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[Cites 2, Cited by 16]

Supreme Court of India

Kundan Mal vs Gurudutta on 25 January, 1989

Equivalent citations: 1989 SCR (1) 330, 1989 SCC (1) 552, AIRONLINE 1989 SC 230

Author: L.M. Sharma

Bench: L.M. Sharma, M.H. Kania

           PETITIONER:
KUNDAN MAL

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
GURUDUTTA

DATE OF JUDGMENT25/01/1989

BENCH:
SHARMA, L.M. (J)
BENCH:
SHARMA, L.M. (J)
KANIA, M.H.

CITATION:
 1989 SCR  (1) 330	  1989 SCC  (1) 552
 JT 1989 (1)   147	  1989 SCALE  (1)196


ACT:
    Rajasthan  Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction)	Act,
1950:	 Section   13(1)(f)--Tenant   denying	 title	  of
landlord--When arises-Denial to be clear and in	 unequivocal
terms.



HEADNOTE:
    The	 appellant was inducted into the structure in  ques-
tion by the owner in 1953. In 1969, the owner died and	some
dispute	 arose	between his legal  representatives  and	 the
respondent. The dispute was finally decided in favour of the
respondent.  The appellant duly recognised him	as  landlord
and started paying rent.
    In	1973,  in  response to a notice	 received  from	 the
Municipal  Authorities	asking him to  remove  the  disputed
structure  on the ground that it was erected  on  Government
land,  the appellant was forced to file a suit in the  Civil
Court,	challenging the validity of the notice	and  praying
for injunction against the Municipal authorities from inter-
fering with his possession.
    The	 respondent  thereafter	 filed a  suit	against	 the
appellant  on the grounds of default in payment of rent	 and
denial	of his title by him. It was alleged that the  appel-
lant  had  challenged the respondent's title in	 the  plaint
filed in the earlier suit. The case of default in payment of
rent was rejected, but the suit was decreed on the ground of
denial of title.
    On	appeal, the Additional District Judge confirmed	 the
decree	and held that the statements in the plaint  amounted
to disclaimer and, in any event, the appellant had failed to
acknowledge the landlord's title therein and consequently he
was liable to eviction under cl.(f) of s. 13(1) of the	Act.
The appellant's second appeal was also rejected by the	High
Court at the admission stage.
Allowing the appeal,
    HELD:  In providing disclaimer as a ground for  eviction
of a tenant in cl.(f) of s. 13(1) of the Rajasthan  Premises
(Control  of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950,  the	 Legislature
decided to give effect to the
331
provisions  of cl.(g) of s. 111 of the Transfer of  Property
Act,  1882.  The principle of forfeiture  on  disclaimer  is
rounded	 on the rule that a man cannot approbate and  repro-
bate at the same time. Since the consequence of applying the
rule is very serious, it must be held that the denial has to
be clear and in unequivocal terms. [334C-D]
    In	the  instant case, the 1973 suit  was  not  directed
against any of the defendants excepting the Municipality and
the statements in the plaint were made by way of giving	 the
background  in	which the impugned notice by  the  Municipal
officers  had been issued. No relief against the  other	 de-
fendants  including the present respondent was	prayed	for.
Even  interpreting the plaint in a manner as  favourable  to
the  landlord as may be possible it has to be accepted	that
the  document  cannot be construed to clearly deny  the	 re-
spondent's  title  in unambiguous terms. One thing  that  is
conspicuous is that the appellant did not claim any title in
himself. He expressly described the character of his posses-
sion  as  that of a tenant. Examining the entire  plaint  in
this background the ground contemplated under s. 13(1)(f) of
the Act is not made out. [334B, E-F]
    Mohammad  Amir Ahmad Khan v. Municipal Board of  Sitapur
and another, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1923, referred to.



JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1048 of 1980.

From the Judgment and Order dated 11.3.80 of the Rajas- than High Court in S.A. No. 52 of 1980.

S. Ganesh and P.H. Parekh for the Appellant. S.S. Khanduja for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SHARMA, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against the decision of the Rajasthan High Court confirming the decree of eviction of the appellant from certain prem- ises under s. 13(1)(f) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), on the ground that he had denied the title of the respondent-landlord.

2. The appellant has been in possession of the structure in ques-

332

tion since 1953, when he was inducted therein by the owner one Nawab M. Ali Khan. In 1969 Nawab M. Ali Khan died, and it appears that some dispute arose between his legal repre- sentatives and the present respondent no. 1. It further appears that the dispute was finally settled in favour of the respondent no. 1 and according to the case of the appel- lant he duly recognised him as his landlord and started paying rent. In 1973 the appellant received a notice from the Municipal authorities asking him to remove the disputed structures on the ground that it was erected on Government land. According to the appellant's case, the notice was issued at the instance of the respondent no. 1, who was anxious to evict the appellant. The appellant, in the situa- tion, was forced to file a suit in the civil court challeng- ing the validity of the notice and praying for injunction against the Municipal authorities from interfering with his possession. The respondent no. 1 filed the present suit on the twin Founds of default in payment of rent and denial of his title. The case of default in payment of rent was re- jected but the suit was decreed on the ground of denial of title. On appeal, the Additional District Judge confirmed the decree. The appellant's second appeal was also rejected by the High Court at the admission stage.

3. The appellant's plaint in the earlier suit by which it is suggested that he challenged the respondent's title was filed in the present case and marked as Ext. 1. The first appellate court has while recording its finding against the appellant observed that the statements in the plaint amount to disclaimer and, in any event, it appears that the appellant failed to acknowledge the land-lord's title therein and consequently he was liable to eviction under clause (f) of s. 13(1) of the Act, which reads as follows:

"13. Eviction of tenants.--(1) Not- withstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree, or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant (xxx) so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefore to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied .-
(a)..............................................

...

................................................ .

(f)that the tenant has renounced his charac- ter as such or denied the title of the landlord and the 333 latter has not waived his right or condoned the conduct of the tenant; or"

We do not agree. There is no statement in the plaint at all challenging the landlord's right and there was no occasion for the appellant to deal with this aspect in view of the scope of his suit. On the other hand, the pleading shows that he described the nature of his possession as that of a tenant and the interest of the present respondent no. 1, who was defendant no. 2 in that suit, as that of a landlord.

4. Mr. S.S. Khanduja, the learned counsel for the re- spondent, relied on the last sentence of paragraph 1 of the plaint, as mentioned below, and contended that since the defendant no. 2 was not one of the heirs of the deceased Nawab M. Ali Khan, this sentence should be read as denial of his title:

"He sold out some portion of his property in his life time and the remaining property came to be owned by his heirs i.e. defendants no. 2 to 6."

Firstly it has to be noticed that although the respondent was wrongly described as an heir, his title to the property was acknowledged. Further this sentence cannot be read in isolation. The position is explained in paragraph 5 of the above noted plaint in the following terms:

"5. That the land where the stall type Kachhi shops of the plaintiffs have been constructed, the Defendant No. 2 has built his house after taking the land on a long term lease from Nawab Mukarram Ali Khan. In between these there is a Pakka 'Dola'. There is dispute about the ownership of the land between the Defendant No. 2 and the Defendant No. 3 to 6 since the death of Nawab Mukarram Ali Khan in the year 1969. Later on the matter has been compromised in between the four heirs, the Defendant No. 2 developed a bad motive and he wants that anyhow the plaintiffs should be evicted from the premises as early as possible and he. should occupy the same."

The argument is that the title of the respondent (defendant No. 2 in the earlier case) was nowhere accepted in the plaint. After mentioning the dispute between him and the legal representatives of the deceased Nawab the appellant did not proceed to clarify the position. So far as 334 the statement in paragraph No. 1 of the plaint is concerned, the grievance is that the title of the landlord was denied, if not completely then at least in part by describing the defendants 3 to 6 as co-owners with him. We are not in a position to agree with the contention of the learned counsel that for these reasons the appellant has to be evicted. Even interpreting the plaint in a manner as favourable to the landlord as may be possible, it has to be accepted that the document cannot be construed to clearly deny the respond- ents' title in unambiguous terms. One thing that is conspic- uous is that the appellant did not claim any title in him- self. We expressly described the character of his possession as that of a tenant. Is it in this situation permissible to forfeit his lease on the ground of disclaimer of title? In providing disclaimer as a ground for eviction of a tenant in clause (f) of s. 13(1) of the Act, the Legislature decided to give effect to the provisions of clause (g) of s. 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. The principle of forfeiture on disclaimer is rounded on the rule that a man cannot appro- bate and reprobate at the same time. Since the consequence of applying the rule is very serious, it must be held that the denial has to be clear and in unequivocal terms. The decision of this Court in Mohammad Amir Ahmad Khan v. Munic- ipal Board of Sitapur and another, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1923, relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant high- lights this aspect. The facts in that case would show that the tenant there had made statements against his landlord which were far more serious than those in the case before us and still was not penalised. It may be appreciated that in the present case the 1973 suit was not directed against any of the defendants excepting the Municipality and the state- ments in the plaint referred to above were made by way of giving the background in which the impugned notice by the Municipal officers had been issued. No relief against the other defendants including the present respondent was prayed for. Examining the entire plaint in this background we are of the opinion that the ground contemplated under s. 13(1)(f) of the Act is not made out. We, therefore, set aside the judgments of the courts below and dismiss the suit. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs through- out.

N.P.V.				      Appeal allowed.
335