Madras High Court
Thiru T.R.Baalu vs The Zonal Officer on 21 June, 2011
Author: R.Sudhakar
Bench: R.Sudhakar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 21.06..2011
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE R.SUDHAKAR
W.P. No. 14191 of 2011
.......
Thiru T.R.Baalu,
Hon'ble Member of Parliament,
Sriperumpudur Constituency,
No.68, Thiyagaraya Road,
T.Nagar,
Chennai.17. .. Petitioner
Vs.
1. The Zonal Officer,
Zone-VIII,
Corporation of Chennai,
No.64, NSK Salai,
Kodambakkam,
Chennai.24.
2. The Commissioner,
Corporation of Chennai,
Rippon Buildings,
Chennai.3.
3. The Council Secretary,
Corporation of Chennai,
Rippon Buildings,
Chennai.3. ... Respondents
Prayer: Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to issue a Writ of Certiorarified Mandamus calling for the records relating to the notice Ref. No.Z.O.8/R.D.C.No.R2/3722/2011 dated 31.5.2011 issued by the first respondent and to quash the same and direct the 2nd and 3rd respondents to place the matter before Council, Corporation of Chennai.
For Petitioner : Mr. P. Wilson
Sr. Counsel
for
Mr. R.U.Dinesh Rajkumar
For Respondents : Mr.A. Navaneethakrishnan
Advocate General
assisted by
Mr. E.Sampathkumar
Spl. Govt. Pleader
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O R D E R
This writ petition is filed to call for the records relating to the notice Ref. No.Z.O.8/R.D.C.No.R2/3722/2011 dated 31.5.2011 issued by the first respondent and to quash the same and direct the 2nd and 3rd respondents to place the matter before Council, Corporation of Chennai.
2. By proceedings No. R.D.C.H.Q.No.004648/09, dated 22.5.2009, the petitioner a member of Parliament has been allotted a room already occupied by him. The particulars of the said premises is not clear in the proceedings, however, the same can be discerned from the impugned proceedings of the first respondent. In the said letter dated 22.5.2009, no details of the period of allotment or the rent payable to the Corporation of Chennai has been given but it is stated that the matter will be placed before the Council. In the impugned proceedings, the first respondent/Zonal Officer has called upon the petitioner to vacate the premises within 15 days from the date of the notice for the reason that the Member of Parliament representing the constituency wants a place.
3. Mr. Wilson, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the petitioner is continuing to perform his duty as a Member of Parliament and it is necessary for him to continue in the said premises. The authority has acted contrary to Section 75 of the Act. Therefore, the impugned proceedings of the respondents is liable to be set aside.
4. On the contrary, the learned Advocate General Shri.Navaneethakrishnan, appearing for the respondents submits that the allotment made to the petitioner by the authority earlier is bad. In any event, the matter has not been placed before the Council and no rent has been paid by the petitioner to the Corporation for occupation of the premises and therefore, the authority is justified in issuing of proceedings. The petitioner instead of reply to the same has rushed to the Court.
5. In this case, the petitioner was allowed to occupy the premises in view of the order passed by the then Commissioner of Corporation and he continues to be in possession. The reason for passing the present proceedings by the first respondent is based on a request from the present Member of Parliament of the South Chennai Parliamentary Constituency, to allot a premises to attend the grievance of the Public. In this factual background, the impugned proceedings is challenged.
6. The petitioner, who is in occupation pursuant to allotment by the authority is entitled to a proper notice and an opportunity of pleading his case if the authority wants to resume the property. The rule of Principles of Natural Justice and fair play will have to be followed. The action of the authority in their administrative capacity should stand the test of reasonableness. The petitioner has been asked to vacate the premises by putting him on notice. In this case, the initiation of the proceedings is by the first respondent and that proceedings should be considered as a show cause notice as the authority to decide the issue will be the second respondent/ Commissioner (i.e.) the authority who allotted the premises. The above stated principles of natural justice and proper opportunity has been emphasized by the Apex Court time and again and two such decisions are referred to hereunder:
(i) Union of India and others vs. - E.G.Nambudiri reported in 1991(3) SCC 38 wherein the Apex Court held in paras 7 and 8 as follows:-
"7. On behalf of the respondent it was contended that principles of natural justice require the superior authority to record reasons in rejecting the government servant's representation made against the adverse remarks as the order of rejection affected the respondent's right. It is true that the old distinction between judicial act and administrative act has withered away and the principles of natural justice are now applied even to administrative orders which involve civil consequences, as held by this Court in State of Orissa v. Dr.(Miss) Binapani Devi. What is a civil consequence has been answered by this Court in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, Krishna Iyer,J. Speaking for the Constitution Bench observed:(SCC p. 440, para 66) "But what is a civil consequence, let us ask ourselves, bypassing verbal booy-traps? 'Civil consequences' undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence."
The purpose of the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice and it is no more in doubt that the principles of natural justice are applicable to administrative orders if such orders affect the right of a citizen. Arriving at the just decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial as well as administrative enquiry, an unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may have far-reaching effect than decision in a quasi-judicial enquiry. Now, there is no doubt that the principles of natural justice are applicable even to administrative enquiries. See: A.K.Kraipak v. Union of India.
8. The question is whether principles of natural justice require an administrative authority to record reasons. Generally, principles of natural justice require that opportunity of hearing should be given to the person against whom an administrative order is passed. The application of principles of natural justice, and its sweep depend upon the nature of the rights involved, having regard to the setting and context of the statutory provisions. Where a vested right is adversely affected by an administrative order, or where civil Consequences ensue, principles of natural justice apply even if the statutory provisions do not make any express provision for the same, and the person concerned must be afforded opportunity of hearing before the order is passed. But principles of natural justice do not require the administrative authority to record reasons for the decision as there is no general rule that reasons must be given for administrative decision. Order of an administrative authority which has no statutory or implied duty to state reasons or the grounds of its decision is not rendered illegal merely on account of absence of reasons. It has never been a principle of natural justice that reasons should be given for decisions. See:Regina v. Gaming Board for Great Britain, ex p. Benaim and Khaida. Though the principles of natural justice do not require reasons for decision, there is necessity for giving reasons in view of the expanding law of judicial review to enable the citizens to discover the reasoning behind the decision. Right to reason is an indispensable part of a sound system of judicial review. Under our Constitution an administrative decision is subject to judicial review if it affects the right of a citizen, it is therefore desirable that reasons should be stated."
(ii) Prakash Ratan Sinha vs. - State of Bihar and others reported in 2009(14) SCC 690 wherein the Apex Court held in paras 13 to 15 as follows:-
"13. The law in this regard has been settled by several decisions of this Court. The principle that emerge from the decisions of this Court is that, if there is a power to decide and decide detrimentally to the prejudice of a person, duty to act judicially is implicit in exercise of such a power and that the rule of natural justice operates in areas not covered by any law validly made.
14. Corollary principles emanating from these cases are as to what particular rule of natural justice should apply to a given case must depend to an extent on the facts and circumstances of that case and that it is only where there is nothing in the statute to actually prohibit the giving of an opportunity of being heard and on the other hand, the nature of the statutory duty imposed n the decision maker itself implies an obligation to hear before deciding. These cases have also observed, whenever an action of public body results in civil consequences for the person against whom the action is directed, the duty to act fairly can be presumed and in such a case, the administrative authority must give a proper opportunity of hearing to the affected person.
15. This Court in Canara Bank case has stated that :(SCC p. 570, para 15) "15. The adherence to principles of natural justice as recognised by all civilised States is of supreme importance when a quasi-judicial body embarks on determining disputes between the parties, or any administrative action involving civil consequences is in issue."
Even an administrative order, which involves civil consequence must be consistent with the rules of natural justice."
The above decisions squarely apply to the facts of the present case except that this court is not inclined to interfere with impugned proceedings so long as the right of the petitioner to defend the action is protected and petitioner's rights are safeguarded.
7. In such view of the matter, the proceedings issued by the Zonal Officer/ first respondent is directed to be treated as a show cause notice to the petitioner and the petitioner is entitled to submit his reply to the Commissioner, the authority, who allotted the premises. The second respondent/ Commissioner of Corporation shall decide the issue on merits based on the reply to be submitted by the petitioner. The learned senior counsel appearing for petitioner pleaded that petitioner should be allowed to raise all the available legal plea before the Commissioner. The apprehension, if any, is not well founded. The petitioner is entitled to raise all tenable legal plea and it is for the authority to deal with it as per law.
8. The petitioner is, therefore, given an opportunity to submit his reply to the impugned proceedings treating it as show cause notice within a period of seven days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order and on such reply being submitted, the second respondent is directed to dispose of the same on merits and in accordance with law within a period of seven days thereafter. Till such time the issue is decided by the second respondent, the petitioner's possession of the premises will not be disturbed.
9. With the above directions, this writ petition is disposed of. Consequently, M.P.No. 1 of 2011 is closed. No costs.
ra/ts To
1. The Zonal Officer, Zone-VIII, Corporation of Chennai, No.64, NSK Salai, Kodambakkam, Chennai.24.
2. The Commissioner, Corporation of Chennai, Rippon Buildings, Chennai.3.
3. The Council Secretary, Corporation of Chennai, Rippon Buildings, Chennai 3