Bombay High Court
Smt. Emilia Tinoco (Deceased By Lrs.) vs Shashikant Naguesh Gad And Others on 4 October, 1996
Equivalent citations: AIR1997BOM319, AIR 1997 BOMBAY 319, (1997) 1 GOALT 103 (1997) 3 ALLMR 13 (BOM), (1997) 3 ALLMR 13 (BOM)
Bench: R.K. Batta, R.M.S. Khandeparkar
ORDER Batta, J.
1. The original appellant had filed a Suit for eviction of the respondent No.1 on the ground of personal occupation and non-payment of rent. The appellant's case, in brief, is that she is the owner of the suit premises which consists of a godown and the same was rented to the father of the respondent No.1 The father of the respondent No.1 had died and the respondent No.1 stopped making payment of rent from January 1974. The appellant's case further is that her son Caetano D'Souza had come to Goa for good from Kenya and wanted to start his own business in the suit premises. On these grounds, namely, that the suit premises were required to start business and non-payment of rent. The appellant sent a notice to the respondent No.1 terminating the tenancy with effect from 30th June, 1976. The notice is dated 29th April, 1976. The respondent No.1, in his reply dated 4th August, 1976, submitted that his father was tenant of the suit premises and after him, he had become the tenant of the same. The allegations relating to non-payment of rent and personal occupation were refuted. The appellant thereafter filed suit for eviction in August, 1976.
2. In the written statement filed by the respondent No.1, an objection was raised that the suit suffers from non-joinder of the necessary parties inasmuch as the suit premises had been rented to the father of the respondent No.1 and on account of his death in the year 1970, the tenancy rights in respect of the suit premises devolved on the heirs of late Naguesh Gad and, as such, all of them were necessary parties.
3. The suit was instituted under Decree No.43525 and during the pendency of the suit, Goa, Daman and Diu Rent Control Act,1968 (hereinafter referred to a Rent Act) was extended to the area where the suit premises exists with effect from 23rd December, 1980. After the extension of the said Act, the appellant joined the other heirs of Naguesh Gad as respondents Nos. 2 to 14. These respondents were added somewhere in the year 1983, that is to say, after about 7 years of the institution of the suit against the respondent No.1 The respondents Nos. 2 to 14 raised preliminary objection that in view of the extension of the provisions of the Rent Act, the Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. They also alleged that no notice of termination of tenancy was ever served on them and, in the absence of proper notice, the suit was not maintainable.
4. On the pleadings of the parties, various issues were framed, which included issues relating to non-joinder, jurisdiction and non-service of notice. Besides that. the issues on merits were also framed. The trial Court, after recording evidence on either side, decided the issues relating to non-joinder, non-service of notice and jurisdiction in favour of the respondents and did not deal with the suit on merits on the ground that it was not necessary to answer the issues on merits, namely, issues Nos.2 to 4.
5. The appellant challenged the said findings of the trial court before the learned single Judge of this Court in First Appeal No.43 of 1987. The learned single judge found that though the respondents had become the joint tenants, yet, in the circumstances of the case, the notice served on the respondent No.1 alone was not sufficient. Accordingly, the finding of the trial Court that suit was not maintainable on the ground of personal requirement was upheld. Nevertheless, the learned single Judge found that the suit on the ground of non-payment of rent would have been maintainable, but taking into account the provision of Order 1, Rule 10(5) of Civil Procedure Code, S. 21 of Limitation Act and the provisions of Rent Act, it was held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction vis--vis the respondents Nos.2 to 14. It was further held that since the respondents Nos. 2 to14 had not been joined as parties, when the suit was instituted, the suit became incompetent for non-joinder of the necessary parties. Upon the basis of the above findings, learned single judge dismissed the Appeal.
6. Before us, learned Advocate Shri S. S. Usgaonkar canvassed the same points which were urged before the learned single Judge. It was urged by learned Advocate Shri Usgaonkar that the learned single Judge has partially misinterpreted the Apex Court ruling in H. C. Pandey v. G. C. Paul, . It was submitted that even though the learned Judge had rightly come to the conclusion that the respondents were joint tenants, yet the learned single on the basis of the Apex Court judgment in Pandey's case (supra) erroneously came to the conclusion that in case of joint tenancy, a notice of termination of tenancy could validly be addressed to only one of the heirs of the original tenant, provided the said heirs pays the rent on behalf of all and also acts on behalf of all heirs of the original tenant. He further submitted that a reading of the Apex Court's judgment in the case of H. C. Pandey v. G. C. Paul (supra) would make it clear that there was no justification for reading the later part of the observations in the form of a proviso. According to him, the Apex Court's ruling in H. C. Pandey's case (supra) is on all fours and the notice to the respondent No.1 under the circumstances of the case, has to be treated as sufficient notice as against the other joint tenants, namely, the respondents Nos. 2 to 14.
7. Insofar as the eviction sought on ground of non-payment of rent is concerned, it is submitted by the learned Advocate for the appellant that no notice was required to be given in respect of the same under the Decree No.43525 and once the learned single Judge had come to the conclusion that the suit was maintainable on ground on non-payment of rent, the same could not be dismissed on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction vis-a-vis the respondents Nos.2 to 14, especially because the proceedings instituted under Decree No.43525 were saved by S. 59 of the Rent Act.
8. The third submission made by the Advocate for the appellant is that the notice even though it was of 2 months cannot be said to be invalid and the only effect in view of Art. 55 of the said Decree is that the suit for eviction could not be filed unless 3 months had elapsed from the notice and in this case, the suit was filed after the lapse of 3 month of notice, in the month of August, 1976. This aspect was not considered by the learned single Judge.
9. As against the above submissions of the Advocate for the appellant, learned Advocate Shri Nitin Sardessai submitted before us that on the facts of the case, it has to be held that it is not a case of joint tenancy, but it is a case of tenancy-in-common. He referred to a Full Bench ruling of the Gujarat High Court in Nanalal Girdharlal v. Gulamnabi Jamalbhai Motorwala, , wherein the concept of joint tenancy and tenancy-in-common has been discussed and it has been observed by the Full Bench that the Apex Court in the case of Kanji Manji v. The Trustees of the Port of Bombay, , did not lay down any absolute proposition that notice to a joint tenant is sufficient notice as against the other joint tenants. According to him, the tenancy in the case under consideration, being tenancy-in-common, the notice served only on the respondent No.1 was not sufficient and, an such, the Courts below were justified in dismissing the suit on that count alone. Shri Nitin Sardessai further submitted that the ruling of the Apex Court in H.C. Pandey's case (supra) does not lay down the law on the subject as the issue relating to joint tenancy and tenancy-in-common had not been considered therein. In this connection, he relied upon ruling of the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. , wherein the doctrine of per incuriam and sub silentio was explained.
10. Insofar as the ground of non-payment of rent is concerned, it was submitted by learned Advocate for the respondents that when the respondents Nos. 2 to 14 were joined as the respondents, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of the fact that the Rent Act had been put into operation and that the respondents Nos. 2 to 14 had acquired valuable rights, which could not be affected by institution of a suit in the Civil Court. He also pointed out that S. 56 of the Rent Act bars jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to entertain in such suits. Accordingly, his contention is that in view of the above mentioned facts, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit insofar as the respondents Nos. 2 to 14 are concerned. On the question of 3 months' notice prescribed under Art. 55, there was no challenge from Advocate for the respondents.
11. Insofar as Art. 55 is concerned, the only effect of the notice falling short of 3 months is that the termination of tenancy cannot take place unless 3 months period elapses form date of notice. The notice was given on 29th of April, 1976 and the suit was filed after a period of 3 months, in August, 1976 and, as such, it cannot be said that the notice under Art. 55 of Decree No. 43525 would, in any manner, after the suit as such.
12. The bone of contention between the parties is whether the tenancy in question is joint tenancy or tenancy-in-common, pursuant to the death of the original tenant Naguesh Gad. On this aspect, learned Advocate for the appellants has placed reliance on two rulings of the Apex Court to substantiate his contention that the tenancy in question is joint tenancy, The first ruling upon which reliance has been placed is Kanjit Manji v. The Trustees of the Port of Bombay (supra). In that case, the Trustees of Port of Bombay had granted lease to five persons who were trading in partnership under the name and style of Mancherji Vadilal and Company. This lease was granted in the year 1924. Subsequently, on 28th February, 1947, the rights under the said lease were assigned to Rupji Jeraj and Kanji Manji as joint tenants and this assignment had been accepted by the lessors. In the suit, defendant had raised a number of pleas, the main contention being that the Notice dated 25th January, 1956 was invalid inasmuch as it had been served only upon one of the lessees (Kanji Manji) and not upon the heirs and legal representatives of Rupji Jeraj. On these facts, the Apex Court held that the deed of assignment had categorically spoken of assignment as joint tenants, which was accepted by the Trustees of the Port of Bombay and, as such, Rupji Jeraj and the respondents must be regarded as joint tenants. The Apex Court further observed that once it is held that the tenancy was joint, a notice to one of the joint tenants was sufficient and the suit for the same reason was also good. The above findings of the Apex Court were interpreted by the Full Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Nanalal Girdharlal v. Gulamnabi Jamalbhai Motorwala (supra) and by the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Vishnawati v. Bhagwat Vithu Chowdhry, , to which we will make reference at a little later stage.
13. The next ruling upon which reliance has been placed by learned Advocate for the appellants is H.C. Pandey v. G.C. Paul (supra). In that case, the original tenant was one B. M. Paul and on his death, he left behind G. C. Paul, his mother, brothers and sisters, who inherited the tenancy. The notice of termination of tenancy was addressed to G. C. Paul and served on him. It was not addressed and served on the other tenants. In the suit for ejectment, the validity of notice was challenged and it was contended that notice should have been addressed to all members of the family and served on them and in the absence of notice to all the members, the suit was incompetent. The trial Court relying upon decision of Allahabad High Court in Smt. Vishnawati v. Bhagwat Vithu Chowdhry (supra) held that the respondents were the joint tenants, constituting a single unit and, therefore, notice to one of the defenants was sufficient to determine the tenancy. When the matter came up before the High Court, the High Court took the view that the tenancy was the tenancy-in-common and not a joint tenancy and after relying upon a Division Bench judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Ramesh Chand Bose v. Gopeshwar Pd. Sharma, , it was held that notice was required to be given to each of the tenants. The Apex Court held that the view taken in Ramesh Chand Bose's case (supra) was erroneous and did not accept the finding of the High Court that the heirs of deceased-tenant succeed as tenants-in-common. In this connection, the Apex Court made following observations (at p.1471 of AIR) :
"It is now well settled that on the death of the original tenant, subject to any provision to the contrary either negativing or limiting the succession, the tenancy rights devolve on the heirs of the deceased-tenant. The incidence of the tenancy are the same as those enjoyed by the original tenant. It is a single tenancy which devolves on the heirs. There is no division of the premises or of the rent payable therefor. That is the position as between the landlord and the heirs of the deceased-tenant. In other words, the heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants. In the present case it appears that the respondent acted on behalf of the tenants, that he paid rent on behalf of all and he accepted notice also on behalf of all. In the circumstances, the notice was served on the respondent was sufficient."
The notice on one of the joint tenants was held to be a valid notice.
14. The contention of Advocate for the respondents is that this judgment of the Apex Court cannot be treated as having laid down the law on the subject, since the relevant considerations on the basis of which decision is taken have not been considered at all by the Apex Court and the said judgment of the Apex Court cannot be applied, since it is bad per incuriam. We are not able to accept this contention in view of the fact that the Apex Court had before it both the view points expressed by two judgments of Allahabad High Court -- one view was that the defendants in such circumstances would be joint tenants as laid down in the case of Smt. Vishnawati v. Bhagwat Vithu Chowdhry (supra) and the other view was that they would be tenants-in-common as laid down in Ramesh Chand Bose v. Gopeshwar Pd. Sharma (supra).
15. At this stage, it is necessary to make a reference to the case of Smt. Vishnawati v. Bhagwat Vithu Chowdhry (supra) which was approved in principle by the Apex Court. In that case, Gyan Prasad Shukla, who had died about 10 years prior to the institution of the suit, had left behind his widow (appellant), 3 sons and daughters from her as also 2 sons from an earlier wife. Notice terminating the tenancy had been addressed and served upon the widow alone and the said notice was challenged buy the defendants therein on the ground that it being a case of tenancy-in-common, notice was required to be served on all the tenants and notice on the widow was not sufficient. Permission to file the suit had also been obtained against widow alone. The Allahabad High Court examined the matter in the background of the law laid down by the Privy Council in Harihar Banerji v. Ramshashi Roy, AIR 1918 PC 102, to the effect that in case of joint tenants, each is intended to be bound. In other words, if a notice is given to one of the joint tenants, it means that joint tenants as a whole are intended to be bound by the notice. It is necessary to record the following observations of Allahabad High Court verbatim, which in principle have been approved by the Apex Court in H.C. Pandey's case :
"It is an incident of 'tenancy' that it is one and even through more than one person may hold it they hold it together as one. It is well recognised that a landlord cannot terminate the tenancy piecemeal, nor can some out of the several co-tenants terminate it for themselves only. Co-tenants who come to hold a tenancy by inheritance may, for the purpose of succession have an estate as "tenants-in-common" and not "joint tenants", but the special incidents attaching to a tenancy will not be changed upon the tenancy passing to more than one person by inheritance. In so far their relationship with the landlord is concerned, they hold the tenancy jointly and for the landlord they constitute one unit. So even if a notice is addressed to one or some of the co-tenants, it must be effective as against all, the only limitation to this being that there is nothing to show that the tenancy is intended to be terminated piecemeal and it is clear that the intention is to terminate the tenancy as a whole. It appears that it is by way of this safeguard that while laying down the rule in the several decisions mentioned above that service of notice on one co-tenant will be sufficient service of notice for terminating the tenancy that the qualification has been added that the notice should be addressed to all the co-tenants. There does not appear to be any sanctity otherwise behind this qualification."
16. The following propositions are, therefore, laid down, namely : (1) that it is an incidence of tenancy that it is one and even though more than one persons may hold it, they hold it together as one; (2) landlord cannot terminate the tenancy piecemeal nor can some out of the several co-tenants terminate it for themselves only; (3) Co-tenants who come to hold a tenancy by inheritance may, for the purpose of succession, have an estate as tenants-in-common and not joint tenants; moreover, the special incidents attaching to a tenancy will not be changed upon the tenancy passing to more than one person by inheritance. Insofar as their relationship with the landlord is concerned, they hold the tenancy jointly and for the landlord they constitute one unit; (4) notice addressed to one or some of the co-tenants is effective as against all, the only limitation being that there is nothing to show that the tenancy is intended to be terminated piecemeal and it is clear that the intention is to terminate tenancy as a whole.
17. The Allahabad High Court has further observed that it appears that it is by way of safeguard that while laying down the rule in several decisions that service of notice on one co-tenant will be sufficient notice for termination of tenancy that the qualification has been added that notice should be addressed to all the co-tenants. The Allahabad High Court further observed that there appears to be no sanctity otherwise behind this qualification and we are in full agreement with the Allahabad High Court on this proposition.
18. It is in this background that the Apex Court has laid down in para 4 of the judgment in H.C. Pandey' case (supra) that the incidence of tenancy is the same as that enjoyed by the original tenant; it is a single tenancy which devolves on the heirs; there is no division of the premises or the rent payable therefore; that is the position as between the landlord and the heirs of tenant. In other words, the heirs succeed to the tenancy as joint tenants. The Apex Court had not accepted the contrary view of the Allahabad High Court in Ramesh Chand Bose's case (supra) and found that the same was erroneous and the heirs could not succeed as tenants-in-common.
19. In fact, the learned single Judged in First Appeal No. 43 of 1986 has also accepted the law laid down by the Apex Court that the tenancy in question is joint tenancy. In another judgment of this Court in Mst. Ramubai v. Jiyaram Sharma, , also it has been held that where the tenant dies leaving behind several heirs including married daughters, the heirs are joint tenants and not tenants-in-common vis--vis landlord. In the said judgment also it is held that there is no difficulty in holding that all the co-lessees or co-tenants held as joint tenants in the sense they have single tenancy relationship with the landlord and they are not different tenants vis-a-vis the landlord. It was urged in the said case that it was a case of tenancy-in-common and not joint tenancy. The learned Judge of the Bombay High Court held that if there is unity of interest, common enjoyment and possession of the property, if all those joint tenants held qua landlord as one tenant, if each of those joint tenants had an interest in the whole of the leasehold, if acts of any of them are the acts of such tenants, then it is difficult to hold why a notice received by one of them should not have the effect of a valid notice in respect of all on whom the notice is meant to operate. It was further observed that there is sufficient community of interest and joint interest inter se in them which clothes everyone of them with a representative character vis-a-vis the landlord. Thus, the principle laid down in this authority is that in cases of joint tenancy, notice to one of the joint tenants is good notice to terminate the entire tenancy. It was, therefore held that notice to one of them was enough and served as a good notice to all as notice was meant to be operative against all the joint tenants.
20. Thus, the proposition of law which flows from the above discussion is that in case of joint tenants, notice to one of the joint tenants is sufficient notice as against the other joint tenants and it is not necessary to give any separate notice to each tenant in case of joint tenancy.
21. On the facts of the case before us, there is no dispute that the tenancy is heritable and that the tenancy devolves on all the legal heirs of Naguesh Gad. All the legal heirs of Naguesh Gad are, therefore, to be taken as joint tenants. At this stage, it is necessary to note that notice had been given by the appellant only to the respondent No.1. In the said notice, it was contended that rent of the suit premises, namely, godown, was paid by respondent No.1 in the hands of the appellant and he had ceased to pay rent from January, 1974. The ground relating to personal occupation was also taken in the said notice. Respondent No.1 in reply dated 4th August, 1976, admitted that his father and, after him he was tenant of the suit premises . In the said reply to notice, the respondent No.1 had not suggested that the other heirs were also tenants of the suit premises. Accordingly, the appellant filed this suit against the respondent No.1 alone and it is only in the Written Statement that he respondent No.1 took the plea of non-joinder of other legal heirs who were also the tenants of the suit premises. In fact, the respondent No.1 would be estopped from taking such plea in view of the stand taken by him in reply to the notice wherein he contended that he was the tenant of the suit premises and the plea in the written Statement has been taken to defeat the suit. In the meantime, Rent Act was made applicable to the area in which the suit premises is existing and, thereafter, the appellant joint the other legal heirs. From the notice and reply it appears that the respondent No.1 alone was conducting business in the suit premises. The notice on the respondent No.1 will have to be treated as notice to all the other legal heirs as well. Moreover, it is the case of the appellant that the rent of the suit premises was being paid by the respondent No.1. In reply to notice also the respondent No.1 contended that he was the tenant. From all these circumstances, it appears that the respondent No.1 was acting on behalf of all the other legal heirs, who were joint tenants. The notice for eviction which was issued by the appellant was in respect of eviction of the entire suit premises and not a part of it. In the case of Smt. Vishnawati v. Bhagwat Vithu Chowdhry (supra), the facts were somewhat similar. It has been laid down in para 18 in the said judgment that the appellant was for all practical purposes acting as the tenant; she admitted the averment in the plaint that the house was in her tenancy; it was for the first time in her written statement that she referred to the existence of her sons and daughters and that the notice required the vacation of the house, which meant house as a whole and not in part. The Apex Court in H.C. Pandey's case (supra) has approved the findings of Allahabad High Court in Smt. Vishnawati v. Bhagwat Vithu Chowdhry (supra). The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Ramesh Chand Bose's case (supra) had, in fact, not accepted the law laid down by single Judge of the Allahabad High Court in smt. Vishnawati v. Bhagwat Vithu Chowdhry (supra), but the Apex Court in H.C. Pandey's case (supra) found that the view taken by the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Ramesh Chand Bose's case (supra) was erroneous. In this background, it is not necessary to consider the Full Bench ruling of the Gujarat High Court in Nanalal Girdharlal v. Gulamnabi Jamalbhai Motorwala (supra) upon which heavy reliance was placed by learned Advocate for the respondents.
22. In view of the above, we find considerable substance in the contention of Advocate Shri Usegaonkar for the appellants that notice served on the respondent No.1 in this case is sufficient compliance of law and that the appellants' case on merits requires further consideration.
23. Insofar as the question relating to non-payment of rent is concerned, even though the learned single judge had come to the conclusion that the suit would have been maintainable only on the ground of non-payment of rent, but in view of Order 1, Rule 10(5) of CPC, S. 21 of the Limitation Act and the provisions of the Rent Act, it was held that the suit was not maintainable for want of jurisdiction of civil Court in respect of the respondents Nos.2 to 14. Admittedly, no notice was required to be given before institution of the suit under Decree No. 43525 on ground of non-payment of rent, though, under the Rent Act, such notice is required. It is no doubt true that Order 1, Rule 10(5) C.P.C. and S. 21 of Limitation Act provide that in case of addition of a new plaintiff or defendant, the suit shall be deemed to have been instituted when such party was added. Of course if the Court is satisfied that omission to include new plaintiff or defendant was due to mistake committed in good faith, it can direct that the suit shall be deemed to have been instituted on an earlier date. Here, of course, we must observe that no effort was made by the appellant to bring her case within the said proviso and she had joined the respondents Nos. 2 to 14 by way of abundant caution as per her case and, as such, the suit as against the respondents Nos.2 to 14 shall have to be deemed to have been instituted when they were joined as parties to the suit.
24. The question to be determined is what is the effect of such joinder, under the circumstances, on the suit. The contention of Advocate Shri Usgaonkar is that Order 1, Rule 10(5) and S. 21 of the Limitation Act are not applicable and Decree No. 43525 is self-Contained. We do not find any force in the said submission of Shri Usgaonkar, since the procedural law relating to joinder of parties is one prescribed under the Civil Procedure Code and provisions of S. 21 of the Limitation Act would be attracted in such cases. In this respect, Advocate Shri Nitin Sardessai has urged before us that when the respondents Nos. 2 to 14 were jointed as respondents, the remedy against them in the Civil Court was barred under S. 56 of the Rent Act and, as such the Civil Court would have no jurisdiction vis-a-vis the respondents Nos. 2 to 14. The argument advanced by Advocate Shri Nitin Sardessai loses sight of the fact that the tenancy as a whole had been terminated and suit in relation to eviction had been filed under Decree No. 43525 and when the suit was filed, the provisions of Rent Act had not been extended to the area where the suit premises existed. Section 59 of the Rent Act clearly saves proceedings which are instituted under the Decree No. 43525 . Section 59(2) lays down that notwithstading the repeal of laws by sub-sec. (1), all suits and other proceedings under repealed law pending at the commencement of the Act before any Court or authority shall be continued and disposed of in accordance with the provisions of repealed law as if that law had continued in force and this Act had not been passed. In view of the same, no rights can be acquired by respondents Nos.2 to 14 during the pendency of the suit which was saved from the applicability of the Rent Act vis-a-vis the subject-matter of the suit. Therefore, the eviction proceedings which had been instituted for termination of tenancy of the suit premises as a whole would be saved under S.59 of the Rent Act, not only vis-a-vis the respondent No.1 against whom this suit was instituted initially, but also against the respondents Nos.2 to 14, who were joined as necessary parties to the suit at a later stage. The civil Court had taken congnizance of the subject-matter as a whole and non-joinder of necessary parties was a mere irregularity, which was subsequently cured by bringing the legal heirs on record. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to deal with the matter against the respondents Nos.2 to 14 shall not be affected in view of S. 56 of Rent Act. In the circumstances of the case, the effect of Order 1, Rule 10(5) CPC and S. 21 of the Limitation Act would be only for the purpose of determination of the question as to whether the proceedings as on the date when the new plaintiff or defendant is added, are barred by limitation and if such proceedings are barred by limitation as on the said date, the proceedings are bound to fail. In the case under consideration, there is no dispute that there is no limitation period prescribed either under Decree No. 43525 or under the Rent Act to file a suit for eviction. Therefore, the joinder of the respondents Nos. 2 to 14 at a later stage does not, in any manner, affect the proceedings and we do not find any force in the submission of Advocate Shri Nitin Sardessai that the proceedings as against the respondents Nos.2 to 14 are bad on account of lack, of jurisdiction in view of S. 56 of the Rent Act.
In view of the above, we hold that the view taken by the trial Court and the learned single Judge cannot be sustained in law insofar as the issue relating to non-joinder of heirs of late Naguesh, jurisdiction to deal with the matter and invalidity of notice are concerned. The findings of the Civil Court as well as of the learned single Judge on these points cannot be sustained. Accordingly, issues Nos.1,5,7 and 8 are answered against the respondents. The trial Court had not dealt with issues Nos.2 to 14 on merits on the ground that it was not necessary to answer the same in view of the findings on the other issues. The trial Court had consequently held that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. However, in view of the findings recorded by us, it is now necessary that the trial Court should answer the issues Nos.2 to 4 and 6 on merits and for that purpose, the matter is remanded to the trial court for decision on the said issues.
25.The Appeal is, accordingly, allowed. In the facts and circumstances, we leave the parties to bear their costs. Since the eviction proceedings were instituted 20 years ago, it is considered necessary that the trial Court should be directed to expedite the matter and dispose of the same on merits within a period of 6 months of the receipt of Order of this Court.
26. Appeal allowed.