Punjab-Haryana High Court
Mohan Lal vs Arya Samaj Sewa Sadan, Ballabgarh on 30 November, 2000
Author: J.S. Khehar
Bench: J.S. Khehar
JUDGMENT J.S. Khehar, J.
1. The respondent-landlord, Arya Samaj Sewa Sadan, Ballabgarh is undisputedly the owner of E/173, Ward No. 3, Ballabgarh, part of which is in possession of the petitioner as a tenant. It is not a matter of dispute that the aforesaid premises is in a residential area and is occupied by the petitioner-tenant for residential purpose.
2. The respondent-landlord filed an application for ejectment of the petitioner-tenant on two grounds. First ground raised for eviction was on account of non-payment of rent. Rent was claimed at the rate of Rs. 49/- per month w.e.f. 1.12.1989 to 31.1.1994. Secondly, eviction was sought on the basis of the alleged personal requirement of the landlord (the respondent). The respondent's need of the premises in occupation of the petitioner-tenant is for the purpose of housing a library therein. In this behalf, it is alleged by the respondent-landlord that the Arya Samaj Sewa Sadan was running a library in the name of Durga Devi Library in another building, situated in ward No. 5, Ballabgarh. The aforesaid building, i.e. Arya Samaj Bhawan site in Ward No. 5. Ballabgarh is primarily used for religious ceremonies in the nature of Havans, Satsangs and discourses of Vedas. During the course of the aforesaid religious ceremonies, the library located therein has necessarily to be closed down. The temporary closure of the library during the course of the said ceremonies caused hindrance to the devotees, who use library. It was alleged that in case the library is shifted to the premises in occupation of the petitioner-tenant, the library would operate without any inconvenience to the devotees.
3. On the first ground, it was held by the Rent Controller that the rate of rent was Rs. 40/- besides house-tax at the rate of Rs. 4/- per month. The petitioner-tenant having tendered the rent @Rs. 44/- per month before the Rent Controller for a period of three years prior of three years prior to the filing of the ejectment application, it was held that the petitioner-tenant had discharged his liability on account of arrears of rent. On the second ground also, the claim of the respondent landlord was turned down by the Rent Controller by holding that the respondent-landlord could seek eviction of the petitioner-tenant under Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Haryana Urban(Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 (hereinafter to be referred as "the Rent Act") only on account of personal residence of the respondents. The plea for requiring the premises sought for running a library was held to untenable.
4. Dissatisfied with the determination of the Rent Controller, the respondent-landlord preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority. Before the Appellate Authority, the solitary claim agitated on behalf of the respondent-landlord was the ground of persons requirement. The Appellate Authority upheld the contention of the respondent-landlord and ordered eviction of the petitioner-tenant.
5. Dissatisfied with the order of the Appellate Authority dated 15.12.1999, the petitioner has approached this Court filing the instant petition, wherein the solitary grievance is confined to the ground of personal requirement raised by the respondent-landlord.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant in order to assert that the plea under Section 13(3)(a)(i) was available only where the landlord requires the premises for residential purpose, placed reliance first of all on the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Attar Singh v. Inder Kumar, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 773. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court was called upon to interpret 13(3)(a)(i) of the Act. The same is extracted hereunder for facility of reference:-
13(3)(a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession.
(ii) In the case of rented land, if
(a) he requires it for his own use;
(b) he is not occupying in the urban area concerned for the purpose of his business any other such rented land, and
(c) he has not vacated such rented land without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act, in the urban area concerned."
7. Meaning to be assigned to the words "for his own use" was discussed in paragraph 7 of the aforesaid judgment. The same is being extracted hereunder-
"We are of opinion that the contention raised on behalf of the appellant is correct, and the view taken by the High Court in the case of Municipal Committee Abohar cannot be sustained. It is true that in sub-cl. (a) the words "for his own use" are not qualified and at first sight it may appear that a landlord can ask for eviction from rented land if he requires it for his use, whatever may be the use to which he may put it after eviction. Now if sub-cls. (b) and (c) were not there this would be the correct interpretation of sub-cl. (a). This interpretation has been put by the High in Municipal Committee Abohar; but in that case the High Court has not considered the effect of sub-cls. (b) and (c) on the meaning to be given to the words "for his own use" in sub cl. (a) and seems to have proceeded as if sub-cls. (b) and (c) were not there at all. We are of opinion that sub-cl. (a) has to be read in this provision along with sub-cls. (b) and (c) and it has to be seen whether the presence of sub-cls. (b) and (c) make any difference to the meaning of the words "for his own use" in sub-cl. (a) which is otherwise unqualified. Now if sub-cls. (b) and (c) were not there, a landlord can ask for an order directing the tenant to put him in possession in the case of rented land if he required it for his own use. In such circumstances, it would have been immaterial what was the use to which the landlord intended to put the rented land after he got possession of its so long as he uses it himself. But as the provision stands, the landlord cannot get possession of rented land merely by saying that the requires it "for his own use" (whatever may be the use to which he may put in after getting possession of it) : he has also to show before he can get possession, firstly that he is not occupying in the urban area concerned for the purpose of his business any other such rented land. If (for example) is in possession of any other rented land in the urban area concerned for the purpose of his business he cannot ask for eviction of his tenant from his rented land even though the rented land of which he may be in possession for the purpose of his business may not be his own land and he may only be a tenant of that land. This shows clearly that though the words "for his own use" in sub-cl. (a) are not qualified, the intention of the legislature must have been that if the landlord is in possession of other rented land, whether his own or belonging to somebody else for his business he cannot evict tenant from his own rented land. It clearly follows from this that the intention when the words "for his own use" are used in sub-cl. (a) is that the landlord requires the rented land from which he is asking for eviction of the tenant for his own trade or business. Otherwise we cannot understand why, if it is the intention of the legislature that the landlord can ask for eviction of his tenant of rented land for any purpose whatever, he should not get it back if he is in possession of other rented land for his business. This to our mind clearly implies that sub-cl. (a) has to be read in the light of sub-cl. (b), and if that is so, the words "for his own use" must receive a meaning restricted by the implication arising from sub-cl. (b).
8. Based on the aforesaid discussion, the Apex Court drew the following conclusion:-
"It should therefore be clear that "for his own use" in sub-cl. (a) means use for the purpose of business principally, for otherwise we cannot understand why, if the landlord had given up some rented land which he had taken for business principally he should not be entitled to recover his own rented land if he required it (say) as in this case, for constructing a residential building for himself. The very fact that sub-cls. (b) and (c) require that the landlord should not be in possession of any rented land for his own business and should not have given up possession of any other rented land i.e. land which he was principally using for business, show that he can only take advantage of sub-cl. (a) if he is able to show that he requires the rented land for business. Otherwise the restrictions contained in sub -cl. (b) and sub cl. (c) would become meaningless, if it were held that sub-cl. (a) would be satisfied if the landlord requires the rented land for any purpose as (for example) constructing a residential house for himself. We are of opinion therefore that sub-cls. (a), (b) and (c) in this provision must be read together, and reading them together there can be not doubt that when sub-cl. (a) provides that the landlord requires rented land for his own use, the meaning there is restricted to use principally for business or trade. We have already said that the Act is an ameliorative piece of legislation meant for the protection of tenant, and we have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the words "for his own use" sub cl. (a) in the circumstances must be limited in the manner indicated above, as that will give full protection to tenants of rented land and save them from eviction unless the landlord requires such land for the same purpose for which it had been let i.e. principally for trade or business. We are therefore of opinion that the view taken in the case of Municipal Committee, Abohar is incorrect, and as the respondent landlord required the land in this case not for business of trade principally but only for constructing a house for himself he is not entitled to eject the appellant under Section 13(3)(ii)."
9. It is argued by learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant that on the analogy of the decision rendered by the Apex Court so far as the present controversy is concerned, the words "for his own use" occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act must be deemed to be confined to the use for residential purpose only. Since admittedly the eviction of the petitioner/tenant was claimed by respondent/landlord for using the premises in occupation of the petitioner-tenant as a library, the same would be beyond the purview of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act. Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act is extracted hereunder for facility of reference:-
"13(3)(a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession.
(i) in the case of a residential building if -
(a) he requires it for his own occupation;
(b) he is not occupying another residential building, in the urban area concerned; and
(c) he has no vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act, in the said urban area"
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon Shri Hari Mittal v. Shri B.M. Sikka, 1998(1) RCR (Rent) 92 (P&H) (FB) : 1986-1(89) P.L.R. 1(F.B.), to assert that the legislature while framing the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act intended to ensure that residential accommodation did not fall short of the communities' requirement. On the basis of the aforesaid decision rendered by the Full Bench of this Court, learned counsel vehemently argued that eviction of a tenant under Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act can be sought only if the landlord requires a premises for his own residential requirement and not for any other purpose.
11. To substantiate his plea that eviction could not be sought for a purpose other than for personal residence, learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant relied upon the decision rendered in Shri Dhani Ram v. Shri Diwan Chand Sharma, 1987(2) Rent Law Reporter 566 by the Hon'ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh, which while interpreting Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act concluded that bona fide requirement for "his own occupation" can only mean for the occupation of the landlord for residence and not for business or trade.
12. Reliance was also placed on a decision rendered by a Full Bench of this Court in The Model Town Welfare Council, Ludhiana v. Bhupinder Pal Singh, AIR 1973 Punjab and Haryana 76 :197(1) RCR(Rent) 617 (P&H), to assert that the user of a premises for running a library cannot be considered to be user for residential purpose, but was a user for carrying on business.
13. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord contradicted the legal pleas raised on behalf of the petitioner-tenant. In this behalf, it is vehemently argued that the decision of the Apex Court in Attar Singh's case (supra) relates to an interpretation of the provisions of Section 13(3)(ii) of the Rent Act. It is accordingly submitted that the aforesaid decision is wholly inapplicable to the present controversy. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied on the decision in Mst. Bega Begum and other v. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L.Rs. and other, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 272 to assert that the term "for his own occupation" cannot be limited to accommodation for residential purpose. Pointed attention of this Court was drawn on the observations made by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case, extracted hereunder:
"This brings us to the next limb of the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents regarding the interpretation of Section 11(1)(h) of the Act. Section 11(1)(h) of the Act runs thus:
"11(1)(h).....where the house or shop is reasonably required by the landlord either for purpose of building or re-building, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house of shop is held;
Explanation: The Court in determining the reasonableness of requirement for purposes of building or re-building shall have regard to be comparative public benefit or disadvantage by extending or diminishing accommodation and in determining reasonableness of requirement for occupation shall have regard to the comparative advantage or disadvantage of the landlord or the person for whose benefit the house or shop is held and of the tenant."
It was submitted by Mr. Andley, learned counsel for the respondents that the words used in Section 11(1)(h) are "that the house should be required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any persons for whose benefit the house or shop is held." It was argued that the words "own occupation" clearly postulate that the landlord must require it for his personal residence and not for starting any business in the house. We are, however, unable to agree with this argument. The provision is meant for the benefit of the landlord and, therefore, it must be so construed as to advance the object of the Act. The word 'occupation' does not exclude the possibility of the landlord starting a business or running a hotel in the shop which also would amount to personal occupation by the landlord. In our opinion, the section contemplates the actual possession of the landlord, whether for his own residence or for his business. It is manifest that even if the landlord is running a hotel in the house, he is undoubtedly in possession or occupation of the house in the legal sense of the term. Furthermore, the section is wide enough to include the necessity of not only the landlord but also of the persons who are living with him as members of the same family."
14. Learned counsel for the respondent has also placed reliance on the decision in Shri Krishan and others v. Ghanesham Dass, 1962(64) PLR 1141, wherein it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court that a juristic person like a Trust is entitled to take advantage of Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act. In the aforesaid case, this Court upheld the claim of the Trust for ejectment of a tenant from a residential building in order to start a school in the said building. In the same tenor, reliance was also placed on a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Swami Triguna Nand v. Mahabir Dal of Kalka, 1963(65) PLR 1124, wherein the question whether ejectment of a tenant could be claimed by a landlord, which is a juristic person Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act was upheld. In the aforesaid case, eviction was sought on account of the fact that the landlord required the premises for string of things like
15. Reliance was also placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on The Ropar Central Cooperative Bank Limited v. The Punjab Khadi Mandal and another, 1998-2(120) PLR 418 : 1998(2) RCR (Rent) 456 (P&H). In the aforesaid case, the landlord, a juristic person, had sought eviction of the tenant under Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act. The claim of the landlord in the aforesaid case was that the premises was required for residence of the employees of the landlord. The said plea was upheld.
16. The short question to be determined by this Court in so far as the present controversy in concerned, is whether the words 'for his own occupation", occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act must be considered to apply to accommodation required only for residential purpose or required for other purpose also, including business or trade. According to learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant, the words "for his own occupation" must be deemed to be confined to the use of the premises only for residence, whereas according to learned counsel for the respondent-landlord, it cannot be so confined, but must include user for other purposes also, including business or trade.
17. For giving effective meaning to the words "for his own occupation" learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant his pointedly relied upon the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Attar Singh's case (supra), whereas learned counsel for the respondent-landlord has relied upon the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Mst. Bega Begam's case (supra).
18. Find force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant. In Attar Singh's case (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court had the occasion to interpret Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act. The aforesaid provision had been extracted in this order. In the instant case, the controversy relates to Section (13)(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act, which has also been extracted herein above. In Attar Singh's case (supra), one finds that while interpreting clause 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Rent Act, reliance was primarily placed by the Apex Court on sub-clause (b) and (c). Likewise, while interpreting Section 13(3)(i) of the Rent Act, sub-clauses (b) and (c) must be read along with sub-clause (a) to determine the true purport of the words "for his own occupation". In sub-clauses (b) and (c) of Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Rent Act, the connotation relates to occupation of land by the landlord for business purposes, whereas in sub-clauses (b) and (c) and Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act, the connotation relates to occupation of a building by the landlord for residential purposes. On the basis of the connotation in sub-clause (b) and (c) of Section 13(3)(a)(ii), the Apex Court concluded that the words "for his own use" occurring in sub-clause (a) must be restricted to include use for business or trade only. On absolutely the same analogy, in my considered view on the basis of the connotation in sub-clause (b) and (c) of Section 13(3)(a)(i) the words "for his own occupation" occurring in sub-clause (a) must be restricted to include occupation for residence only.
19. The appellate authority while upholding the claim of the respondent-landlord had relied on Mst. Bega Begum's case (supra) i.e. the same authority relied upon by the counsel for the respondent-landlord. The statutory provision interpreted by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case i.e. Section 11(i)(h) of the Jammu and Kashmir Houses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966, is distinctively different from Section 13 of the Rent Act. In Section 11(i)(h) of the J&K House and shops Rent Control Act the words "for his own occupation" were interpreted at their face value, whereas in the instant case, the words "for his own occupation" must be interpreted in conjunction with sub-clauses (b) and (c) of Section 13(3)(i) of the Rent Act. In the aforesaid view of the matter, it would not be proper to reply upon the decision, relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent-landlord to determine the true connotation of the words "for his own occupation".
20. For the reasons recorded above, the impugned order passed by the Appellate Authority is set-aside by holding the eviction under Section 13(3)(i) of the Rent Act can only be on account of use of the premises by the landlord for residential purpose.
21. Resultantly, the claim for eviction of the petitioner-tenant for use and occupation of the premises in the possession of the tenant for housing a library is declined.
22. Petition allowed.