Madras High Court
Chairman-Cum-Managing Director, ... vs Ranganatha Iyer V.S. on 3 February, 1998
Equivalent citations: (1998)ILLJ560MAD
JUDGMENT C. Shivappa, J.
1. The appellant-Corporation is a public sector undertaking under the Department of Coal, Ministry of Energy, Government of India. The respondent herein filed two writ petitions W.P. Nos. 9906 and 9907 of 1984. Writ petition No. 9906 of 1984 sought for quashing the order of the Labour Court in Claim Petition No. 966 of 1980. Writ Petition No. 9907 of 1997 sought for quashing the proceedings bearing No. 17439/RI-3/75-16, dated November 7, 1975. The learned Single Judge, while dismissing Writ Petition No. 9906 of 1984, allowed the second Writ Petition No. 9907 of 1984 and granted the relief to the respondent herein. The appellants are aggrieved by the said order in Writ Petition No. 9907 of 1984. Hence, this Appeal.
2. Few facts are necessary to appreciate the issue involved in this appeal. The Department of Coal, Ministry of Energy, Government of India, issued a notification to all public sector undertakings, including the appellant herein, wherein a policy direction was given to the public sector undertakings to implement the twelve point programme for increasing the efficiency of the public sector undertakings. Item 8 of the said programme relates to "weeding out of 'dead wood' among officers, staff and workers" in the public sector undertakings.
3. On the foot of the above direction, a Committee consisting of Shri. D.P. Gupta, the then Director (Mines) as its Chairman, Shri. V. Ramanujachari, the then Financial Adviser & Chief Accounts Officer and Shri. S. Srinivasan, I.A.S. the then Joint Chief of Personnel Administration, was constituted by the Corporation to evaluate the efficiency and performance of higher grade employees in the Corporation. After careful evaluation of the performance of the higher grade employees, the Committee submitted a detailed report on September 26, 1975. The Committee, in its report, identified certain officers as being inefficient and determined that to retain them is not in the interest of the Corporation and recommended dispensing with the services of certain higher grade employees. The respondent herein is one of such persons found to be inefficient and incorrigible. The services of the respondent were dispensed with by an order of the Chairman-cum-Managing Director in Proc. No. 17439/RI-3/75-16, dated November 7, 1975 by giving three months' pay in lieu of three months' notice. This was done in terms of the procedure directed to be adopted by the Board of Directors, in their 111th Meeting held at Neyveli, on October 30, 1974.
4. After three years, the respondent moved the Central Government Labour Court (Tribunal) by filing C.P. No. 82 of 1978 claiming relief under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as "the Act", for retrenchment compensation on the basis that he was a 'workman'. The Claim Petition was dismissed on the ground that the respondent herein was not a workman under Section 2(s) of the Act and secondly that he had approached a wrong forum.
5. In 1980, the respondent moved the Principal Labour Court, Madras, by a Claim Petition No. 966 of 1980 under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, again, claiming to be a workman and seeking retrenchment compensation. The Labour Court, dismissed the claim petition on the ground that the respondent is not a workman under Section 2(s) of the Act, on two grounds that the nature of his work was managerial and supervisory and his salary of Rs. 1100/- exceeds the limit of the Act by Rs.500/- per month (before Industrial Disputes Act, 1982 had come into effect). In 1984, the respondent herein resorted to the two writ petitions before this Court.
6. The case of the respondent herein is that he had been in the services of the Corporation as a Junior Engineer (Civil) and in due course, was promoted as Assistant Engineer (Civil) with effect from November 1, 1971. After sixteen years of continuous service, he was suddenly subjected to impugned order of the Chairman-cum-Managing Director and informed that his services were terminated with effect from November 10, 1975 and an amount equivalent to three months' pay in lieu of three months' notice was delivered to him. According to the petitioner/respondent herein, the removal from service was sudden and unwarranted. He appealed to the Chairman of the Corporation and the Hon'ble Minister, Energy and Power, Ministry, Government of India, only to get a reply that his services were terminated in terms of the service conditions governing the Higher Grade Employees under the contractual obligation fulfilling and discharging on payments due and that there was no case for reconsideration.
7. The Respondent No. 2/appellant herein in the writ petitions filed a counter contesting the claim of the respondent herein inter alia contending that he was appointed as Section Officer in January 1960 and later was promoted as Assistant Engineer (Civil). By invoking the terms and conditions of his employment, the services of the respondent herein were terminated by an order of the Chairman-cum-Managing Director vide order Proc. No. 17439/RI-3/75-16, dated November 7, 1975, on payment of three months' salary. The respondent herein accepted the said termination without any protest. However, after a lapse of about five years, he filed an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act before the first respondent in the writ petitions seeking retrenchment compensation of a sum of Rs. 8,800. Even in the Claim Petition, the writ petitioner has not disputed the order of termination; On the contrary, accepting the termination, he wanted only compensation. The Claim Petition was contested by the appellant herein mainly on two grounds viz., the petitioner is not a 'work man' as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act and the Claim Petition is not maintainable when the status of an employee is in dispute. In support of the contention set forth by the appellant, relevant documentary and oral evidence were adduced. The first respondent in the writ petitions, labour Court, upholding the contentions, held that the writ petitioner is not a workman under the Act and that the petition under Section 33-C(2) of the Act is not maintainable. The order was passed by the first respondent on April 23, 1984. Only subsequent to the disposal of the above Claim Petition, the petitioner has come forward with the present writ petition along with another writ petition challenging the order of termination. The appellant further contended that the writ petition has to be dismissed on the ground of laches as there has been an inordinate delay totally unexplained by the respondent herein. The services of the petitioner were terminated on November 7, 1975. He did not agitate the matter by challenging the notification. In the meantime, two other employees of the Corporation, whose services were also similarly terminated, filed writ petitions challenging their termination of services. In both these cases, writ petition Nos. 565 of 1982 and 10631 of 1984, this Court passed an order dismissing the petitions on the ground of laches and declined to go into the merits of the contentions raised by those petitioners. In both, the petitions, the delay was far less than the delay in the present case. Even then, this Court declined to exercise the extraordinary original jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The earlier decisions of this Court, in almost identical cases since similar, have a bearing in view of the decision in (1993-I-LLJ-260) (SC).
8. As per the terms and conditions of the. service of the petitioner, the Corporation was entitled to dispense with the services of the petitioner by giving three months' notice or three months' pay in lieu of notice period. Paragraph 6 of the Proceedings No. 501/E & G/71, dated December 20, 1971 of the respondent herein, reads thus:
"They shall have to give three months notice or in lieu of such notice forfeit (pay) three months basic pay to the Corporation (employee) if they desire to resign (terminate) from the service of the Corporation, from time to time."
It is the case of the appellant that the respondent herein was a contractual worker and has no right to claim that he is an employee and that the termination does not cast any stigma on the individual nor is it by way of penalty or disciplinary action. The termination has been ordered within the terms of the contract of service as applicable to the individual.
9. From these facts and contentions, the points that emerge for consideration are:
(i) Whether the appellant had the right to dispense with the services of the respondent herein? and
(ii) Whether the claim of the respondent can be entertained after a long lapse of nine years, that too, when he has not challenged the act of termination at the initial point of time?
10. The learned counsel for the respondent has cited several decisions in support of the order of the learned Single Judge, touching the delay, and inter alia contending that the delay in the instant case is not fatal and does not disentitle the respondent for the relief. Since the learned counsel cited these decisions we have adverted to all those decisions though it has consumed a good deal of judicial time. The cases cited by the respondent regarding delay have no application to the case on hand for the following reasons:
11. In Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. (1974-I-LLJ-221) (SC), there was a delay of more than 10 or 12 years in filing the petition. Though the Apex Court held that the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition, but having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case, opined that the petitioners were, therefore, justified in proceeding on the assumption that there were no unified rules of recruitment to the posts of Deputy Collector and the promotions that were being made by the State Government were only provisional to be regularised when unified rules of recruitment were made. It is only when the Bombay High Court accepted that the Rules of July 30, 1959 were the unified rules of recruitment to the posts of Deputy Collector applicable throughout the reorganised State of Bombay that the petitioner did not lose any time in filing the writ petition. In that context, the Apex Court thought it unjust to deprive the petitioners of their rights which accrued to them and that too, in that case, the promotions being provisional they had not conferred any right on those promoted and they were by their very nature liable to be set at naught, if the correct legal position, as finally determined, so required. The effect was only to disturb their inter se seniority as officiating Deputy Collectors or as Deputy Collectors.
12. In Sushil Kumar Yadunath Jha v. Union of India and Anr. (1987-I-LLJ-7) (SC), the situation was that the petitioner was urging for condonation of break in service and he was supported throughout by his immediate superiors because of the high order of the work performed by him in his various postings. It was only then the Government itself turned down his request that he resorted to approach the Court of law for redress, the Apex Court held that he was not guilty of laches in resorting to judicial process, for relief.
13. Arun Kumar Chatterjee v. South Eastern Railway and Ors. (1985-I-LLJ-532) (SC) is a case of loss of seniority of a Government servant with consequent loss of promotion prospects, higher pay and emoluments. He was urging to refix the seniority with the departmental authorities and in that process, there was some delay and he was informed on December 21, 1973 that his representation was rejected and therefore he filed the writ petition on April 30, 1975. The Apex Court held that there was no reason for the Railway Administration to have deprived the petitioner of the benefit of the circular, particularly in view of the decision of Anil Kumar Sen, J. in Lal Mohan Paul v. General Manager, Eastern Railway, Calcutta 1974 Civil Rule No. 620 (W) of 1970, dt. April 23, 1974 (Cal.). It was a case where a right accrued to a litigant after decision by the Court and not during the time he was adjudicating the matter. In such a context, the delay did not assume much importance.
14. In Sualal Yadav v. The State of Rajasthan and Ors. 1977 (2) SLR 698, the Governor had not dismissed the Review Application on the ground of delay but had held that the case was not fit for review. In such a situation, the Apex Court held that it was not open to the High Court to resurrect the ground of delay in the review application at a remote stage and make it a ground for dismissing the writ petition.
15. In Shri. Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. , the Apex Court has held, whether a relief should be granted is a matter of sound judicial discretion governed by the doctrine of laches. It has further held that it is appropriate ordinarily to consider that an unexplained delay in filing the writ petition after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing a suit is unreasonable. But, however, opined that this Rule cannot be a rigid form and held that there may be cases where even delay of a shorter period may be considered to be sufficient to refuse relief in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In that case, the appellant had made excess payment on being assessed by the Department and such payment cannot be treated as voluntary payment precluding him from recovering them. There, the Court did not find anything wrong in the conduct of the appellant to disentitle him to claim the refund of excess payment made in respect of the goods other than wired glass. In such a situation, the Court held, to resort to alternative remedy of second appeal is no bar.
16. Haryana State Electricity Board v. The State of Punjab & Haryana and Ors. is a case where refixing the seniority of a Government servant was involved, which was dismissed on the ground of delay and laches. In such a situation, when the petitioners kept on making representations and moving the appropriate authorities at all stages, the delay was put against them. In that context, the Apex Court held that it was not a case where relief could be declined on ground of delay and laches.
17. In P. C. Sethi and Ors. v. Union of lndia and Ors. (1975-I- LLJ-520)(SC), in view of the hopes held out by the Government from time to time, delay and laches were not considered against the petitioners. It is not the same situation in the instant case.
18. In Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Limited v. District Board, Bhojpur and Ors. , the Apex Court has taken a view that to enquire into a belated and stale claim is not a rule of taw but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case depends on its own facts on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed and how the delay arose etc. If an illegality is manifest it cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. But, when there is no reasonable explanation for the delay and the petitioner kept quiet for a considerable time without questioning the order and that too, when there is no right and the appointment being contractual, removal after enquiry after a report cannot be considered that it is not based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. In such a case, there is nothing like illegality manifest in the order of termination. In such a situation, the delay assumes all the importance and the case cited has no application.
19. Bonbehari v. Nimbkar and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. was a case where arbitrariness was said much on the impugned action. In such a situation, when the petitioners were not personally interested in challenging the arbitrary and illegal allotment of land to a widow of a freedom fighter, the Court took it as a public interest litigation and attached least importance to the delay and laches and the context was the thing to be looked into.
20. Smt. Sudama Devi v. The Commissioner and Ors. was a case where the writ petition filed after expiry of 90 days was rejected by the High Court. The Apex Court held that it was not proper. That case has no application to the case on hand.
21. Rameshwarlal v. Municipal Council Tonk and Ors. is a case where it was held that the time taken in prosecuting the proceedings before the High Court, and the Supreme Court, diligently and bona fide, by needs to be excluded. That decision has no application to the case on hand.
22. West Bengal State Electricity Board and Ors. v. Desh Bandhu Ghosh and Ors. (1985-I-LLJ-373) (SC) was a case of a permanent employee of the West Bengal State Electricity Board, who was unjustly and arbitrarily removed from service and the regulation was in question on the ground of arbitrariness and of vicious discrimination. That is not the fact situation in the instant case.
23. The learned single Judge overlooked the delay on more than one ground viz., that the rule of laches or delay is not a rigid rule which can be cast in a straight jacket formula and if the writ petition has already been admitted, delay need not be considered strictly to defeat the rights of the party, but the learned single Judge has failed to notice the oft repeated dictum of the Supreme Court in and , that in case, a single Judge of the High Court wishes to differ from the view taken by a single Judge of the same High Court, he should refer the matter to a larger Bench or place the papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench. In two other writ petitions, where the facts of the case were same as the present one, the petitions have been dismissed on the ground of laches. In cases of lesser delay, two Judges of this Court dismissed the writ petitions on the ground of laches, but in the impugned order, a contrary view has been taken.
24. In Lala Shri Bhagwan and Anr. v. Ram Chand and Anr. , it has been held that it is hardly necessary to emphasise that considerations of judicial propriety and decorum require that if a learned single Judge hearing a matter is inclined to take the view that the earlier decisions of. the High Court, whether of a Division Bench or of a single Judge, need to be reconsidered, he should not embark upon that enquiry sitting as a single Judge, but should refer the matter to a Division Bench or, in a proper case, place the relevant papers before the Chief Justice to enable him to constitute a larger Bench to examine the question. Court declined to grant the relief. It may, perhaps, be the respondent might have been misdirected in regard to the remedies which he should have adopted. But, what stares one in the face is that it was for the first time in 1984 that he invoked the extra-ordinary powers of the High Court, under Article 226, challenging the legality of the order passed in 1975 and it is in this back-ground that the petition filed after gross delay for which there is no satisfactory explanation, was rejected. The learned single Judge has lost sight of this fact. The conduct of the respondent was, therefore, such which disentitles him for any relief.
31. In Bhoop Singh v. Union of India and Ors. (supra), the Apex Court has held that a person cannot be permitted to challenge the termination of his service after a period of twenty two years without any cogent explanation for. the inordinate delay, merely because others similarly dismissed had been reinstated as a result of their earlier petitions being allowed. In the instant case, the persons similarly situated, though approached earlier, their claim was rejected on the ground of delay and there is no justification to grant the relief claimed by the respondent herein, that too, when he approached the High Court for the first time in 1984, though he was dismissed from service in the year 1975. It is expected of any employee who has a legitimate claim to approach the Court for a relief he seeks within a reasonable period. This is necessary to avoid dislocating the administrative set up after it has been functioning on a certain basis for years. The impact on the administrative set up and other employees is a strong reason to decline consideration of a stale claim unless the delay is satisfactorily explained and is not attributable to the claimant. The lapse of a much longer unexplained period of several years in challenging the termination in the case of the petitioner is a strong reason to classify him with the other dismissed persons who were terminated on the same date on similar grounds. In fact, inordinate and unexplained delay or laches is by itself a ground to refuse the relief irrespective of the merit of the claim.
32. In High Court of M.P. v. Mahesh Prakash and Ors. (1995-II-LLJ-48), the Apex Court has held that when the denial of a right, though was with the knowledge of the first respondent, his approach to the writ Court was grossly delayed. In that situation, the Apex Court has opined that it is appropriate to dismiss such petition on the ground of delay and laches. The rule is that delay defeats rights of a party to seek redress by means of prerogative writ under Article 226. In such situation, he should come to Court at the earliest reasonable possible opportunity.
33. In the instant case, the respondent has not even averred what he was doing after the dismissal of the application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act for a period of three years and he has encashed the amount set along with the notice and he kept quiet for three years and not even averred where he was working till he filed the writ petition and till he attained the age of superannuation though he was removed from service when he was 45 years old. This conduct of the respondent and suppression of his place of working elsewhere gives room to doubt about the bona fides of his case.
34. The learned single Judge held that the respondent herein is an employee under Article 12 of the Constitution of India, known as Neyveli Lignite Corporation Ltd., and that the respondent in the writ petition has acted in complete disregard to the constitutional guarantees aforementioned and has infringed constitutional rights of the petitioner that the order of termination dated November 7, 1975 in proceedings No. l7439/RI-3/75-16 is wholly arbitrary and unconstitutional. Since the respondent herein had attained the age of superannuation, the learned single Judge, on the ground that the respondent herein has not stated anywhere in the petition whether he has some years to go as an employee before he would attain the age of superannuation, he declined to grant that relief, but opined that the proper course will be to compensate by quantifying the amount of compensation for the lost years of service under the appellant corporation, which would, on the one hand repair to some extent the injuries caused to the respondent herein and on the other hand, make the employer corporation aware of its duties towards its employees and directed the corporation to conduct an enquiry and quantify the emoluments payable to the respondent herein from the date of retrenchment minus any amount paid in lieu of termination of service upto the date of compulsory retirement, that is of his attaining the age of superannuation (58 years), and deduct from the same the amount received by the petitioner as emoluments from any other employment and income from any other source and of the amount so worked out, pay to the respondent herein three fourth only, preferably within three months from the date of such application.
35. The learned single Judge, in the course of his order, has observed that nothing has been brought from which it could be found that the Corporation can terminate the contract of service by giving three months' notice or one months' notice as the case may be. The proceedings No. 17439/RI-3/75-16, dt. November 7, 1975 reads as follows: -
"In terms of para 6 of proceeding No. 501/-E&G/71 dated December 20, 1971 read with proceedings No. 11198/RI-3 dated February 1/3, 1975, you are hereby informed that your services in the Corporation be and are hereby terminated with effect from the afternoon of November 10, 1975.
2. Accordingly, a cheque No. CC:18: 220814 dt. November 7, 1975 for Rs. 2,085/- (Rupees Two thousand and eighty five only) representing three months' pay in lieu of three months' notice, after providing for tax deduction, is enclosed.
The learned single Judge has lost sight of the terms under which the respondent herein was appointed. It was only in 1979 (Airports Authority case - AIR 1979 SC 1340) that public sector undertakings are held to be state under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Until 1979, the Courts have repeatedly held that Public Sector undertakings were not State under the Constitution of India and were not amenable to writ jurisdiction and the action of the Appellant Corporation, was not questioned and accepted, by the respondent herein and he encashed even the amount set along with the correspondence, dated November 7, 1975.
36. While holding that the action of the appellant herein was arbitrary, the learned single Judge has not noticed to appreciate that the Corporation being an economic entity and a national industry, has to improve its efficiency and is well within its rights to dispense with the services of inefficient and incorrigible employees and it constituted a duty to evaluate the efficiency and performance of their grade employees in the Corporation and after careful evaluation only, a report was submitted on September 26, 1975 and the Committee in its report identified certain officers as being inefficient and determined that to retain them is not in the interest of the Corporation and recommended dispensing with the services of those employees . It is in those circumstances, a decision was taken in respect of many persons and among them, two persons approached this Court on the earlier occasion and their cases were dismissed on the ground that they have approached the Court belatedly.
37. Ignorance may be either of law or fact. When a person being aware of his termination and he has lost certain right which is vested in him and ignores to take appropriate action or approached a wrong forum and suffered the judgment to go against him or without attempting to rectify the mistake at the earliest possible time, even assuming he has done nothing wrongly, he ought not to be permitted to make a profit out of his own wrong on the principle, " no man is allowed to take advantage of his own wrong". Where a man does an act which may be rightfully performed, he cannot say that the act was not intentional and intact done wrongly. In other words, the author of a wrong who has put a person in a position in which he has no right to put him, shall not take advantage of his own illegal act, or, in other words, shall not avail himself of his own wrong. In the instant case, the respondent having availed the remedy under Section 33-C(2) of the Act before the Central Labour Tribunal and also before the State Labour Court and having lost the case on the ground that he is not a workman, has filed the writ petition in the year 1984 and kept it pending
25. The view of the learned single Judge that the respondent herein has pursued his remedies with due diligence is ill- conceived. In fact, in service matters, the word 'due diligence' has to be interpreted on much stricter footing. In other words, a higher standard of diligence is required. In the instant case, the respondent here in though was relieved of his service on November 7, 1975, he approached the Labour Court in Claim Petition No. 82 of 1978 and he later moved the Central Government Labour Court (Tribunal) by filing a Claim Petition C.P. No. 82 of 1978. Thereafter, he moved the Principal Labour Court, Madras, in 1980 in C.P. No. 966 of 1980 under Section 33-C(2) of the Act and the writ petitions were filed in the year 1984. There was a delay of about three years initially before approaching the Central Government Labour Court (Tribunal) and in all, upto the year 1984, about nine years time was taken when the writ petitions were filed on July 29, 1984. Nowhere in the petition the respondent herein has averred that he was not employed anywhere. This does not speak of bona fides of the respondent herein, in prosecuting the proceedings in other forums. In S. S. Moghe v. Union of India (1981-II-LLJ-198), the Apex Court clearly expressed itself against delay in approaching the Court for relief and held that a period of nearly seven years is too long a period to be ignored, as regards challenging the promotion granted to certain respondents therein. The Apex Court reiterated the earlier view of the Apex Court in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India . It is also contended that setting aside the order of termination amounts to unsettling all actions taken as per the direction of the Central Government.
26. In M.K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank and Ors. , it has been held that "the public sector can never fulfil its life-aim or successfully vie with the private sector if it is not managed by capable and efficient personnel with unimpeachable integrity and the requisite vision, who enjoy the fullest confidence of such undertakings". Where a person was terminated on account of policy decision, on the ground of lack of efficiency and incorrigibleness, granting compensation in view of his reinstatement, that too, when he has not stated in the affidavit that he was not otherwise gainfully employed, amounts to enriching a person who knocks at the doors of the Court at a later time, after attaining the age of superannuation and speaks of non-bonafides in his action.
27. In Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar and Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors. (supra), the Apex Court has taken the view that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there was reasonable explanation for the delay.
28. In AmritLal Berry and Ors. v. Collector of Central Excise, Central Revenue and Ors. (1975-I-LLJ-144), the Apex Court has held that merely by filing repeated or delayed representations, a petitioner cannot get over the obstacles which delay in approaching the Court creates because equitable rights of others have arisen.
29. In The Swadeshi Cotton Milts Co. Ltd, v. The Government of U.P. and Ors. , it has been held that every individual is deemed to know the law of the land. The Courts merely interpret the law and do not make law. Ignorance of law is not an excuse for not taking appropriate steps within limitation. It was also held that the High Court was fully justified in refusing to exercise its discretion under Article 226. Moreover, the petitioner had an adequate alternative remedy by way of going up in appeal and the petitioner, having failed to do so, could not be permitted to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. The contention that the respondent did not know the true legal position is not one that can be accepted in law, as the respondent did not move the High Court at the initial stage and there is no satisfactory reasoning for the same.
30. In Naib Subedar Lachhman Dass v. Un-ion of India and Ors. , the Apex Court deprecated invoking of Article 226 in the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the delay. Even in that case, the writ petitioner adopted various ill- conceived remedies after the Army Chief Staff passed the order and approached the High Court after two years. The for nine long years, till attaining the age of superannuation. In such situation, it is not proper to grant the relief as prayed for by the respondent, who has not even averred what he was doing after the termination, as otherwise it will amount to conferring a relief to a person enabling him to take advantage of his own wrong, when persons similarly situated were denied the relief, if done, it amounts to unsettling the settled matter.
38. We have detailed our reasoning in the aforestated paragraphs disagreeing with the reasoning of the learned single Judge and hence we hold the reasoning of the learned single Judge that the termination is arbitrary and unsustainable and he has lost sight of the terms under which the respondent herein was appointed, the nature of the appointment and also the circumstances under which he was terminated, viz., on the basis of the report of the committee which identified certain officers as being inefficient and incorrigible. Therefore, the appellant had a right to dispense with the services of the respondent herein. Since he has approached this Court for the first time in 1984 though he was dismissed from service in the year 1975, the unexplained delay or laches defeats the right of the respondent to seek redress by means of a prerogative writ under Article 226 of the Constitution, and we answer the second point against the respondent.
39. In fine, we hold that the decision of the learned single Judge is unsustainable on facts and in law and the same is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, it is set aside and the appeal is allowed. The parties to bear their own cost.