Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal - Delhi
Commissioner Of Central Excise vs Space Foods (P) Ltd. on 4 June, 1999
Equivalent citations: 1999(112)ELT416(TRI-DEL)
ORDER
P.C. Jain, Vice President
1. Matter called. None for the respondents.
2. Question involved in this appeal of Revenue is that whether the value of goods affixed with the brand name of another person who is not entitled to the benefit of Notification 175/86-C.E. and these being cleared on payment of duty in terms of para 7 of the said notification should be taken into account in computing the aggregate clearances of Rs. 20 lakhs or 30 lakhs in terms of that para of the said notification of the specified goods. This question has been decided by the Revenue in the case of Jaina Detergent P. Ltd. v. C.C.E., Allahabad vide Tribunal's Order No. 232/99-C, dated 11-3-1999. Relying on the same, this Bench to which one of us was a party has taken a similar view and dismissed the appeal of the Revenue in the case of May Fair Electricals in Appeal No. E/1697/94-D [Final Order No. 471/99-D, dated 26-5-1999]. In this connection para 6 of the Tribunal's judgment in the case of May Fair Electricals, supra is reproduced below :-
"We have carefully considered the plea of the ld. JDR. Revenue forgets that clearance of branded goods in terms of para 7 of the notification are not within the scope of the notification itself. Therefore question of reckoning the same for computing the clearances under Clause (a) & (b) of para 1 of the notification does not arise. Revenue's reliance on Tribunal's judgment of East Zone Bench in the case of C.C.E. v. India Portteries Limited reported in 1993 (67) E.L.T. 294 (Tribunal) is a misapplication of that judgment to the facts and circumstances of this case. Therefore question of computing the clearances of branded goods which are outside the scope of Notification No. 175/86 does not arise. At this stage ld. JDR Shri V.M. Udhoji points out that Jaina Detergent case is applicable to Notification 1/93 and not to Notification 175/86. This plea in our view is of no substance because the two notifications are parimateria in their content and intent. We may also mention at this stage that para 3 of the notification significantly lays down that the clearances in respect of such branded goods shall not be taken into account for the purpose of computing the aggregate value of clearances of all excisable goods for eligibility under this notification. Therefore, there is no reason why the same analogy should not be extended for the purpose of determining the computation under para 1. What has been considered as 'non-excisable goods' for the purposes of this notification in terms of para 3, it is difficult to accept the proposition, that these are 'specified goods' for the purposes of computing clearances under para 1."
3. In view of the foregoing, we dismiss the appeal of Revenue.