Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Inspr. Satyavir Singh (D-1/745) vs Government Of Nct Of Delhi Through on 13 October, 2009
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL PRINCIPAL BENCH NEW DELHI O.A. NO.2719/2008 This the 13th day of October, 2009 HONBLE SHRI JUSTICE V. K. BALI, CHAIRMAN HONBLE SHRI L. K. JOSHI, VICE-CHAIRMAN (A) Inspr. Satyavir Singh (D-1/745) Posted at T.I./Najafgarh, R/O H. No.215, Police colony, Hauz Khas, New Delhi-16. Applicant ( By Shri Pradeep Dahiya, Advocate ) Versus 1. Government of NCT of Delhi through Commissioner of Police, Police Headquarters, IP Estate, New Delhi. 2. Joint Commissioner of Police Traffic, Delhi, Police Headquarters, IP Estate, New Delhi. Respondents ( By Shri R. V. Sinha, Advocate ) O R D E R Justice V. K. Bali, Chairman:
Censure is indeed a minor punishment prescribed under rules, but it is often seen that the same turns out as stumbling block in a big way in the matter of promotion of an officer in Delhi Police. Even though, there are instructions to state that unless the censures may be on the allegations of corruption and moral turpitude, the same may not be taken into consideration in case of promotion, but the law that has evolved is that overall service record of an officer is relevant for the purpose of his promotion. That being so, while proposing to visit a police officer with the penalty of censure, the concerned authority is to give serious thought.
2. Satyavir Singh, an Inspector in Delhi Police, in this Original Application filed by him under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, while challenging the order of censure dated 19.1.2008 upheld by the appellate authority vide order dated 1.10.2008, complains that his case has not been dealt with proper application of mind. The learned counsel appearing on his behalf also contends that mere suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic enquiries, and it may be that the technical rules which govern criminal trials in courts may not necessarily apply to disciplinary proceedings, but nevertheless, the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocent are not punished, applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under statutory rules, on the basis of the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Union of India v S. C. Goel [AIR 1964 SC 364]. We may, while appreciating the points raised by the learned counsel, straightway refer to the allegations on which the applicant has been censured. A show notice dated 11.10.2007 was issued to the applicant on the allegation that on perusal of the fortnightly diary about the use of equipment for the period from 16.9.2007 to 30.9.2007, it was observed that only two prosecutions had been made with alcometers whereas, as per the distribution of general store, two radar guns and two alcometers had been issued to the circle, which would show that there was no proper monitoring, supervision and check on the use of the equipment. It was alleged that the prosecution against drunken driving was on decrease, whereas accidents were on increase. One of the reasons attributed to these accidents was mentioned as over speeding and drunken driving. It was further stated that the need to conduct quality prosecution and to put in use the modern gadgets available had been repeatedly stressed, but it was found that adequate attention towards this aspect was not being paid. The applicant was called upon to submit his reply to the show cause within seven days. Even though, the applicant did not respond to the show cause notice, which was confirmed by the disciplinary authority vide order dated 19.1.2008, but in the appeal filed by him he raised number of issues. His plea with regard to non-use of radar gun being out of order was accepted, whereas the point raised by him with regard to use of alcohol meter was rejected. Relevant observations made by the appellate authority read, thus:
I have carefully considered the appeal and facts and circumstances and evidence on record. I have also heard the appellant in the O.R. While there is no denying that the radar gun was out of order, there is no excuse for not taking adequate action with the alcohol meters issued. If action was not possible against speeding drivers because of the faulty radar gun, all the more emphasis could have been placed on checking with the use of alcohol meters which was not done. The appeal is therefore, rejected. It would appear from the order passed by the appellate authority that one ground raised by the applicant with regard to the radar gun being out of order was accepted. While, however, confirming the order passed by the disciplinary authority, it was observed that there was no excuse for not taking adequate action with the alcohol meters issued, and further that if action was not possible against speeding drivers because of the faulty radar gun, all the more emphasis should have been placed on checking with the use of alcohol meters, which was not done. The applicant raised the pleas with regard to the area where there was no pub and where the residents were such who would normally not indulge in drunken driving. The findings as made by the appellate authority, in our view, could not be recorded unless it was first found on some reasonable data or material that there was indeed lot of cases of drunken driving in the area of the applicant. All on that count that has been mentioned in the show cause notice is that accidents were on the rise. One could imagine if in tune with the contents of the show cause notice as mentioned above, a finding was also to be recorded that during the period under consideration, there have been number of accidents. No such data appears to have been collected nor thus mentioned either in the order passed by the disciplinary or the appellate authority. The positive case of the applicant is that wherever a person was found drunk, use of alcometer was made and if its use did not lead to the conclusion of the driver being under influence of liquor, or even having consumed liquor, it could not be said that the alcometer was not used. There appears to be considerable merit in the contention of the learned counsel as noted above. There is no data showing the number of accidents during the period in question. Simply by saying that there was increase in accidents, that would lead to a conclusion that alcometer was not used, may not be enough to inflict the applicant with the penalty of censure. It is interesting to note that the categorical case of the applicant is that he had issued 457 challans for over speeding and this fact is not in dispute. It is not the case of the respondents that in respect of the challans issued by the applicant he had not made use of alcometer. The applicant has placed on records a list of drunken challans in three areas known as NJC, VVC and DCC. In the month of January, 2007 in the area of NJC, there were two challans, whereas there were four and six challans in the areas of VVC and DCC respectively. The challans in the three areas as mentioned above, between January and December, 2007 vary from one to twenty. It does not appear that the appellate authority applied its mind to the relevant data, nor surely, it dealt with the various points raised by the applicant, and in particular, as referred to above. It is not a case where the respondents may have even mentioned the number of accidents in the concerned area. It is not even their case that the accidents had occurred but cases were not being registered. Unless, therefore, there was a finding with regard to number of accidents, which may be far more than which actually occurred, and where alcohol meter was not used, no finding adverse to the applicant could be recorded. To illustrate, if it may be first established that there were fifty accidents in the concerned area during a specified period and the applicant had made use of alcohol meter only in two cases, the applicant would be certainly held guilty, but unless, as mentioned above, there is no data with regard to the number of accidents, the finding of non-use of alcohol meter could not be recorded. It may be recalled that it is not that the applicant was not doing his duty; he had issued 457 challans for over speeding.
3. We find considerable merit in this Application. That being so, the impugned orders dated 19.1.2008 and 1.10.2008 passed by the disciplinary and appellate authorities respectively, deserve to be quashed and set aside. Ordered accordingly. The applicant would be entitled to consequential reliefs, if any, in consequence of setting aside the impugned orders. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.
( L. K. Joshi ) ( V. K. Bali ) Vice-Chairman (A) Chairman /as/