Telangana High Court
N. Suresh, vs The State Of Telangana on 21 April, 2025
Author: K. Lakshman
Bench: K. Lakshman
HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K. LAKSHMAN
WRIT PETITION Nos.1591 AND 2884 OF 2025, 35951, 36532
AND 36554 OF 2024
COMMON ORDER:
Heard Mr. M.A.K. Mukheed, Mr. T.V.Ramana Rao, Mr. Ramu Nallamothu, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr.Aniketh Reddy, learned Asst. Govt. Pleader for Home, appearing for State.
2. These writ petitions are filed to declare the action of the respondent Nos.3 to 6 in registering FIR Nos. 154 and 155 of 2024 of P.S. Bomraspet pertaining to the same incident which is the subject matter of FIR No.153 of 2024 and consequently quash the proceedings in Cr.Nos.154 and 155 of 2024.
3. In the light of the same, it is apt to refer the relevant particulars of the writ petitions, petitioners, FIRs, date, time and place of the incident and offences registered, against the petitioners in all the aforesaid crimes and the same are extracted below:-
` 2 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch WP Petitioner/s Name of the Place, date & No. ranking in complainant time of the Offences Cr.Nos. & incident Designation 1591/ A.35 in 153/24, N.Srinivasa Anjaneya under 2025 A.18 in 154/24 Reddy, Temple, Sections 61 and A.3 in Sub Lagcherla (2) 191(2), 155/24 of Divisional 11.11.2024 191(3) P.S.Bomraspet Police 12.20 PM 132,109, Officer, 121(1), Vikarabad in 126(2), 324 FIR No.153, (4) read with 190 BNS, Section 3 of PDPPA 2884/23 P.1 is A.38 in Karra Kishan, Hanuman under FIR No.153, MRO, Temple, Sections A.21 in FIR Dudyal in Lagcherla 191(2), No.154 & A.15 FIR No.154 191(3) in FIR No.155 of 11.11.2024 132,109, 2024, Time not 121(1), specifically 126(2), 324 P.2 is A.47 in mentioned (4) read FIR No.153, with 190 A.10 in FIR BNS, No.154 & A.11 Section 3 of in FIR No.155 of PDPPA 2024, under P.3 is A.10 in D. Janaiah, Cherllapuram Sections FIR No.153, A.5 DCRB,DSP Venkataiah's 191(2), in FIR No.154 & Vikarabad, in residence, 191(3) A.7 in FIR FIR No.155 Lagcherla 132,109, No.155 of 2024, of 2024, 121(1), 126(2), 324 P.4 is A.47 in (4) read FIR No.153, with 190 A.10 in FIR BNS, No.154 & A. Section 3 of No.11 in FIR PDPPA No.155 of 2024, ` 3 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch P.5 is A.36 in FIR No.153, A.19 in FIR No.154 & A.13 in FIR No 155 of 2024, P.6 is A.42 in FIR No.153, A.16 in FIR No.154 and spet and as such I am well acquainted with the facts of the case.35951/ P.1 is A. No. 11 24 in FIR No. 153,
A.6 in FIR No. 154 & A.No.9 in FIR No. 155 of 2024.
P.2 is A.2 in FIR No. 153, A.6 in FIR No. 154 & A.No.8 in FIR No. 155 of 2024.
P.3 is A. 13 in FIR No. 153, A.7 in FIR No. 154 & A.9 in FIR No. 155 of 2024.
` 4 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch 36532/ P.1 is A.4 in FIR 24 No. 153, A.12 in FIR No. 154 & A.1 in FIR No. 155 of 2024.
P.2 is A.5in FIR No. 153, A.8 in FIR No. 154 & A.No.5 in FIR No. 155 of 2024.
P.3 is A.8 in FIR No. 153, A.15 in FIR No. 154 & A.4 in FIR No. 155 of 2024.
36554/ Sole petitioner, 24 A.6 in FIR No. 153, A.13 in FIR No. 154
4. In all the writ petitions, the petitioners are residents of Bala Naik Thanda, Roti Banda Thanda, Pulicherla kunta Thanda and Lagcherla Village, Bomraspet Mandal, Vikarabad District. They are accused in the aforesaid three crimes. On the complaints lodged by the aforesaid complainants, the Police Bomraspet registered the aforesaid three crimes.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that the date of incident, place of incident etc., are same. Basing on the same incident, the police cannot register the aforesaid three crimes against ` 5 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch the petitioners herein. The allegations leveled against the petitioners herein are same. Therefore, registration of subsequent Crime Nos.154 and 155 of 2024 by Bomraspet Police, are liable to be quashed.
6. The allegations leveled against the petitioners in all three Crimes are one and the same and therefore, registration of the other two crimes i.e. Cr.Nos.154 and 155 of 2024 is impermissible and liable to be quashed. He has also placed reliance on the principle laid down in Smt. K.Mathamma vs. State of Telangana 1 and Akbaruddin Owaisi vs. State of A.P. represented by its Principal Secretary, Home Department 2. With the said submissions, he sought to quash the Cr.Nos.154 and 155 of 2024.
7. Whereas, learned Asst.Govt.Pleader for Home, would contend that the allegations leveled against the petitioners in the aforesaid three crimes are different. Place of incident is different. Victims and accused are different. Even the offences are also different. There is no political motive. The allegations leveled against the petitioners herein are serious. At the instance of A.1, the petitioners herein attacked the District Collector, Special Officer, 1 2022 (1)ALT (Crl) 12 (T.S.) 2 2013 (6) ALT 101 (SB) ` 6 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch KADA and other officials, who went to the spot for the purpose of conducting public hearing. They have formed into unlawful assembly and attacked the said Special Officer, KADA with deadly weapons. Investigation is at the threshold. Quashing of the three crimes at the threshold is impermissible as per the principle laid down by the Apex Court and this Court in Crl.P.Nos.1232 of 2022 and batch vide order dated 29.04.2022. He has placed reliance on the principle laid down in TT Antony vs. State of Kerala 3 and Jacob John vs. State of Manipur 4 in common order dated 29.04.2022 in Crl.P.No.1232 of 2022.
8. Perusal of the aforesaid complaints in Cr.Nos.153, 154 and 155 of 2024 pending on the file of Bomraspet Police Station, would reveal that the District Collector, Special Officer, KADA and other officials went to the outskirts of Lagcherla Village for the purpose of conducting public hearing with regard to establishment of Pharma Company. Villagers and other stakeholders were not found to participate in the public hearing. A.2 informed the District Collector and other officials stating that nobody will come to the said place of 3 (2001) 6 SCC 181 4 (2020) Supreme (Manipur) 176 ` 7 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch meeting and they have to conduct public hearing at Lagcherla village. They can hold gramsabha in the village. Thereafter, the District Collector and other officials believed his version bonafidely and went to Lagcherla village in his car bearing No.TS 07 EV 2929. Other officials including defacto-complainants in all the said crimes followed them to the village.
9. It is further alleged that in Lagcherla village, the people of Lagchrela, Bala Naik Thanda, Roti Banda Thanda and Pulicherla kunta Thanda formed themselves into an unlawful assembly with stones, sticks and Chili powder. At about 12.20 hours, when all the officials including the Collector reached Lagcherla village, accused and others raised slogans against the District Collector saying that 'go back Pharma'. They have also obstructed the Collector's vehicle and also Special Officer, KADA. They have attacked the Collector. They have also attacked the defacto-complainant in all the aforesaid crimes with stones, sticks and chilli powder. They have also damaged Collector's vehicle. When Special Officer, KADA tried to convince the accused and other people, they have attacked him. In the said attack, he received injuries on the left hand and back side of his neck ` 8 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch and right leg etc. He has saved himself, otherwise they would have killed him. Thus, all the accused formed into unlawful assembly, tried to kill the Collector, Special Officer, KADA and other officials for conducting public hearing.
10. In all the aforesaid three crimes, the names of the some of the petitioners are not there. There is no allegation against the petitioners herein in the aforesaid three complaints that the petitioners conspired with other accused and attacked the District Collector, Special Officer, KADA and other officials who came to Lagcherla village for conducting public hearing. In the remand report, there are certain allegations against the petitioners herein. In all the aforesaid three complaints, the date of incident is 11.11.2024 and time of incident is around 12.20 P.M.
11. In all the three complaints in the aforesaid three crimes specifically alleged about forming of unlawful assembly by the accused, attacking the District Collector, Special Officer, KADA and other officials who came to Lagcherla village for the purpose of conducting public hearing. They have also raised slogans 'go back Pharma'. They are opposing establishment of Pharma Company in the ` 9 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch said village and also opposing the public hearing. They have attacked the District Collector, Special Officer, KADA and damaged their vehicles. Special Officer, KADA received injuries.
12. As discussed supra, learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that the allegations in all the aforesaid complaints are one and the same. Therefore, the Police, Bomraspet Police Station cannot register crimes vide Cr.Nos.154 and 155 of 2024 on the very same allegations. It is contrary to the procedure laid down in Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short, 'BNSS') and also principle laid down by the Apex Court and this Court in catena of decisions.
13. In the light of the said submission, it is relevant to note that in TT Antony (supra), the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with the registration of multiple F.I.Rs. In paragraph No.24, the Apex Court held that there can be no second FIR and consequently there could be no fresh investigation in receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or some occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. It was further held that only the information about the commission of cognizable offence(s), which is first entered in the Station House ` 10 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch Diary by the Officer In-Charge of the Police Station, can be regarded as First Information Report under Section 154 of Cr.P.C; on subsequent information, the same offence will be covered by Section 162 of Cr.P.C.
14. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment is extracted below:-
A just balance between the fundamental rights of the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the Court. There cannot be any controversy that sub-section (8) of Section 173 Cr.P.C. empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narangs' case (supra) it was, however, observed that it would be appropriate to conduct further investigation with the permission of the Court. However, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. It would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 Cr.P.C. nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in ` 11 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is underway or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or under Article 226/227 of the Constitution.
15. Relying on the said judgment, in Akbaruddin Owaisi (supra), this Court held that the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to a fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive, FIRs, whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. the Court, observed that case of fresh investigation based on the consequent or successive FIRs not being counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or final report under Section 173 (2) of Cr.P.C. has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India.
` 12 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
16. In Upkar Singh (supra), the Apex Court clarifying the principle laid down by it in TT Antony (supra), held that any further complaint by the same complainant or others against the same accused, subsequent to the registration of a case, is prohibited under the Code because an investigation in this regard would have already started and further complaint against the same accused will amount to an improvement on the facts mentioned in the original complaint, hence will be prohibited under Section 162 of the Code.
17. In Babu Bai vs. State of Gujarat5, in paragraph No.21, the Apex Court held as follows:-
"21. In such a case the court has to examine the facts and circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction. If the answer is in the affirmative, the second FIR is liable to be quashed. However, in case the contrary is proved, where the version in the second FIR is different and they are in respect of the two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible. In case in respect of the same incident the accused in the first FIR 5 (2010) 12 SCC 254 ` 13 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch comes forward with a different version or counterclaim, investigation on both the FIRs has to be conducted."
This Court held that the relevant enquiry is whether two or more FIRs relate to the same incident or relate to incidents which form part of the same transactions. If the Court were to conclude in the affirmative, the subsequent FIRs are liable to be quashed. However, where the subsequent FIR relates to different incidents or crimes or is in the form of a counter- claim, investigation may proceed. [See also in this context ChirraShivraj v. State of A.P. [ChirraShivraj v. State of A.P., (2010) 14 SCC 444 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 757] and Chirag M. Pathak v. Dollyben Kantilal Patel [Chirag M. Pathak v. Dollyben Kantilal Patel, (2018) 1 SCC 330 :
(2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 369]
18. In Anju Chaudhary vs. State of UP6, the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with the concept of registration of second FIR at length. In paragraph No.14, the Apex Court held as follows:
14. On the plain construction of the language and scheme of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the Code, it cannot be construed or suggested that there can be more than one FIR about an occurrence. However, the opening words of Section 154 suggest that every information relating to commission of a cognizable offence shall be reduced to writing by the officer in-charge of a Police Station. This implies that there has to be the first information report about an incident which constitutes a cognizable offence. The purpose of registering of an FIR is to set the machinery of criminal investigation into 6 2013 (6) SCC 384 ` 14 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch motion, which culminates with filing of the police report in terms of Section 173(2) of the Code. It will, thus, be appropriate to follow the settled principle that there cannot be two FIRs registered for the same offence.
However, where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different, or even where the subsequent crime is of such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of the FIR recorded first, then a second FIR could be registered. The most important aspect is to examine the inbuilt safeguards provided by the legislature in the very language of Section 154 of the Code. These safeguards can be safely deduced from the principle akin to double jeopardy, rule of fair investigation and further to prevent abuse of power by the investigating authority of the police. Therefore, second FIR for the same incident cannot be registered. Of course, the Investigating Agency has no determinative right. It is only a right to investigate in accordance with the provisions of the Code. The filing of report upon completion of investigation, either for cancellation or alleging commission of an offence, is a matter which once filed before the court of competent jurisdiction attains a kind of finality as far as police is concerned, may be in a given case, subject to the right of further investigation but wherever the investigation has been completed and a person is found to be prima facie guilty of committing an offence or otherwise, reexamination by the investigating agency on its own should not be permitted merely by registering another FIR with regard to the same offence. If such protection is not given to a suspect, then possibility of abuse of investigating powers by the Police cannot be ruled out. It is with this intention in mind that such interpretation should be given to Section 154 of the Code, as it would not only further the object of law but even that of just and fair investigation. More so, in the backdrop of the settled canons of criminal jurisprudence, re-investigation or de novo investigation is beyond the competence of not only the investigating agency but even that of the learned Magistrate. The courts have taken this view primarily for the reason that it ` 15 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch would be opposed to the scheme of the Code and more particularly Section 167(2) of the Code. [Ref. Rita Nag v. State of West Bengal [(2009) 9 SCC 129] and Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali @ Deepak & Ors. (SLP (Crl) No.9185- 9186 of 2009 of the same date).
19. In Kari Chowdhary vs. Sita Devi 7, in paragraph No.11, the Apex Court held as follows:-
"11. Learned counsel adopted an alternative contention that once the proceedings initiated under FIR No. 135 ended in a final report the police had no authority to register a second FIR and number it as FIR No. 208. Of course the legal position is that there cannot be two FIRs against the same accused in respect of the same case. But when there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, they would normally take the shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried on under both of them by the same investigating agency. Even that apart, the report submitted to the court styling it as FIR No. 208 of 1998 need be considered as an information submitted to the court regarding the new discovery made by the police during investigation that persons not named in FIR No. 135 are the real culprits. To quash the said proceedings merely on the ground that final report had been laid in FIR No. 135 is, to say the least, too technical. The ultimate object of every investigation is to find out whether the offences alleged have been committed and, if so, who have committed it."
(Emphasis supplied).
20. On consideration of the said principles laid down in the said judgments, in the State of Rajasthan vs. Surender Singh Rathore8, 7 2002 (1) SCC 714 8 2025 Law Suit (SC) 249 ` 16 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch the Apex Court laid down the following principles with regard to the permissibility of registration of second FIR:-
9. From the above conspectus of judgments, inter alia, the following principles emerge regarding the permissibility of the registration of a second FIR:
9.1 When the second FIR is counter-complaint or presents a rival version of a set of facts, in reference to which an earlier FIR already stands registered.
9.2 When the ambit of the two FIRs is different even though they may arise from the same set of circumstances.
9.3 When investigation and/or other avenues reveal the earlier FIR or set of facts to be part of a larger conspiracy.
9.4 When investigation and/or persons related to the incident bring to the light hitherto unknown facts or circumstances.
9.5 Where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different.
21. On examination of the facts of the said case wherein the first FIR refers to a particular incident, action taken therein was limited, the second FIR pertains to the larger issue of widespread corruption in the concerned department and, therefore, is much larger in its scope than the previous FIR. On consideration of the said facts, the Apex Court held that two incidents are different and distinct. Therefore, registration of second FIR is permissible.
` 17 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch 9
22. In Arnab Ranjan Goswami vs Union of India , the Apex Court, on examination of the facts therein, more particularly, registration of multiple F.I.Rs against the petitioner therein, based on TV show aired on a particular day i.e. 21.04.2020, the facts mentioned in all the F.I.Rs. was the same, and that it was held that no subsequent FIR can be registered in respect of same, the incident arising out of the same occurrence or incident.
23. In Krishna Lal Chawla vs. State of UP 10 reiterated the principle laid down in TT Antony (supra), and Upkar Singh (Supra) and held as follows:
7. This Court in Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] has clearly stated that any further complaint by the same complainant against the same accused, after the case has already been registered, will be deemed to be an improvement from the original complaint. Though Upkar Singh [Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash, (2004) 13 SCC 292 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 211] was rendered in the context of a case involving cognizable offences, the same principle would also apply where a person gives information of a non-cognizable offence and 9 AIR 2020 SC 2386 10 AIR 2021 SC 1381 ` 18 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch subsequently lodges a private complaint with respect to the same offence against the same accused person. Even in a non-cognizable case, the police officer after the order of the Magistrate, is empowered to investigate the offence in the same manner as a cognizable case, except the power to arrest without a warrant. Therefore, the complainant cannot subject the accused to a double whammy of investigation by the police and inquiry before the Magistrate.
24. In C. Muniappan (Supra), the Apex Court held that two or more crimes can be clubbed if the circumstances and facts indicate that the second crime was connected or was a result of the first crime. The relevant portion is extracted below:
37. The submission on behalf of the appellants that two crimes bearing Nos. 188 and 190 of 2000 could not be clubbed together, has also no merit for the simple reason that if the cases are considered, keeping in view the totality of the circumstances and the sequence in which the two incidents occurred, taking into consideration the evidence of drivers and conductors/cleaners of the vehicles involved in the first incident and the evidence of C. Ramasundaram, VAO (PW
87), we reach the inescapable conclusion that the second occurrence was nothing but a fall out of the first occurrence. The damage caused to the public transport vehicles and the consequential burning of the University bus remained part of one and the same incident. Merely because ` 19 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch two separate complaints had been lodged, did not mean that they could not be clubbed together and one charge-sheet could not be filed (see T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] ).
25. The decisions in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (Supra) and Yanob Sheikh (Supra) relied upon by the Petitioners herein also reiterate that multiple FIRs relating to the same transaction and between same parties are not maintainable. . 26. In Akbaruddin Owaisi (supra), this Court held that multiple FIRs cannot be registered if the offences relate to the same incident and arise out of same circumstances. The Court therein discussed the test of sameness to be applied while deciding whether the subsequent FIRs are maintainable. The Court held as follows:
39. Let us now briefly refer to the tests which should, ordinarily, be applied to determine whether or not the two FIRs under consideration relate to the same incident/transaction. The law recognizes a common trial or a common FIR being registered for one series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction as contemplated under Section 220 Cr.P.C. The expression 'same transaction', from its very nature, is incapable of exact definition. (Anju Chaudhary, (2013 Cri LJ
776); Mohan Baitha v. State of Bihar57.). The distinction ` 20 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch between two FIRs relating to the same incident, and two FIRs relating to different incidents or occurrences of the same incident, should be carefully examined. (Babubhai) : 2010 AIR SCW 5126. The merits of each case must be considered to determine whether a subsequently registered FIR is a second FIR relating to the same incident or offence or is based upon distinct and different facts and whether its scope of inquiry is entirely different or not. It will not be appropriate for the Court to lay down one straight jacket formula uniformly applicable to all cases. This will always be a mixed question of law and fact depending on the merits of a given case. (Anju Chaudhary.). The test, to determine whether two FIRs can be permitted to exist, is whether the two incidents are identical or not. (Ram Lal Narang, (1979 Cri LJ 1346)).
40. The concept of "sameness" has been given a restricted meaning. In order to examine the impact of one or more FIRs. the Court has to rationalise the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply the test of 'sameness' to find out whether both FIRs relate to the same incident and to the same occurrence; and whether they are in regard to incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction or relate completely to two distinct occurrences.It is only if the second FIR relates to the same cause of action, the same incident, there is sameness of occurrence and an attempt has been made to improvise the case, would the second FIR be liable to be quashed. In cases ` 21 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch where every FIR has a different spectrum, and the allegations made are distinct and separate, it may be regarded as a counter complaint, but it cannot be stated that an effort has been made to improve the allegations that find place in the first FIR or that the principle of "sameness" is attracted.
(Babubhai, (2010 AIR SCW 5126); Surendra Kaushik v. State of Uttar Pradesh-2013 CrlLJ 1570).
41. It is not possible to enunciate any formula of universal application to determine whether two or more acts constitute the same transaction. They are to be gathered from the circumstances of a given case indicating proximity of time, unity or proximity of place, continuity of action, commonality of purpose or design. For several offences to be part of the same transaction, the test to be applied is whether they are so related to one another in point of purpose or of cause and effect or as principal and subsidiary, so as to result in one continuous action. Where there is commonality of purpose or design, where there is a continuity of action, then all those persons involved can be accused of the same or different offences "committed in the course of the same transaction". Where two incidents are of different times with involvement of different persons, there is no commonality, the purpose thereof is different, they emerge from different circumstances, and would not form part of the same transaction. (Anju Chaudhary, (2013 Cri LJ 776)).
` 22 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
27. In Jakka Vinod Kumar Reddy vs. The State of Telangana 11, this Court discussed various decisions held that in following cases multiple FIRs are maintainable:
20. The sum and substance of the above said judgments is that there is no embargo for registration of two FIRs on the following circumstances/grounds:
(a) where the allegations made in both the FIRs are from different spectrum, where there are different versions from different persons;
(b) same set of facts may constitute different offences;
(c) where there are two distinct offences having different ingredients;
(d) where the allegations are different and distinct;
(e) when there are rival versions in respect of same episode, they would normally take shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried out under both of them by the same Investigating Agency.
The decision in Jakka Vinod Kumar Reddy (Supra) was subsequently followed by this Court in K. Mathamma (Supra).
28. Relying on the said principles, this Court in Crl.P.No.1232 of 2022 held that registration of multiple FIRs is impermissible, if they relate to the occurrence of same incident, involve same parties and arise out of the same cause of action. Registration of multiple 11 2021(2) ALT (Crl) 171 (TS) ` 23 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch FIRs is impermissible even in cases of different incidents if such incidents form part of the same transaction. In other words, if the subsequent offence alleged in the subsequent FIR is connected with the first FIR or is the consequence of the first FIR, such subsequent FIR is not maintainable. The courts before reaching a conclusion that the subsequent FIRs are not maintainable, shall see if the alleged incidents or offences are identical or not and whether any commonality between the accused and the complainant exists. Further, registration of subsequent FIRs are impermissible if they are filed only to improve the case of the prosecution or fill up the lacunae in the earlier complaint.
29. In Sreekumar vs. State of Kerala 12, the Apex Court held that where the subsequent FIR was registered on different set of allegations by a different person, the said FIR is maintainable.
30. In Jakir Hussain Kosangi vs. State of Andhra Pradesh13 Division Bench of this Court discussed various decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with multiple registration of crimes. The Court held that where similar offences involving various victims are 12 (2018) 4 SCC 579 13 2017(5) ALT 342 ` 24 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch committed, each of such offence involves an independent cause of action. Further, registration of FIRs by multiple victims cannot be prohibited simply because the nature of allegations are the same as each offence arises out of an independent cause of action.
31. In Jacob John (supra), wherein two complaints were registered against the accused i.e. one in Ukhrul Police Station, and the other is by Mansarovar Police Station, Jaipur city. The offences leveled against the petitioner therein are punishable under Sections 370 (5), 376, 34 of IPC and Section 6/2010 of the POCSO, 2012. On examination of the facts therein, Manipur High Court at Imphal held that successive FIRs for the same incident are permissible if they pertain to different incidents/crimes. The seriousness of the offences and their societal impact, shall also be considered and the accused must face trial in two different places.
32. In the light of the said principle, coming to the facts of the present case, as discussed supra, the incident is one and the same which took place on 11.11.2024. Most of the accused are common. On the complaint lodged by 7th respondent i.e. Sub Divisional Police Officer, Vikarabad, Bomraspet Police, registered a case in Cr.No.153 ` 25 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch of 2024 for the offences under Sections 61 (2), 191(2), 191(3) 132,109, 121(1), 126(2), 324 (4) read with 190 Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (for short 'BNS'), Section 3 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 ( for short, 'PDPPA'). The Police, Bomraspet, received a complaint from 7th respondent at 14.00 hours on 11.11.2024 and they have registered the aforesaid crime at 14.00 hours. Admittedly, names of some of the petitioners are not there in the complaint dated 11.11.2024 of 7th respondent.
33. On the complaint lodged by 8th respondent - the MRO, the very same police, registered a case in Cr.No.154 of 2024 against the accused for the offences under Section 191(2), 191(3) 132,109, 121(1), 126(2), 324 (4) read with 190 BNS, Section 3 of PDPPA. Names of some of the petitioners are not there in the said complaint. The said complaint was received by the Police, Bomraspet Police Station at 15.00 hours on 11.11.2024 and they have registered the said crime at 15.00 hours.
34. On the complaint lodged by 9th respondent, the very same police, registered a case in Cr.No.155 of 2024 at 16.00 hours for the ` 26 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch offences under Section 191(2), 191(3) 132,109, 121(1), 126(2), 324 (4) read with 190 BNS, Section 3 of PDPPA .
35. In Cr.No.153 of 2024, the place of incident is mentioned as near Anjaneya Swamy temple, Lagcherla village. Time of incident is 12.20 p.m. In the complaint in Cr.No.154 of 2024, place of incident is mentioned as Anjaneyaswamy temple, Lagcherla village. In the complaint in Cr.No.155 of 2024, the place of incident is mentioned as Chellapuram Venkataiah's residence. As discussed supra, Cr.No.153 of 2024, Cr.No.154 of 2024 and Cr.No.155 of 2024 were registered at 14.00, 15.00 and 16.00 hours. by the Police, Bomraspet Police Station on the complaints lodged by respondent Nos.7 to 9.
36. It is also relevant to note that the scribe of all the three complaints is one and the same. Respondent No.7 is Sub Divisional Officer, Respondent No.8 is Mandal Revenue Officer, respondent No.9 is also a DCRB, DSP, who are highly educated and responsible officers. Instead of preparing complaints on their own by mentioning the incident specifically, they have signed on the written complaint prepared by Writer of Bomraspet Police Station. The only explanation offered by learned Asst.Govt.Pleader, with regard to the same is that ` 27 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch there was attack on the District Collector, Special Officer, KADA and other officials and situation in the village was tense. Therefore, respondent Nos.7 to 9 were not in a position to prepare complaint on their own. However, the complaints were prepared by Writer of Bomrapet Police Station on the instructions of respondent Nos.7 to 9 and after going through the same, they have signed. The said explanation offered by the learned Asst. Govt. Pleader is not satisfactory. Respondent Nos.7 to 9 being Sub Divisional Police Officer, the MRO and Deputy Superintendent of Police, have to prepare complaints by mentioning the incident specifically. They cannot sign on the complaints prepared by Writer of the Police Station and lodge a complaint with police, Bomraspet Police Station at different timings i.e. at 14.00, 15.00 and 16.00 hours. In the said complaints, there is no mention that on the instructions of respondent Nos.7 to 9, Writer of the said Police Station prepared complaints and on going through the same, they have signed on the same. The said facts would show the intention of the respondents in implicating the petitioner in the aforesaid three crimes.
` 28 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
37. It is trite to note that learned Asst.Govt.Pleader, fairly admitted that the place of incident in Cr.No.153 of 2024 and 154 of 2024 is one and the same.
38. It is also relevant to note that in all the aforesaid three FIRs, the names of some of the petitioners are not there. According to the respondent Nos.7 to 9, A.1 is the main conspirator, on his instigation and assistance both financial and moral etc., the petitioners herein formed into unlawful assembly, attacked the District Collector, Special Officer, KADA and other officials with an intention to kill them. Except the said allegation, there is no other allegation against the petitioners herein that they were present were present physically at the scene of offence and participated in the said attack. Vide order dated 29.11.2024 in W.P.No.32798 of 2024, this Court quashed the proceedings in Cr.No.154 and 155 of the very same police station against A.1, an Ex-MLA.
39. In the light of the said discussion and the principle laid down by the Apex Court and this Court, registration of multiple FIRs against the petitioners is impermissible. If they relates to the occurrence of same incident and investigation is same, arising out of ` 29 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch the same cause of action, registration of multiple FIRs is impermissible even in case of different incidents. This Court has to see if the alleged incident or offences are identical or not or commonality between the accused and the complainant exists or not. Registration of subsequent FIRs are impermissible, if they are filed only to improve the case of the prosecution or to fill up lacunae in the earlier complaint.
40. As discussed supra, the incidents, nature of allegations, most of the accused, damage to vehicles and cause of action in three crimes, offences registered are one and the same. There is commonality between the accused and the complainants. Therefore, registration of multiple FIRs i.e. Cr.No.154 and 155 of 2024 of Bomraspet Police Station with regard to the same incident against the petitioners is impermissible and are liable to be quashed.
41. The complaints in Cr.No.154 and 155 of 2024 and statements, if any, recorded by the Investigating Officer shall be treated as statements in Cr.No.153 of 2024 and the statements of the witnesses recorded under Section 180 of BNSS, may be treated as statements of witnesses in Cr.No.153 of 2024.
` 30 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
42. Vide order dated 29.11.2024 in W.P.No.32798 of 2024, this Court quashed the proceedings in the present Cr.No.154 and 155 of the very same police station against A.1, an Ex-MLA. This Court held that the incidents, nature of allegations, most of the accused, damage to vehicles and cause of action in three crimes, offences registered are one and the same. There is commonality between the accused and the complainant. Therefore, registration of multiple FIRs i.e. Cr.No.154 and 155 of 2024 of Bomraspet Police Station with regard to the same incident against the petitioners is impermissible and are liable to be quashed. No appeal is preferred against the said order. Therefore, the said order has become final.
43. In the light of the said submission, it is relevant to extract paragraph Nos.15 and 16 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Hazi Iqbal @ Bala through SPOA vs. State of UP 14 and the same are as follows:-
15. At this stage, we would like to observe something important.
Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the 14 Order dated 08.08.2023 in Crl.A.No.2345 of 2023 of the Apex Court.
` 31 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines.
The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.
16. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522, a two-Judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held:-
"5. ...Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
` 32 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239, this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (AIR p.869, para
6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death....." (Emphasis supplied)
44. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, these writ petitions are allowed. The proceedings in Cr.No.154 and 155 of 2024 pending on the file of Bomraspet Police Station against the petitioners herein are hereby quashed. The investigating Officer in Cr.No.153 of 2024 pending on the file of Bomraspet Police Station is at liberty to record ` 33 KL,J W.P.No.1591 of 2025and batch statements of respondent Nos.8 and 9 (complainants in Cr.Nos.154 and 155 of 2024) in Cr.No.153 of 2024. The statements, if any, recorded by the Investigating Officer in Cr.No.154 and 155 of 2024 shall be treated as statements in Cr.No.153 of 2024.
iii) However, in the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the writ petition shall stand closed.
_________________ K. LAKSHMAN, J Date:21.04.2025 vvr