Madras High Court
Meenakshiammal vs Ramasamy Muthiriar And Ors. on 3 April, 1998
Equivalent citations: (1998)3MLJ390
JUDGMENT S. S. Subramani, J.
1. Second Appeal No. 1583 of 1984 is filed by the plaintiff in O.S.No. 146 of 1981, on the file of Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirapalli. Second Appeal No. 527 of 1991, is filed by the 1st defendant in O.S.No. 1799 of 1984, on the file of I Additional District Munsif, Tiruchirapalli.
2. The relevant facts in both these Second Appeals could he summarised thus:
The subject-matter of both these Second Appeals is one and the same. The property belonged to Alamelu Ammal, wife of late V.K. Subramania Iyer. She settled the property in favour of Janaki Ammal, who is none other than her sister-in-law, i.e., her husband's sister. In the settlement deed she settled not only the plaint schedule property in favour of her sister-in-law, but also assigned the mortgage right worth about Rs. 16,000. It is stated in that document that she is executing the settlement deed due to her special affection towards her and also for the reason that she was being maintained by her and also under the hope that she will continue to maintain her till her life time. She also declares that from the date of Gift, Janaki Ammal be in possession of the property as absolute owner with full right and she further declares that from that date onwards the executant has ceased any right over the same. She also declares that in regard to the mortgage right, Janaki Ammal shall receive the entire amount with interest from the mortgagor and realise the same. She further declares that the property is free from all encumbrances and the executant is also not indebted to anyone. She further states that she is executing the settlement deed on condition that Janaki Ammal will maintain her till her life time. The original document relating to the plaint property and also the original mortgage deed were also handed over to the donee. Within a period of five years after the settlement deed, Janaki Ammal died, and on 19.1.1958, Alamelu Ammal is alleged to have executed a Will in favour of Sree Kanchi Kamakoti Peedathpathi Mut (hereinafter referred to at Mut). In that Will it is stated that she had executed a settlement deed in favour of Janaki Ammal on condition that she will maintain her and that the donee is dead, Janaki Ammal could not maintain her and therefore, the settlement deed did not come into effect. Since the document has not come into effect, there is no necessity for cancelling the same and by abandon caution she is executing the Will bequeathing all the properties in favour of Mut.
3. The plaintiff in O.S.No. 146 of 1981, from which S.A.No. 1583 of 1984 arises, is the daughter of Janaki Ammal, claiming herself as the owner of the property filed the suit for recovery of possession from the tenants. It is seen that the legatee under the Will filed an application to get himself impleaded in the suit, but the same was not allowed. Subsequently, Mut filed a suit as O.S.No. 1790 of 1984, on the file of the First Additional District Munsif, Tiruchirapalli, for declaration of its right over the property and for consequential reliefs.
4. The earlier suit O.S.No. 146 of 1981 was dismissed by the trial court and confirmed in appeal. The main reason for dismissal of the suit was that the defendants are cultivating tenants and their names have been recorded by the record officer, and therefore eviction cannot be ordered by a civil court. In that suit, the defendants have taken a contention that the plaintiff therein is not the owner of the property and she has no title to the property, in view of the Will executed by late Alamelu Ammal in favour of Mut. The concurrent judgment is assailed in S.A.No. 1583 of 1984, on the ground that even if the defendants are cultivating tenants, decree for possession should have been granted, since title of the plaintiff has been denied, and there is no necessity to go back to the authorities under the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act for getting possession. The civil court is competent to order possession in view of the denial of title, even if the defendants are recorded as cultivating tenants. In S.A.No. 1583 of 1984, the following substantial question of law has been raised at the time of admission:
Whether the lower appellate court is right in upholding the claim of the first defendant that he is a cultivating tenant in respect of the suit property in the face of Section 16-A of Tamil Nadu Act 25 of 1955, which ousted the jurisdiction of the court in relation to such a question?
5. The suit filed by the Mut was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the plaintiff has not proved its title. It came to the conclusion that after the settlement deed, Alamelu Ammal had no right to execute the Will. The matter was taken in appeal as A.S.No. 44 of 1989, on the file of V Additional Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirapalli. The lower appellate court reversed the finding of the trial court and held that the Mut has title to the property. It was of the view that the settlement deed has not come into effect. The title was declared in favour of Mut. The 1st defendant has therefore, filed S.A.No. 527 of 1991, and the following substantial questions of law have been raised at the time of admission:
1. Whether in law the lower appellate court was right in omitting to note that in the absence of any express reservation of a power of revocation in the settlement deed Ex.B-1 Alamelu Ammal the donor did not have the right to revoke a settlement deed.
2. Whether in law the lower appellate court is right in omitting to note that the respondent has failed to produce the original Will it is for him to show that the Will had not been revoked by the testatrix before her death?
6. I will first consider the questions of law raised in S.A.No. 527 of 1991. Registration copy of settlement deed produced in S.A.No. 1583 of 1984 was taken by me by consent of parties. Even though in the suit filed by the Mut, a copy of the deed is available, the same is not the registration copy. But in the earlier suit the same is marked as Ex.A-1, which is also a registration copy. In the subsequent Will Ex.A-1, which is the subject matter of S.A.No. 527 of 1991, Alamelu Ammal admits the execution of the settlement deed.
7. Learned Counsel for the respondents in S.A.No. 527 of 1991 contended that there is no evidence in this case to show that the settlement deed of 1943 was accepted. It is his case that the gift deed is 1943 is not simple gift, but it is either a conditional or onerous gift, and there is no presumption of acceptance. It is also his case that in the Will, there is a statement that the settlement deed has not come into effect, and there is no necessity for cancelling the same. Learned Counsel also submitted the circumstances also are such that the settlement might not have been come into effect, and there is no evidence in this case to show that the donee-Janaki Ammal was paying tax to the property or maintaining the donor. According to the counsel, the statement in the Will must be taken as a prima facie evidence. How far the said contention could be accepted.
8. I will first consider whether the settlement deed of 1943 was accepted by Late Janaki Ammal. From a reading of the document, it is clear that both the donor and donee were living together in the same house and in fact the donor was maintained by the donee. It is also clear from the circumstances, that before the execution of the settlement deed, both the donor and donee must have discussed the matter and the settlement is a result of an arrangement between them. In the document Alamelu Ammal says that she is executions it due to special affection towards the donee and that she was all along maintained by her. The future maintenance, which is made as a conditions in the subsequent portion of the document is not a new arrangement nor a new obligation that is created by this deed. It is further seen that stamp paper for execution of the deed was purchased by Janaki Ammal even on 9th September, 1943. The document is executed on 16.9.1943, and the same is presented for registration on 20.9.1943. When the donee herself has purchased the stamp papers so as to enable the donor to execute a settlement deed, naturally it can only be on the basis of some earlier arrangement. Immediately after the document was executed, though it is in the statutory form, Ex.A-2, a request is made by the donor to change the patta in the name of donee. Both the donor and donee are signatories in Ex.A-2. It may be on the same date. But one thing is clear that the donee was also aware that such a document was executed. Patta was also changed subsequently in the name of Janaki Ammal. The application for changing the patta and the original patta which stands in the name of Janaki Ammal are Exs.A-2 and A-3 in O.S.No. 146 of 1981 (S.A.No. 1583 of 1984). Alamelu Ammal, the donor requests the revenue authorities that patta may be changed in favour of Janaki Ammal, and the source of title is mentioned as settlement deed. Janaki Ammal gives her consent that patta may be changed in her name. A few months later, original patta is also issued in the name of Janaki Ammal, which is Ex.A-3. These circumstances alone are sufficient to hold that settlement deed has been accepted and the same has come into effect.
9. It is true that in the case of a simple gift, there is a presumption and even a silence on the part of the donee can occasionally be taken as an indication of acceptance. But in the case of onerous gift that presumption is not there. Evidence for acceptance is required. In Julakanti Krishnamurthi v. Appalarajugari Venkataramaiah A.I.R. 1958 A.P. 213 : (1958) 2 An.W.R. 343, a learned Judge of that court held thus:
Acceptance of a gift is not something which has necessarily to take place only after the transfer is completed or effected. If a near relation seeks a gift and a gift deed is drawn up because of that request, it is open to the court to hold on the basis of that antecedent request at any rate in the light of the surrounding circumstances that the intended transfer of property was accepted. The law does not require that there should be proof that there was acceptance only after the deed was executed. There can be cases where it may be possible to draw an inference as to the acceptance of a gift even from acts anterior to the execution of a deed of gift.
I am relying on the above decision only for the purpose that acceptance could be inferred from circumstances of a case, and direct evidence of acceptance may not be necessary. Purchasing the stamp papers some days before the execution of the deed, both the donor and donee jointly applied to the Revenue Authorities for change of patta, and the donee subsequently becomes the patta holder, the statement of the donor that she was being maintained by the donee, are all taken together as circumstances to come to the conclusion that the settlement deed was accepted.
10. In Ganapathi Subramania Ayyar v. Kulathu Ayyar Sankara Ayyar. I.L.R. 1951 T & C 875, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, in paragraph 5 of the judgment, at page 880 of the reports said that 'if a gift is executed after due deliberation and with the concurrence of the person benefited by the gift, there is a circumstance to hold that the gift was accepted.' In the decision reported in Narayani Bhanumathi v. Lalitha Bhai 1973 K.L.T. 961, which is a case of simple gift, a learned Judge of Kerala High Court held thus:
There may be cases where slightest evidence of such acceptance would be sufficient. There may be still cases where the circumstances themselves eloquently speak to such acceptance. Normally, when a person gifts properties to another and it is not an onerous gift, one may expect the other to accept such a gift when once it comes to his knowledge, since normally, any person would he only too willing to promote his own interests. May be in particular cases there may be peculiar circumstances which may show that the donee would not have accepted the gift. But these are rather the exceptions than the rule. It is only normal to assume that the donee would have accepted the gift deed. Mere silence may sometimes be indicative of acceptance provided it is shown that the donee knew about the gift.
The said decision was followed by the same Kerala High Court in the decision reported in Vannathi Valappil Janaki v. Puthiya Purayil Paru .
11. I have already said that by virtue of the settlement deed of 1943, no further obligation is created, since the donee was already maintaining the donor. After the settlement was over, there was a further statement that this is made as a condition of the gift. According to me, the said statement by itself will not make the gift any onerous. But, even if we take the consideration for executing the gift deed as the continued maintenance of the donor, even then, the' evidence regarding acceptance adduced by the appellant is sufficient.
12. Commenting on Section 127 of the Transfer of Property Act by D.V. Chitaley and S. Appu Rao - 4th Edition - 1969, at page 2181, the learned author said thus:
The burden contemplated by the section is one that attaches to thing gifted, e.g., shares in a company, subject to heavy calls. This section does not apply where the thing gifted is itself not burdened by any obligation, but the instrument of gift imposes a condition that the donee should discharge certain liabilities. In such cases, the donee accepting the gift will take it subject to the condition and is bound to perform the condition. This, however, is not by virtue of this section, but under general principles of law.
13. In MT. Janki v. Mohanlal A.I.R. 1925 Nag. 29, a learned Judge held that an implied trust was created where one condition in a gift deed was that the donee should maintain a certain person. Even in the case of conditional gift, coming under Section 127 of the Transfer of Property Act, acceptance of the gift will be sufficient. There need not he separate acceptance regarding the conditions. It was so held in Sabba Mohan Banerjee v. Manmohan Banerjee and Ors. A.I.R. 1933 Cal. 488. In that case, a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court held thus:
After execution Harmohan himself made over the deed to her and told her that he had made the gift to her and if she received the document knowing that it was a deed of gift and never thought of doing anything contrary to its terms that was more than enough to constitute acceptance. In English Law assent by a donee is presumed until and unless he disclaims Xenos v. Wickham (1863) 2 H.L. 296, London and County Bank v. London and River Plate Bank (1888) 21 Q.B.D. 535 and the same principle is extended even to onerous gifts Siggers v. Evans (1855) 5 E. &. B. 367. And in the case of Standing v. Bowring (1885) 31 Ch.D. 282 at 288 Cotton L.J. observed:
Now I take the rule of law to be that where there is a transfer of property to a person, even although it carries with it some obligation which may be onerous, it vests in him at once before he knows of the transfer, subject to his right when informed of it to say, if he pleases, "I will not take it. When informed of it he may repudiate it, it vests in him until he repudiates it.
Whatever difference the wording of Section 122, Transfer of Property Act may make in the matter, there is no authority for the view, which to us seems most unreasonable, that for an acceptance of an onerous gift, acceptance of the gift itself, is not sufficient, but an acceptance of the onerous condition also at the same time is necessary." In that case also there is a provision for maintenance. A paltry sum was directed to be paid to the donor. Taking into consideration the conduct of the parties and the nature of obligation the Division Bench has held that acceptance of the gift will amount to acceptance of a condition and the gift is complete.
14. Mulla on the Transfer of Property Act - Eighth Edition - 1995, at page 985, the learned author based on various decision has said that acceptance has been inferred from the acceptance of the right to collect rents in the case of a gift of tenanted property, or from the mutation in the register. In an earlier portion at page 984, the learned author said thus:
There was a divergence of view between the two schools of Hindu Law as to the necessity of acceptance of the gift by the donee, Dayabhaga holding that it was not necessary but Mistkshara holding the contrary. This section has modified the ingenuous Dayabhaga law. In English law express acceptance is not necessary, for although it recognises that it 'requires the assent of both minds to make a gift as it does to make a contract,' yet it will readily infer that a man will accept what is for his benefit. Thus, a transfer of a stock to the name of the donee vests the property in him subject to his right to repudiate the gift, even though he be unaware of the transfer. And this is so even though the gift be onerous." The learned author further says that "though the rules of English law do not all apply in India, there is nothing in the section to show that the acceptance under this section should be expressed. The acceptance may be inferred, and it may be proved by the donee's possession of the property, or even by the donee's possession of the deed of gift. Oral evidence can be looked into for finding out whether the gift had, in fact, been acted upon or not.
Based on the above legal position, the irresistable conclusion is that the settlement was accepted.
15. The further question that arises for consideration is whether Alamelu Ammal has a right to revoke the gift, once it is accepted. Admittedly, the document does not reserve any right of revocation with the donor. What she declares is that from the date of gift, Janaki Ammal is the absolute owner with absolute power of dealing with the same and on the death of donee the same could be inherited by her children and grand-children. She further declares that on and from the date of gift, she has no right over any portion of the gifted properties. She does not reserve any right or revocation for herself.
16. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that when the gift is executed with a condition and when such condition could not be complied with, that gives a right of cancellation. Learned Counsel submitted that execution of the Will would follow that she continues to be the owner, treating the settlement deed as invalid or not come into effect. It is also contended that the donor did not get maintenance after the execution of the settlement deed and her right of ownership therefore continues. The statements that the deed has not come into effect and the conditions have not been complied with are all stated 15 years after the settlement deed and ten years after the death of Janaki Ammal. The fact that the donee died within a few years after the execution of the settlement deed cannot be stated as a breach of condition. On going by the wordings in the settlement deed, it is too much to think that Janaki Ammal would refuse to maintain the donor after getting the document. Even before anticipating any benefit, the donee was maintaining the donor. Naturally, inference could be drawn that she will be little more sincere to maintain the donor after the benefit is derived by taking the settlement deed. We must also consider that it is nobody's case that after the settlement deed the relationship between the donor and the donee at any point of time was strained. We can presume that the good relationship that was retained earlier continued till her death. Even in the Will, the donor did not say anything about the strained relationship with the donee.
17. I have already said that the donor has not reserved the right of revocation for herself. In Murikipudi Ankamma v. Tummalacheruvu Narasayya and Ors. (1946) 2 M.L.J. 278 : 226 I.C. 280 : A.I.R. 1947 Mad. 127, it was held thus:
In the absence of any express reservation of a power of revocation in the gift deed a donor does not continue to have the right to revoke a gift. For if a man will improvidently bind himself up by a voluntary deed, and not reserve a liberty to himself by a power of revocation, a court will not loose the fetters he has put upon himself.
In Ganapathi Subramania Ayyar v. Kulathu Ayyar Sankara Ayyar I.L.R. 1951 T & C 875, also it is said that once the gift becomes complete, it may not be revoked, unless there is an express revocation clause in the deed of gift itself.
18. Much reliance was placed on the decision reported in Marius Louis Peria v. Santo Rane Charles (1988) 1 L.W. 183. In that case, the donor filed a suit to revoke the settlement deed executed by her on the ground that the condition in the gift was violated. In that case the donee was directed to maintain the donor. A contention was taken that the same is only a pious wish and it would not entitle the donor to cancel the document. Rejecting the said contention of the donee, this Court held thus:
In this case, the gift deed contains an express contingency that in case of failure to maintain, the gift is liable to be cancelled.
...The condition mentioned in Ex.A1, that the appellant-donor is bound to maintain the respondent (donor) and in the event of failure to comply with such condition by the appellant to maintain the respondent, the settlement deed is liable to be cancelled, is a contingency provided in the agreement and agreed to between both the parties even at the time of the acceptance of the gift deed. The said condition cannot be divorced from the other terms of the gift." By so stating, the learned Judge held that the suit is maintainable.
I do not think that the said decision has any relevance to the facts of this case. It is clear therefrom that the cancellation can only be during the life time of the donee, and when the right to cancel is also to be reserved. Again, the donor by himself cannot cancel it. He has to take the; assistance of the court to have the same set aside.
19. Section 126 of the Transfer of Property Act, is very clear oh that point. The said section reads thus:
126. When gift may be suspended or revoked: The donor and donee may agree that on the happening of any specified event which does not depend on the will of the donor a gift shall be suspended or revoked; but a gift which the parties agree shall be revocable wholly or in part at the mere will of the donor is void wholly or in part, as the case may be.
A gift may also be revoked in any of the cases (save want or failure of consideration) in which, if it were a contract, it might be rescinded.
Save as aforesaid, a gift cannot be revoked.
Nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to affect the rights of transferees for consideration without notice.
In this connection it is also worthwhile to consider the corresponding provision under the Indian Succession Act. Section 127 of the Transfer of Property Act is corresponding to Section 122 of the Indian Succession Act. Where a gift is a transfer inter vivos, a Will is a bequest after life of the testator. Section 122 of the Indian Succession Act also deals with onerous bequest. It says "where a bequest imposes an obligation on the legatee, he can take nothing by it unless he accepts it fully."
20. Commenting on the same, Sanjiva Row's Indian Succession Act - Sixth Edition - 1992, the learned author said thus:
Once an onerous gift has been accepted subject to the condition imposed by it, it cannot be repudiated. The position in law is that it is open to the legatee to whom an onerous gift is given either to accept it in toto or to reject it in toto. If he accepts it, he cannot refuse to carry out the obligation subject to which it is given. In Attorney General v. Christ's Hospital 48 E.R. 156, the testator gave a sum of money each year to the Governors of a certain hospital subject to the condition of their receiving a number of boys and girls annually, nominated by the Governors of another hospital. For sometime the condition was being fulfilled. But later there was a refusal to perform the condition. It was held, that the gift having been once accepted, the condition could not be repudiated. In the case of disclaimer, an opinion was expressed in Fraser v. Young (1913) 1 Ch.D. 272, that till the disclaimer is acted upon, the disclaimer could be retracted, especially when the disclaimer had not induced the trustees or the other legatees under the Will to change their position on the faith of the disclaimer.
I have made a reference to this section only to emphasis the fact that if at all the gift could be repudiated, that can only be by the legatee by disclaiming it and the discontainer is accepted by the donor. In this case, the gift is complete and it was accepted and the patta is also changed in the name of donee. The circumstances are clear that the document might have been executed in consultation with the donee and she has also accepted the same. Once the gift is accepted, the donor has no right over the property and there cannot be any question of executing a will in favour of the Mutt. The Mutt will not get any benefit on the basis of the will.
21. Learned Counsel for the respondents submitted that the Mutt came to know about the will, and the earlier documents, only long after the death of Alamelu Ammal, and they cannot get any knowledge about what transpired earlier. The ignorance will not absolve the Mutt to prove their case. Prima facie, the circumstances are against the Mutt and it shows that the donee has accepted the gift. It is for the Mutt to prove that those circumstances are not the real state of affairs and the gift is not accepted. Regarding the same there is absolutely no evidence.
22. The trial court discussed the entire evidence and rightly came to the conclusion that the Mutt has no right over the property, once the gift is accepted. The lower appellate court went in a tangentind did not concentrate on the real issue in the case. It took the statement in the Will as prima facie evidence. Even if the very same donor comes to court and pleads the same case, the result would not have been different. The Mutt cannot be in a better position than the testator herself. Therefore, I am constrained to set aside the judgment of the lower appellate court and consequently the suit filed by Mutt is liable to be dismissed and the Second Appeal No. 527 of 1991 is to be allowed without any order as to costs.
23. The appellant in S.A.No. 527 of 1991, is the appellant in the other appeal also. In O.S.No. 146 of 1981, she has filed the suit for recovery of property from the tenants who ae in possession. The defence of the defendants/tenant is that they are cultivating tenants and not liable to be evicted. Accepting the said contention, the suit was dismissed and confirmed in appeal.
24. On the question of law that has been raised in S.A.No. 1583 of 1984, two contentions have been urged, viz., there is a denial of title by the tenants, and therefore, the benefit of Cultivating Tenants Protection Act or the fixity as provided in that Act, cannot be granted to them. The landlord, in such cases, is entitled to immediate possession. Alternatively it is contended that if it is a question of status of a cultivating tenants, that question cannot be decided by a civil court. Under Section 6-A of the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, there is absolute bar of jurisdiction on the civil court to deal with those matters, which are to be dealt with by the authorities under that Act. Learned Counsel submitted that in case the court holds that the appellant is not entitled to get possession in the suit, instead of dismissing the suit, the matter may be remanded back to the trial court with a direction to refer the matter to the authorities under the Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, who shall decide the rights and liabilities of the parties in accordance with that Act.
25. The appellant has brought to my notice the written statement filed by the defendants in that case. In paragraph 3 of the written statement, it is stated thus:
The allegations in para. 3 of the plaint are admitted. This defendant is not aware of the execution of any settlement deed by the original owner Alamelu alias Kuppammal in favour of Janaki. The truth, validity, execution attestation etc. of settlement deed alleged to have been executed by Alamelu Ammal alias Kuppammal is specifically denied. The allegation that Janaki Ammal accepted the settlement and it has come into force is denied.
In paragraph 8 of the written statement, the 1st defendant has taken a contention that the Mutt is the owner on the basis of the will executed by Alamelu Ammal. In the suit filed for eviction by the daughter of Janaki Ammal, she did not make the Mutt as defendant. Though Mutt wanted to get itself impleaded, it was not allowed. In spite of it, a contention was taken in the written statement, that Mutt is the owner. From the definite stand taken in the written statement that the settlement deed has not been accepted by Janaki Ammal, it is clear that the written statement was filed at the instance of Mutt, and the denial of title was intentional. He could have simply contended that there is a confusion regarding ownership, and he will abide by the decision of the court. But, in this case, he denied the title of Janaki Ammal and the plaintiff in the suit. In such circumstances, I do not think that the defendants are entitled to the benefit of Cultivating Tenants Protection Act."
26. In Chinnamuthu Gounder and Ors. v. P.A.S. Perumal Chettiar 1970 S.C.J. 616, this question was considered, and their Lordships have held thus:
The clear import of Section 6-A is that in any suit before any civil court for possession, if the defendant proves not only that he is a cultivating tenant but also that he is entitled to the benefits of the Act the civil court is bound to transfer it to the Revenue Divisional Officer and cannot proceed to try and dispose of itself. In the present case, it has been found by the High Court as also by the trial court that the appellant's had wilfully denied the title of the respondent who is the landlord. They thus became disentitled to the benefits of the Act. Consequently the civil court had jurisdiction to proceed with the trial and there was no question of its transferring the suit to the Revenue Divisional Officer. There has been a consistent course of decisions of the Madras High Court that in order to attract the applicability of Section 6-A both the conditions must co-exist, namely, the defendant must be a cultivating tenant within the meaning of the Act and he should be entitled to the benefits of the Act. If both these conditions are not satisfied no question of any transfer under Section 6-A will arise. The civil court may have to determine, for the purpose of coming to the conclusion whether a suit has to be transferred under Section 6-A, certain questions which are within the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court under the Act. But that cannot affect the entitled to the benefits of the Act.
I also had an occasion to consider a similar question in Veeramalai and Ors. v. Murugesan and Ors. S.A.No. 886 of 1993 dated 27.8.1997). In paragraphs 17 and 18 of the judgment, I took into consideration the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited supra, and held that in such cases, Cultivating Tenants' Protection Act will not give any benefit to the tenant and the relief from eviction will not be available to him.
27. In the result, Second Appeal No. 1583 of 1984 is allowed with costs throughout, and the Judgments and decrees of the courts below are set aside, and the suit in O.S.No. 146 of 1981, is decreed as prayed for. Second Appeal No. 527 of 1991 is allowed, however without any order as to costs, and the judgment of the lower appellate court is set aside and that of the trial court in O.S.No. 1799 of 1984, is restored. All the pending C.M.Ps. in both the appeals are closed.