Delhi District Court
Kunwar Pal vs Delhi Development Authority And Others on 25 April, 2026
IN THE COURT OF GAURAV: DISTRICT JUDGE-01
SHAHDARA DISTRICT, KARKARDOOMA COURTS: DELHI
DLSH010016412023
MCA DJ/22/2023
In the matter of: -
Sh. Kunwar Pal
S/o Sh. Chet Ram
R/o. Jhugee No. 24
Opposite Deepak Memorial Hospital,
Near Karkardooma Village
Delhi-ll0092. ....Appellant
Versus
1. Delhi Development Authority
Through its Director/Chairman,
Vikas Sadan, I.N.A.,
New Delhi
2. Slum and JJ Department.
(DUSsIB)
Through Its Chairman
A-4, Vikas Kutir,
I.P. Estate, ITO
New Delhi-110002.
3. Govt of NCT of Delhi
Digitally
signed by
GAURAV
GAURAV Date:
MCA DJ No. 22/2023
2026.04.25
17:02:09
+0530
Kunwar Pal Vs. DDA & Ors Page No. 1 of 17
Through its Chief Secretary
Delhi Secretariat
IP Estate, ITO, New Delhi-110002. ....Respondents
25.04.2026
ORDER
1. Vide this order, I shall dispose of the present miscellaneous civil appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred as CPC), which has been filed by the appellant/plaintiff against the impugned order dated 17.12.2022, passed by the Ld. Trial Court whereby the application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 CPC has been dismissed. During the pendency of the present appeal, separate application under Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as "LA") seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal has also been filed.
2. To avoid confusion and for the ease of reference and clarity in the order, the appellant and respondents herein, shall be referred to by their original nomenclature in the suit as "plaintiff", "defendant no. 1", "defendant no. 2" and "defendant no. 3" respectively, throughout the present order.
BRIEF MATRIX OF THE SUIT
3. The case of the plaintiff is that he is the owner and occupant of one of the jhuggis situated behind Deepak Memorial Hospital in Karkardooma Digitally signed by GAURAV GAURAV Date:
2026.04.25 17:02:14 MCA DJ No. 22/2023 +0530 Kunwar Pal Vs. DDA & Ors Page No. 2 of 17 village, Delhi, and has been residing therein along with his family members for a considerable length of time.
4. It is the further case of the plaintiff that the said jhuggi forms part of a larger cluster comprising more than sixty dwellings, all of which have been in existence for over two decades, thereby evidencing a settled habitation rather than a transient encroachment. In order to substantiate his claim of continuous residence and possession, the plaintiff has relied upon various official documents issued in his favour as well as his family members, including Birth Certificate, his Election Identity Card, Ration Card, Pan-Card, Bank Passbook, Driving Licence and Aadhaar Card.
5. According to plaintiff, these documents are demonstrative of his long-standing occupation of the premises and establish his entitlement to protection under the statutory and policy framework governing slum dwellers in the National Capital Territory of Delhi.
6. The grievance of the plaintiff is that officials of defendant no. 1 i.e. Delhi Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as "DDA") have on several occasions visited the site and threatened him and his family members with forcible dispossession. Such threats are unlawful and contrary to the policy of the Government of NCT of Delhi, which according to him, recognizes the rights of long-term jhuggi dwellers and does not treat them as mere encroachers upon public land.
7. It is the further case of the plaintiff that his possession is safeguarded under the provisions of the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board Digitally signed by GAURAV GAURAV Date:
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Kunwar Pal Vs. DDA & Ors Page No. 3 of 17 +0530
(DUSIB) Amendment Act, 2015. The said enactment, read conjointly with the Master Plan for Delhi, 2021, provides protection to slum dwellers against arbitrary eviction and mandates the provision of alternative accommodation prior to any displacement.
8. It is the further case of the plaintiff that these instruments confer upon him a legal right not to be evicted without due process and without the assurance of rehabilitation. On the strength of the aforesaid statutory provisions and policy guidelines, the plaintiff has claimed that defendant no. 2 i.e. the Slum and JJ Department of the Government of Delhi (hereinafter referred to as "DUSIB"), be directed to prepare a list of eligible persons and to allot alternative land to those found entitled. Pending such determination, the plaintiff has prayed for an order of interim injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing his and his family members from the suit premises during the pendency of the suit.
DEFENCE OF DEFENDANT NO. 1/DDA
9. In the written statement filed on behalf of DDA, it is asserted that the plaintiff has not approached this Court with clean hands and has suppressed material facts. The plaintiff has no documentary proof in support of his alleged ownership of the suit property and is attempting to unlawfully grab land belonging to the DDA.
10. It is further asserted that the land in question is owned by the DDA and that possession thereof was duly taken by the Authority on 03.12.1968.
Digitally signed by GAURAV GAURAV Date:
2026.04.25 MCA DJ No. 22/2023 17:02:25 +0530 Kunwar Pal Vs. DDA & Ors Page No. 4 of 17 The plaintiff has not sought any relief of declaration with respect to ownership or title, and therefore, the present suit is not maintainable in law.
11. The defendant has categorically denied the plaintiff's claim of lawful possession and has described him as a trespasser who is not entitled to any discretionary relief from the Court. In support of this contention, the defendant no.1 has pointed out that the electricity connection at the suit premises shows the date of energisation as 2013, which is inconsistent with the plaintiff's assertion of possession prior to the year 2005.
12. It is further asserted that mere possession of documents such as a bank account, voter identity card, or any other personal identification records does not confer ownership rights over immovable property. Such documents only establish the identity of a person and cannot be relied upon to claim title or lawful possession of land belonging to the DDA.
13. It is further asserted that the suit property was encroached upon by labourers of one Jai Bhagwan, who sought to take advantage of a status quo order passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in W.P.(C) No. 10067/2015 titled Jai Bhagwan vs. Union of India. The said writ petition, however, has since been dismissed, and therefore, no protection or benefit can be claimed by the plaintiff under the garb of the said proceedings.
DEFENCE OF DEFENDANT NO. 2/DUSIB
14. In the written statement filed on behalf of DUSIB, it is asserted that it is the nodal agency entrusted with the responsibility of relocation and Digitally signed by GAURAV GAURAV Date:
2026.04.25 MCA DJ No. 22/2023 17:02:30 +0530 Kunwar Pal Vs. DDA & Ors Page No. 5 of 17 rehabilitation of jhuggi jhopri situated on lands belonging to the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD), the Government of NCT of Delhi, and its various Departments and Agencies.
15. It is further asserted that the jhuggi cluster referred to in the present suit, does not find mention in the list of 675 identified bastis, nor in the additional 82 bastis subsequently recognized, under the Delhi Slum and Jhuggi Jhopri Rehabilitation and Relocation Policy, 2015.
16. After hearing both the parties, the application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 CPC was dismissed by the Ld. Trial Court, vide impugned order dated 17.12.2022.
17. The plaintiff being aggrieved by the said impugned order dated 17.12.2022 passed by Ld. Trial Court, preferred the present appeal mainly on the grounds that:
1. Because the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that the cluster where the appellant resides is covered under Section 2(g) of the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board Act, 2010, and respondent no. 2 has filed relevant documents confirming its existence as per the 2015 policy dated 15.01.2020.
2. Because the Ld. Trial Court ignored the site inspection report dated 27.01.2020 by Ms. K. Gupta, which recorded about 60-70 jhuggies at the site, identified DDA as the land-owning agency, and noted valid occupancy proofs such as OPD cards (2002), bank passbooks (2006), ration cards, Aadhaar, and voter IDs issued prior to 2015, though the camp was not listed in the official DUSIB cluster list.
3. Because the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider that respondent no.2's own visit confirmed compliance with the 2015 policy and that the Digitally signed by GAURAV GAURAV Date:
2026.04.25 17:02:35 MCA DJ No. 22/2023 +0530 Kunwar Pal Vs. DDA & Ors Page No. 6 of 17 sociological department of DUSIB found the residents were not encroachers.
4. Because the Ld. Trial Court overlooked that the DUSIB official's report supports the appellant's cluster as a notified area, and denial by respondent no.2 amounts to evasion of duty. Possession is prima facie in favour of the appellant, supported by the Delhi High Court judgment in Manoj Kumar & Ors. vs. DUSIB & Ors.
5. Because the Ld. Trial Court failed to require respondent no.2 to file the compliance survey report along with affidavit, which remains absent.
6. Because the Ld. Trial Court ignored the binding precedent of Sudama Singh vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, affirmed by the Supreme Court, which supports the appellant's case.
7. Because the Ld. Trial Court failed to appreciate that Ajay Makan vs. Union of India (para 112.11) reiterated the principle from Sudama Singh that jhuggi dwellers must not be treated as second-class citizens.
8. Because the Ld. Trial Court wrongly applied Manoj Kumar & Ors.
judgment, where the 2015 policy criteria were not met. In contrast, the appellant's cluster fulfils the policy, with about 70 households existing prior to 01.01.2006.
9. Because the Ld. Trial Court wrongly equated the appellant's case with Dinesh Singh & Ors. vs. DDA and Kasturba Nagar Residents Welfare Association vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, which are distinguishable.
10. Because the Ld. Trial Court failed to consider the Government of NCT Delhi's order dated 16.02.2015, which directed that no demolitions of jhuggies or residential houses be carried out without prior approval of the Urban Development Minister.
11. Because the Ld. Trial Court ignored respondent no.2's own admission under Part A Clause 2(v) of the 2015 Policy, which prohibits demolition of eligible jhuggi bastis except under limited circumstances: (i) court Digitally signed by GAURAV GAURAV Date:
2026.04.25 17:02:40 MCA DJ No. 22/2023 +0530 Kunwar Pal Vs. DDA & Ors Page No. 7 of 17 orders, (ii) encroachment on public ways or safety zones, or (iii) urgent public projects under the Special Provisions Act, 2011.
18. Notice of this appeal was sent to defendants and trial court record was also requisitioned for adjudicating the present appeal.
19. Defendant no. 1 and defendant no. 2 have duly appeared through counsel and filed written submission/reply to the appeal, denying all the assertions made therein and have prayed for dismissal of the same.
20. Having heard the rival contentions of Ld. Counsels for the parties and meticulously perused the impugned order, trial court record, and the documents placed before this Court, as well as the relevant provisions of law.
21. Before proceedings further, firstly, this court has to decide as to whether the application under Section 5 of LA, seeking condonation of delay in filing appeal is deserves to be allowed or not.
22. The Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff contended that the delay of around 56 days in filing the appeal is not intentional or deliberate, but has occurred due to unforeseen and unavoidable circumstances. He further contended that the he was preoccupied with personal difficulties, including the demise of his grandmother in the February-2023, and due to which he had to travel to his native place to perform last rites and "tehravi" of his grandmother, resulting in an initial delay of about 40 days. He further contended that upon his return to Delhi, he had to observe a mandatory 10-day quarantine Digitally signed by GAURAV GAURAV Date:
2026.04.25 17:02:45 MCA DJ No. 22/2023 +0530 Kunwar Pal Vs. DDA & Ors Page No. 8 of 17 as per then-prevailing COVID-19 protocols. He further contended that further delay occurred as the appellant, being a poor litigant, had to arrange funds for filing the appeal and obtaining certified copies of the impugned order. He further contended that the delay is procedural and inadvertent and ought not to be construed as negligence or lack of diligence. At the end, it is prayed that the aforesaid applications may kindly be pleased to allow and condone the delay.
23. In support of his contentions, he has also relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107, wherein the Apex Court emphasized that courts should adopt a liberal and justice-oriented approach in considering applications for condonation of delay, so that the substantial justice is not sacrificed at the altar of technicalities.
24. Per Contra, Ld. Counsels for the defendants vehemently opposed the present application, and contended that the reasons mentioned in the condonation of delay's application are vague, unsubstantiated, and lack documentary support. They further contended that the appellant has failed to establish a cogent and legally sustainable "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay. They further contended that the law of limitation is founded upon public policy and the party must approach the court with due diligence and bona fides. At the end, it is prayed that the aforesaid application may kindly be pleased to dismiss with heavy cost.
Digitally signed by GAURAV GAURAV Date:
2026.04.25 17:02:52 MCA DJ No. 22/2023 +0530 Kunwar Pal Vs. DDA & Ors Page No. 9 of 17
25. Before proceedings further, it is a settled principle of law that "procedure is the handmaid of justice, not its mistress" and that the procedural laws are meant to facilitate and not to obstruct the cause of justice. Likewise, substantive rights should not be defeated on technical grounds. The object of the rules of procedure is to secure the ends of justice and not to thwart them. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred.
26. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 empowers the court to admit an appeal after the prescribed period if the appellant satisfies the court that he had "sufficient cause" for not preferring the appeal within time. The test of "sufficient cause" is not rigidly defined and must be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case.
27. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression 'sufficient cause' should be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that a litigant does not stand to benefit by filing an appeal belatedly, and that refusing to condone delay may result in miscarriage of justice.
Digitally signed by GAURAV GAURAV Date:
2026.04.25 17:02:58 MCA DJ No. 22/2023 +0530 Kunwar Pal Vs. DDA & Ors Page No. 10 of 17
28. Now, reverting back to the case in hand, the explanation furnished by the Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff for the delay attributes it to a combination of personal and practical circumstances, which, though not supported by any documentary evidence, cannot be outrightly disbelieved on the face of the record.
29. The contention of the defendants that the appellant failed to support his plea with documentary evidence, such as a death certificate, COVID protocol advisory, or proof of financial condition, is noted. However, the absence of supporting documents is not per se conclusive against the plaintiff where the facts pleaded are otherwise plausible, natural, and not inherently improbable. It is recognized that events like bereavement, travel to native place for last rites, and financial constraints are not unusual in common human experience and do not always leave behind formal documentation. In such circumstances, mechanical insistence on documentary proof would elevate form over substance, and unjustly penalize a party seeking adjudication on merits. The overall explanation appears bona fide and deserving of acceptance, especially when no serious prejudice is shown to have been caused to the respondents due to the delay.
30. It is matter of record that the appeal was eventually filed on 22.03.2023, and while there is a delay of around three months. Taken together, and assessed in light of judicial standards for determining "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the explanation provided although not elaborate or supported by documentary proof, does Digitally signed by GAURAV GAURAV Date:
2026.04.25 17:03:04 MCA DJ No. 22/2023 +0530 Kunwar Pal Vs. DDA & Ors Page No. 11 of 17 not appear to be tainted by mala fide intent or deliberate negligence. No doubt, such omissions would weaken the claim of "sufficient cause". However, Courts are expected to consider the totality of circumstances and apply judicial discretion pragmatically. In the absence of supporting documents, while reflecting a slightly lack of diligence, does not render the explanation implausible per se.
31. Therefore, this Court finds that the delay was procedural and unintentional, and refusal to condone such delay would defeat the interest of justice, especially when no substantial prejudice has been caused to the defendants. Accordingly, this Court is inclined to consider the explanation with a view to ensuring that the appeal with regard to the right over the immovable properties, is adjudicated on its merits rather than being defeated on technical grounds.
32. In the light of aforesaid discussion and findings and also the guiding principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court is inclined to take a liberal view in the interest of substantial justice. Accordingly, the aforesaid application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is hereby allowed and disposed of. The delay in filing the appeal is hereby condoned.
33. Now, the main question that arises for consideration in the present miscellaneous civil appeal is whether the plaintiff was able to establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable loss so as to warrant the grant of interim injunction, and whether the Ld. Trial Court was Digitally signed by GAURAV GAURAV Date:
2026.04.25 17:03:10 +0530 MCA DJ No. 22/2023 Kunwar Pal Vs. DDA & Ors Page No. 12 of 17 justified in dismissing the application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC.
34. Before adverting to the merits of the present miscellaneous civil appeal, it would be apposite to refer to the relevant provisions of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, which provide for the grant of temporary injunctions. Rule 1 CPC provides that where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise: that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged, or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree; or that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property with a view to defraud his creditors; the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act. Rule 2 CPC empowers the Court to grant an injunction to restrain the defendant from committing a breach of contract or other injury of any kind to the plaintiff in relation to any property in dispute in the suit.
35. It is a settled principle that, while considering an application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, the court must examine whether a prima facie case exists, where the balance of convenience lies, and whether irreparable harm would ensue if interim relief is not granted.
36. It is imperative to mention herein that during the course of arguments, Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff placed on record two orders passed by the Court of Sh. Mayank Goyal, Ld. JSCC/ASCJ, Shahdara District, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi; in CS No. 1387/19 titled as "Lochan Lal vs. DDA & Ors." dated 23.10.2024 and CS No. 262/20 "Sanjay Kumar vs. Digitally signed by GAURAV GAURAV Date:
MCA DJ No. 22/2023 2026.04.25
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Kunwar Pal Vs. DDA & Ors Page No. 13 of 17 +0530
DDA & Ors." dated 23.10.2024. In both matters, the defendants were restrained from dispossessing the plaintiffs from their respective jhuggis situated behind Deepak Memorial Hospital, Karkardooma Village, Dayanand Vihar, Delhi, without following due process of law. Ld. Counsel for the plaintiff contended that these orders pertain to the same cluster in which the present plaintiff resides, and therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to similar protection.
37. On being specifically queried from the defendant no. 1/DDA to which Ld. Counsel for the defendant no. 1 fairly submitted that the aforesaid orders have not been challenged before any higher forum. At the same time, he contended that those directions were passed in separate suits and cannot bind this Court while deciding the present appeal. He further contended that the appellant cannot derive any vested right merely because neighbouring residents obtained interim protection.
38. The Court is conscious of the fact that the orders relied upon by the plaintiff were passed by a Ld. ASCJ and, strictly speaking, are not binding precedents upon this Court. However, the significance of those orders lies in the fact that they pertain to the same cluster of jhuggis and were passed after consideration of similar facts and circumstances. The admitted position that those orders remain unchallenged lends weight to the plaintiff's contention and that the defendants have not sought to disturb the judicial protection already extended to similarly situated residents. While Digitally signed by GAURAV GAURAV Date:
2026.04.25 MCA DJ No. 22/2023 17:03:22 +0530 Kunwar Pal Vs. DDA & Ors Page No. 14 of 17 not binding, such orders are relevant for assessing the existence of a prima facie case and the balance of convenience.
39. Turning now to the essential requirements of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC, the first requirement is whether the plaintiff has disclosed a prima facie case. The plaintiff has produced documentary evidence of residence, including voter IDs, electricity meter bill, Gas connection and other relevant documents, prior to the year 2015. The site inspection report dated 27.01.2020 records the existence of 60-70 jhuggis at the site and identifies the DDA as the land-owning agency. The aforesaid unchallenged orders in "Lochan Lal vs. DDA & Ors." and "Sanjay Kumar vs. DDA & Ors." further corroborate that residents of the same cluster have been recognized as being in possession. While the defendants contended that identity documents do not confer ownership and that the land belongs to DDA since 1968, it is herein clarified that the plaintiff is not seeking declaration of ownership at this stage but only protection of his residence until the suit is finally adjudicated. In these circumstances, a prima facie case stands established.
40. The second requirement is the balance of convenience. The plaintiff resides in the suit premises along with his family, and eviction at this stage would result in immediate homelessness. The defendants, being statutory authorities, are bound to act in accordance with law and policy, and maintaining status quo during the pendency of the suit does not cause them any prejudice. The fact that similarly placed residents in the same cluster Digitally signed by GAURAV GAURAV Date:
2026.04.25 17:03:28 MCA DJ No. 22/2023 +0530 Kunwar Pal Vs. DDA & Ors Page No. 15 of 17 have already been granted protection by competent courts, and those orders remain unchallenged, further tilts the balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff. To deny him similar protection would result in unequal treatment of persons similarly situated.
41. The third requirement is irreparable loss. It is well settled that deprivation of shelter amounts to irreparable injury which cannot be compensated in monetary terms. In the present case, refusal of interim protection would expose the plaintiff to precisely such irreparable harm.
The contention of defendant no. 1/DDA that the electricity connection was obtained only in 2016 does not negate the plaintiff's claim of prior residence, as the inspection report dated 27.01.2020 shows occupation prior to that date.
42. At the same time, it is necessary to clarify herein that the grant of interim protection does not amount to recognition of ownership or title in favour of the plaintiff. The restraint order is intended only to preserve the status quo and to ensure that the plaintiff is not dispossessed during the pendency of the suit. The rights of the parties shall be determined finally at the stage of trial, and nothing stated herein shall prejudice that determination. The plaintiff's protection is limited to safeguarding his residence until the suit is adjudicated, and does not confer any proprietary rights over the land in question.
43. In view of the above observations, this Court finds that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the balance of convenience lies in his Digitally signed by GAURAV GAURAV Date:
2026.04.25 17:03:36 MCA DJ No. 22/2023 +0530 Kunwar Pal Vs. DDA & Ors Page No. 16 of 17 favour, and irreparable loss would ensue if interim protection is denied. The impugned order dated 17.12.2022 passed by the Ld. Trial Court is accordingly set aside. The appeal is hereby disposed of as allowed. The defendants are restrained from dispossessing the plaintiff from the suit premises until the final disposal of the suit.
44. It is clarified that nothing stated herein shall be construed as a final expression on the merits of the suit.
45. Ld. Trial Court is also requested to proceed with the suit expeditiously and decide the same on its own merits without being influenced by any observations made in this order.
46. A copy of this order along with the trial court record be sent back to the Ld. Trial Court for information.
47. Appeal file be consigned to Record Room as per rules. (Typed to the dictation directly, corrected and Digitally signed by GAURAV pronounced in open court on 25.04.2026). GAURAV Date: 2026.04.25 17:03:44 +0530 (GAURAV) DISTRICT JUDGE-01 SHAHDARA DISTRICT KARKARDOOMA COURTS DELHI Certified that this order contains 17 pages and each page bears my signature. Digitally signed by GAURAV GAURAV Date:
(GAURAV) 2026.04.25
17:03:48
+0530
DISTRICT JUDGE-01
SHAHDARA DISTRICT
KARKARDOOMA COURTS
DELHI
MCA DJ No. 22/2023
Kunwar Pal Vs. DDA & Ors Page No. 17 of 17