Delhi District Court
Gurbinder Singh Dhillon vs Gagan Dass on 2 December, 2021
IN THE COURT OF SHRI SANJEEV KUMAR-II,
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE-04,
SOUTH DISTRICT, SAKET COURTS,
NEW DELHI.
RCA DJ 47/2020
Gurbinder Singh Dhillon
S/o Shri Chandan Singh Dhillon,
R/o P-81, South Extension,
Part-II, New Delhi-110049. ............Appellant
Versus
Gagan Dass,
S/o Late Sh. Jai Karan Dass,
R/o H. No. 5770,
Gali Hanuman Mandir,
Nabi Kareem, Pahar Ganj,
New Delhi. .........Respondent
Instituted on: 15.12.2020
Reserved on: 10.11.2021
Pronounced on: 02.12.2021
JUDGMENT
This is an appeal preferred by the appellant-defendant against the respondent-plaintiff under Section 96 of of the Code RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 1 of Civil Procedure,1908 (in short 'CPC') against the judgment and decree dated 20.09.2019 passed the learned Civil Judge-01, South District, Saket Courts, New Delhi in CS SCJ 83556/2016 titled as "Gagan Dass v. Gurbinder Singh Dhillon" wherein and whereby the application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC moved by the plaintiff was allowed and suit was decreed with costs by directing the defendant to hand over the vacant possession of the suit property (property bearing no. P-81, South Extension, Part-II, New Delhi to the plaintiff and to pay the arrears of rent @ rupees 8800/-, as per the lease agreement dated 05.08.08 from 01.01.2013 to 22.12.2014 and damages at the rate of rupees 300/- per day from 23.12.2014 till date of delivery of possession.
2. The respondent-plaintiff had filed suit for possession, recovery of arrears of rent and damages and permanent injunction against the appellant-defendant which was pending before learned trial court stating that he is the owner of the suit property purchased from one Shyam Lal vide registered sale deed dated 12.06.2009 and the suit property was got mutated in his name on 14.10.2019. At request of the defendant, the suit property was leased out by the plaintiff to the defendant with effect from 01.08.2009 to a mutually agreed monthly rent of rupees 6000/- vide a registered lease agreement dated 05.08.2009. The tenancy was for a period of three years and in terms of the clause of the lease agreement, it was agreed that rent was to be enhanced by 20 per cent of every year and if the lease would be extended for any further period on the request of RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 2 the tenant, then the rent would be increased for 15 per cent.
3. It is further stated in the plaint that the defendant had been most irregular in paying the rent and have not paid any rent since 31.12.2012. By efflux of time, the lease was expired but the defendant did not hand over the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property to the plaintiff. The plaintiff served a notice dated 22.12.2014 on the defendant whereby the lease of the suit property was terminated for commuting breach of terms of the lease agreement and also completion of the lease period but the defendant has neither replied to the said notice nor complied with the demand. The plaintiff had prayed for decree of possession of the suit property; decree of sum of rupees 1,50,000/- being arrears of rent with effect from 31.12.2012; decree for a sum of rupees 15,000/- per month (which is the prevalent market rent of the suit property) as mesne profits and damages for a illegal use and occupation of the suit property with effect from 31.12.2012 till the date of handing over the possession; decree of permanent injunction restraining the defendant from parting the possession of the suit property to any third person and pendentlite and future interests at the rate of 18 per cent per annum on the due amount.
4. The appellant-defendant had filed written statement before the learned trial court stating that the plaintiff has suppressed from the court the material facts i.e. the FIR no. 81 of 2013 which was filed against the plaintiff by members of his family for forging and fabricating documents and falsely claiming absolute title to the suit property. The plaintiff has suppressed material fact RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 3 from the court that one late Sh. Banarasi Dass Santosh Nath was original owner of the suit property who executed a will dated 24.01.1990 whereby he bequeathed the suit property amongst his four sons, namely, Jai Karan Dass, Jagminder Dass, Rakesh Dass and Joginder Dass. One son, namely, Jai Karan Dass (father of the plaintiff) instituted a suit for partition against the three brothers and four-sisters which was finally decided by civil court vide judgment dated 09.09.2004 holding that the property be divided among four sons in equal shares. As per the said judgment, the father of the plaintiff at best was entitled to only ¼ share in the suit property. Father of the plaintiff expired on 04.05.2009 leaving behind a widow and two sons including plaintiff. Thus, the plaintiff is entitled to only 1/3rd share in the ¼ share of his father in the suit property. The plaintiff deliberately with a malafide intention represented in the suit that he is sole and absolute owner of the suit property. The fact is that the plaintiff is claiming ownership of the suit property on the basis of forged and fabricated documents which is subject of a FIR no. 81/2013 against the plaintiff in P.S. Hauz Khas, Delhi.
5. It is further mentioned in the said written statement that the defendant's wife's family has originally taken the suit property in 1984 from one late Sh. Banarasi Dass Santosh Nath. The lease agreement was renewed from time to time and a renewal lease deed dated 06.01.1990 was executed between late Banarasi Dass Santosh Nath and J.V Liddle (defendant's father-in-law). This lease was again renewed in the year 15.01.1994 and another lease deed was executed between Banarasi Dass Santosh Nath and RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 4 A.G. Liddle (defendant's month-in-law). On 27.04.1996 Sh. Banarasi Dass Santosh Nath expired. In late 1996 Late Sh. Jai Karan Dass, son of Mr. Banarasi Dass and father of the plaintiff approached defendant and asked him stop paying the rent. No reason was given for this request, despite questions on the same and thereafter for many years neither the landlord nor anybody on their behalf approached the defendant for payment of rent despite repeated attempts on behalf of the defendant for the same.
6. It is further stated in the written statement that in the year 2007 Late Sh. Jai Karan Dass, father of the plaintiff, approached defendant and demanded the rent whatever was unpaid till 2006. He claimed that he has been authorized by the family to collect the rent of the premises and showed the defendant some document with respect to the same. The copy of the document was not provided to the defendant. After some negotiations with Mr. Jai Karan Dass, it was agreed that the defendant should pay the rent of three years for the unpaid period and this was duly paid to Late Sh. Jaikaran Dass. Thereafter a fresh lease was entered into for a period of four years between Late Sh. Jai Karan Dass and the defendant starting from 07.05.2008. Sh. Karan Dass expired on 04.05.2009. Thereafter the plaintiff, son of Sh. Jai Karan Dass approached the defendant and falsely represented himself to be true and absolute owner of the suit property. The plaintiff told defendant that Late Sh. Banarasi Dass had sold the suit property to one Mr. Shyam Lal who in turn sold the suit property to him. The defendant was unaware of true state of family affairs of plaintiff's family and did not know that plaintiff RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 5 was making false representations and claims. The defendant did not know that Late Sh. Banarasi Dass Santosh Nath had executed a will dated 24.01.1990 and as per it plaintiff had only 1/4 th share in 1/3rd share of the suit property which had fallen into plaintiff's fathers share as per the will. The plaintiff misled defendant on basis of his false representations and forged documents to enter into fresh lease agreement dated 04.08.2009.
7. It is further case of the defendant that in early 2010 plaintiff expressed a desire to sell the suit property to the defendant. After discussions, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement to sell for the entire property in May, 2010. This agreement to sell was entered into on the condition that all original papers relating to the title would be handed over to defendant for verification. An advance of rupees One Lac only was paid to plaintiff vide cheque No. 701451. Subsequently to this agreement, the plaintiff refused to submit the complete set of papers importantly, the Relinquishment Deeds from his family members. Subsequently, the defendant came to know that other members of plaintiff family were also claiming to have a share in suit property. Thereafter, the defendant put the agreement to sell on hold at this point. The defendant found out that the plaintiff has sold the suit property to other people also.
8. In appeal, the grounds taken by the appellant are that the Trial Court has failed to answer the issues framed as to whether the the plaintiff is legally entitled to a decree of recovery of possession. The respondent by his own admission and averments RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 6 made in the suit has not been able to prove his right, title and interest in the suit property. The Trial Court has erred in holding that as per the provisions of Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, the tenant cannot question the landlord's title to the suit property. In the present case, the appellant i.e. the tenant on the basis of misrepresentation and fraud was made to sign a lease deed on 04.08.2009 and after that had also been incited to enter into an agreement to sell dated 24.05.2010 and make a payment of rupees 1,00,000/- based on the false claims of the respondent of being the sole and absolute owner of the suit property vide fraudulent and fabricated sale deed. As soon as the appellant got to know of the respondent's misactions of selling the property to several other people and of the title of the suit property being in dispute, the appellant stopped the process of purchasing the suit property. Therefore, the Trial Court erred in holding that the tenant cannot question the title of the landlord when it was only in 2010 that they found out about the falsehood of the respondent's statement of being sole and absolute owner of the suit property on the basis of the fraudulent sale deed.
9. It is further stated in appeal that the contract of lease deed executed by the respondent is a piece of fraud since the respondent has admitted in its cross examination of not having any valid sale deed in respect of the suit property at any time. It has been established on record that the alleged sale deed is invalid and a fraudulent document where execution of a lease deed would not raise any estoppel against the appellant. The Trial Court has failed to consider the disputed questions of facts and RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 7 issues arising in the plaint itself in as much as no finding has been returned with regard to issue of locus of respondent to maintain the suit based on defective title. In the absence of any documentary proof of ownership with regard to title of the suit property the respondenv/plaintiff's, suit for possession and injunction could not have been decreed merely based on admission made by appellant in his written statement. On the pleadings of the party there are disputed issues of facts and law and the Trial Court grossly erred in decreeing the suit.
10. It is further stated in appeal that the impugned judgment and decree has completely failed to consider the active concealments brought about by the appellant by way of documentary evidence and recorded in the impugned judgment and decree. The entire lease deed is actuated by fraud and hence illegal on which no reliance could have been placed to attorn the provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act in the present case. The respondent prior to executing the lease deed had obtained fabricated sale deed dated 12.06.2009 to become alleged owner of the suit property. In such circumstances it does not debar a tenant from challenging the validity of the landlord on the basis of previous events which occurred before the tenant was inducted in the premises. Hence Section 116 of the Evidence Act does not debar the tenant from proving the subsequent events in relation to the title of the landlord. In other words Section 116 of the Evidence Act does not stop the tenant from raising the plea that landlord had no title to the suit property before he was inducted as tenant. Trial Court has erroneously passed the impugned RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 8 judgment and decree in complete disregard to the documents placed on record and the objections raised by the appellant more particularly that the respondent has till date not been able to show the Relinquishment Deeds, if any, executed by other family members of Late Shri Banarsi Dass Santosh Nath who have a share in the suit property. The respondent has without any cogent proof thereof, showcased himself as the sole and absolute owner of the suit property rendering the execution of lease deed in favour of the appellant as invalid document under the Contract Act.
11. Mr. S.S Jauhar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has submitted that in view of the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of S.C. Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2020) SCC OnLine SC 841, the power under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC is a discretionary power and cannot be exercised as a matter of right where the disputes and objection raised by the defendant goes to the root of the case.
12. Mr. Jauhar has further submitted that a suit had been filed by the respondent on the ground that he is the absolute owner of the suit property vide sale deed dated 12.06.2009 which was alleged to have been purchased from one Shyam Lal. After completion of the pleadings, the learned trial court framed the issues on 15.12.2015 including the issue "(b) whether the suit was maintainable for want of cause of action and suppression of material facts". The respondent has not been able to prove his right, title and interest in the suit property and the learned trial RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 9 court has failed to decide the issue in the suit.
13. Mr. Jauhar has further submitted that the learned trial court has grossly erred in holding that as per the provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act the tenant cannot question the title of the plaintiff qua the suit property. The appellant on the basis of misrepresentation and fraud was made to sign a lease deed on 04.08.2009 and thereafter, entered into agreement to sell dated 24.05.2010 based on false claim of the respondent of being sole and absolute owner of the suit property vide fraudulent and fabricated sale deed. In law, the tenant has every right to challenge subsequent to the execution of the lease deed the same being based on misrepresentation and fraud and is hit by Section 17 of the Contract Act. The said lease deed is a nullity in the eyes of law and cannot be acted upon and as such the law of estoppel cannot be pressed to such absurdity. The contract or lease executed by the respondent is piece of fraud since the respondent has admitted in his cross-examination of not having any valid sale deed in respect of suit property in any time which goes to establish that the sale deed is forged and fraudulent piece of document where execution of lease deed would not raise any estoppel against the appellant.
14. Mr. Jauhar has further submitted that in the absence of any documentary evidence with regard to ownership of the suit property, the respondent's suit for possession and injunction could not have been decreed based on admissions made by the appellant in the written statement. The learned trial court has RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 10 decreed the suit on the basis of admissions under Order XII Rule 6 CPC without adverting to the defence which was taken by the defendant to resist the suit. In this regard, learned counsel has relied upon S.C Ahuja (supra) and Manisha Commercial Ltd. v. N.R. Dongre & Ors. AIR (2000) DEL 176.
15. Mr. Jauhar relying upon Smriti Madan Kansagra v. Perry Kansagra, 2021 (12) SCALE 98, it has been submitted further that the basic principal is that a party who secures a judgment by taking recourse to fraud should not be allowed to entertain the fruits of the decree thereof. The suppression of any material facts and documents amounts to a fraud on court. Further relying upon S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath, (1994) 1 SCC 1, learned counsel has submitted that no judgment of the court can stand if it has been obtained by fraud.
16. Mr. Jauhar further submitted that impugned judgment and decree has failed to consider the active concealments brought about by appellant by way of documentary evidence and recorded in the impugned judgment. The entire sale deed is actuated by fraud and hence illegal and non-est on which no reliance could have been placed to attorn the provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act. The respondent prior to executing the lease deed had obtained fabricated sale deed dated 12.06.2009 to become alleged owner of the suit property. As such it does not debar under the circumstances a tenant from challenging the validity of the landlord on the basis of previous events which occurs before the tenant was inducted in the RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 11 present. Hence, Section 116 of Evidence Act does not debar the tenant from providing the subsequent events in relation to the title of the landlord. Section 116 of Evidence Act does not stop the tenant from raising the plea that landlord had no title to the suit property before he inducted as tenant. The learned trial court ought not to have decreed the suit merely on the admissions on the part of the appellant. Judgment passed in case of Rajeshwar Prasad & Ors. v. Sita Ram Marwari & Ors., MANU/BH/0069/1977 has been relied upon.
17. Mr. Jauhar has lastly submitted that sale deed produced by the respondent did not make out clear title in the name of the respondent to entitle him a decree of recovery of possession of the suit property. Judgment passed in case of Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi & Ors., (2003) 8 SCC 319 has been relied upon.
18. Mr. Vipin Saini, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has opposed the appeal stating that in the said FIR which has been stated by the learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant is also one of the accused. There is no suit pending in any court disputing the ownership of the respondent herein qua the suit property. The sale deed in favour of the respondent has not been challenged. The suit has been decreed on the basis of admissions made in the written statement of the appellant herein. The appellant has not filed any counter-claim against the respondent herein. The learned trial court has rightly decreed the suit on the application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC moved RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 12 on the basis of admissions made by the appellant herein in his written statement and therefore, appeal may be dismissed.
19. Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC pertaining to judgment on admissions, reads as follows :-
''6. Judgment on admissions.-
(1) where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions.
(2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1) a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced''.
20. On 15.10.2020, three-Judge Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja, Civil Appeal no. 2483 of 2020 in relevant paragraphs 86, 87, and 97 held/observed:
"86. The question which is posed for the consideration is, whether the learned Trial Court was justified in passing the decree on alleged admission under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC or not. What is required to be considered is what constitutes the admission warranting the judgment on admission in exercise of powers under Order XII Rule 6, CPC. This Court had occasion to consider above in decisions; Himani Alloys Limited Vs. Tata Steel Limited, (2011) 15 SCC 273 and S.M. Asif Vs. Virender Kumar Bajaj, (2015) 9 SCC 287.
87. In Himani Alloys Limited (supra), this Court had an occasion to consider the scope and ambit of judgment on RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 13 admission in exercise of powers under Order XII Rule 6, CPC. It is observed and held in paragraph 11 that being an enabling provision, it is neither mandatory nor preemptory but discretionary for the Court to pass judgment on admission in exercise of powers under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. It is observed that the Court, on examination of the facts and circumstances, has to exercise its judicial discretion keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant by way of an appeal on merits. It is further observed that, therefore, unless the admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional, the discretion of the Court should not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim. In short, the discretion should be used only when there is a clear "admission"
which can be acted upon. It is further observed and held that "admission" should be categorical. It should be a conscious and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
97. We have noticed the law laid down by this Court in S.M. Asif Vs. Virender Kumar Bajaj (supra) where this Court in paragraph 8 has laid down following:
"8. The words in Order 12 Rule 6 CPC "may" and "make such order ..." show that the power under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Judgment on admission is not a matter of right and rather is a matter of discretion of the court. Where the defendants have raised objections which go to the root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise the discretion under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC. The said rule is an enabling provision which confers discretion on the court in delivering a quick judgment on admission and to the extent of the claim admitted by one of the parties of his opponent's claim."
21. Hence, the law in respect of judgment on admissions under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC is settled and has been reiterated recently in Satish Chander Ahuja (supra) that being an enabling provision, it is neither mandatory nor pre-emptory but discretionary for the Court to pass judgment on admissions in RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 14 exercise of powers under Order XII Rule 6 CPC; that the Court, on examination of the facts and circumstances, has to exercise its judicial discretion keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant by way of an appeal on merits; that, unless the admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional, the discretion of the Court should not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim; that the discretion should be used only when there is a clear "admission" which can be acted upon; that discretion cannot be claimed as of right; that where defendants raised objections which go to root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise discretion under Order XII Rule 6 CPC.
22. It is not in dispute between the parties that the appellant- defendant is tenant of the respondent-plaintiff in respect of the suit property; that the registered lease agreement dated 05.08.2009 was executed between the parties qua the suit property whereby monthly rent of rupees 6000/-was fixed; that the tenancy was for a period of three years and rent was to be enhanced by 20 per cent of every year and if the lease would be extended for any further period on the request of the tenant, then the rent would be increased for 15 per cent; that the lease would be extended subject to the approval of the lessor; that the appellant has not paid rent since 31.12.2012; that the appellant served a notice dated 22.12.2014 upon the respondent whereby said lease was terminated.
RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 15
23. It is pertinent to mention here that before passing impugned order, learned trial court vide order dated 14.12.2018, allowed the application under Order XXXIX Rule 10 of the CPC filed by the respondent herein directing the appellant herein to deposit arrears of rent in court at the rate of rupees 8,800/- per month from January 2013 till December 2018, within three months by way of short term fixed deposit and directing further to regularly deposit rent of rupees 8,800/- per month before the seventh day of each month in court on monthly basis by way of short term fixed deposit. While passing said order, it was also observed by learned trial court that title of a landlord is not open to challenge by a tenant in terms of Section 116 of Indian Evidence Act; that the tenancy has been admitted by him; that the payment of rent to the plaintiff till December 2012 is not disputed; that it stands admitted that no rent has been paid by the defendant in respect of suit property since January 2013; that rent receipt placed on record by the plaintiff alongwith the plaint are also not disputed; that even in reply to the application under Order XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 CPC, the only defence taken by the defendant is that the plaintiff is not a real owner and therefore, he is not entitled to receive the rent from the defendant. The said order was challenged by the appellant herein in appeal but same was dismissed as withdrawn. Hence, that order and the observations made therein attained finality.
24. In a landlord-tenant suit, the landlord is not required to prove his title in the subject property as in a title-suit. The defendant-appellant stated in para 5 of his written statement that RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 16 the plaintiff is entitled to only 1/3 rd share in 1/4th share of his father in the the suit property. In its para 9, it is stated that the defendant did not know that Late Sh. Banarasi Dass Santosh Nath had executed a will dated 24.01.1990 and as per it plaintiff had only 1/4th share in 1/3rd share of the suit property which had fallen into plaintiff's fathers share as per the will. Therefore, the appellant himself admitted that the respondent has share in the suit property. This is not the case where the appellant-defendant is denying the right, title and interest of the respondent-plaintiff completely in the suit property. Even if it is assumed that the respondent is not sole owner of the suit property even then the suit of the respondent-plaintiff cannot be thrown out because the appellant-defendant is admitting share of the respondent in the suit property. The respondent can be said atleast to be landlord of the suit property. From this angle also, it cannot be said that the appellant-defendant has raised the objections which go to root of the case.
25. The defence taken on behalf of the appellant-defendant that the plaintiff is not the owner of the suit property and has mislead the defendant at the time of entering into the lease agreement, was rightly rejected by learned Trial Court in view of rule of estoppel embodied in Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872. In view of said rule of estoppel, no tenant of immovable property shall during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property.
RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 17
26. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Sri S.K. Sarma v. Mahesh Kumar Verma [Appeal (Crl.) No. 960 of 2002] decided on 17.09.2002 referred to the decision in S. Thangappan v. P. padmavathy, (1999) 7 SCC 474 in which it was held that Section 116 of the Evidence Act, 1872 puts an embargo on a tenant of an immovable property, during the continuance of his tenancy to deny the title of his landlord at the beginning of his tenancy, and the significant words under it are 'at the beginning the tenancy". So a tenant once inducted as a tenant by a landlord, later cannot deny his landlord's title. However defective the title of such landlord may be, such tenant cannot deny his title.
27. Section 116 of the Evidence Act embodies therein a rule of estoppel. No tenant of immovable property, or person claiming through such tenant, shall, during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to deny that the landlord of such tenant had, at the beginning of the tenancy, a title to such immovable property. This estoppel so long as it binds the tenant excludes the tenant from raising a plea disputing the title of his landlord at the commencement of the tenancy. It flows as a corollary therefrom that the proof of landlord-tenant relationship tantamounts during the continuance of tenancy to proof of ownership of landlord over the tenancy premises at the beginning of the tenancy so far as the tenant is concerned. It is significant to note that on the phraseology of Section 116 of the Evidence Act the rule of estoppel applies so long as the tenancy is not terminated and the rule estops the tenant from laying challenge to the ownership of the landlord at the commencement of the tenancy. But the rule of RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 18 estoppel as incorporated in Section 116 is not exhaustive and it may be extended or suitably modified in its application to other situations as well, retaining the basic feature of the rule. [Sheela & Ors v. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, Appeal (Civil) No. 3965 of 1999]
28. There are exceptions to this rule of estoppel. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment passed on 18.11.2005 in case of E. Parashuraman (D) By LRs. v. V. Doraiswamy (D) By LR, [Civil Appeal No. 3502 of 2004] observed that the exception to the rule of estoppel embodied under Section 116 of the Evidence Act arises if it is shown that since the date of the tenancy the title of the landlord came to an end, or that he was evicted by a paramount title holder, or that even though there was no actual eviction or dispossession from the property, under a threat of eviction, the tenant had attorned to the paramount title holder and a new jural relationship of landlord and tenant had come into existence between them. The instant case does not fall in any exception of rule of estoppel embodied under Section 116 of the Evidence Act because such a situation has not arisen in the instant case. In these circumstances the exception to the rule of estoppel embodied in Section 116 of the Evidence Act cannot be pleaded by the appellant.
29. In view of above discussion, this Court is of the view that appellant-defendant raised no objections which go to root of the case and the learned Trial Court on the admissions of the RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 19 appellant herein, has rightly allowed application under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC. Hence, appeal is dismissed.
Digitally signed by SANJEEV SANJEEV KUMAR
Dated: 02.12.2021 KUMAR Date:
2021.12.02
16:31:07 +0530
(Sanjeev Kumar-II)
Additional District Judge-04
South District, Saket Courts, New Delhi.
RCA DJ 47/2020 Gurbinder Singh Dhillon v. Gagan Dass 20