Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
The Commissioner Of Police And Anr. vs Rachakonda Ranga Subbaiah on 11 September, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2002(6)ALD2, 2002(6)ALT66
Author: B. Sudershan Reddy
Bench: B. Sudershan Reddy
JUDGMENT B. Sudershan Reddy, J.
1. This writ petition is filed questioning the order passed by the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal dated 14-12-2001 made in O.A.No.6799 of 2000 where under the Tribunal set aside the departmental proceedings initiated against the respondent herein.
2. The respondent herein filed the said Original Application before the Tribunal challenging the departmental enquiry initiated against him in pursuance of the Charge Memo No.L&O/B4/1067/98, dated 30-6-1998.
3. The case of the respondent-applicant is that the criminal cases registered against him were ended in clean acquittal and as such the departmental enquiry sought to be conducted against him on the same set of facts is not sustainable in law. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-applicant relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in M.Paul Anthony V. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd.,1 and also the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in A.P.S.R.T.C. and others V. T.Venkatapathi2.
4. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the criminal cases, which were registered against the respondent-applicant alone are mentioned as basis for the charge framed against him in the Memorandum of Charges. The Tribunal held that since the respondent-applicant was held not guilty for the commission of any of such offences and he was acquitted in all the criminal cases there is no other material against the respondent-applicant in order to enable the disciplinary authority to proceed with the enquiry against him and accordingly quashed the very disciplinary proceedings.
5. The Commissioner of Police, aggrieved by the said order, filed the present Writ Petition invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is contended that the order passed by the Tribunal is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record. The Tribunal committed a serious error in quashing the very disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondent-applicant. It is submitted that mere acquittal of the respondent-applicant in criminal cases registered against him cannot be the basis for quashing the very proceedings.
6. Before adverting to the question as to whether the Tribunal had committed any error in quashing the disciplinary proceedings, it may be necessary to notice the relevant facts leading to filing of this writ petition:
The respondent-applicant is a Police Constable working in Musheerabad Police Station. He is alleged to have been caught red handed by the passengers at Jubilee Bus Station, Secunderabad while he was committing theft of a suitcase, which was kept on the platform. He was arrested on 2-5-1998 and a case in Crime No.67/98 under Sections 379 and 511 of the Indian Penal Code has been registered at Marredpally Police Station and he was sent to judicial custody on 8-5-1998. It is alleged that during the course of the investigation, the respondent-applicant confessed of his committing crimes of theft of lifting 15 suitcases separately from R.T.C. buses at Imlibun Bus Station and Jubilee Bus Station. It is the case of the petitioners that the gold ornaments weighing about 22 tolas and 94 sarees etc., all worth about Rs.2.00 lakhs were recovered.
7. During the further investigation, the respondent-applicant is alleged to have confessed of his involvement in the following criminal cases:
1. Cr.No.123/97 under Sec.379 IPC of Marredpally P.S.
2. Cr.No.20/98 under Sec.379 IPC of Afzalgunj P.S.
3. Cr.No.226/97 under Sec.379 IPC of Afzalgunj P.S.
4. Cr.No.256/97 under Sec.379 IPC of Afzalgunj P.S. The respondent-applicant was placed under suspension vide the proceedings dated 18-5-1998. He was also served with a Charge Memo dated 30-6-1998 and statement of imputation was issued accordingly. The respondent-applicant submitted his written statement of defence dated 8-9-1998 denying the allegations levelled in the article of charge and requested to keep the departmental proceedings in abeyance. The Commissioner by the proceedings dated 14-10-1998 appointed the Inspector of Police, Mirchowk Police Station as the Enquiring Authority.
8. The respondent-applicant filed O.A.No.6879 of 1998 before the Tribunal challenging the enquiry initiated against him and the Tribunal passed an interim order directing the petitioners herein not to proceed with the oral enquiry till the disposal of criminal case in Crime No.67/98, under Sections 379 and 511 I.P.C. of Marredpally Police Station. The fact remains that the X Metropolitan Magistrate, Secunderabad has disposed of the said criminal case in Crime No.67/98 including two other criminal cases in Crime Nos.123/97 and 75/98 registered against the respondent-applicant under Section 379 of the Indian Penal Code at Marredpally Police Station, by his Judgment dated 21-9-1999 acquitting the respondent-applicant of the charge framed against him. Likewise, the criminal cases in Crime Nos.20/98, 256/97 and 226/97 registered against the respondent-applicant at Afzalgunj Police Station were also disposed of by the learned IV Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad acquitting him of the charges.
9. Thereafter, the Commissioner of Police revoked the order of suspension by the proceedings dated 8-6-2000. However, the Enquiry Officer was directed to proceed with the enquiry.
10. The respondent-applicant thereafter filed the present O.A.No.6799 of 2000 before the Tribunal questioning the proceedings dated 14-10-1998 where under the Enquiry Officer was appointed to make an enquiry into the charges already framed against him. The Tribunal intervened in the matter and accordingly set aside the disciplinary enquiry initiated against the respondent-applicant.
11. Before adverting to the question as to whether the Tribunal had committed any error, it may be necessary to notice the charge framed against the respondent-applicant, which is to the following effect:
ARTICLE PC 4428 R.Ranga Subbaiah while working at Musheerabad P.S. has exhibited gross misconduct/reprehensible conduct/irresponsible behaviour, by involving himself in a criminal case No.67/98 under Sections 379, 511 IPC of Marredpally P.S. On 2-5-1998 at 8-30 A.M., he was caught red handed by the passenger at Jubilee Bus Station while he was committing theft of Suitcase which was kept on the platform.
Sri R.Ranga Subbaiah, PC-4428 by his above acts exhibited lack of integrity and conduct, unbecoming of Government Servant thereby violating Rule 3 of APCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
12. It is evident from a bare reading of the Charge that the respondent-applicant is charged with the act of exhibiting lack of integrity and conduct, unbecoming of a Government Servant and thereby violating Rule 3 of A.P.C.S. (Conduct) Rules, 1964. The disciplinary action is not initiated against the respondent-applicant only on the ground that he is involved in a criminal case. His involvement in the criminal case is made a statement of fact and basis for levelling a charge against the respondent-applicant of his exhibiting lack of integrity and conduct, unbecoming of a Government Servant.
The question that falls for consideration in the instant writ petition is not res integra, but squarely covered by the judgments rendered by the Apex Court and as well as this Court.
A Division Bench of this court in V.Srinivas V. Superintendent of Police, Medak District3 after referring to the judgment of the Apex Court in M.Paul Anthony (1 supra) held that "in a case where the criminal trial ends in acquittal in favour of the delinquent employee, there does not exist any embargo on the part of the disciplinary authority in initiating disciplinary proceedings on the self same charges. As noticed herein before, in PAUL ANTHONY's case (1 supra), the Supreme Court itself has categorically held that it is possible that a person can be found guilty of commission of misconduct despite his acquittal in the criminal trial."
13. We have also taken similar view in W.P.No.13814 of 2002, dated 20-8-2002. This Court relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Rajastan V. B.K. Meena4 wherein it was held as follows:
"There is no legal bar for both proceedings disciplinary and criminal to go on simultaneously, however, in certain situations, it may not be 'desirable', 'advisable' or 'appropriate' to, proceed with the disciplinary enquiry when a criminal case is pending on identical charges.The staying of disciplinary proceedings is a matter to be determined having regard to the facts and circumstances of a given case and no hard and fast rules can be enunciated in that behalf.The only valid ground for staying the disciplinary proceedings is "that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced." This may be done in cases of grave nature involving questions of fact and law. It means that not only the charges must be grave but that the case must involve complicated questions of law and fact. More over 'advisability', 'desirability' or 'propriety', as the case may be, has to be determined in each case taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case."
14. The Supreme Court further held:
"The approach and the objective in the criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings is altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings, the question is whether the respondent is guilty of such conduct as would merit his removal from service or a lesser punishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminal proceedings, the question is whether the offences registered against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act (and the Indian Penal Code, if any) are established and, if established, what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial in both the cases are entirely distinct and different. Staying of disciplinary proceedings pending criminal proceedings, should not be a matter of course but a considered decision. Even if stayed at one stage, the decision may require reconsideration if the criminal case gets unduly delayed."
15. The Supreme Court as early as in 1981 itself in Corporation of Nagpur City, Civil Lines V. Ramchandra5 held:
"Normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges it would not be expedient to continue a departmental inquiry on the very same charges or grounds or evidence, but the fact remains, however, that merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental inquiry is not taken away nor is its direction in any way fettered."
16. The learned counsel for the respondent-applicant, Sri A.Hanumantha Reddy, however, would place reliance upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in T.Venkatapathi (2 supra). The said decision, in our considered opinion, has no application whatsoever to the facts on hand for the simple reason that the charge framed as against the delinquent officer in the said case was only for his involvement in a criminal case resulting in instituting of a criminal case against the delinquent.There was no other charge against the delinquent therein. No charge of misconduct under the APCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 was framed against the delinquent therein. But in the instant case, the charge framed against the respondent-applicant in the departmental proceedings is not of his involvement in the criminal case. There is a distinct allegation of his committing theft of a suitcase and thereby mis-conducting himself. The charge against the respondent-applicant is that he has conducted himself in an unbecoming manner of a public servant.
17. The learned Counsel also would place reliance upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in S.K. Ramju V. Regional Manager, APSRTC6. This case is again similar to that of T.Venkatapathi (2 supra) wherein the disciplinary authority did not charge the delinquent with the commission of any misconduct. The charge against the delinquent therein was on account of alleged act of rashness and negligence of driving of the vehicle as a result whereof a valuable life of a cyclist was lost and resulted in causing damage to the reputation of the Corporation. Since the charge of rash and negligence driving of the vehicle itself was held not proved in the criminal Court, the Court came to the conclusion that the causing damage to the reputation of the Corporation as such does not arise. The said Judgment does not lay down any principle contrary to what has been laid down by the same Division Bench in V.Srinivas (3 supra). The judgment turns upon its own facts.
18. It needs no reiteration in our hands that an employer can proceed against its employee and initiate departmental enquiry as well as criminal prosecution on the same set of facts. There is no bar in law to initiate both the proceedings simultaneously. It is well settled that acquittal in a criminal case by the competent Court of criminal jurisdiction does not confer any automatic right upon the delinquent employee for his reinstatement into the service, even if the prosecution and the departmental enquiry is based on same set of facts.The distinction between the criminal proceeding and the departmental proceeding is clear. The nature of proof required in a criminal case for establishing the charges and the departmental proceedings for proving the misconduct is not one and the same. It cannot be said that the charges in a criminal case and departmental proceedings would be the same, merely because the same set of facts are involved.The question that may arise for consideration in a criminal case is as to whether the charged person is guilty of offence punishable under Indian Penal Code or any penal statutes for the time being in force, whereas in a departmental enquiry what is required to establish is as to whether the employee is guilty of misconduct.The misconduct is invariably defined by the rules or regulations, as the case may be, by which an employee's conduct is regulated. Such misconduct is entirely different from that of an offence under Indian Penal Code or any penal statutes, as the case may be. On the same set of facts, the disciplinary authority and the criminal Court can come to different conclusions with regard to the allegations made against the delinquent. The conclusions so reached operate in different fields. The consequences that flow from such conclusions are also different.
19. In this view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the Tribunal committed an error in setting aside the disciplinary proceedings initiated against the respondent-applicant and the order passed by it suffers from incurable legal infirmities and the same is accordingly set aside.
20. It shall be open to the petitioners to proceed with the further enquiry as against the respondent-applicant pursuant to the Memorandum of Charge already framed against him. The enquiry shall be held in accordance with law uninfluenced by the observations, if any, made in this order. The enquiry shall be completed as expeditiously as possible.
21. The writ petition is accordingly allowed. No order as to costs.