Delhi High Court
Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi & Anr. vs Sant Gurbaksh Singh on 12 April, 2012
Author: Rajiv Sahai Endlaw
Bench: Rajiv Sahai Endlaw
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 12th April, 2012
+ LPA No.383-84/2006
% GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR. ....Appellants
Through: Ms. Rachna Srivastava, Adv.
Versus
SANT GURBAKSH SINGH ..... Respondent
Through: None.
CORAM :-
HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
JUDGMENT
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. This intra-court appeal impugns the judgment dated 07.11.2005 of a Single Judge of this Court allowing W.P.(C) No.719/2003 preferred by the respondent by directing the appellant to allot an alternative plot of land to the respondent in lieu of the acquired land.
2. The sole ground on which the appellant impugns the said judgment is, that the Supreme Court in UOI Vs. Shiv Kumar Bhargva 1995 (2) SCC 427 and in Sneh Prabha Vs. State of U.P. (1996) 7 SCC 426 has held that only those persons are eligible for benefit of the Scheme of Alternative Land in lieu of Acquired Land, who were recorded owners of the acquired land LPA No.383-84/2006 Page 1 of 6 when the Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act is issued and that the persons who become owners subsequently, though may be entitled to claim compensation for acquisition, but are not entitled to the benefit of alternative plot. It is contended that though the respondent had entered into an Agreement dated 13.02.1974 for purchase of the subject land and which Agreement contemplated execution of Sale Deed by 30.04.1975 but neither any Sale Deed was executed in favour of the respondent nor had the respondent filed any suit for specific performance, till the issuance of the Notification under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act on 13.02.1981. It is further argued that the suit for specific performance was filed much later in the year 1986 and which was decreed in terms of compromise on 18.09.1991. It is thus argued that the respondent is not eligible for alternative land.
3. It is the admitted position in the present case that the compensation for acquisition of the subject land was received by the respondent.
4. We also find that the respondent had earlier filed Civil Writ petition No.1743/2000 impugning the rejection on 09.06.2000 by the appellant of his application for alternative land on the ground that the respondent was not the recorded owner of the acquired land at the time of issuance of the LPA No.383-84/2006 Page 2 of 6 Notification under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act. The said writ petition was disposed of vide judgment dated 16.05.2002 holding that ownership could have been either by virtue of purchase or by virtue of being the recorded owner of the land; that if after purchase, for some reason the land is not entered into the name of the purchaser in the revenue records, that cannot be a ground for depriving such purchaser from the benefit of the Scheme of allotment of alternative land; it was thus held that the respondent was eligible to be considered for allotment of alternative plot of land and his application could not have been rejected on the ground that he was not the recorded owner of the acquired land before the issuance of the Notification under Section 4 of the Acquisition Act. A direction was issued to the appellant to consider the application within three months.
5. We have enquired from the counsel for the appellant as to whether any appeal was preferred against the aforesaid judgment dated 16.05.2002; the counsel candidly admits that the said judgment has attained finality.
6. Once we find the aforesaid to have attained finality, we fail to understand as to how the issue, finally decided by the said judgment, can be re-agitated. The same would constitute res judicata between the parties, even if erroneous in law. The Supreme Court in Mathura Prasad Bajoo LPA No.383-84/2006 Page 3 of 6 Jaiswal Vs. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy (1970) 1 SCC 613 held that in determining the application of the rule of res judicata the Court is not concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the earlier judgment; the matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened; a mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding between the same parties may not, for the same reason, be questioned in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties; but, where the decision is on a question of law, i.e. the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is the same. Similarly in V.S. Charati Vs. Hussein Nhanu Jamadar (1999) 1 SCC 273 it was held that a decision, simply because it may be wrong would not become nullity; it would continue to bind the parties unless set aside.
7. The Supreme Court in M. Nagabhushana Vs. State of Karnataka (2011) 3 SCC 408 reiterated that the principle of res judicata is based on the age old principles of it being in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation and that no one ought to be vexed twice in a litigation if LPA No.383-84/2006 Page 4 of 6 it is for one and the same cause. The principle of finality of litigation is based on high principle of public policy and to promote honesty and a fair administration of justice. Recently in Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action Vs. Union of Indian (2011) 8 SCC 161 also it was observed that it is rare that in an adversarial system, despite the judges of the highest Court doing their best, one or more parties may remain dissatisfied with the decision; however opening door for re-arguing in such cases would be opening a flood gate which will cause more wrongs in the Society at large at the cost of rights. The Supreme Court noticed that strict observance of the said principles may occasionally entail hardship upon individual litigants, but the mischief arising from that source will be small in comparison with the greater mischief which would necessarily result from doubt being thrown upon the finality of the decisions.
8. When we test the facts of the present case in the light of the law aforesaid, we find that even if the issue of entitlement to alternate land were to be held to be a question of law only, the cause of action for the writ petition from which the present appeal arises was the same as for the earlier writ petition No.1743/2000 and thus the decision in the earlier writ petition is res judicata.
LPA No.383-84/2006 Page 5 of 6
9. We therefore do not find any merit in this appeal and dismiss the same. No order as to costs.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE APRIL 12, 2012 'gsr' LPA No.383-84/2006 Page 6 of 6