Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Mr.Santosh Kumar Meena vs Government Of Nct Of Delhi Through on 31 August, 2015
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL BENCH O.A.NO.869 OF 2014 New Delhi, this the 31st day of August, 2015 CORAM: HONBLE SHRI SUDHIR KUMAR, ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER & HONBLE SHRI RAJ VIR SHARMA, JUDICIAL MEMBER . Mr.Santosh Kumar Meena, Son of Sh.Ram Bhool Singh, R/o Village Fatehpur, PO Anoop Sahar, District Bulandshahr, UP, Presently in Delhli Applicant (By Advocate: Ms.Jasvinder Kaur) Vs. 1. Government of NCT of Delhi through Commissioner of Police, PHQ, MSO Building, IP Estate, New Delhi 2. Deputy Commissioner of Police, Recruitment Cell, NPL, Kingsway Camp, Delhi 110009 . Respondents (By Advocate: Mr.Amit Anand) . ORDER Raj Vir Sharma, Member(J):
Brief facts of the applicants case are that in the year 1991-92 the respondents issued advertisement inviting applications from eligible persons desirous of participating in the selection process for recruitment to the post of Constable in Delhi Police. In response thereto, he made application on 21.6.1992, as a candidate belonging to Scheduled Tribe (ST). On his qualifying the preliminary test, i.e., race, and physical endurance test, he was called to appear for interview. On 7.9.1992, he appeared for interview, along with his original certificates including Caste Certificate issued by the City Magistrate, Bharatpur (Rajasthan). On medical re-examination, he was found fit. His antecedents were verified. Thereafter, he was provisionally selected for appointment to the post of Constable. Subsequently, his candidature was cancelled by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, III BN DAP, Delhi Police, vide office order dated 11.6.1993 (Annexure A/2), without assigning any reason. Upon receipt of the order dated 11.6.1993 (Annexure A/2), the applicant approached the Recruitment Cell of Delhi Police, at Kingsway Camp, Delhi, and enquired about the reason for cancellation of his candidature, when he was told that his Caste Certificate was found to be forged, and that the Delhi Police was likely to initiate criminal proceedings against him under appropriate sections of IPC. Subsequently, the Delhi Police filed an FIR No.121/1993, PS Mukerjee Nagar, under Sections 420 and 471 IPC, dated 22.6.1993, against him. The trial in the criminal case began on 24.2.1995. During trial, the prosecution examined as many as 11 P.Ws., and he examined 4 D.Ws. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Rohini Courts, Delhi, vide judgment dated 7.4.2011(Annexure A/3), acquitted him of the charges under Sections 420 and 471 IPC. Criminal Appeal No.6 of 2011 filed by the State against the trial courts judgment was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohini Courts, Delhi, vide judgment dated 16.4.2012 (Annexure A/4). In view of the aforesaid verdicts of the courts, the applicant made a representation, dated 19.9.2012 (Annexure A/6), requesting the respondents to appoint him to the post of Constable. His representation dated 19.9.2012 was rejected by the respondents, vide order dated 26.9.2013 (Annexure A/1). Hence, the applicant filed the present O.A. seeking the following reliefs:
Quash and set aside impugned order dated 26.09.2013 and 11.06.1993;
Respondents be directed to appoint the applicant to the post of Constable and his seniority and pay be fixed in the batch of recruitees of 1991-1992;
Respondents be directed to pay arrears of pay and emoluments;
Respondents be directed to pay the costs of the case to the applicants.
May pass such other further orders/directions deem fit and proper in the facts of the case in favour of the applicant and against the Respondents.
2. In their counter reply, the respondents have stated that the applicant, claiming to be son of Shri Ram Bhool Singh, R/o village Fatehpur, PO-Anoop Shahar, District Bulandshahar (UP), applied for the post of Constable (Exe.) in Delhi Police during the year 1991-92. He was provisionally selected, against Roll No.106 under ST category, subject to verification of his character and antecedents, medical fitness, and final checking of documents, etc. In support of his claim that he was belonging to ST community, the applicant furnished a Caste Certificate of Meena community issued by the City Magistrate, Bharatpur (Rajasthan), indicating his above residential address. The respondents, vide letter No.5018/Rectt.Cell (III Bn.DAP) dated 31.12.1992, requested the Collector & District Magistrate, Bharatpur (Rajasthan), to get the said Caste Certificate verified and to submit a report about its genuineness, or otherwise. In response to the said letter dated 31.12.1992, the Collector & District Magistrate, Bharatpur (Rajasthan), vide his office letter no.Judge/416/12(1)/86-92/2951, dated 29.5.1993 (Annexure R/1), informed that Caste Certificates were issued by the Tehsildar only in District Bharatpur (Rajasthan) and not by the City Magistrate. The Caste Certificate of Meena community was not issued to the applicant. It was a bogus/forged one. As the applicant managed to seek job in Delhi Police by adopting deceitful means, his candidature was cancelled, and he was accordingly informed, vide letter dated 11.6.1993 (Annexure A/2 to the O.A.). Moreover, it was decided to register a case of forgery and cheating against the applicant, and the DCP, North West District, Delhi, registered a case of forgery and cheating against him for submission of forged Caste Certificate of Meena community in order to seek appointment in Delhi Police by adopting deceitful means with dishonest intention. Accordingly, a case FIR No.121/1993, PS Mukherjee Nagar (Delhi), under Sections 420 and 471 IPC, was registered against the applicant. The above criminal case was decided by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Rohini Courts, Delhi, vide judgment dated 7.4.2011, and the applicant was acquitted in the said criminal case on benefit of doubt. The Criminal Appeal filed by the State against the said judgment of acquittal was dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohini Courts, Delhi, vide judgment dated 16.4.2012. The learned trial court, while acquitting the applicant, observed that the applicant was entitled to the benefit of doubt, as the prosecution failed to either place on record the name of the concerned City Magistrate, Bharatpur, or to examine, as a witness, the concerned City Magistrate, Bharatpur, who was alleged to have issued the purported Caste Certificate, and none of the material prosecution witnesses deposed that he could either identify the signature of the concerned City Magistrate or could state that the signature appearing on the copy of the Caste Certificate was not of the concerned City Magistrate. Although the applicant was acquitted in the criminal case on technical grounds, the fact still remains that the applicant did not possess a valid ST certificate at the time of selection, as the ST certificate produced by him was declared as Bogus by the issuing authority. Therefore, the applicants representation, dated 19.9.2012, was rejected by the respondents, vide order dated 26.9.2013. In view of the above, the respondents have prayed for dismissal of the applicants O.A.
3. The applicant has filed a rejoinder reply refuting the stand taken by the respondents. It is stated by the applicant that both the trial and appellate courts have held that there was nothing on record to show that the Caste Certificate in question was not issued by the City Magistrate, Bharatpur (Rajasthan). The respondents have failed to prove their case against the applicant before the trial and appellate courts. There is absolutely nothing on record to show or establish that the Caste Certificate issued by the City Magistrate, Bharatpur (Rajasthan), was not genuine. Therefore, the respondents cannot deny appointment to the applicant at their whims and fancies.
4. We have heard Ms.Jasvinder Kaur, learned counsel appearing for the applicant, and Mr.Amit Anand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.
5. Ms. Jasvinder Kaur, learned counsel appearing for the applicant invited our attention to paragraphs 18 and 19 of the trial courts judgment, dated 7.4.2011 ibid, which read thus:
18. The allegations of cheating and using forged documents by the accused in the case are both based on the fact whether the photocopy of the caste certificate dated 22.01.1990 marked as mark A and mark G that was produced by him at the time of seeking employment in Delhi Police is forged or not. The said certificate is purported to have been issued by City Magistrate, Bharatpur, Rajasthan. The prosecution has failed to examine the officer, who was the City Magistrate, Bharatpur, Rajasthan on 22.01.1990. Moreover, the prosecution has also failed to place on record, the name of the aforesaid concerned City Magistrate. Thus, the identity of the concerned City Magistrate could also not be established by the prosecution. Besides that, the register, if any maintained by the office of the said City Magistrate in that regard has also not been produced on record to show that the said certificate was not issued by the said City Magistrate. PW11 ADM Mahavir Prasad Sharma ahs deposed that he was posted as City Magistrate, Bharatpur, Rajasthan from July, 1990 to September, 1991. Therefore, it is evident that the said witness was not City Magistrate at the relevant time. The cardinal principle of Indian Evidence Act is that the best evidence should be placed on record. In the instant case, the best evidence and the witness was the concerned City Magistrate, who could have identified or denied his signatures on the photocopy of the certificate mark A and Mark G. However, the said witness failed to enter witness box. The none of the material prosecution witnesses has stated that they can identify the signatures of the concerned City Magistrate and the signatures on the photocopy of caste certificate marked as Mark and Mark G does not belong to him. It has created doubt in the prosecution version.
19. The prosecution has placed reliance on a letter Ex.PW2/A dated 29.05.1993,whereby District Magistrate, Bharatpur had intimated DCP, III BTN, DAP, Delhi that the certificate marked as Mark A has not been issued by tehsildar/City Magistrate of Bharatpur. The said letter has been proved by PW2 Kanwar Bahadur, LDC office of Collectorate Bharatpur, Rajasthan. However, PW2 in his cross-examination has deposed that he cannot deny that the certificate Mark A and Mark G might have been issued by City Magistrate, Bharatpur, Rajasthan. He has further volunteered that the report exhibited as Ex.PW2/A written by District Magistrate, Bharatpur, Rajasthan was prepared on the basis of the report of tehsildar. It is an admitted fact that City Magistrate is the superior officer of tehsildar. As per the prosecution as well as the letter Ex.PW2/A dated 29.05.1993, the tehsildar is competent to issue caste certificate and in the normal routine City Magistrate does not issue the same. But it is not denied that the City Magistrate, being senior of tehsildar, is also authorized and competent to issue the same. However, PW2 Kanwar Bahadur, LDC office of Collectorate, Bharatpur, Rajasthan, who has proved the said letter, has specifically stated that the said letter was issued on the basis of report of tehsildar. Thus, it is evident that report from the office of City Magistrate was not obtained before issuing the aforesaid letter exhibited as Ex.PW2/A. Therefore, it seems that the said letter was written only on the basis of the presumption that, since in normal routine the caste certificates are not issued by the City Magistrate, therefore, the said certificate marked as Mark A might not have been issued by the City Magistrate. In the criminal jurisprudence, the accused cannot be convicted on the basis of presumption, rather the accused is held guilty only if evidence against him are proved beyond any shadow of doubt. Thus, there is no clinching evidence on record to suggest that the said certificate marked as Mark A and Mark G is not issued by the City Magistrate, Bharatpur, Rajasthan. So, the accused is entitled to benefit of doubt. In absence of any proof regarding the ingenuity of the said certificate the allegations pertaining to cheating and forgery against the accused are bound to fail and thus, the onus place upon the prosecution has remained undischarged. Ms.Jasvinder Kaur also invited our attention to paragraph 9 of the appellate courts judgment, dated 16.4.2012 ibid, which reads thus:
9. There is nothing on the record file to show that the certificate in question was not issued by the concerned City Magistrate. In the present case, the prosecution witnesses have not deposed on the point that the said Certificate was not issued by the concerned City Magistrate. The concerned City Magistrate has not been examined on behalf of the prosecution. There is nothing on the record file to show that the appellant (sic) had produced forged document i.e. Caste Certificate. In the absence of any evidence on the record file that the said certificate was not issued by the concerned City Magistrate, I am of the considered view that the Ld. Trial Court was justified in acquitting the respondent/accused U/s 420/471 IPC. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, the present appeal is hereby dismissed. Relying on the above findings arrived at by the learned trial and appellate courts, Ms. Jasvinder Kaur submitted that the Caste Certificate, which was produced by the applicant at the time of his selection for the post of Constable (Exe), having been issued by the competent authority and, thus, being a valid Caste Certificate, the cancellation of the applicants candidature and rejection of his representation dated 19.9.2012, vide letter dated 11.6.1993 (Annexure A/2) and memo dated 26.9.2013 (Annexure A/1), respectively, issued by the respondents, are unsustainable and liable to be quashed. Consequently, the respondents are liable to be directed to appoint the applicant to the post of Constable (Exe) with effect from the date when persons selected pursuant to the selection held in 1991-92 were so appointed, with all service benefits including arrears of pay and allowances.
6. Per contra, Mr.Amit Anand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, submitted that the applicant was not honourably acquitted of the charges in the criminal case. The learned Metropolitan Magistrate acquitted the applicant of the charges in the criminal case, by giving him benefit of doubt. The criminal case ended in acquittal, mainly because of non-examination of the then City Magistrate, Bharatpur, and non-production of documentary evidence to show that the purported Caste Certificate was not issued by the City Magistrate, Bharatpur. In the absence of specific findings recorded by the trial and appellate courts that the purported Caste Certificate was issued by the City Magistrate, Bharatpur, and, hence, was genuine, and that a false criminal case under Sections 420 and 471 IPC was foisted against the applicant, the plea of the applicant that the said Caste Certificate was valid, is untenable. Mr.Amit Anand also submitted that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court is entirely different from that required for determining the genuineness, or otherwise, of any documents, including the Caste Certificate, produced by a candidate during the selection process for recruitment to any post/service. On due verification, the purported Caste Certificate having been found to be forged, the candidature of the applicant was rightly cancelled, and after lapse of more than two decades, the applicant cannot be allowed to question the cancellation of his candidature and to claim appointment with retrospective effect solely on the basis of his acquittal in the criminal case. In support of his contentions, Mr.Amit Anand placed reliance on the decision of the Honble High Court of Delhi in Commissioner of Police, etc. v. Mukesh Kumar, etc., W.P. ( C ) No. 4052 of 2012 and connected writ petitions, decided on 29.4.2013; and the decision of the Honble High Court of Jharkhand in The State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) & others v. Ajay Kumar Nand @ Jai Prakash Mandal, L.P.A.No.177 of 2012, decided on 8.1.2014.
7. In Commissioner of Police, etc. v. Mukesh Kumar, etc. (supra), the Honble High Court of Delhi observed thus:
a person being acquitted at a criminal trial may not necessarily mean that the person is innocent. It would only mean that the prosecution could not muster sufficient and credible evidence to sustain a conviction. In todays environment where witnesses are suborned and hence turn hostile, one has to be careful. Thus, the fact of mere acquittal by itself may not be relevant and the background under which an acquittal took place may also become relevant for the reason the concern is not with the consequence of a man being acquitted but is on the subject of character verification. The Honble High Court also observed thus:
23. While considering the nature of acquittal, it would not be enough to simply observe that the witnesses had turned hostile and therefore it would be presumed that the accused had created a terror twice over; firstly when the offending act constituting the crime was committed and secondly when the witnesses were suborned. The judgment of the criminal court has to be taken into consideration with all the aspects leading to acquittal. The manner of acquittal and in particular whether it is on a benefit of doubt. Insofar as the nature of offence is concerned, the facts disclosed in the FIR supported with other material has to be considered. The gravity of the acts alleged the narration of the facts in the FIR and medical evidence has to be considered. Witnesses may not depose in tune with their statements made before the police and thus it would have to be looked into as to whether it was a case where the Investigation Officer did not seek full and complete version from the witness. It being settled law that while appreciating the deposition of witnesses, vis-`-vis their statements made before the police, on the issue of variation and improvements it has to be kept in mind that many a times a person informs facts which he thinks are relevant and ignores to tell facts which he thinks are irrelevant, but in law the relevance or irrelevance may be in converse and hence the duty of he who seeks information to elicit all relevant information.
8. In The State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) & others v. Ajay Kumar Nand @ Jai Prakash Mandal (supra), the respondent was appointed as a Revenue Employee by the Collector. A complaint was received, alleging that the respondents appointment was by way of impersonating the name of Ajay Kumar Nand, whereas his actual name was Jai Prakash Mandal. Based on the complaint, verification and enquiry were made by the departmental authorities, and FIR was lodged against the respondent. In the criminal case, by giving him benefit of doubt, the trial court acquitted the respondent of the charges under Sections 198,200,416, 420, 463, 467, 468 and 471 IPC. The appeal against his acquittal was dismissed by the Honble High Court. Thereafter, departmental proceeding was initiated and charge was framed against the respondent for producing bogus certificate and getting appointment on the basis of false certificate. The Inquiry Officer held that the charges levelled against the respondent were proved, and concluded that the respondent obtained appointment on forged educational certificate in the name of Ajay Kumar Nand. The respondent was imposed punishment of dismissal from service. The respondent assailed the penalty order of his dismissal from service, by filing a writ petition before the Honble High Court. The learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition by setting aside the punishment of dismissal from service and ordering reinstatement of the respondent with 40% of arrears of salary. Hence, LPA was filed by the State challenging the judgment of the learned Single Judge. Allowing the LPA, the Division Bench of the Honble High Court held thus:
20. Mere acquittal in a criminal case by itself cannot be a ground for interfering with an order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. Having regard to the gravity of charges, order of dismissal can be passed even if the delinquent officer had been acquitted of the criminal charges. As held by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr v. Mehar Singh reported in (2013) 7 SCC 685 while the standard of proof in a criminal case is a proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities.
21. The expression honourable acquittal was considered by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Deputy Inspector General of Police and Another v. S.Samuthiram reported in (2013) 1 SCC 598. Considering the meaning of the expression honourable acquittal in S.Samuthiram case, the Honble Supreme Court in paras-25 and 26 held as under :-
25. In R.P.Kapur v. Union of India it was held that even in the case of acquittal, departmental proceedings may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable. In State of Assam v. Raghava Rajgopalachari this Court quoted with approval the views expressed by Lord Williams, J. in Robert Stuart Wauchope v. Emperor which is as follows : raghava case, SLR p.47, para 8) 8. The expression honourably acquitted is one which is unknown to courts of justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in courts martial and other 12 extrajudicial tribunals. We said in our judgment that we accepted the explanation given by the appellant, believed it to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted by the government authorities and by the Magistrate. Further, we decided that the appellant had not misappropriated the monies referred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of our judgment was that the appellant was acquitted as fully and completely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably, this is equivalent to what government authorities term honourably acquitted.
26. As we have already indicated, in the absence of any provision in the service rules for reinstatement, if an employee is honourably acquitted by a criminal court, no right is conferred on the employee to claim any benefit including reinstatement. Reason is that the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court and the enquiry conducted by way of disciplinary proceeding is entirely different. In a criminal case, the onus of establishing the guilt of the accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is assumed to be innocent. It is settled law that the strict burden of proof required to establish guilt in a criminal court is not required in a disciplinary proceedings and preponderance of probabilities is sufficient. There may be cases where a person is acquitted for technical reasons or the prosecution giving up other witnesses since few of the other witnesses turned hostile, etc. In the case on hand the prosecution did not take steps to examine many of the crucial witnesses on the ground that the complainant and his wife turned hostile. The court, therefore, acquitted the accused giving the benefit of doubt. We are not prepared to say that in the instant case, the respondent was honourably acquitted by the criminal court and even if it is so, he is not entitled to claim reinstatement since the Tamil Nadu Service Rules do not provide so.
22. S.Samuthiram case was referred to and followed in the decision of Commissioner of Police, New Delhi & Anr v. Mehar Singh [(2013) 7 SCC 685] and it has been observed that quite often criminal cases end in acquittal because witnesses turn hostile or due to non-adducing of evidence. Such acquittals are 13 not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not stand on par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over. In R.P.Kapur v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1964 SC 787 the Honble Supreme Court has taken a view that departmental proceedings can proceed even though a person is acquitted when the acquittal is other than honourable.
23. In the light of the above, let us examine what is the nature of acquittal in the criminal case against the respondent. By perusal of the judgment of the criminal court (Annexure-10) it is seen that only the informant, who registered the case who was also the Enquiry Officer, alone was examined. The documents also were not produced and marked in the criminal case. Judicial Magistrate, Pakur pointed out that apart from the informant who was also the Enquiry Officer, no other witnesses were examined by the prosecution and the prosecution has not produced the documents. The case ended in acquittal mainly because of non-examination of the witnesses, non-production of the documentary evidence and giving benefit of doubt to the respondent.
24. We are of the view that in the criminal case the respondent was not honourably acquitted by the criminal court: but only due to the non-examination of the witnesses and non-production of the documents, the benefit of doubt was given to the respondent and he was acquitted. These aspects were not kept in view by the learned Single Judge and the learned Single Judge was not right 14 in interfering with the punishment of dismissal merely on the ground that the criminal case ended in acquittal. Having regard to the gravity of the charges that the respondent had secured employment on the basis of fake certificates, the respondent cannot be allowed to work in the department and we are of the view that the punishment of dismissal from service is commensurate with the gravity of the charges and the order of the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.
9. In the criminal case, the charges of cheating and using forged document by the applicant were based on the fact whether, or not, the Caste Certificate dated 22.1.1990, which was produced by him at the time of seeking employment in Delhi Police, was forged. The said Caste Certificate was purported to have been issued by the City Magistrate, Bharatpur (Rajasthan). The prosecution failed to examine, as a witness, the person who was the City Magistrate, Bharatpur (Rajasthan) on 22.1.1990. None of the material prosecution witnesses deposed that he could either identify the signature of the concerned City Magistrate or could state that the signature appearing on the photocopy of the said Caste Certificate was of the concerned City Magistrate. It was found by the learned trial court that no report was called for from the City Magistrate, Bharatpur, by the Collector & District Magistrate, Bharatpur. The letter dated 29.5.1993, whereby the Collector & District Magistrate, Bharatpur, intimated the respondents that the said Caste Certificate was not issued by the Tehsildar/City Magistrate of Bharatpur, was issued solely on the basis of the report of Tehsildar, Bharatpur. The said letter was issued on the presumption that since in normal routine Caste Certificates were not issued by the City Magistrate at the relevant point of time, the purported Caste Certificate might not have been issued by the City Magistrate, Bharatpur. The prosecution did not place on record any documentary evidence to show that Caste Certificates were not being issued by the City Magistrate, Bharatpur, at the relevant point of time. In the circumstances, the learned trial court held that the prosecution failed to place on record the best evidence to sustain the charges levelled against the applicant, and that the onus placed upon the prosecution to prove the charges against the applicant beyond any shadow of doubt remained undischarged. Therefore, the learned trial court acquitted the applicant of the charges, by giving him benefit of doubt. On appeal, the learned appellate court upheld the trial courts judgment. It is, thus, clear that the applicant was not honourably acquitted of the charges levelled against him in the criminal case, but due to non-examination of an important witness and non-production of any documentary evidence to show that Caste Certificates were not issued by the City Magistrate, Bharatpur, at the relevant point of time, the benefit of doubt was given to the applicant, and he was accordingly acquitted of the charges. After going through the trial courts judgment, we have found that the applicant during trial pleaded that he was innocent and was falsely implicated in the case. His Caste Certificate was genuine. The Meena community was recognized in the Central List of the Scheduled Tribes. He had been residing in Rajasthan before shifting to Uttar Pradesh. We have also found that the applicant did not place on record any evidence, either oral or documentary, to establish his plea that the purported Caste Certificate was duly issued by the City Magistrate, Bharatpur (Rajasthan) in his favour and, hence, the same was genuine. D.Ws.1 to 4, examined on behalf of the applicant, only deposed that the applicant belonged to Meena community, and that his family shifted to village Fatehpur, District Bulandshahar (U.P.), in the year 1990. Both the trial and appellate courts have not found that the said Caste Certificate was issued by the City Magistrate, Bharatpur, and was genuine, and that a false criminal case under Sections 420 and 471 IPC was foisted against the applicant. Moreover, the standard of proof required for holding a person guilty by a criminal court is entirely different from that required for determining the genuineness of any documents, including the Caste Certificate, produced by a candidate during the selection process for recruitment to any post/service. On due verification, the purported Caste Certificate having been found to be forged, the candidature of the applicant was cancelled. Therefore, we find no substance in the contention of the applicant that in view of the judgment of his acquittal in the criminal case, the cancellation of his candidature is liable to be quashed and the respondents are liable to be directed to appoint him to the post of Constable (Exe.) with retrospective effect.
10. The other aspect of the matter is that the applicants candidature was cancelled by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, III BN DAP, Delhi, vide letter dated 11.6.1993 (Annexure A/2). If, according to the applicant, the Caste Certificate, produced by him before the respondents, was genuine, he ought to have, immediately or within a reasonable period after cancellation of his candidature, vide letter dated 11.6.1993(Annexure A/2), made a representation to the appropriate departmental authority questioning the cancellation of his candidature, and in the event of his being unsuccessful in getting his grievance redressed at the hands of the departmental authority, he ought to have approached the Tribunal within the prescribed period of limitation. Furthermore, if, according to the applicant, the Caste Certificate produced by him before the respondents was valid, and the respondents filed false FIR dated 22.6.2013 against him under Sections 420 and 471 IPC, he ought to have approached the appropriate court of law for quashing the criminal prosecution. He could also have instituted a suit in the civil court, seeking a declaratory decree that the Caste Certificate in question was valid. Instead of seeking redressal of his grievance relating to cancellation of his candidature and/or selection for appointment to the post of Constable (Exe.), the applicant waited until conclusion of the criminal case in 2012, and thereafter made a representation, dated 19.9.2012, to the respondents to appoint him to the post of Constable (Exe.) and, after the said representation was rejected by the respondents, vide memo dated 26.9.2013 (Annexure A/1), he approached the Tribunal by filing the present O.A. in 2014 questioning the said letter dated 11.6.1993 and memo dated 26.9.2013, and also praying for a direction to the respondents to appoint him to the post of Constable (Exe.) with retrospective effect in view of his acquittal in the criminal case. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the claim of the applicant, besides being otherwise untenable, is clearly hit by the doctrine of delay and laches
11. It is also pertinent to mention here that the applicant has not even produced before this Tribunal a copy of the purported Caste Certificate. He has also not produced before this Tribunal any other contemporaneous documents to substantiate his claim that the letter dated 29.5.1993 ibid issued by the Collector & District Magistrate, Bharatpur (Rajasthan) was baseless; that Caste Certificates were being issued by the said City Magistrate during the relevant period; and that the Caste Certificate in question was duly issued by the City Magistrate in his favour.
12. After having bestowed our anxious consideration to the facts and circumstances of the case and the rival contentions of the parties in the light of the decision of the Honble High Court of Delhi in Commissioner of Police, etc. v. Mukesh Kumar, etc. (supra) and the decision of the Honble High Court of Jharkhand in The State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) & others v. Ajay Kumar Nand @ Jai Prakash Mandal (supra), we have found no substance in the claim of the applicant.
13. In the light of the above discussions, we hold that the O.A., besides being barred by delay and laches, is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the O.A. is dismissed. No costs.
(RAJ VIR SHARMA) (SUDHIR KUMAR) JUDICIAL MEMBER ADMINISTRATIVE MEMBER AN