Delhi High Court
National Agricultural Co-Operative ... vs Nafed Processed Food Cooperative ... on 31 January, 2001
Equivalent citations: 2001IIIAD(DELHI)887, 90(2001)DLT754, 2001(58)DRJ799
Author: Arun Kumar
Bench: Arun Kumar, A.K. Sikri
ORDER Arun Kumar,J.
1. National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as NAFED, for short) has filed this Letters Patent Appeal against judgment dated 19th July, 1999 rendered by learned Single Judge in Civil Writ Petition No. 6239 of 1998. The writ petition was filed by two petitioners (respondents herein) namely, NAFED Processed Foods Employees Union (Regd.), and NAFED Process Food Karamchari (Workers) Union. By the impugned judgment the aforesaid Civil Writ Petition No.
2. 6239 of 1998 of the respondents herein has been allowed. Orders passed by the appellant herein under Clause 17(IV)(d) of the Staff Regulations dated 23/24th December, 1998, 23rd December, 1998, 4th January, 1999 and 5th January, 1999 in respect of 67 employees have been set aside holding that they are arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of Constitution of India and therefore amounted to illegal and arbitrary mode of retrenchment. It may be mentioned that the appellant had taken preliminary objection to the maintainability of the Writ Petition on the ground that NAFED is not a "State" and /or "instrumentality or agency of State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and therefore Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India invoking provisions of Article 14 thereof was not maintainable. Before deciding the petition on merits, the learned Single Judge negatived this contention holding that a Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was maintainable against NAFED. The preliminary argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is aimed at challenging this aspect of the judgment. If the Writ Petition filed by the respondents is held to be not-maintainable, observations contained in the judgment on merits will be rendered otiose.
3. Before dealing with the contentions of the respective parties it would be appropriate to notice, in the first instance, the approach adopted by learned Single Judge in determining this question. The perusal of the impugned judgment shows that the learned Single Judge recorded the contention of both the parties and also observed that the respondents herein had relied upon the judgment of Madras High Court in the case of Ahmad and Company, Madras and others versus Union of India wherein Court held NAFED to be a "State" and the appellant had relied upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court in J.S. Arneja versus National Co-operative Consumers Federation of India Ltd. and others in relation to National Cooperative Consumers Federation Limited (hereinafter referred to as NCCF, for short) holding NCCF not to be a "State". However, thereafter the learned Single Judge opined that it was not necessary to examine which judgment was applicable to the f acts of this case in view of the orders passed by Supreme Court in Writ Petition No. 89 of 1989 relating to NAFED inasmuch as notwithstanding the preliminary objection raised by NAFED in that case that it was not a "State", the Supreme Court had decided the matter on merits. The relevant portion of the impugned judgment to this effect reads as under:-
However, in my view, it is not necessary to go into this matter to test whether the Madras High Court's view or the view taken by this Hon'ble Court is applicable to the facts of the present case because writ petition No. 89/1989 was filed in the Hon'ble Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and the preliminary objection of the respondent that NAFED is not a "state" had also been taken by the respondent no.2/NAFED in the writ proceedings before the Supreme Court. In spite of the preliminary objections specifically taken before the Supreme Court in paragraph C of the counter affidavit by NAFED to the effect that NAFED was not "State" or "authority" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court had decided the said writ petition on merits on 16.2.1995 and the Supreme 'Court had entertained a writ petition even under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The relevant portion of the said preliminary objection in paragraph 'c' taken before the Hon'ble Supreme Court by N.A.F.E.D./respondent no.2 herein reads as under:
"That the National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India Ltd. is neither a 'State' nor an 'authority' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Thus, a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution would not lie against the 'NAFED'."
It is also significant to note that this writ petition No.89/1989 was listed on 16.2.95 before the Bench presided over by the same learned Judge who presided over the Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in J.S.Arneja's case (Supra) and the f act that preliminary objection was raised on an earlier occasion on 9.1.95 could not have been lost sight of.
The question relating to NAFED being 'State' is thus no longer open and in view of the fact that the Supreme Court entertained a writ petition in spite of a specific preliminary objection regarding its maintainability on the plea that NAFED was contended not to be 'State', it is not open to this Court to entertain such a preliminary objection. In this view of the matter, I hold that NAFED is a 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and is amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court and the preliminary objection is thus unsustainable."
4. The aforesaid discussion shows that while holding NAFED to be a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution the learned Single Judge has been persuaded by the fact that notwithstanding objection to the maintainability of the aforesaid Writ Petition before the Supreme Court filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court decided the Writ Petition on merits. We were shown Order dated 16th February, 1995 passed by Supreme Court in the aforesaid Writ Petition. Perusal thereof shows that the Supreme Court has not even adverted to the question as to whether NAFED is a "State" and/or "instrumentality or agency of the State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Even the contention in this respect is not noted in the Order dated 16th February, 1995. Order dated 16th February, 1995 is a brief Order and it would be appropriate to reproduce the same in entirety :-
"It is not disputed that the National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India Ltd. New Delhi (NAFED) has categorised its employees as industrial employees and the federation employees. The petitioners are the industrial employees. In the writ petition, the contention of the petitioners is that they be treated at per with federation employees for purposes of pay, bonus and other service conditions. Mr.D.K.Garg, learned counsel for the petitioners has, however, confined his claim only to the question of payment of bonus. According to him, the industrial employees are being paid the statutory bonus at the rate of 8.33% of the wages; whereas the federation employees are being paid 20%. Learned counsel has contended that there is no justification whatsoever for treating the two categories of employees different for the purpose of payment of bonus. We see force in the contention of the learned counsel. All employees who are entitled to the payment of bonus under the Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 are a class by themselves and there cannot be discrimination within the class. Although, for the purposes of internal working the NAFED has categorised the employees as federation employees and industrial employees but for the purposes of payment of bonus, they cannot be classified differently.
We, therefore, allow the writ petition and direct the respondents to pay the petitioners bonus at the same rate, with effect from April 1, 1995, as is being paid to the federation employees. Mr.Garg states that the other points involved in the petition need adjudication on facts and as such he may, if necessary, resort to the appropriate proceedings in appropriate forum. The petition is allowed in the above terms. No costs.
5. When the question of NAFED being a "State" or not is neither referred to, touched or discussed in the aforesaid Order, can it be said that the Supreme Court held that NAFED was a "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution merely because preliminary objection was taken by NAFED in that case and notwithstanding this the case was decided don merits? In our view, the answer has to be in the negative. The Supreme Court decision does not warrant a conclusion that in view of the said judgment NAFED has to be held to be a "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The decision of the Supreme Court does not refer to or decide this question. Therefore, it cannot be treated as a precedent on this proposition. It is the ratio of a judgment which is a blinding precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The aforesaid order dated 16th February, 1995 passed by the Supreme Court does not lay down any "ratio" on the question of NAFED being "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Ratio decidendi is the principle or reasons underlying a decision, apart from the special peculiarities of the case. The expression has three meanings. The first is "the reason for deciding". A finding of fact may, in this sense, be the ratio decidendi. Secondly, it may mean "the rule or law proffered by the judge as the basis of his decision." Thirdly, it may mean "the rule of law which others regard as being of binding authority." The second and third meanings overlap but do not coincide. Therefore, the ratio decidendi of a case contemplates some situation of fact and therefore its determination involves ascertaining the material facts to which it applies. It is the choice of these facts by the deciding judge that is important. Now, fact may be stated at different levels of generality. And a fact may be material in the sense that it is included in the ratio decidendi, as opposed to a fact which is omitted as being immaterial. Hence the ratio decidendi of a case can be defined as the material facts of the case plus the decision thereon. In this connection reference be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of The Punjab Land Development & Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh versus The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and others reported in JT 1990 (2) SC 489 which contains detailed and erudite discussion on the concept of ratio decidendi.
6. Once that is the position in law, it is difficult to sustain the judgment of the learned Single Judge holding that NAFED us a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and as such amenable to jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. This leads us to examine the question as to whether NAFED is a "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India?
7. It is essential to know the constitution of the Society for finding an answer to this question. NAFED is a co-operative Society registered under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act as extended to Delhi. Later it was deemed to be registered as a Co-operative Society under the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 1973. It being a Multi-Unit Cooperative Society it is deemed to be registered as a Cooperative Society under the Multi State Co-operative Societies Act, 1984 in view of Section 3(g) of this Act. The second schedule of this Act contains a list of National Level Co-operative Societies. The name of petitioner figures at item no.4 in this list. It has its own buy-laws as per which it manages its affairs. It is created for the benefit and welfare of its members. The entire share capital of the Society is held by Members, Co-operative Societies, and no share capital is vested with the Government of India. In the counter affidavit filed by the appellant in the appeal it has been asserted that the Society does not receive any financial assistance or subsidy from the Government and it runs its own business on commercial principles, raising its own funds/resources and obtaining loans from financial institutions/commercial banks on commercial terms. NAFED does not enjoy any monopoly status in its business. Some times export of certain commodities like nigerseed, onions etc. are canalised through NAFED. According to the Buy-laws the Board of Directors is the authority responsible for the management, administration, business and functioning of NAFED. The Board of Directors is elected in accordance with the Bye-Laws and out of 42 Directors, only three are government nominees who do not have special or veto powers in the management of the society i.e. NAFED.
8. On the basis of aforesaid structure in constitution of NAFED it cannot be treated as "State" or other authority or instrumentality or agency of the "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
9. The respondents could not dispute the factual position contained in the bye-laws of NAFED as spelt out above. In fact respondents admit that the management of NAFED vests in the Board of Directors elected from amongst the representatives of the State owned cooperatives marketing Federations and other member societies with three representatives from the Government of India and one each from National Cooperative Union of India, National Cooperative Development Corporation, National Cooperative Consumer Federation Ltd., Bharat Krishik Samaj and State Bank of India. However, they emphasise that out of 44 Directors, ten are Indian Administrative Service officers and two are Provincial Civil Service officers representing Government of India and state owned Federations. Support is also sought to be taken from the fact that NAFED has been entrusted with the implementation of Market Intervention Scheme in respect of perishables (onions/potatoes etc.) and spices like black pepper, chillies, as well as the fact that Government of India has also canalised the export of onion and niger seed through NAFED. But these would not be sufficient considerations to lead to a finding that NAFED us a "State" under Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
10. There are number of judgments of various High Courts whereby such co-operative societies are held not to be "State" or other authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. Learned counsel for the appellant referred to the following judgments in this behalf :-
i. J.S. Arneja versus NCCF .
ii. S.S.Dhanoa versus Municipal Corporation of Delhi .
iii. Ajmer Singh versus The Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Punjab .
iv. Pritham Singh Gill versus State of Punjab .
v. R.R. Sahu versus NCCF .
vi. Bana Bihari Tripathi versus Registrar of Cooperative Societies .
vii. Sri Kona Seema Cooperative Central Bank versus N. Sitarama Raju reported in AIR 1990 AP 171.
11. The judgment in the case of J.S. Arneja (supra) is rendered by a Division Bench of this very Court.
12. In Ajay Hasia Versus Khalid Mujib , the Apex Court culled out six criteria as laid down in the judgment of Ramana Dayaram Shetty Versus the International Airport Authority of India & Ors. to determine whether a concern is an instrumentality or agency of the State. These are the following:-
1. "One thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government."
2. "Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character."
3. "It may also be a relevant factor ..... whether the corporation enjoys monopoly status which is the State conferred or State protected."
4. " Existence of " deep and pervasive State control may afford an indication that the Corporation is a State agency or instrumentality."
5. "If the functions of the corporation of public importance and closely related to governmental functions, it would be a relevant factor in classifying the corporation as an instrumentality or agency of Government."
6. "Specifically, if a department of Govt. is transferred to a corporation, it would be a strong factor supportive of this inference" of the corporation being an instrumentality or agency of Government."
13. These tests still hold the field. The decision of the Supreme Court in Ajay Hasia (supra) and later M.C.Mehta versus Union of India reiterate the same position. It follows from this that name does not matter. The fact that an authority is a Company registered under the Companies Act or under the Societies Registration Act or a State Cooperative Societies Act, alone will not be determinative. Each case will turn on its own peculiar facts. What normally matters is the facts surrounding the constitution, functioning, control and management of a society. Control will include financial control. Keeping these aspects in view a Full Bench of this Court held the Indra Gandhi National Centre for Arts as a "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, in Sanghi Technologies Private Ltd. versus Union of India . In Sri Kona seema Cooperative Central Bank Ltd. versus N.S.Raju reported in 1990 A.P.171, a Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court found that a Bank registered under the Cooperative Societies Act was not discharging any functions of public importance or which could be said to be governmental. It was held not to be a "State". Similarly, after examining all relevant facts the National Consumers; Cooperative Federation was held to be not a "State" in Ramu Ram Sahni versus N.C.C.F. reported in 1991 M.P. 63. This Court also held NCCF not to be a "State" for purposes of Article 12 of the Constitution of India in J.S. Arneja (supra).
14. NAFED does not meet any of the criteria laid down by the Supreme Court which have been noted above. Admittedly, the Government is not holding any share capital of NAFED. It also cannot be said that any financial assistance is provided by the Government which meets almost all the entire expenditure of NAFED. There is no state control, much less "deep and pervasive" state control. Moreover by no stretch of imagination it can be said that functions of NAFED are closely related to governmental functions. One may also refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Chander Mohan Khanna Versus NCERT . While holding NCERT as not "State" or "instrumentality" or an "agency" of the State, following pertinent observations were made by the Supreme Court:
"3. Article 12 should not be stretched so as to bring in every autonomous body which has some nexus with the government within the s weep of the expression "State". A wide enlargement of the meaning must be tempered by a wise limitation. It must not be lost sight of that in the modern concept of Welfare State, independent institution, corporation and agency are generally subject to State control. The State control does not render such bodies as "State" under Article 12. The State control, however vast and pervasive is not determinative. The financial contribution by the State is also not conclusive. The combination of State aid coupled with an unusual degree of control over the management and policies of the body, and rendering of an important public service being the obligatory functions of the State may largely point out that the body is "State". If the government operates behind a corporate veil, carrying out governmental activity and governmental functions of vital public importance, there may be little difficulty in identifying the body as "State" within of Article 12 of the Constitution."
15. Courts have been unanimous on this legal aspect. Co-operative societies, normally, cannot be termed as a "State" or other authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the respondent strongly relied on Ahmad and Company (supra). In our view this judgment does not advance the case of the respondents. This judgment only reiterates the contention of the appellant as elaborated in the case of Sri Kona Seema (supra) that any organisation can be an instrumentality of a State for limited purposes, viz. canalisation of export of onions as was the case in Ahmad and Company. In para 11, the Madras High Court posed the following question:-
"The question, therefore, is whether NAFED, which is a society registered under the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act in relation to its activity as a canalising agency can be said to be an authority as contemplated in the definition of State in Article 12 ...."
16. In para 18, the Court observed as under:-
"But the further question to be decided is whether by reason of such appointment as canalising agency, NAFED can be considered to be an instrumentality of the State in respect of such activity as canalising agency, so that it can be considered to be a "State" under Article 12".
17. The Court answered this question in para 20 of the said judgment which reads as follows :-
"In the scheme of canalisation, it is really the Government which acts through the canalising agency and the juristic personality owned by the agency is only for the purpose of convenience and cannot be allowed to obliterate the true nature of the reality, behind which is the Government. It is because of this true nature of the scheme of canalisation that the Supreme Court had upheld the monopoly right conferred on such agency. There could, therefore, be no doubt that NAFED in respect of its activity as a canalising agent is an authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. " [emphasis added]
18. This judgment, therefore, has to be confined to its own facts and it would not help the respondents in advancing the proposition of law which they want to canvass in the present case.
19. One may also usefully refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.S.Dhanoa (supra) which is to the effect that even predominantly government dominated co-operative society is not a "State".
20. It was submitted by the respondent, in the alternative that even assuming that NAFED does not come within the definition of "State" as per provisions of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, it cannot act arbitrarily and against all norms of service jurisprudence on the ground that it is not a "State". A statutory duty is imposed upon an authority to act in a fair and reasonable manner especially when it is dealing with essential service conditions of employees such as termination and compulsory retirement. It has been constantly held by the Supreme Court in a large number of decisions that the words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 are not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. In support of this argument learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of U.P.State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. versus Chandra Bhan Dubey and others .
21. In order to appreciate this contention, let us first reproduce provision of Article 226(1) of the Constitution. This Article reads as under:
"226 (1): Power to High Courts to issue certain writs.
Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have a power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, {for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by part III and for any other purposes}.
22. As already recorded above, the main contention of the respondents is that the expression "any person" occurring in Article 226 has to be given wide meaning and it should not be restricted to person exercising sovereign or public functions or Governmental authority. We have already held that NAFED is not a State and/or instrumentality and/or agency of the State under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is a society registered under the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 1973. The dispute between NAFED and its employees would therefore be a private dispute. It is in this light, the contention of the respondents is to be examined. The judicial trend shows court's jurisdiction will not extend to deciding such private disputes. H.M.Seervai in his book entitled 'Constitutional Law of India', Fourth Edition, Vol.2 at page 1579 has listed the following propositions:
" (1). The literal construction of Art.226 could not have been intended because "it would enable any person to obtain any relief by an application under this Article..... This construction of the Article would practically abrogate the entire judicial system and the machinery set up for the administration of justice in the State."
(2). There is internal evidence in Art.226 that the words "to any person" and "for any purpose" cannot be construed literally. For, whatever other power Art.226 confers on the High Courts, it undoubtedly confers the power to issue writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, certiorari and quo warranto. But these writs cannot be issued "to any person" and "for any.....purpose". The purposes for which, and the persons to whom, these writs can be issued have long been well settled. Therefore, the power to issue writs of the nature expressly mentioned "to any person" can only mean "the power to issue such a writ to any person to whom, according to well-established principles the writ lay". And the words "for any other purpose" must mean "for any other purpose for which any of the writs would according to well-established principles issue" the word "other" being read in antithesis to "for the enforcement of fundamental rights". It is submitted that from the propositions set out in (2) above, proposition (3) must follow:
(3) Orders, directions or writes are to be issued "to any person" and for "any purpose". Once the meaning of these words is ascertained with reference to writs, a different meaning cannot be given to them with reference to "orders" or "directions". Nor should this surprise us. In England, the writs of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition were replaced by "orders" of the same name in 1938; the writ of quo warranto later by an injunction - that is, an order of the court. In India the writs of habeas corpus and mandamus were replaced by "directions" in the nature of habeas corpus and by "directions" in the nature of mandamus by s. 491, Cr.P.c., and S. 45, Specific Relief Act, 1877, respectively. The words "orders" and "directions" were used to describe what at one time were called writs, and since that terminology had been in use in England and in India, all the three words have been used in Art.226 to describe well-recognized English writs.
(4) Article 226 should not be construed so as to replace the ordinary remedies by way of a suit and application available to the litigant under the general law of the land."
23. This Court in the case of National Seeds Corporation Employees Union & Another Versus National Seeds Corporation held that once the origin and history of the Prerogative Writs are remembered, it is clear that powers given to the High Court under Article 226 are to be exercised in accordance with the principles which govern the present writs. Therefore, the expression "any person" is to be read ejusdem generis and it cannot include private persons. Interpreting in this manner, "any person" should be the person who is discharging the public function. It may be mentioned that in the case of Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust and Others Versus V.R.Rudani & Others , the Supreme Court even when giving liberal interpretation to the words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 and holding that these words are not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State, still covered only those under "any other person" who are performing public function.
24. No doubt in the case of U.P. Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd (supra) the Supreme Court observed that the distinction between public function and private function was being obliterated. However, the court still did not extend the principle by lying down any rule of law that direction can be issued to a private person as well. Decision ultimately rested on the proposition that the persons in question were dancing to the tune of State Government and their affairs were controlled by the State Government and the respondent was "another authority" or State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The authority involved was U.P. State Cooperative Land Development Bank Ltd. which was constituted under U.P. Cooperative Land Development Bank Act and it was found that affairs of the society were controlled by the State Government on the basis of which it was held that it was an instrumentality of "State".
25. No doubt some observations are made to the effect that there should not be any difference between public functions and private functions. However, no authoritative pronouncement has been made on this aspect. There was no principle enunciated in the said judgment to the effect that writ can lie against private persons or bodies doing pure commercial activity. Thus this judgment does not advance the case of the respondents inasmuch as no such principle and be deduced from this judgment to the effect that writ lies against NAFED. On the other hand, we have a recent authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court. In the case of VST Industries Ltd. versus VST Industries Workers' Union and another reported in JT 2001 (1) SC 36, the Supreme Court held that no writ would lie against a person discharging function of private character. In this case the appellant was engaged in the manufacture and sale of cigarette which does not involve any public function. In view of the obligation cast on the appellant under Section 46 of the Factories Act, 1948 the appellant had to set up a canteen because the establishment had more than 250 workmen. This was a labour welfare device for the benefit of the work force. It was found as a fact that the appellant had complete control over the activities in respect of the canteen. The contractor who was actually running the canteen had practically no discretion in the affairs relating to the canteen. The canteen was, therefore, taken to be a canteen run by the management itself. This, therefore, could not be said to be a public function so as to make the appellant amenable to writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
26. Even if the writ petition is not maintainable, respondents are not remediless. The respondents have, in the writ petition, challenged the decision of NAFED in introducing Voluntary Retirement Scheme and the orders of termination issued under Clause 17(IV)(d) of the Staff Regulations providing for compulsory retirement. The respondents can raise appropriate industrial dispute.
27. Because of the view that we have taken namely, NAFED is not a "State" or other authority within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and the writ petition filed by the respondent was not maintainable, it is not necessary to go into the other aspect of the impugned judgment whereby Orders of termination under Clause 17(IV)(d) of the Staff Regulations were set aside as arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. In view of the decision that the Writ petition filed by the respondents was not maintainable, observations contained in the impugned judgment on the merits of the controversy do not survive.
28. This Appeal is accordingly allowed. Impugned judgment dated 19th July, 1999 is set aside. Writ Petition No. 6239 of 1998 filed by the respondents is hereby dismissed on the ground that it is not maintainable. It is, however, once again clarified that is would be open to respondents to raise their grievances by invoking the machinery provided under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or any other law. Any such dispute raised by them will be decided by the said authority on its own merit without being influenced by the judgment dated 19th July, 1999 of the learned Single Judge. In the facts of the case there will be no order as to costs.