that since he is General Secretary of the University he has been falsely implicated by the members of his rival party. Since he did not appear before the Committee the decision to permanently debar him was taken, however, after considering the entire material on record. The report of the Observer, the written explanation of the petitioner as well as the communications between the University and the concerned college were taken into consideration. The principles of natural justice have not been violated by the respondents No. 1 and 2. It has lastly been contended that the Court should be slow to interfere in matters regarding educational and academic institutions since it is imperative to maintain discipline in such institutions and to prevent malpractices from taking place. In this regard reliance has been placed on the following decisions:
(a) Prem Prakash Kaluniya v. Punjab University .
(b) Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi and Ors. .
(c) Controller of Examinations v. G.S. Sunder reported in 1993 Supp (3) SCC 82.
15. In Prem Prakash Kaluniya v. Punjab University (supra), reliance was placed on paragraphs-8, 11, and 12 of the said judgment which are reproduced hereinbelow:
8. As regards the requirement of giving information of the precise charge it had been pointed out by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the Standing Committee had come to the conclusion that the appellant as well as the other candidate Virender Singh had committed mistakes in the answer-books while answering the Question No. 1 (b) and those mistakes were such which could be possibly made only when each had copied from a common source or from each other. It was urged that no such charge was conveyed to the appellant and he was therefore not in a position to adequately explain or meet that charge. The law on this point is well settled that an examinee must be adequately informed of the case he has to meet and given a full opportunity of meeting it. As to what the extent and content of that information should or ought to be would depend on the facts of each case. The examinee can ask for more information or details with regard to the material or evidence which may be sought to be used against him and normally if he makes a request in that behalf, the University authorities, in order to inform him adequately of the case he has to meet, would supply him the necessary particulars or details of the evidence. In the very nature of things no hard and fast rule can be laid down and so long as the Court is satisfied that the opportunity which was afforded to the examinee was adequate and sufficient, it will not interfere with any orders prejudicial to him which may have been made by the University authorities.
...
11. A good deal of emphasis had been laid on the answers which were given by the two candidates and our attention had been invited to the discrepancies between the details of the answers contained in the two answer books. It was further pointed out that the appellant had made rough calculations at the back of the answer book which showed that he had worked out the answer on his own without the aid of any other source which could be regarded as common from which the other candidate was alleged to have copied. These, however, are matters on which the Court cannot entertain a petition under Article 226. It was for the Standing Committee to arrive at its own conclusion on the evidence before it and the same cannot be re-examined except on very limited grounds which have not been established. We are also unable to see how the finding of the Standing Committee could be regarded as vague or as having been based on no evidence.
12. In Board of High School and Intermediate Education U.P. v. Bagleshwar Prasad in which the facts were very similar, it was held that the identity of the wrong answers given by the respondent in that case with that of the other candidate bearing the consecutive Roll Number rendered the charge of the respondent having employed unfair means highly probable and that the findings of the enquiry committee based upon such probabilities and circumstantial evidence could not be said to be based on no evidence as in such matters direct evidence quite often cannot be available. It was further pointed out that in dealing with those cases the problem faced by such institutions should be appreciated by the High Court and so long as the enquiry held was fair and afforded the candidate an opportunity to defend himself, the matter should not be examined with the same strictness as applicable to criminal charges in the ordinary Courts of law. There is hardly any justification for saying in the present case that the finding of the Standing Committee was based on no evidence.
16. The decision of the Supreme Court referred to above was pertaining to copying at the Examination wherein the petitioner was debarred from appearing in the Examination for two years. However, in paragraph 9 of the said judgment it has been noticed by the Supreme Court that the copies of the reports of examiners were supplied to the appellant as also the questions which were put to him in the questionnaire and by the standing committee when he personally appeared before it and he was duly informed of the charge against him. In the instant case there is no charge of copying in the Examination, against the present petitioner. The incident for which he has been permanently debarred took place outside the Examination Center. The facts of the case relied upon, being totally different from the facts of the present case, the ratio of the Supreme Court judgment would not apply to the facts of the present case. There is no dispute with the proposition of law laid down and, the Supreme Court has held that the examinee should be adequately informed of the case he has to meet and given a full opportunity of meeting it, which has not been done by the respondent in the present case.
17. In the case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi and Ors. (supra), reliance has been placed on paragraph 37 thereof, which reads as under:
Strict rules of Evidence Act, and the standard of proof envisaged therein do not apply to departmental proceedings or domestic tribunal. It is open to the authorities to receive and place on record all the necessary, relevant, cogent and acceptable material facts though not proved strictly in conformity with the Evidence Act. The material must be germane and relevant to the facts in issue. In grave cases like forgery, fraud, conspiracy, misappropriation, etc. seldom direct evidence would be available. Only the circumstantial evidence would furnish the proof. Inference from the evidence and circumstances must be carefully distinguished from conjectures or speculation. The mind is prone to take pleasure to adapt circumstances to one another and even in straining them a little to force them to form parts of one connected whole. There must be evidence direct or circumstantial to deduce necessary inferences in proof of the facts in issue. There can be no inferences unless there are objective proved facts, direct or circumstantial from which to infer the other fact which it is sought to establish. The standard of proof is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but the preponderance of probabilities tending to draw an inference that the fact must be more probable. Standard of proof, however, cannot be put in a strait-jacket formula. The probative value could be gauged from facts and circumstances in a given case. The standard of proof is the same both in civil cases and domestic enquiries.
18. In this case it was found that the mark sheet relating to 283 examinees including 53 respondents were tampered with and a detailed inquiry was conducted wherein it was held that the conclusion reached by the Standing Committee that the fabrication was done at the instance of either the examinees or their parents or guardians was amply borne out from the record. What is sought to be urged by the learned Counsel for the respondents No. 1 and 2 is that in proceedings before the 'Unfair Means Committee' in the present case, strict rules of evidence will not apply and the standard of proof is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but the preponderance of probabilities. There can be no dispute regarding this proposition of law. However, in the present case no detailed inquiry has taken place, neither is the any discussion of any evidence or material which was considered by the 'Unfair Means Committee' on the basis of which the decision to permanently debar the petitioner was taken. In fact, there is no material on record to which the standard of preponderance of probabilities can be applied.
19. In the third judgment i.e. Controller of Examinations v. G.S.Sunder (Supra) learned Counsel for the respondent has relied upon paragraphs 10 and 11, which read as under:
In matters of enforcement of discipline Supreme Court must be very slow in interference. After all, the authorities in charge of education whose duty it is to conduct examinations fairly and properly, know best how to deal with situations of this character. One cannot import fine principles of law and weigh the same in golden scales. In the present system of education, the system of examinations is the best suited to assess the progress of the student so long as they are fairly conducted. Interference by court in every case may lead to unhappy results making the system of examination a farce. Unhealthy practices which are like poisonous weeds in the field of education must be rooted out in order that the innocent and the intelligent students are not affected.
It cannot be a sheer coincidence that in all the semesters, namely, Semesters III to VI the first respondent secured good marks and the other student failed. There is nothing unbelievable in the first respondent admitting his mistake and giving a statement to this effect. There is no question of violation of principles of natural justice. The first respondent knew the charges fully and he had admitted his guilt. Therefore, the technicalities of law should not be imported to further the cause of a student who had indulged in malpractice. Even if others are in complicity with the perpetration of fraud, that does not mean the first respondent is absolved of his guilt. When the University wants to take action, certainly the blame cannot be laid at the doors of the University, directing action be taken against its officials.
20. The principles laid down in this decision cannot be disputed. However, if the facts of the present case are seen, it is very clear that the respondent No. 3 in his first report of the incident on April 3,2000 to the Co-ordinator of the M.P. Patel Science College, where the Examination took place, has only stated that eight to ten unknown persons snatched the sealed answer book of the petitioner after manhandling him. In his report to the Vice Chancellor he states the same but does not name the petitioner. The Registrar in his complaint to the D.S.P., Anand also does not name the petitioner to be one of the persons who allegedly manhandled the respondent No. 3. Moreover, in the FIR lodged at the behest of the respondent No. 3, who was the victim of the incident, the petitioner has not been named. The Supreme Court, in the decision relied upon, has nowhere stated that the principles of natural justice are not required to be followed before any detrimental action/decision is taken against a student.
21. This Court has given deep consideration to the arguments advanced by the parties. It is no doubt true that in matters regarding maintenance of discipline in academic institutions the Court should be slow to interfere with the decision of the authorities. However, it is also a settled position of law that before taking any decision, full opportunity of meeting the charges levelled against the delinquent should be afforded to him and he should be supplied with the material which is sought to be used against him which forms the basis of any decision, which could prove to be detrimental to him. A perusal of the Minutes of the proceedings which took place on September 11, 2000 shows that what was considered was the report of the Observer i.e. respondent No. 3, the explanation offered by the petitioner on 22.6.2000 and the communications between the University and the concerned college. It is not disputed that this material was not supplied to the petitioner. Moreover, it is stated in the said Minutes that after a long and detailed discussion the Committee has decided that the petitioner should be permanently debarred from appearing in any of the examinations conducted by the University or taking admission in any of the courses offered by it and that the result of his examination would be cancelled. What was the nature of the discussion which took place and what were the reasons for reaching the said decision has not been disclosed. This aspect assumes relevance in the light of the fact that the petitioner has not been named by the respondent No. 3 in any of the complaints made by him on the basis of which action has been taken against the petitioner.
22. The provisions of Section 23(xxxii) of the Act make it clear that the Syndicate was fully empowered to constitute the 'Unfair Means Committee'. Therefore, the ground taken by the petitioner that the Committee, being contrary to the Ordinance of the University, had no power to inflict the punishment upon the petitioner and that the proceedings should be declared null and void is not correct and is not accepted.
23. Any action taken by an administrative or quasi judicial authority which entails civil consequences should only be taken after complying with the principles of natural justice. Although the principles of natural justice cannot be put into a strait-jacket formula, it cannot be disputed that the doctrine of natural justice exists not only to secure justice but also to prevent the miscarriage of justice. It is true that strict rules of evidence do not apply in proceedings such as those which took place in the case of the petitioner before the 'Unfair Means Committee'. However, even the requirement of preponderance of probabilities has not been adhered to since the impugned Notification dated October 4,2000 as well as the Minutes of the proceedings which led to the passing of the impugned order do not disclose the material which was available with the committee which pointed out the involvement of the petitioner in the incident. In that view of the matter, the impugned order is also not a speaking one and does not disclose the reasons or the grounds on which the decision to permanently debar the petitioner has been taken.
24. In A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India the aim and relevance of the principles of natural justice have been clearly enunciated by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in para 20 thereof, which reads as under:
20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. In other words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules, namely (1) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (Nemo debet esse judex propria causa), and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (Audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned was required by the law under which it functioned to act judicially there was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice. The validity of that limitation is not questioned. If the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why those rules should be made inapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it is not easy to draw the line that demarcates administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries which were considered administrative at one time are now being considered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have more far reaching effect than a decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court in Suresh Koshy George v. University of Kerala Civil Appeal No. 990 of 1968, D/- 15-7-1968 : the rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. What particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to a great extent on the facts and circumstances of that case, the frame-work of the law under which the enquiry is held and the constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is made before a court that some principle of natural justice had been contravened the court has to decide whether the observance of that rule was necessary for a just decision on the facts of that case.
25. Further in Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Girja Shankar Pant reported in (2001)1 SCC 182, the Supreme Court has held as under in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the reported judgment:
Since the decision of this Court in Kraipak's case (A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India) one golden rule that stands firmly established is that the doctrine of natural justice is not only to secure justice but to prevent miscarriage of justice. What, however, does this doctrine exactly mean? Lord Reid about four decades ago in Ridge v. Baldwin very succinctly described it as not being capable of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances - who then is a reasonable man - the man on the clapham omnibus? In India, however, a reasonable man cannot but be a common man similarly placed. The effort of Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin in not attributing a definite meaning to the doctrine but attributing it to be representing a fair procedure still holds good even in the millennium year. As a matter of fact this Court in the case of Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India upon reliance on the attributes of the doctrine as above stated as below (SCC p.387,para 8)
8. The second question, however, as to what are the principles of natural justice that should regulate an administrative act or order is a much more difficult one to answer. We do not think it either feasible or even desirable to lay down any fixed or rigorous yard-stick in this manner. The concept of natural justice cannot be put into a strait-jacket. It is futile, therefore, to look for definitions or standards of natural justice from various decisions and then try to apply them to the facts of any given case. The only essential point that has to be kept in mind in all cases is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case and that the administrative authority concerned should act fairly, impartially and reasonably. Where administrative officers are concerned, the duty is not so much to act judicially as to act fairly. See, for instance, the observations of Lord Parker in H. K. (an infant), In re. It only means that such measure of natural justice should be applied as was described by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin case as 'insusceptible of exact definition but what a reasonable man would regard as a fair procedure in particular circumstances'. However, even the application of the concept of fair-play requires real flexibility. Everything will depend on the actual facts and circumstances of a case. As Tucker, L.J observed in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk:
The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the enquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is being dealt with and so forth.
2. While it is true that over the years there has been a steady refinement as regards this particular doctrine, but no attempt has been made and if we may say so, cannot be made to define the doctrine in a specific manner or method. Strait-jacket formula cannot be made applicable but compliance with the doctrine is solely dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The totality of the situation ought to be taken note of and if on examination of such totality, it comes to light that the executive action suffers from the vice of non-compliance with the doctrine, the law courts in that event ought to set right the wrong inflicted upon the person concerned and to do so would be a plain exercise of judicial power. As a matter of fact the doctrine is now termed as a synonym of fairness in the concept of justice and stands as the most-accepted methodology of a governmental action.
26. It is now an accepted proposition of law that any statutory body which is entrusted by statute with discretion, must act fairly. It does not matter whether its functions are described as judicial or quasi-judicial on the one hand, or as administrative on the other. Even an administrative order, which involves civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. Although the expression 'civil consequences' has not been defined anywhere, the observation made in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner is relevant in this context and reads as below:
What is civil consequence, let us ask ourselves, by passing verbal booby-traps? 'Civil consequences' undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties material deprivation and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence
27. The permanent debarring of the petitioner from appearing in any examinations conducted by the University and from seeking admission in any of the courses to be conducted by the University, no doubt entails serious civil consequences. In these circumstances, the rule of Audi Alteram Partem should have been followed by the respondents. The principle that no man should be condemned unheard and both sides must be heard in order to ensure fairness on the part of the deciding authority or body before passing any order is well known. A person against whom any action is sought to be taken which entails civil consequences must have knowledge about the allegations/charges/materials against him on the basis of which such a decision is sought to be taken.
28. The Committee such as the 'Unfair Means Committee' constituted by the respondent No. 1 can be said to be acting quasi-judicially, although the Statute may not provide, in so many words, that the authority passing the order is required to act judicially. The very nature of rights affected are such that the authority passing the order is, in fact, required to act judicially and in accordance with the rules of natural justice. Fairness in action is a fundamental ingredient of the principles of natural justice wherein justice should not only be done but should also manifestly be seen to be done, in order to ensure that the authority arrives at a just decision which affects the rights of a person.
29. The impugned order and the Minutes of the proceedings which took place on September 11,2000 do not disclose the material on the basis of which a conclusion has been arrived at that it was the petitioner who was responsible for the said incident nor the reasons for taking the said decision. If there is some material on record pointing to the involvement of the petitioner, then he should have been given an effective opportunity to be heard and render his explanation regarding the same. The fact that he did not appear when he was called upon to do so does not absolve the respondent No. 1 of the obligation of giving a fair and effective hearing which is not a mere paper formality.
30. In view of the above principles of law, as discussed hereinabove, and in the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated October 4,2000 passed by the respondent No. 1 deserves to be set aside as being violative of the principles of natural justice.
31. Accordingly the order/notification dated October 4,2000 passed by the Vice Chancellor of the respondent No. 1 is set aside. However, liberty is reserved to the respondents No. 1 and 2 to take fresh action, if so inclined, and pass an order in accordance with the principles of natural justice after giving the petitioner an effective hearing and opportunity to represent his case and meet the charges against him. In that event, the respondents will communicate in writing to the petitioner, a mutually suitable date on which he is to appear before any Committee that may be constituted for the purpose. The entire exercise will be completed within a period of three months from the date of the receipt of a copy of this judgment. The petitioner is directed to co-operate with the respondents during the said proceedings.
32. The writ petition is partly allowed to the extent indicated hereinabove. Rule is made absolute to the above extent. There shall be no orders as to costs.