Jharkhand High Court
Dashrath Singh Bhokta @ Dashrath Ganjhu vs Union Of India Through National ... on 29 April, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:12850-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Criminal Appeal (DB) No.57 of 2025
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Dashrath Singh Bhokta @ Dashrath Ganjhu, aged about 39
years, son of Ramdev Singh Bhokta, resident of Village-
Margarha Tola, Ekpa, P.O. & P.S.-Kunda, District-Chatra,
Jharkhand. ... ... Appellant
Versus
Union of India through National Investigating Agency,
Represented by Superintendent of Police, N.I.A having its
office at N.I.A. Camp Office, Quarter No.305, Sector-II, P.O.
Dhurwa, P.S. Dhurwa, District Ranchi, Jharkhand-834002.
... ... Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA
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For the Appellant : Mr. Balaji Srinivasan, Advocate (Through V.C.)
: Mr. Niranjan Kumar, Advocate
For the NIA : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
: Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate
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C.A.V. on 07.04.2025 Pronounced on 29/04/2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. The instant criminal appeal has been preferred on behalf of the appellant under Section 21(4) of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 for setting aside the order dated 01.07.2024 passed by the learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-XVI- cum-Special Judge, NIA Ranchi in Misc. Criminal Application No. 1473 of 2024 in connection with Special (NIA) 08 of 2018 corresponding to R.C. No. 23/2018/NIA/DLI arising out of Panki P. S. Case No. 157 of 2017 and G. R. No. 2615 of 2017 for the offence under Sections 386/120-B of the Indian Penal Code, under Sections 17,18,20 and 21 of the Unlawful Activities 1 2025:JHHC:12850-DB (Prevention) Act,1967 and under Section 17 of CLA Act 1908, has been rejected.
Factual Matrix
2. The prosecution case, as per the First Information Report, in brief is that the instant case is pertaining to the incident of extortion/levy collection by TPC cadres in Left Wing Extremist (LWE) affected state of Jharkhand. The instant case was registered by Panki Police Station, Dist- Palamu on 23.11.2017.
3. The brief fact is that on credible information received to SI Kamaldev Singh of Panki Police Station that TPC Operative Paramjeet Singh @ Sonu Das and his associates are collecting and demanding /extorting levy money from contractors in the area of Panki. Accordingly, the information was confirmed and was informed to SP, Palamu. On the directions of SP, Palamu in co-ordination with SP (Ops) of Jharkhand Jaguar team consisting of Jharkhand Jaguar, Panki Police personnel and Reserve team of Police Station conducted an operation.
4. Subsequently on 23.11.2017 at about 03.00 Hrs in Panki market, the police team got information that one TPC operative is coming from Piprataand side and going towards Balumath. At about 04.15 Hrs, TPC operative Shyam Bhokta @ DC was caught near the Amaanath Barrage on Amaanat River and Rs.5 lakh in cash, 01 country made Pistol and 02 live rounds and 01 empty fired case and other items were seized from his possession. 2
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5. Accordingly, FIR No. 157/17 dated 23.11.2017 was registered at PS Panki, Distt. Palamu, relating to the above seizure from the TPC operative Shyam Bhokta @ DC and other accused persons involved in the conspiracy namely Paramjeet Singh @ Sonu Das, Akramanji, Vikas @ Varunji, Laxman Ganju @ Kohramji, Mukeshji, Nageswar Ganjhu @Tarunji, Premsagar Mahto, Uchit Mahto, Amit Kumar Singh and other TPC members.
6. After the arrest, Shyam Bhokta @ DC has disclosed that heavy cache of arms/ammunition is hidden in Lambitaand Hills. Acting on the disclosure of Shyam Bhokta @ DC, the police party had gone to Lambitaand hills, and caught two accused persons Prem Sagar Mahto with one country made loaded pistol and Uchit Mahto with 9 mm pistol and magazine. However, one accused Amit Kumar Singh managed to escape. Uchit Mahto and Prem Sagar Mahto were arrested on 23.11.2017.
7. Subsequently accused Amit Kumar Singh was also arrested on next day i.e. on 24.11.2017. On recovery of arms/ammunition along with other incriminating materials from two TPC operatives, another FIR No.158/2017 dated 23.11.2017 was lodged under same PS Panki on the same day. Later on, the three accused persons Uchit Mahto, Prem Sagar Mahto and Amit Kumar Singh were remanded in case no. 157/2017 on 04.12.2017.
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8. It further appear that Panki police, Palamu, registered Panki PS case no 157/2017 dated 23.11.2017 under sections 386 & 120B of Indian Penal Code, section 25(1B)(a), 26 & 35 of Arms Act, section 17 & 18 of CLA Act and section 10,11,17,18,19 & 20 of the UA(P) Act, against Shyam Bhokta @ DC, Amit Kumar Singh, Prem Sagar Mahto, Uchit Mahto, Mukeshji @ Mukesh Ganjhu, Kohramji @ Akramanji, Vikas @ Varunji, Nageshwar Ganjhu @ Tarunji (petitioner), Paramjeet Singh @ Sonu Das and others on the basis of complaint made by Sh. Kamaldev Singh, Sub Inspector, PS- Panki.
9. After investigation of the case, investigating officer of the PS Panki case being FIR No. 157/2017, had filed Charge Sheet - 16/2018 on 17.02.2018 in the Court of CJM Palamu against arrested accused persons namely Shyam Bhokta @ DC, Uchit Mahto, Premsagar Mahto & Amit Kumar Singh under Sections 386 & 120B of IPC, under section 25(1B)(a), 26 & 35 of Arms Act, Section 17 & 18 of Criminal Law Amendment Act. Investigation was continued against absconding accused persons Mukesh Jee, Kohramji, Akramanji @ Ravindra Ganjhu, petitioner Nageshwar Ganjhua @ Tarun Jee, Vikas @ Varun Ji and Paramjeet @ Sonu Das.
10. Appreciating the gravity of the offence in the instant crime due to seizure of arms and ammunitions and cash to the tune of Rs. 5,00,000/ and other incriminating materials from TPC 4 2025:JHHC:12850-DB operative, the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred under sub-section 5 of section 6 read with section 8 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 vide MHA, New Delhi CTCR Division order no.11011/43/2018/NIA dated 06.07.2018, directed NIA to take up investigation of the case.
11. Accordingly, PS Panki case no. 157/2017 dated 23.11.2017 was re-registered as NIA case No. RC- 23/2018/NIA/DLI dated 09.07.2018 under sections 386 & 120B of the IPC, section 25 (1B)(a), 26 & 35 of the Arms Act and section 17 & 18 of the CLA Act and section 10,11,17,18,19 & 20 of the UA(P) Act.
12. The present appellant who is named in the said FIR and absconding was arrested by Simaliya Police of District Chatra on 17.05.2020, thereafter he was remanded in the instant case on 02.09.2020.
13. Accordingly, the appellant has filed an application being Misc. Criminal Application no. 1473 of 2024 which was rejected by the Court of Special Judge (NIA) Ranchi on 01.07.2024 and thereafter the instant appeal has been preferred against the said order.
14. It is evident from the record that earlier to the case having been taken by the NIA in view of the provision of Section 6(5) NIA Act, 2008, the case was registered in the district police being Panki P.S. Case No. 157 of 2017.
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15. It needs to refer herein that in the said case (Panki P.S. Case No. 157 of 2017), after the investigation the charge-sheet having been submitted, and investigation was continued against absconding accused persons including the present appellant who was also remained absconding.
16. Subsequent to the filing of the charge-sheet, the Central Government, under the suo motu power conferred in view of the provision of Section 6(5) of the NIA Act, 2008 has taken over the investigation to be conducted by the National Investigation Agency being registered as Special (NIA)08 of 2018, RC No. RC- 23/2018/NIA/DLI.
17. The appellant is in judicial custody since 17.05.2020 in Panki P.S. Case No.157 of 2017 and the NIA has taken remand in this case on 02.09.2020 and since then he is languishing in judicial custody.
18. The appellant, thereafter had preferred an application being Misc. Criminal Application no. 1473/2024 for consideration of his regular bail by taking the ground that the petitioner is in custody for more than four years and trial of the instant case will not be concluded in near future and as such the long incarceration of the petitioner is in the teeth of the principle laid down in under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, therefore, the prayer for regular bail of the petitioner may be allowed.
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19. Per contra learned counsel for the NIA had submitted before the learned special court that the charge in this case has been framed and trial is at advance stage. There is likelihood that in near future prosecution evidence may be closed and, as such, the present application is not fit to be allowed.
20. The learned Special Judge after considering the submissions advanced by the parties, vide order dated 01.07.2024 passed in Misc. Criminal Application no. 1473/2024 has rejected the prayer for regular bail by taking note of the implication found to be there of the appellant and the said order is under challenge by filing the instant appeal by invoking the jurisdiction conferred under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act, 2008. Submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant:
21. Mr. Balaji Srinivasan, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant through video conferencing, has assailed the impugned order, by which the prayer for bail of the appellant has been rejected, on the following grounds:
(1) The appellant is in custody since 17.05.2020, but there is no chance of early conclusion of the trial and the appellant has remained in custody for more than four years but without taking into consideration the same, the prayer for bail has been rejected by the learned special Court, therefore, considering the long 7 2025:JHHC:12850-DB incarceration of the appellant, it is a fit case where impugned order needs to be interfered with.
(2) It has been contended by taking the ground that there is nothing on record to suggest that the petitioner was a member of terrorist organization and that one of the property in the name of his wife amounting to Rs.2,00,000/- at Pakriya, Thana No.174, Khata No.13, Plot No.20, area 8 decimals was purchased from the levy collected on behalf of the Terrorist Organization. The appellant is the cultivator and has acres of land of his ancestral property.
(3) It has been contended that the co-accused, namely, Prem Sagar Mahto and Uchit Mahto, appellants in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 305 of 2024 had been allowed to be released from judicial custody by the order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 25.06.2024.
(4) According to the appellant, the case of the present appellant is identical to the case of Prem Sagar Mahto and Uchit Mahto, the appellants of Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 305 of 2024, therefore this appellant is equally qualified for privilege of bail.
(5) Appellant in no way concerned with the TPC group.
He was not arrested on the spot and nothing has been 8 2025:JHHC:12850-DB recovered from his conscious possession to show his proximity with the TPC.
(6) The appellant has falsely been implicated in this case, only on the basis of the confessional statement of the co-accused persons.
(7) The appellant is under judicial custody since 17.05.2020 more than 4 years. It has been submitted that the allegation pertaining to the petitioner's role is essentially related to involvement and connection with Akraman ji @ Netaji @ Ram Vinayak Bhogta who is considered to be a supremo of alleged banned organization to whom petitioner was allegedly reporting in this case.
(8) It has been contended that no case is made out even if the entire charge sheet is taken to be true on the face of it. There is no documentary evidence to substantiate the story put forward by the prosecution. The prosecution case is confined to the fact that one of the accused persons namely, Shyam Bhogta @ DC was arrested with Rs.5,00,000/-cash, one country made pistol and two live rounds and one empty fire case were seized from his possession, which is alleged proceeds of terrorism. An essential finding of first supplementary charge sheet that the 9 2025:JHHC:12850-DB confession of the Shyam Bhogta @ DC, the present petitioner and other co-accused persons came in the present case. The NIA has not investigated the actual fact and collected documentary evidence in respect of alleged crime of the present petitioner.
(9) There is no documentary evidence to substantiate the story put forward by the prosecution. Prosecution case is confined to the fact that one of the accused persons namely, Shyam Bhogta @ DC (A-1) was arrested with cash and pistol. The said amount is the levy amount according to the NIA. This is alleged proceeds of terrorism. The Government of Jharkhand vide Gazette Notification dated 22.05.2009 has declared TPC as proscribed organization under Section 16 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908. As per records, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India never declared TPC as a Terrorist Organization. When TPC was never declared as a Terrorist Organization by Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India and it does not find mention in the schedule to UA(P) Act. NIA ought to have not been handling over charges for handling the present case.
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2025:JHHC:12850-DB (10) It has been contended that from thorough analysis of RTI Application bearing 1928/RTI/2013 and the Lok Sabha decision dated 18.02.2014 on the topic "Front Organization of Naxalites in various states to be discussed in Lok Sabha", it is evident that "TPC is not a Terrorist Organization and clearly not disturbed any supply of coal".
(11) The appellant was made an accused in the 2nd supplementary charge sheet and the said charge sheet has been submitted on 25.02.2021. In the 1st supplementary charge sheet, there were 71 PWs and in the 2nd supplementary charge sheet, there were 131 PWs. Out of 71 witnesses of the 1st supplementary charge sheet, 23 witnesses have been examined whereas no witness has been examined in the 2nd supplementary charge sheet.
(12) According to the second supplementary charge sheet, the present petitioner had collected levy from various businessmen, crusher owners, contractors who were engaged in civil construction. The levy amount collected from Vijay Kumar Bhogta was the tune of Rs.1,25,000/-, Anil Kumar Singh to the tune of Rs.15,000/-, Rs.50,000/- from protected witness 'D', Rs.50,000/- from protected witness 'F', Rs.20,000/-
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from protected witness 'G', Rs.25,000/- +
Rs.40,000/- from protected witness 'H'. But there is no documentary evidence collected by the NIA that the said amount was collected from these persons on different dates and time. There is a vague allegation leveled against the present petitioner.
(13) The Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 22.12.2022 passed in Criminal Appeal (DB) No.352 of 2019 had directed the trial court to make endeavour to conclude the trial within a period of one year and from the date of order, more than two years have been passed but trial has not been concluded.
(14) That similarly situated co-accused persons, namely, Prem Sagar Mahto and Uchit Mahto have been granted Bail in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 305/2024 on 25.06.2024 considering the observation given in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 352/2019 by the Coordinate Bench of this Court.
(i) The learned counsel for the appellant in support of his argument has relied upon the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of: Yedala Subba Rao & Anr. Vs. Union of India [(2023) 6 SCC 65, Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713, Thwaha Fasal v. Union of India, (2021) 8 SCR 797, Vernon v. State of 12 2025:JHHC:12850-DB Maharashtra, (2023) 10 SCR 867, Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2024) 12 SCR 134, Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v, Vishanbhai Hirabhai, (2021) 6 SCC 230 and others relevant Judgments.
22. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that in the light of Article 21 of the constitution of India the personal liberty of individual has been considered as paramount importance as per the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713.
23. The learned counsel for the appellant, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the learned court has not taken note of the aforesaid facts, therefore, the present appeal is fit to be allowed and it is a fit case where the appellant may be directed to be released on bail.
Submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the Respondent-NIA:
24. Per contra, Mr. A.K. Das, learned counsel appearing for the NIA has vehemently opposed the prayer to interfere with the impugned order by taking aid of the averment made by the National Investigation Agency in the counter-affidavit.
25. The ground has been taken that allegation against the present appellant is serious as it would be evident from the 2nd supplementary charge-sheet submitted in connection with the present case.
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26. It has been submitted that the fact about the involvement of the present appellant has been taken note by the learned Special Judge as would be evident from the impugned order.
27. It has been contended by countering the argument of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant regarding the principle of parity so far as which is related to the appellants in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 305 of 2024 is concerned, wherein the primary ground taken for consideration of bail was at that time when 71 witnesses were to be examined out of which 26 witnesses had only been examined.
28. It has been contended, on instruction, that at present as of now 35 witnesses have been examined and as per the decision taken by the competent authority the trial will be concluded in very short time.
29. Therefore, the consideration which has been considered by the Co-ordinate Bench while granting bail to the appellants, i.e., Prem Sagar Mahto and Uchit Mahto in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 305 of 2024 is not applicable herein.
30. It has been submitted that in the instant case the conduct of the appellant is to be seen, since, the appellant remained absconded for a long time and only in year 2020, he has been arrested and as such, at this stage where only few witnesses are left to be examined, and there are chances of his absconding and in such case entire trial will be jeopardized. 14
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31. The learned counsel further submitted that the question which has been raised regarding the applicability of the principle as laid down under Article 21 of the Constitution will not be applicable herein.
32. The judgment upon which reliance has been placed on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellant, i.e., on Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb (supra) is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case since the 35 witnesses have already been examined and the offence as alleged against the present appellant is very grave in nature in compare to the respondent of the said case.
33. It has been contended that in the case of "National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali" (2019) 5 SCC 1, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that bail proceedings under the Special enactment are distinct and the Courts are duty bound to refused bail where the suspect is prima facie believed to be guilty.
34. It has further been submitted that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in "Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab and Another [(2024) SCC OnLine SC 109] has held that "for the offences under UA(P) Act, bail will be an exception and jail will be the rule".
35. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the respondent- NIA, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that since 15 2025:JHHC:12850-DB the nature of allegation levelled against the appellant is very grave, therefore, the present appeal is fit to be dismissed. Analysis:
36. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the material available on record, the pleading made on behalf of the appellant as available in Memo of Appeal and the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the National Investigation Agency.
37. This Court, before appreciating the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties needs to be referred the underlying principle based upon that the consideration for prayer for regular bail is to be considered so far as the penal offences as stipulated in the UAP Act, 1967.
38. The main objective of the Act, 1967 is to make powers available for dealing with activities directed against the integrity and sovereignty of India. As per Preamble, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 has been enacted to provide for more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities of individuals and associations and dealing with terrorist activities and for matters connected therewith. Therefore, the aim and object of enactment of U.A.(P) Act is also to provide for more effective prevention of certain unlawful activities.
39. To achieve the said object and purpose of effective prevention of certain unlawful activities the Parliament in its wisdom has provided that where an association is declared 16 2025:JHHC:12850-DB unlawful by a notification issued under Section 3, a person, who is and continues to be a member of such association shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 2 years, and shall also be liable to fine.
40. Clause (m) of Section 2 of the 1967 Act defines "terrorist organization". It is defined as an organization listed in the First Schedule. CPI (Maoist) has been listed at Item no. 34 in the First Schedule. Chapters III onwards of the 1967 Act incorporate various offences. Chapter IV has the title "punishment for terrorist act". Clause (k) of Section 2 provides that "terrorist act"
has the meaning assigned to it under Section 15 and the terrorist act includes an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the treaties specified in the Second Schedule.
41. Further section 10(a)(i) of Act, 1967 provides that where an association is declared unlawful by a notification issued under Section 3 which has become effective under sub-section (3) of that Section, a person, who is continues to be a member of such association shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, and shall also be liable to fine therefore, so long as Section 10(a)(i) stands a person who is or continues to be a member of such association shall be liable to be punished.
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42. Further, it would be relevant to mention the offences punishable under Sections 13 of the 1967 Act, which read thus:
13. Punishment for unlawful activities.--(1) Whoever-- (a) takes part in or commits, or
(b) advocates, abets, advises or incites the commission of, any unlawful activity, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. (2) Whoever, in any way, assists any unlawful activity of any association, declared unlawful under section 3, after the notification by which it has been so declared has become effective under sub-
section (3) of that section, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with both. (3) Nothing in this section shall apply to any treaty, agreement or convention entered into between the Government of India and the Government of any other country or to any negotiations therefor carried on by any person authorised in this behalf by the Government of India.
43. Thus, it is evident that Section13 prescribes Punishment for unlawful activities. It is further evident that as per section 13 (1) Whoever takes part in or commits, or advocates, abets, advises or incites the commission of, any unlawful activity, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.
44. Further, The "terrorist act" has been defined under Section 2(k) has the meaning assigned to it in Section 15. Section 15 contains the activities which will be treated to be a "terrorist act". Section 15 reads as under :
"15. Terrorist act.--4(1) Whoever does any act with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security, 18 2025:JHHC:12850-DB economic security, or sovereignty of India or with intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country,--
(a) by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisonous or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological radioactive, nuclear or otherwise) of a hazardous nature or by any other means of whatever nature to cause or likely to cause--
(i) death of, or injuries to, any person or persons; or
(ii) loss of, or damage to, or destruction of, property; or
(iii) disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community in India or in any foreign country; or (iiia) damage to, the monetary stability of India by way of production or smuggling or circulation of high quality counterfeit Indian paper currency, coin or of any other material; or]
(iv) damage or destruction of any property in India or in a foreign country used or intended to be used for the defence of India or in connection with any other purposes of the Government of India, any State Government or any of their agencies; or
(b) overawes by means of criminal force or the show of criminal force or attempts to do so or causes death of any public functionary or attempts to cause death of any public functionary; or
(c) detains, kidnaps or abducts any person and threatens to kill or injure such person or does any other act in order to compel the Government of India, any State Government or the Government of a foreign country or an international or inter-governmental organisation or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act; or commits a terrorist act.
[Explanation.--For the purpose of this sub-section,--
(a) "public functionary" means the constitutional authorities or any other functionary notified in the Official Gazette by the Central Government as public functionary; 19
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(b) "high quality counterfeit Indian currency" means the counterfeit currency as may be declared after examination by an authorised or notified forensic authority that such currency imitates or compromises with the key security features as specified in the Third Schedule.] (2) The terrorist act includes an act which constitutes an offence within the scope of, and as defined in any of the treaties specified in the Second Schedule.
45. As per the provision of Section 15, whoever has acted with intent to threaten or likely to threaten the unity, integrity, security, economic security, or sovereignty of India or with intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror in the people or any section of the people in India or in any foreign country would be covered under the definition of "terrorist act". This provision, therefore, stipulates that any activity with an intent to strike terror or likely to strike terror will come under the fold of terrorist act if done to threaten the unity, integrity, security, sovereignty of India or economic security, which has been inserted by way of Act 3 of 2013 with effect from 01.02.2013.
46. Section 17 provides punishment for raising funds for terrorist act which reads as under :
"17. Punishment for raising funds for terrorist act.-- Whoever, in India or in a foreign country, directly or indirectly, raises or provides funds or collects funds, whether from a legitimate or illegitimate source, from any person or persons or attempts to provide to, or raises or collects funds for any person or persons, knowing that such funds are likely to be used, in full or in part by such person or persons or by a terrorist organisation or by a terrorist gang or by an individual terrorist to commit a terrorist act, 20 2025:JHHC:12850-DB notwithstanding whether such funds were actually used or not for commission of such act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.--For the purpose of this section,--
(a) participating, organising or directing in any of the acts stated therein shall constitute an offence;
(b) raising funds shall include raising or collecting or providing funds through production or smuggling or circulation of high quality counterfeit Indian currency; and
(c) raising or collecting or providing funds, in any manner for the benefit of, or, to an individual terrorist, terrorist gang or terrorist organisation for the purpose not specifically covered under section 15 shall also be construed as an offence."
47. It is evident from the contents of Section 17 of the Act, 1967 that whoever, in India or in a foreign country, directly or indirectly, raises or provides funds or collects funds, whether from a legitimate or illegitimate source, from any person or persons or attempts to provide to, or raises or collects funds for any person or persons, knowing that such funds are likely to be used, in full or in part by such person or persons or by a terrorist organisation or by a terrorist gang or by an individual terrorist to commit a terrorist act, notwithstanding whether such funds were actually used or not for commission of such act, the same would be covered under the aforesaid provision. Meaning thereby, raising of funds directly or indirectly to commit a terrorist act by a terrorist organization or by terrorist gang or by an individual terrorist, irrespective of the fact whether this was 21 2025:JHHC:12850-DB actually used for commission of such act, would be punishable under Section 17.
48. Sub-section (c) of Section 17 of the Act, 1967 enlarges the scope of the terrorist act since the same provides that any act for the benefit of an individual terrorist, terrorist gang or terrorist organisation even if not specifically covered under Section 15 shall also be construed as an offence.
49. At this juncture it will be purposeful to discuss the core of Section 43(d)(5) of the Act 1967 which mandates that the person shall not be released on bail if the court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations made are prima facie true apart from the other offences the appellant is accused of committing offences under Sections 17, 18 and 21 of the UA(P) Act, 1967. For ready reference, the Section 43-D(5) of UAP Act is being referred herein which reads as under:
"43D. Modified application of certain provisions of the Code-
"(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release: Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true."22
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50. It is evident from the perusal of the provision of Section 43- D(5) that the bail is to be granted only in a situation where the court comes to the conclusion by taking into consideration the entire material concluded in course of the investigation, prima facie, found to be untrue but if the material which has been collected in course of the investigation found to be true, then the regular bail is not to be given to such an accused person.
51. The requirement as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act, 1967 in the matter of grant of regular bail fell for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] wherein at paragraph 23 it has been held by interpreting the expression "prima facie true" as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the Act, 1967 which would mean that the materials/evidence collected by the investigation agency in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the First Information Report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence.
52. It has further been observed that it must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. The degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine 23 2025:JHHC:12850-DB that the accusation is "prima facie true", as compared to the opinion of the accused "not guilty" of such offence as required under the other special enactments. For ready reference, paragraph 23 of the aforesaid judgment is required to be quoted herein which reads hereunder as :-
"23. By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it is the duty of the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or otherwise. Our attention was invited to the decisions of this Court, which has had an occasion to deal with similar special provisions in TADA and MCOCA. The principle underlying those decisions may have some bearing while considering the prayer for bail in relation to the offences under the 1967 Act as well. Notably, under the special enactments such as TADA, MCOCA and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is required to record its opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is "not guilty" of the alleged offence. There is a degree of difference between the satisfaction to be recorded by the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is "not guilty" of such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded for the purposes of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable 11 grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is "prima facie" true. By its very nature, the expression "prima facie true" would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the first information report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is 24 2025:JHHC:12850-DB lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is "prima facie true", as compared to the opinion of the accused "not guilty" of such offence as required under the other special enactments. In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge application or framing of charges in relation to offences under the 1967 Act...."
53. It is, thus, evident from the proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (Supra) that it is the bounden duty of the Court to apply its mind to examine the entire materials on record for the purpose of satisfying itself, whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused or not.
54. Further it is settled proposition of law that at the stage of granting or non-granting of the bail, the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise and the elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage.
55. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court by setting out propounding the law in the same case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra), has observed that the elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage and the Court is merely 25 2025:JHHC:12850-DB expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise. For ready reference paragraph 24,25 and 26 of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted herein under:-
"24. A priori, the exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this stage--of giving reasons for grant or nongrant of bail-- is markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage. The Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise.
25. From the analysis of the impugned judgment, it appears to us that the High Court has ventured into an area of examining the merits and demerits of the evidence. For, it noted that the evidence in the form of statements of witnesses under Section 161 are not admissible. Further, the documents pressed into service by the investigating agency were not admissible in evidence. It also noted that it was unlikely that the document had been recovered from the residence of Ghulam Mohammad Bhatt till 16-8-2017 (para 61 of the impugned judgment). Similarly, the approach of the High Court in completely discarding the statements of the protected witnesses recorded under Section 164 CrPC, on the specious ground that the same was kept in a sealed cover and was not even perused by the Designated Court and also because reference to such statements having been recorded was not found in the charge-sheet already filed against the respondent is, in our opinion, in complete disregard of the duty of the Court to record its opinion that the accusation made against the accused concerned is prima facie true or otherwise. That opinion must be reached by the Court not only in reference to the accusation in the FIR but also in reference to the contents of the case diary 26 2025:JHHC:12850-DB and including the charge-sheet (report under Section 173 Cr.P.C.) and other material gathered by the investigating agency during investigation."
26. Be it noted that the special provision, Section 43-D of the 1967 Act, applies right from the stage of registration of FIR for the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act until the conclusion of the trial thereof. To wit, soon after the arrest of the accused on the basis of the FIR registered against him, but before filing of the charge-sheet by the investigating agency; after filing of the first charge-sheet and before the filing of the supplementary or final charge- sheet consequent to further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC, until framing of the charges or after framing of the charges by the Court and recording of evidence of key witnesses, etc. However, once charges are framed, it would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion was founded upon the materials before the Court, which prompted the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused, to justify the framing of charge. In that situation, the accused may have to undertake an arduous task to satisfy the Court that despite the framing of charge, the materials presented along with the charge-sheet (report under Section 173 CrPC), do not make out reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against him is prima facie true. Similar opinion is required to be formed by the Court whilst considering the prayer for bail, made after filing of the first report made under Section 173 of the Code, as in the present case."
56. It is, thus, evident that the exercise to be undertaken by the court at this stage of granting bail of giving reasons for grant or non-grant of bail that is markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage. Rather, the Court is merely expected to record a finding on the 27 2025:JHHC:12850-DB basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise.
57. Further it is the duty of the Court to record its opinion that the accusation made against the accused concerned is prima facie true or otherwise and such opinion must be reached by the Court not only in reference to the accusation in the FIR but also in reference to the contents of the case diary and including the charge-sheet (report under Section 173 CrPC) and other material gathered by the investigating agency during investigation. Reference in this regard may be taken from the Judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2005) 5 SCC 294. For ready reference the following paragraph of the aforesaid Judgment is being quoted herein under:-
"46. The duty of the court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. However, while dealing with a special statute like MCOCA having regard to the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the Act, the court may have to probe into the matter deeper so as to enable it to arrive at a finding that the materials collected against the accused during the investigation may not justify a judgment of conviction. The findings recorded by the court while granting or refusing bail undoubtedly would be tentative in nature, which may not have any bearing on the merit of the case and the trial court would, thus, be free to decide the case on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial, without in any manner being prejudiced thereby."28
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58. The Hon'ble Apex Court in a very recent judgment rendered in Gurwinder Singh Vs State of Punjab and Another (supra) while taking in to consideration of the judgment as rendered in the National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) and Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb (supra) has observed that, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail and lays down that if the Court, 'on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure', is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond.
59. The Hon'ble Apex Court further observed that the conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis ordinary penal offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted phrase - 'bail is the rule, jail is the exception' - unless circumstances justify otherwise - does not find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP Act and the 'exercise' of the general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope.
60. In the aforesaid context it has further been observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the courts are, therefore, burdened with 29 2025:JHHC:12850-DB a sensitive task on hand and in dealing with bail applications under UAP Act, the courts are merely examining if there is justification to reject bail and the 'justifications' must be searched from the case diary and the final report submitted before the Special Court.
61. In the aforesaid background the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the test for rejection of bail is quite plain and Bail must be rejected as a 'rule', if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. It has further been observed that it is only if the test for rejection of bail is not satisfied - that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail application in accordance with the 'tripod test' (flight risk, influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence).
62. For ready reference following paragraphs of the aforesaid Judgment are being quoted herein under:
"27. A bare reading of Sub-section (5) of Section 43D shows that apart from the fact that Sub-section (5) bars a Special Court from releasing an accused on bail without affording the Public Prosecutor an opportunity of being heard on the application seeking release of an accused on bail, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail. It lays down that if the Court, 'on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure', is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation, 30 2025:JHHC:12850-DB against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond. It is interesting to note that there is no analogous provision traceable in any other statute to the one found in Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act. In that sense, the language of bail limitation adopted therein remains unique to the UAP Act.
28. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis ordinary penal offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted phrase - 'bail is the rule, jail is the exception' - unless circumstances justify otherwise - does not find any place while dealing with bail applications under UAP Act. The 'exercise' of the general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope. The form of the words used in proviso to Section 43D (5)- 'shall not be released' in contrast with the form of the words as found in Section 437(1) CrPC - 'may be released' - suggests the intention of the Legislature to make bail, the exception and jail, the rule.
29. The courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive task on hand. In dealing with bail applications under UAP Act, the courts are merely examining if there is justification to reject bail. The 'justifications' must be searched from the case diary and the final report submitted before the Special Court. The legislature has prescribed a low, 'prima facie' standard, as a measure of the degree of satisfaction, to be recorded by Court when scrutinising the justifications [materials on record]. This standard can be contrasted with the standard of 'strong suspicion', which is used by Courts while hearing applications for 'discharge--"
63. In this background, the test for rejection of bail is quite plain. Bail must be rejected as a 'rule', if after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable grounds 31 2025:JHHC:12850-DB for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. It is only if the test for rejection of bail is not satisfied that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail application in accordance with the 'tripod test' (flight risk, influencing witnesses, tampering with evidence). This position is made clear by Sub-section (6) of Section 43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on granting of bail specified in Sub-section (5), are in addition to the restrictions under the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force on grant of bail.
64. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment after textual reading of Section 43D(5) UAP Act, has formulated the guideline which was summarized in the form of a twin-prong test. For ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted herein under:
"31. On a textual reading of Section 43 D(5) UAP Act, the inquiry that a bail court must undertake while deciding bail applications under the UAP Act can be summarised in the form of a twin-prong test:
1) Whether the test for rejection of the bail is satisfied?
1.1 Examine if, prima facie, the alleged 'accusations' make out an offence under Chapter IV or VI of the UAP Act 1.2 Such examination should be limited to case diary and final report submitted under Section 173 CrPC;
2) Whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail in light of the general principles relating to grant of bail under Section 439 CrPC ('tripod test')?"
65. Further, it is settled proposition of law that at the stage of granting or non-granting of the bail, the Court is merely expected 32 2025:JHHC:12850-DB to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise and the elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage.
66. Further, it is the duty of the Court to record its opinion that the accusation made against the accused concerned is prima facie true or otherwise and such opinion must be reached by the Court not only in reference to the accusation in the FIR but also in reference to the contents of the charge-sheet and other material gathered by the investigating agency during investigation.
67. This Court, on the basis of the abovementioned position of law and the factual aspect, as has been gathered against the appellant, is proceeding to examine as to whether the accusation against the appellant is prima facie true as compared to the opinion of accused not guilty by taking into consideration the material collected in course of investigation.
68. Counter affidavit has been filed by the respondent wherein the various accusation based upon the investigation has been stated against the present appellant.
69. It is evident from the perusal of record that Special (NIA) Case No. 08/2018 arising out of R.C. Case No.23/2018/NIA/DLI corresponding to Panki PS case no 157 of 2017 in which allegation was made that, on 23.11.2017, in Panki market, the 33 2025:JHHC:12850-DB Police team got information that one TPC operative is coming from Piprataand side and going towards Balumath.
Subsequently, acting on the input, the police arrested TPC operative Shyam Bhokta @ DC (A-1) co-accused of the instant case from the Amaanat Barrage made on Amaanat River and Rs 5 lakh cash, 01 country made Pistol and 02 live rounds and 01 empty fired case and other incriminating items were recovered and seized from his possession.
70. On the basis of the same FIR No. 157/17 dated 23.11.2017 was registered at PS Panki, Distt. Palamu, against the TPC operative Shyam Bhokta @ DC and other 09 co-accused persons involved in the conspiracy. Huge cache of Arms/ammunitions and other incriminating items were recovered from Lambitaand Hills at the instance of accused Shyam Bhokta @ DC and from possession of Uchit Mahto and Premsagar Mahto. On recovery of arms/ammunition along with other incriminating materials, another FIR No. 158/2017 dated 23.11.2017 was lodged in the same PS Panki on the same day.
71. It is evident that appreciating the gravity of the offence in the instant crime the Central Government in exercise of the powers conferred under sub- section 5 of section 6 read with section 8 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 directed NIA to take up investigation of the case.34
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72. Thereafter, NIA took up the investigation of the case from the state police and after investigation, submitted 1st Supplementary charge sheet No. 18/2019 on 23.07.2019 against the 08 accused persons by keeping further investigation continued u/s 173(8) of Cr.P.C. against absconding accused persons including the present appellant.
73. On 17.05.2020 the present appellant was arrested and was remanded in the instant case on 02.09.2020 and consequently NIA had taken police remand of this appellant from 28.09.2020 to 02.10.2020. After the investigation the NIA submitted 2nd supplementary charge-sheet dated 25.02.2021 arraigned the present appellant as Accused No. 9 (A-9).
74. The relevant paragraph 17.12 of the 2nd supplementary charge-sheet wherein accusation against the present appellant has been mentioned is being referred as under:
"Therefore, as per the averments made hereinabove/ in the earlier paragraphs evidence on record, it is established that A-9 col Juded with top commanders of TPC and member of proscribed unlawful association by Jharkhand Government and a breakaway group of CPI (Maoist). criminally conspired with co- He accused persons for making extortion from local contractors, businessmen crusher owners by endangering to their life and property, he knowingly collected/raised funds in form of levy for TPC through illegitimate means/sources and further knowingly acquired property derived /obtained from the levy money in the name of his wife and others. The Government of Jharkhand also has declared cash reward rupees to the tune of five Lakh for apprehension of A-9. There by Vikas Ganjhu @ Dashrath Ganjhu @ Varun Ji @Avinash (A-9) committed offences under section 35 2025:JHHC:12850-DB 1208 read with 386 of Indian Penal Code, Sections 17, 18, 20 &, 21 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, Section 17 of Criminal Law Amendment Act."
75. Thus, it has come in the investigation that the accused appellant (A-9) was earlier an active armed cadre of CPI (Maoist) from 2010 to 2016. He used to work under Prashant Ji, Zonal Commander of CPI(Maoist). He took training in use of arms, explosives, IED while he was in CPI (Maoist). In the meantime, TPC attacked on the dasta of Prashant Ji and killed almost 10 cadres of CPI (Maoist) and remaining cadres surrendered before TPC including the appellant/accused (A-9) and thereafter, he was motivated to join TPC by Akraman Ji (A-5), and initially, he was given INSAS rifle and later became Zonal Commander and worked under Kohram Ji (A-6). Thus he has worked under top Commander of TPC, terrorist gang/ unlawful association, proscribed by the Jharkhand Government. He criminally conspired with co-accused persons for making extortion and collected funds for TPC through illegitimate sources.
76. Thus, as per the evidence collected on record, in charge- sheet it is revealed that present appellant is an armed cadre of TPC, a terrorist gang and was earlier an operative of CPI(Maoist). He used to extort levy from local contractors and businessmen.
77. It has come during investigation that appellant/accused Vikas Ganjhu Varun Ji Avinash Dashrath Ganjhu (A-9) in the year 2012 he was given levy amount by cadres of CPI (Maoist) namely Dipankar, Abhay Yadav and Prashant Ji to the tune 36 2025:JHHC:12850-DB rupees 02 lakhs, 02 Lakhs and 04 Lakhs respectively. By using this Levy money, in the year 2014, he purchased land in Pakariya, Chatra in the name of his wife, Jayanti Devi.
78. He joined TPC in the year 2016 and initially worked under Akraman ji (A-5) Regional Commander and thereafter he became sub-Zonal Commander and worked under Laxman Ganjhu Kohram ji (A-6), Regional commander of TPC and his areas of operations were Panki, Badkagaon, Katkamsandi, Katkamdag pathalgada, Simaria and Hazaribagh. After arrest of Kohram Ji (A-6), the appellant/accused was made Zonal Commander. He used to demand, threaten and collect levy from several businessmen, leaf-traders, crusher owners tendu and Contractors engaged in civil construction and government development projects, by way of extortion.
79. The levy amount was used for furtherance of terrorist activities, the appellant/accused (A-9) also used the levy amount in acquiring movable/immovable properties in the name of his wife or his relatives or were owned by men who were working in nexus with him. In the year 2017, the appellant/accused received Rupees 6 lakhs from Regional Commander, Akraman Ji (A-5) which he gave to his wife in order to purchase one Scorpio vehicle .
80. The appellant/accused Vikas Ganjhu & Varun Ji Avinash Dashrath Ganjhu (A-9) has also identified the photographs of 37 2025:JHHC:12850-DB TPC operatives Akraman @ Neta ji @ Ramvinayak Bhokta @ Ravinder Ganjhu (A-5), Regional Commander, Brijesh Ganjhu, Mukesh Ganjhu (A-7), Kohram Ji , Laxman Ganjhu (A-6), Shyam Bhokta (A-1) and the weapons which are being used by the TPC operatives.
81. It is evident that the gist of the persons who paid levy and the amount associates) levied by the (via himself or appellant/accused through appellant/accused from various businessmen, crusher owners, contractors who were engaged in civil construction has been mentioned in para 17.4.2 of the 2nd Supplementary Charge Sheet.
82. Further it has come during the investigation based upon the the available Oral and documentary evidences that the appellant/accused Vikas Ganjhu @ Varun Ji @ Avinash Dashrath Ganjhu (A-9) demanded levy, by using mobile phones, from contractors/businessmen and raising funds for TPC in Jharkhand which would be evident at Para 17.4.3 of the 2nd Supplementary Charge Sheet.
83. Thus, it is evident from the 2nd Supplementary Charge Sheet, that present appellant/accused being a member of the TPC, used use the collected levy from extortion and use the same to further terrorist activities and also acquired movable /immovable properties in name of his wife. These facts have been 38 2025:JHHC:12850-DB corroborated by several witnesses who deposed their statements U/s 161 & 164 CrPC.
84. During investigation it has also been revealed that the appellant/accused Dashrath Ganjhu @ Vikas Varun (A-9) being a Zonal Commander of the TPC has been named in several other heinous offences relating to murder, extortion, possession of illegal arms and ammunition and the tabular list of criminal antecedents of present appellant has been referred in the counter affidavit.
85. Thus, it appears that there is sufficient prima facie evidence which indicate the complicity of the appellant in the alleged offence.
86. The learned counsel for the appellant has emphatically contended that if the period of custody of the appellant will be taken into consideration, same is in the teeth of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, hence appellant may enlarge to privilege of bail.
87. In the context of aforesaid this Court is of view that there is no quarrel about the settled position of law that Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides for protecting the fundamental right of liberty but that is to be assessed by carving out the balance in enforcing the law and order and merely because the custody is there, the availability of other cogent evidence which 39 2025:JHHC:12850-DB prima facie indicates the involvement of accused/appellant with the proscribed organization cannot be ignored.
88. Therefore, mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gurwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (supra). For ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
46. As already discussed, the material available on record indicates the involvement of the appellant in furtherance of terrorist activities backed by members of banned terrorist organisation involving exchange of large quantum of money through different channels which needs to be deciphered and therefore in such a scenario if the appellant is released on bail there is every likelihood that he will influence the key witnesses of the case which might hamper the process of justice. Therefore, mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail. Hence, the aforesaid argument on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted.
89. Thus, it is settled proposition of law that any form of deprival of liberty must be justified on the ground of being reasonable, following a just and fair procedure. In the instant case as we discussed herein above that prima facie the culpability of the appellant/ accused has been established on the basis investigation culminated in to charge-sheet and further the protected witnesses have corroborated the prosecution case and 40 2025:JHHC:12850-DB further the trial of the instant case is continuing therefore in the instant case, it appears that all the due procedure has been followed.
90. Since the learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the judgment of K.A. Najeeb (supra), so as to interfere with the impugned order, therefore, this Court deems it fit and proper to going through the judgment as referred by learned counsel for the appellant.
91. The Appellant's counsel has relied upon the case of K.A. Najeeb (supra) to back its contention that the appellant has been in jail in the instant case since 2020 which is contrary to law laid down in the aforesaid case. While this argument may appear compelling at first glance, it lacks depth and substance.
92. In K.A. Najeeb's (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court was confronted with a circumstance wherein except the respondent- accused, other co- accused had already undergone trial and were sentenced to imprisonment of not exceeding eight years therefore the Hon'ble Apex Court while considering the fact that since the respondent-accused had already served portion of the maximum imprisonment i.e., more than five years, hence not interfered in order granting bail.
93. Further, in KA Najeeb's case the trial of the respondent- accused was severed from the other co-accused owing to his absconding and he was traced back in 2015 and was being separately tried thereafter and the NIA had filed a long list of 41 2025:JHHC:12850-DB witnesses that were left to be examined with reference to the said accused.
94. The Hon'ble Apex Court taking in to consideration the huge number of witnesses i.e. 276, put a pin-pointed question therein for reducing the number of witnesses by the investigating agency and when the same has been shown to be not possible then the Hon'ble Apex Court, by taking into consideration the period of custody and there is no likelihood of conclusion of the trial in near future, has not interfered in the order granting bail to the respondent-accused.
95. While, the fact of the instant case is that there are only 53 witnesses approximately which is very much less in comparison to 276 witnesses of aforesaid case.
96. Adverting to the factual aspects of the present case both on the principle of Section 43-D(5) and the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb (supra) along with the Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the fact which has come against the appellant as per the 2nd supplementary charge- sheet is very grave and serious in nature.
97. Thus, the nature of the allegation has shown to be there prima facie attracting the ingredient of the UAP Act along with the other allied penal offences.
98. Further, herein in the instant case, as per the submission of the learned counsel for NIA charges have been framed against the appellant/accused vide order dated 24.03.2021 and 42 2025:JHHC:12850-DB presently, the prosecution has been examined 35 (Thirty Five witnesses) and is fully committed to a timely conclusion of the trial. Currently, the case on record is pending for prosecution before the Hon'ble trial Court.
99. It is submitted that at this stage, if appellant/accused is allowed to be released bail, then he will get all opportunities the on to tamper with the evidence as well as influence the witnesses and from the relevant part of charge-sheet prima facie appears that the present appellant being member of the extremist organization has extorted the levy from the trader and contractor.
100. Thus, this Court is of the view that in the facts and circumstances the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex court in Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb(supra) will not be applicable in fact and circumstances of instant case.
101. In the case of Yedala Subba Rao & Anr. Vs. Union of India [supra] upon which the reliance has been placed by the learned Senior counsel for the appellant,t the Hon'ble Supreme Court has taken into consideration the implication of Section 43- D(5) of the Act, 1967 and considering the fact of the aforesaid case wherein on the basis of confession the implication was of the said case but the said confession lead to no recovery and hence applying the principle as stipulated under Section 43-D(5) of the Act, 1967 the Hon'ble Apex Court has come to the 43 2025:JHHC:12850-DB conclusion that the allegation leveled against the appellant of the said case cannot be said to be prima facie true.
102. In Vernon Vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr. [supra], case letters and statements, various literatures, books etc. have been referred to by the prosecution which have been claim to have recovered from the residences of the appellant and those literature mainly involve writings on extreme left-wing ideology including its application to India. The Hon'ble Apex Court has found that, no evidence has been led by the agency which would implicate the appellant in terrorist acts and the other offences barring the letters on which emphasis has been laid by the agency.
103. The Hon'ble Apex Court based upon the aforesaid fact has submitted that merely by writing a script cannot said to attract the penal offence of UAPA Act and thereby reached to the conclusion that the allegation cannot be said to be prima facie true.
104. But in the instant case direct nexus has been shown by the charge-sheet and from charge-sheet it is evident that the appellant present appellant/accused being a member of the TPC, used use the collected levy from extortion and use the same to further terrorist activities and also acquired movable /immovable properties in name of his wife. Hence the ratio of the aforesaid cases cannot be applicable herein. 44
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105. All these judgments, upon which, reliance has been placed, as referred hereinabove, is on the principle laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (Supra) has primarily considered the implication of Section 43-D(5) of the UAPA Act, 1967. 59. The Section 43-D(5) is having the condition for grant of bail that is if as per allegation leveled against the concerned the same is found to be prima facie untrue then by recording reason to that effect the person concerned can be enlarged on bail but contrary to the same if the concerned court comes to the conclusion that the allegation leveled against the concerned is prima facie true then the appeal is to be rejected
106. Further it is settled proposition of law that the applicability of the judgment depends upon the facts and circumstances of each and every case and there cannot be any universal application of the judgment rather each judgment is to be decided on the basis of fact of each case. Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment as rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. reported in (2014) 5 SCC 75 for ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted herein under :
"47. It is a settled legal proposition that the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case and the case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. "The court should not place reliance on decisions without 45 2025:JHHC:12850-DB discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed."
Issue of parity
107. The issue of parity with the Prem Sagar Mahto and Uchit Mahto has also been taken as they have been allowed to be released on bail vide order dated 25.06.2024 passed by the Co- ordinate Bench of this Court in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 305 of 2024.
108. We have considered the reasoning given by the Co-ordinate Bench wherein the reference has been given that the appellants, namely, Prem Sagar Mahto and Uchit Mahto were in custody since 04.12.2017 and out of 71 charge-sheeted witnesses, 26 witnesses have been examined.
109. It is evident from the order dated 25.06.2024 that the Co- ordinate Bench has not gone into the issue of merit regarding the culpability said to be committed by the appellants of the Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 305 of 2024, and has taken into consideration the delay in conclusion of the trial and the long incarceration of the said appellants as they were in custody since 04.12.2017.
110. Herein, the fact about the custody of the present appellant is that he is languishing in custody since 2020 as he remained absconded from the case for last 4 years.
111. The issue of parity, no dispute, is to be taken into consideration but the same is to be taken into consideration by applying the factual aspect along with the surrounding facts, as 46 2025:JHHC:12850-DB has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Tarun Kumar vs. Assistant Director Directorate of Enforcement, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1486 wherein it has held as under:
"18. The submission of learned Counsel Mr. Luthra to grant bail to the appellant on the ground that the other coaccused who were similarly situated as the appellant, have been granted bail, also cannot be accepted. It may be noted that parity is not the law. While applying the principle of parity, the Court is required to focus upon the role attached to the accused whose application is under consideration."
112. It is further settled connotation of law that Court cannot exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has to consider the totality of circumstances before granting bail and by only simply saying that another accused has been granted bail is not sufficient to determine whether a case for grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramesh Bhavan Rathod vs. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana, (2021) 6 SCC 230 wherein it has been held as under:
"25. We are constrained to observe that the orders passed by the High Court granting bail fail to pass muster under the law. They are oblivious to, and innocent of, the nature and gravity of the alleged offences and to the severity of the punishment in the event of conviction. In Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527], this Court has held that while applying the principle of parity, the High Court cannot exercise its powers in a capricious manner and has to 47 2025:JHHC:12850-DB consider the totality of circumstances before granting bail. This Court observed : (SCC p. 515, para 17) "17. Coming to the case at hand, it is found that when a stand was taken that the second respondent was a history- sheeter, it was imperative on the part of the High Court to scrutinise every aspect and not capriciously record that the second respondent is entitled to be admitted to bail on the ground of parity. It can be stated with absolute certitude that it was not a case of parity and, therefore, the impugned order [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 16031] clearly exposes the non-application of mind. That apart, as a matter of fact it has been brought on record that the second respondent has been charge-sheeted in respect of number of other heinous offences. The High Court has failed to take note of the same. Therefore, the order has to pave the path of extinction, for its approval by this Court would tantamount to travesty of justice, and accordingly we set it aside."
26. Another aspect of the case which needs emphasis is the manner in which the High Court has applied the principle of parity. By its two orders both dated 21-12- 2020 [Pravinbhai Hirabhai Koli v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2986] , [Khetabhai Parbatbhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2988] , the High Court granted bail to Pravin Koli (A-10) and Kheta Parbat Koli (A-15). Parity was sought with Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13) to whom bail was granted on 22- 10-2020 [Siddhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela v. State of Gujarat, 2020 SCC OnLine Guj 2985] on the ground (as the High Court recorded) that he was "assigned similar role of armed with stick (sic)". Again, bail was granted to Vanraj Koli (A16) on the ground that he was armed with a wooden stick and on the ground that Pravin (A-10), Kheta (A-15) and Sidhdhrajsinh (A-13) who were armed with sticks had been granted bail. The High Court has evidently misunderstood the central aspect of what is meant by parity. Parity while granting bail must focus upon the role of the accused. Merely observing that another accused who was granted 48 2025:JHHC:12850-DB bail was armed with a similar weapon is not sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. In deciding the aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused, their position in relation to the incident and to the victims is of utmost importance. The High Court has proceeded on the basis of parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above, which again cannot pass muster under the law."
113. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the NIA, on instruction, has submitted at bar that 35 witnesses have already been examined trial is going and will be concluded in very short time.
114. It has further been submitted that being a Zonal Commander of the TPC has been named in several other heinous offences relating to murder, extortion, possession of illegal arms and ammunition and the tabular list of criminal antecedents of present appellant has been referred in the counter affidavit.
115. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the case of the present appellant shall not fall under the category of parity to be arrived on the basis of the order passed by the Co-ordinate Bench dated 25.06.2024 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 305 of 2024.
116. This Court, in view of the principle of parity as discussed hereinabove and taking into consideration the conduct of the present appellant and also the culpability of the present appellant in alleged commission of crime is of the view that the principle of parity is not fit to be applied herein furthermore, in 49 2025:JHHC:12850-DB the instant case the conduct of the appellant is to be seen, since, the appellant remained absconded for a long time and only in year 2020, he has been arrested and as such, at this stage where only few witnesses are left to be examined, there is chances of his absconding and in such case entire trial will be jeopardized.
117. Further, as has been submitted by Mr. Das that the trial is going on day-to-day and 35 witnesses have already been examined as such at this moment if the appellant will be allowed to be released, the same will jeopardize the further proceeding in the trial since the appellant having long list of Criminal antecedents and remained absconded for 4 years.
118. This Court cannot dispute such submission taking into consideration, the conduct of the present appellant, who remained absconded from the case for last 4 years and having criminal antecedents of the like nature which would be evident from counter affidavit filed by the NIA.
119. Since we have referred the provision of Section 43-D(5) coupled with the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] and as such by taking into consideration the imputation which has come in course of investigation is of the view that the allegation cannot be said to be prima facie untrue.
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120. Further, it needs to refer herein that Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of T.N. (2005) 2 SCC 13 has observed that the considerations which normally weigh with the court in granting bail in non-bailable offences, basically they are -- the nature and seriousness of the offence; the character of the evidence; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with; the larger interest of the public or the State and other similar factors which may be relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under:
"16. ... The considerations which normally weigh with the court in granting bail in non-bailable offences have been explained by this Court in State v. Jagjit Singh [State v. Jagjit Singh, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 2 : (1962) 3 SCR 622 :
AIR 1962 SC 253] and Gurcharan Singh v. State (UT of Delhi) [Gurcharan Singh v. State (UT of Delhi), (1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41] and basically they are -- the nature and seriousness of the offence; the character of the evidence; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused;
a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with; the larger interest of the public or the State and other similar factors which may be relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case."
121. So, this Court considering the applicability of the provision of Section 43-D(5) along with the conduct of the present 51 2025:JHHC:12850-DB appellant and on the face of the trial which is going on day-to- day basis wherein 35 witnesses have already been examined, therefore at this juncture if the appellant is to be allowed to be released on bail, considering his conduct, there is likelihood of hamper the progress of the trial.
122. As such this Court is of the view by going through imputation as has found in course of investigation that the complicity of the appellant in the alleged crime cannot be denied. It is thus evident that this Court on the aforesaid allegation cannot come to the conclusion that whatever has come in course of investigation against the appellant is said to be prima facie untrue rather this Court is of the view that the allegations are sufficient to come to the conclusion that the allegation is prima facie true.
123. Therefore, this Court is of the view that it will not to be just and proper to interfere with the impugned order. This Court is also of the view while coming to the aforesaid conclusion that as per the chargesheet the specific attributability has been casted upon the petitioner regarding the commission of offence said to attract the criminal offence under UA(P) Act.
124. In view of the foregoing discussions, we find no illegality in the impugned order dated 01.07.2024 passed in Misc. Criminal Application No. 1473 of 2024b by learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-XVI-cum Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi in 52 2025:JHHC:12850-DB connection with Special (NIA) 08 of 2018 (R.C case no 23/2018/NIA/DLI) arising out of Panki PS case no 157 of 2017, as such, we are of the view that the instant appeal lacks merit.
125. In the result, we find no merit in instant appeal, hence, the same is dismissed.
126. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, also stands dismissed.
127. We make it clear that the prima facie findings recorded in this judgment are only for considering the prayer for bail of the appellant. The reasons are confined to the prayer for bail of the appellant. The same will have no bearing on the trial of the case of the appellant and other co-accused.
I agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava J.)
Birendra/ A.F.R.
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