Karnataka High Court
M/S Filtrex Technologies Pvt Ltd vs State Of Karnataka on 22 September, 2025
Author: S.R.Krishna Kumar
Bench: S.R.Krishna Kumar
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 262 OF 2025 (482(Cr.PC) / 528(BNSS)
C/W
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 1352 OF 2025(482(Cr.PC) / 528(BNSS)
IN CRL.P No. 262/2025
BETWEEN:
1. SRI KRISHNAMURTHY. B. N.,
S/O SRI BOMMI NARASIMHALU REDDY
AGED ABOUT 84 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO 20
BUDDA VIHARA ROAD,
FRAZER TOWN
Digitally signed
by SAMREEN BANGALORE NORTH
AYUB BANGALORE - 560 005.
DESHNUR
Location: HIGH
COURT OF
KARNATAKA 2. SMT LATHA HARI BABU
DHARWAD W/O SRI KRISHNA HARI BABU
BENCH
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO 4,
DEFENCE AVENUE
BEHIND KALAYANA NAGAR BUS DEPOT,
CHELEKERE,
KALYANANAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 043.
3. SRI KRISHNA HARI BABU
S/O SRI B N KRISHNAMURTHY
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AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
RESIDING AT NO 4,
DEFENCE AVENUE
BEHIND KALAYANA NAGAR BUS DEPOT,
CHELEKERE,
KALYANANAGAR
BENGALURU - 560 043.
...PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. P B RAJU, ADVOCATES)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY HOSKOTE POLICE STATION,
REPRESENTED BY
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT BUILDING
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2. SMT LAKSHMI SREEKUMAR
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
WIFE OF SREE KUMAR,
T 76 HARMONY HOMES
HENNUR MAIN ROAD
KALYAN NAGAR,
BENGALURU - 560 043.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. SOWMYA R., HCGP FOR R1
SRI. KASINAGALINGAM, ADVOCATE FOR R2)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 BNSS)
PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR DATED 22.11.2024 REGISTERED IN CRIME
NO. 359/2024 FOR OFFENCES PUNISHABLE SECTIONS 120B,
467,468,471, 474 AND 405 OF THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 PENDING
ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE PRL. CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN) & CJM COURT,
HOSAKOTE, BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT (ANNEXURE-A) REGISTERED
BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT POLICE I.E., HOSKOTE POLICE STATION
POLICE AGAINST THE PETITIONERS HEREIN BASED ON THE
COMPLAINT LODGED BY THE 2nd RESPONDENT..
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IN CRL.P NO. 1352/2025
BETWEEN:
M/S FILTREX TECHNOLOGIES PVT LTD.,
FACTORY AT JADIGENAHALLI, 7TH KM,
HOSKOTE MALUR ROAD,
HOSKOTE 562 114
REP BY ITS DIRECTOR
MR.PRADEEP KUMAR TOTLA
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI. P B RAJU, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY HOSKOTE POLICE STATION
REPRESENTED BY
STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
HIGH COURT BUILDING
BANGALORE - 560 001.
2. SMT. LAKSHMI SREEKUMAR
AGED ABOUT 60 YEARS
WIFE OF SREE KUMAR
T 76, HARMONY HOMES
HENNUR MAIN ROAD KALYAN NAGAR
BANGALORE - 560 043.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. .,ADVOCATE)
THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.P.C (U/S 528 BNSS) BY PRAYING
TO QUASH THE FIR DTD 22.11.2024 REGISTERED IN CR.NO.359/2024,
FOR OFFENCES P/U/S 120(B),467,468,471,474,405 OF IPC, 1860, PENDING
ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE PRL. CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN) AND CJM
COURT, HOSAKOTE, BANGALORE RURAL DISTRICT (ANNEXURE-A)
REGISTERED BY THE 1st RESPONDENT POLICE i.e., HOSKOTE P.S.,
AGAINST THE PETITIONER HEREIN BASED ON THE COMPLAINT
LODGED BY THE 2nd RESPONDENT.
THESE PETITIONS ARE BEING HEARD AND RESERVED ON
10.07.2025 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS THIS DAY,
THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR
CAV ORDER
Both these petitions arise out of the impugned complaint
dated 22.11.2024 registered as an FIR in Crime No.359/2024
lodged by the 2nd respondent - de facto complainant before the 1st
respondent - police authorities for the offences punishable under
Sections 120B, 467, 468, 471, 474 and 405 IPC.
2. Petitioners in Crl.P.No.262/2025 are arraigned accused
Nos. 1 to 4, while petitioner in Crl.P.No.1352/2024 is arraigned as
accused No.5 and both the petitions are filed seeking quashing of
the impugned complaint and the FIR and for other reliefs.
3. The 2nd respondent- de facto complainant has filed
statement of objections to both the petitions and contended that the
same are liable to be dismissed.
4. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned
HCGP for 1st respondent as well as learned counsel for the 2nd
respondent and perused the material on record.
5. In addition to reiterating the various contentions urged in
the petition and referring to the material on record, learned counsel
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for the petitioner would contend that the dispute between the
parties is essentially civil in nature relating to immovable property
and is sought to be given a cloak of criminality which is an abuse of
process of law. It was submitted that there is long and inordinate
delay in lodging the complaint, which is barred by limitation and
deserves to be quashed. It was therefore submitted that both the
petitions deserve to be allowed by quashing the impugned
compliant and FIR as sought by the petitioners. In support of his
contentions, learned counsel paced reliance upon the following
judgments:-
(i) Usha Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal -
(2023) 15 SCC 135;
(ii) Kishan Singh v. Gurpal Singh - (2010) 8 SCC
775;
(iii) S. Dutt (Dr.) v. State of Uttar Pradesh - 1965
SCC OnLine SC 6 ;
(iv) Dr. Vimla v. State (NCT of Delhi) - (1963) 33
COMP CAS 279;
(v) Ravichandra v. State - 2022 SCC OnLine Kar
1192;
(vi) Ravi Kapoor v. State of Himachal Pradesh -
2019 SCC OnLine HP 642.
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6. Per contra, learned counsel for the 2nd respondent -
complainant would reiterate the various contentions urged in the
statement of objections and submits that the impugned complaint
and the FIR discloses the commission of the cognizable offences
which are made out, would require investigation and cannot be
interfered with in the present petitions, which are liable to be
dismissed. In support of his submissions, learned counsel placed
reliance upon the following judgments:
(i) Delhi Development Authority v. Lila D. Bhagat
-(1975) 1 SCC 410;
(ii) Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana -
(1977) 4 SCC 451;
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the rival
submissions and perused the material on record.
8. Before adverting to the rival contentions, it would be
apposite to refer to the impugned complaint which reads as under:-
"22 November 2024
From
Mrs Lakshmi Sreekumar
T 76, Harmony Homes
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Hennur Main Road
Kalyan Nagar
Bangalore 560043
Whatsapp Ph: +91 9611 530 543
Resident of:
142 Westchester Drive
Churton Park Wellington 6037
New Zealand
To
The Ponce Inspector
Haskote Police Stution Hoskate Taluk
Bangalore Rural
Sub: Submitting Police Complaint for the following:
A) Section 336 (3) BNS - Forgery
B) Section 338 BNS-Forgery to benefit from financial and
property transactions.
C) Section 340 BNS-Use of a forged document as genuine
D) Section 339 BNS - Possession of a forged document
intended to be used as genuine
E) Section 316-Breach of trust
F) Section 61 - Criminal Conspiracy
G) Section 3(8) - Common Intention
Respected Sir.
1) This is to inform that my signature has been forged in a
GPA in the year 2000 by my maternal uncle
B.N.Krishnamurthy, witnessed by his daughter in law Latha
Hari and notorised by an advocate N.Dorairajulu Naidu on 24
June 2000 in Bangalore while I was away overseas.
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2) This forged GPA has been used to re-register my property
survey number 269, Jadegenahalli, Hoskote Taluk in 2002
and converted to industrial status in 2008 and leased to a
factory since 2008 without my consant and knowledge by
B.N.Krishnamurthy and he has been collecting exorbitant
rents on my land since 2008.
3) As recent as last week Bangalore Metro and Rural
Development (BMRD) has confirmed that the approval and
building plan was given in the name of B. N. Krishnamurthy
as the owner of my land 269.
4) I nad issued clarification and legal notice to Fitrex to
confirm the same and have evidence in their response to
show that there has been a collusion between B.N.
Knishnamurthy, his son Hari Babu and Filtrex.
5) BMRD has confirmed that there is no legal route to
segregate my land 269 from the combination of B. N.
Krishnamurty's lands as it has been granted the Industrial
status and BMRD approval as a combination of lands due to
the nature of application made in 2008. And the only way to
segregate is to cancel the DC order for industrial conversion
which means all lands will lose the industrial status and
Filtrex buildings will be demolished and another fresh
application has to be made for industrial conversion with new
costs. This was also confirmed through the DD, Zilla
Panchayat at DC office, Doddaballapur.
6) Basically while the RTC confirms I am the owner, I cannot
legally do anything on it as it is leased to Filtrex. BMRD has
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confirmed that it cannot be leased separately either so it is
still leased as a bundle with other survey numbers of
B.N.Krishnamurthy. While Filtrex and B. N. Krishnamurthy
and Hari Babu may ignore this fact, as a victim of this
situation caused by them I want to lodge this complaint on
the grounds of breach of trust, criminal conspiracy and
forgery, fraud and cheating with an intent to destroy me as
well as grab my lands.
7) I have evidence to prove that B.N.Krishnamurthy and his
family members have conspired to grab my land through the
years. His daughter in law has witnessed the forgery as well
as signed the lease agreement on behalf of Filtrex despite
knowing it includes my land 269.
I am filing this complaint with evidence of such criminal acts
and request you to register this complaint and investigate
further and file a FIR for criminal case.
Please find enclosed my complaint against the following:
1) B.N.Krishnamurthy Son of Narasimhalu Reddy, residing at
20, Buddha Vihara Road, Frazer Town, Bangalore 20. Ph no:
+91 98440 68994
2) Latha Hari, wife of Hari Babu and daughter in law of
B.N.Krishnamurthy, residing at 5 Defence Avenue,
Chelekere, Kalyan Nagar, Bangalore 560043. Ph по:+91
98454 48031
3) N Dorairajulu Naidu, 445, 15th main road, 8th block,
Koramangala, Ph: not known.
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4) Hari Babu, son of B.N.Krishnamurthy, residing at 5
Defence Avenue, Chelekere, Kalyan Nagar, Bangalore
560043. Ph nó: +91 98450 19274
5) Pradeep Kumar Totla, Director, M/s Filtrex Technologies
Pvt Ltd, factory at Jadigenahalli, 7th KM., Hoskote Malur
Road, Hoskote-562 114, Phone No. 080 49206500, 080
2792 1001
I can be contacted on +91 9611 530 543 for any questions
related to this complaint.
Thanking you
Yours sincerely
Sd/-
Lakshmi Sreekumar"
9. A perusal of the aforesaid complaint would indicate that
the 2nd respondent - de facto complainant has specifically stated
that she has been residing in New Zealand from a long time and
the accused persons had forged her signature in the year 2000 and
used the forged GPA in relation to transactions relating to
immovable property without her consent or knowledge. The
complainant alleged that about a week prior to the complaint, the
allegations were confirmed by the BMRCL who had informed her
about the same. The complainant further alleged that there has
been collusion between accused Nos. 1 to 5 and the alleged tenant
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accused No. 6 and that various illegal transactions as well as illegal
acts, deeds and things done by the accused persons were also
confirmed by the Zilla Panchayat and Deputy Commissioner,
Doddaballpur. It was further alleged that taking advantage of her
absence from India, the accused persons committed the offences
of forgery, breach of trust, criminal conspiracy, fraud and cheating
with an intention to destroy the complainant and grab her lands.
The complainant further stated that she was enclosing the
evidence along with the complaint in support of her allegation.
10. A careful perusal of the impugned complaint will indicate
that prima facie necessary ingredients constituting the offences are
contained and forthcoming in the complaint, which discloses and
makes out a prima facie commission of the offences which are
cognizable in nature warranting investigation; in fact, the
complainant has given material particulars and details in relation to
immovable property, documents, transactions in support of her
allegations. In the facts and circumstances obtaining in the instant
case, it cannot be said that the complaint contains vague or
omnibus or general allegations warranting interference by this
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Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C or
Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
11. In the case of Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v.
State of Maharashtra - (2021) 19 SCC 401, the Apex Court held
as under:-
12.7. In CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh [CBI v. Tapan
Kumar Singh, (2003) 6 SCC 175 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1305]
and in State of U.P. v. Naresh [State of U.P. v. Naresh,
(2011) 4 SCC 324 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 216] , it is
observed and held by this Court that FIR is not an
encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details
relating to the offence reported. In para 20 in Tapan
Kumar Singh [CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh, (2003) 6 SCC
175 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1305] , it is observed and held as
under : (Tapan Kumar Singh case [CBI v. Tapan Kumar
Singh, (2003) 6 SCC 175 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1305] , SCC
pp. 183-84)
"20. It is well settled that a first information report is
not an encyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and
details relating to the offence reported. An informant may
lodge a report about the commission of an offence though
he may not know the name of the victim or his assailant.
He may not even know how the occurrence took place. A
first informant need not necessarily be an eyewitness so
as to be able to disclose in great detail all aspects of the
offence committed. What is of significance is that the
information given must disclose the commission of a
cognizable offence and the information so lodged must
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provide a basis for the police officer to suspect the
commission of a cognizable offence. At this stage it is
enough if the police officer on the basis of the information
given suspects the commission of a cognizable offence,
and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that a
cognizable offence has been committed. If he has
reasons to suspect, on the basis of information received,
that a cognizable offence may have been committed, he
is bound to record the information and conduct an
investigation. At this stage it is also not necessary for him
to satisfy himself about the truthfulness of the information.
It is only after a complete investigation that he may be
able to report on the truthfulness or otherwise of the
information. Similarly, even if the information does not
furnish all the details he must find out those details in the
course of investigation and collect all the necessary
evidence. The information given disclosing the
commission of a cognizable offence only sets in motion
the investigative machinery, with a view to collect all
necessary evidence, and thereafter to take action in
accordance with law. The true test is whether the
information furnished provides a reason to suspect the
commission of an offence, which the police officer
concerned is empowered under Section 156 of the Code
to investigate. If it does, he has no option but to record
the information and proceed to investigate the case either
himself or depute any other competent officer to conduct
the investigation. The question as to whether the report is
true, whether it discloses full details regarding the manner
of occurrence, whether the accused is named, and
whether there is sufficient evidence to support the
allegations are all matters which are alien to the
consideration of the question whether the report discloses
the commission of a cognizable offence. Even if the
information does not give full details regarding these
matters, the investigating officer is not absolved of his
duty to investigate the case and discover the true facts, if
he can."
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13.12. The first information report is not an
encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details
relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the
investigation by the police is in progress, the court should
not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police
must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would
be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy
facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be
investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law.
During or after investigation, if the investigating officer
finds that there is no substance in the application made
by the complainant, the investigating officer may file an
appropriate report/summary before the learned
Magistrate which may be considered by the learned
Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure.
33.12. The first information report is not an
encyclopaedia which must disclose all facts and details
relating to the offence reported. Therefore, when the
investigation by the police is in progress, the court should
not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police
must be permitted to complete the investigation. It would
be premature to pronounce the conclusion based on hazy
facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve to be
investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law.
After investigation, if the investigating officer finds that
there is no substance in the application made by the
complainant, the investigating officer may file an
appropriate report/summary before the learned
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Magistrate which may be considered by the learned
Magistrate in accordance with the known procedure.
12. A perusal of the material on record will indicate that the
subject matter of the complaint relates to offences said to have
been committed by the petitioners in respect of documents,
transactions, acts, deeds and things pertaining to immovable
properties; as stated supra, the 2nd respondent - complainant has
enclosed various documents in support of her allegations which are
disputed and denied by the petitioners - accused persons; similarly,
in the instant petitions, both sides have produced several
documents in support of their rival contentions with both parties
disputing and denying not only the allegations but also the
documents produced by the rival party; the pleadings of the parties
as well as the complaint, FIR and documents produced by both
sides leads to the sole / unmistakable conclusion that there exists
serious, complicated and disputed questions of fact that arise for
consideration between the parties, which would necessarily have to
be investigated into by the 1st respondent - police authorities and
consequently, the question of interfering with or scuttling the
investigation to be conducted, pursuant to the impugned complaint
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and FIR would not arise in the facts and circumstances of the
instant case; in other words, the various allegations and counter
allegations made by the complainant and accused persons against
each other by placing reliance upon disputed documents and facts
would clearly indicate that at this stage, it is not a fit case for this
court to interfere by exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C or Article 226 of the Constitution of India, especially in the
light of the well settled position of law that it is impermissible to
conduct a mini trial while considering or examining a challenge at
the initial stage of complaint and FIR without conducting any
investigation.
13. The petitioners contend that the dispute between the
parties is purely civil in nature and the complaint seeks to give a
cloak of criminality to an essentially civil dispute which would
amount to an abuse of process of law and the same deserves to be
quashed; it is well settled that mere availability of civil remedies
and pendency of civil disputes between a de facto complainant and
accused persons will not by itself ipso facto entail quashing of
criminal proceedings or operate as a bar/embargo to initiate
criminal action.
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14. In the case of P.Swaroopa Rani vs. N.Harinarayana -
(2008) 5 SCC 765, the Apex court held as under:-
"11. It is, however, well settled that in a given case, civil
proceedings and criminal proceedings can proceed
simultaneously. Whether civil proceedings or criminal
proceedings shall be stayed depends upon the fact and
circumstances of each case. (See M.S. Sheriff v. State of
Madras [AIR 1954 SC 397] , Iqbal Singh
Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005
SCC (Cri) 1101] and Institute of Chartered Accountants of
India v. Assn. of Chartered Certified Accountants [(2005) 12
SCC 226 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 544] .)
12. It is furthermore trite that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the
Code of Criminal Procedure would not be attracted where a
forged document has been filed. It was so held by a
Constitution Bench of this Court in Iqbal Singh
Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] stating :
(SCC pp. 387-88, paras 25-26)
"25. An enlarged interpretation to Section
195(1)(b)(ii), whereby the bar created by the said
provision would also operate where after commission
of an act of forgery the document is subsequently
produced in court, is capable of great misuse. As
pointed out in Sachida Nand Singh [Sachida Nand
Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 : 1998
SCC (Cri) 660] after preparing a forged document or
committing an act of forgery, a person may manage
to get a proceeding instituted in any civil, criminal or
revenue court, either by himself or through someone
set up by him and simply file the document in the said
proceeding. He would thus be protected from
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prosecution, either at the instance of a private party
or the police until the court, where the document has
been filed, itself chooses to file a complaint. The
litigation may be a prolonged one due to which the
actual trial of such a person may be delayed
indefinitely. Such an interpretation would be highly
detrimental to the interest of the society at large.
26. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the
courts are normally reluctant to direct filing of a
criminal complaint and such a course is rarely
adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give an
interpretation which leads to a situation where a
person alleged to have committed an offence of the
type enumerated in Clause (b)(ii) is either not placed
for trial on account of non-filing of a complaint or if a
complaint is filed, the same does not come to its
logical end. Judging from such an angle will be in
consonance with the principle that an unworkable or
impracticable result should be avoided. In Statutory
Interpretation by Francis Bennion (3rd Edn.), Para
313, the principle has been stated in the following
manner:
'The court seeks to avoid a construction of an
enactment that produces an unworkable or
impracticable result, since this is unlikely to have
been intended by Parliament. Sometimes, however,
there are overriding reasons for applying such a
construction, for example, where it appears that
Parliament really intended it or the literal meaning is
too strong.' "
In regard to the possible conflict of findings between
civil and criminal court, however, it was opined :
(SCC pp. 389-90, para 32)
"32. Coming to the last contention that an effort
should be made to avoid conflict of findings between
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the civil and criminal courts, it is necessary to point
out that the standard of proof required in the two
proceedings are entirely different. Civil cases are
decided on the basis of preponderance of evidence
while in a criminal case the entire burden lies on the
prosecution and proof beyond reasonable doubt has
to be given. There is neither any statutory provision
nor any legal principle that the findings recorded in
one proceeding may be treated as final or binding in
the other, as both the cases have to be decided on
the basis of the evidence adduced therein."
It was concluded : (SCC p. 390, para 33)
"33. In view of the discussion made above, we are
of the opinion that Sachida Nand Singh [Sachida
Nand Singh v. State of Bihar, (1998) 2 SCC 493 :
1998 SCC (Cri) 660] has been correctly decided and
the view taken therein is the correct view. Section
195(1)(b)(ii) CrPC would be attracted only when the
offences enumerated in the said provision have been
committed with respect to a document after it has
been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding
in any court i.e. during the time when the document
was in custodia legis."
13. Filing of an independent criminal proceeding,
although initiated in terms of some observations made by the
civil court, is not barred under any statute."
15. In the case of Kathyayini v. Sidharth P.S. Reddy -
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1428, the Apex Court held as under:
7. It is clear from the facts that a prima facie case for
criminal conspiracy and cheating exists against
respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It appears that they, along
with their uncles Guruva Reddy and Umedha Reddy,
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have attempted to defraud their aunts by creating a
forged family tree and partition deed with a motive to
gain all the monetary award for land in question
bypassing the appellant and her sisters. They
succeeded in their plan until Sudhanva Reddy
revealed it to the authorities by a letter. The High
Court has erroneously relied upon the statement of
Sub-Registrar who stated that partition deed dated
24.03.2005 was presented for registration on
26.03.2005 and due to health reasons concerning
K.G. Yellappa Reddy, his thumb impressions were
secured at his house in presence of the Sub-
Registrar. However, we must note this statement of
the Sub-Registrar has not been put to cross
examination. It would be unwise to rely on unverified
testimony of a Sub-Registrar to ascertain the
genuineness of Partition deed. The High Court erred
in heavily relying on his statement to conclude that
the Partition deed was genuine and thus no offence
is made out against the respondents under
Sections 463 and 464 IPC.
18. Further, the High Court could not find any
justification to deny that respondents
misrepresented the family tree. The Court itself has
acknowledged that respondents were bound to
disclose the names of daughters of K.G. Yellappa
Reddy and Jayalakshmi in the family tree.
Considering the fact that both the partition deed and
the family tree were used in gaining the monetary
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compensation awarded for the land, it is necessary
that genuineness of both the documents is put to
trial.
19. We now come to the issue of bar against
prosecution during the pendency of a civil suit. We
hereby hold that no such bar exists against
prosecution if the offences punishable under criminal
law are made out against the parties to the civil suit.
Learned senior counsel Dr.Menaka Guruswamy has
rightly placed the relevant judicial precedents to
support the above submission. In the case of K.
Jagadish v. Udaya Kumar G.S. - (2020) 14 SCC
552, this Court has reviewed its precedents which
clarify the position. The relevant paragraph from the
above judgment is extracted below:
"8. It is thus well settled that in certain cases the
very same set of facts may give rise to remedies in
civil as well as in criminal proceedings and even if a
civil remedy is availed by a party, he is not
precluded from setting in motion the proceedings in
criminal law."
20. In Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar - (1985) 2 SCC
370, this Court summed up the distinction between
the two remedies as under:
"21. ... There are a large number of cases where
criminal law and civil law can run side by side. The
two remedies are not mutually exclusive but clearly
coextensive and essentially differ in their content
and consequence. The object of the criminal law is
to punish an offender who commits an offence
against a person, property or the State for which the
accused, on proof of the offence, is deprived of his
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liberty and in some cases even his life. This does
not, however, affect the civil remedies at all for suing
the wrongdoer in cases like arson, accidents, etc. It
is an anathema to suppose that when a civil remedy
is available, a criminal prosecution is completely
barred. The two types of actions are quite different in
content, scope and import. It is not at all intelligible
to us to take the stand that if the husband
dishonestly misappropriates the stridhan property of
his wife, though kept in his custody, that would bar
prosecution under Section 406 IPC or render the
ingredients of Section 405 IPC nugatory or abortive.
To say that because the stridhan of a married
woman is kept in the custody of her husband, no
action against him can be taken as no offence is
committed is to override and distort the real intent of
the law."
21. The aforesaid view was reiterated in Kamaladevi
Agarwal v. State of W.B- (2002 1 SCC 555),
"17. In view of the preponderance of authorities to
the contrary, we are satisfied that the High Court
was not justified in quashing the proceedings
initiated by the appellant against the respondents.
We are also not impressed by the argument that as
the civil suit was pending in the High Court, the
Magistrate was not justified to proceed with the
criminal case either in law or on the basis of
propriety. Criminal cases have to be proceeded with
in accordance with the procedure as prescribed
under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the
pendency of a civil action in a different court even
though higher in status and authority, cannot be
made a basis for quashing of the proceedings."
22. After surveying the abovementioned cases, this
Court in K. Jagadish (supra) set aside the holding of
High Court to quash the criminal proceedings and
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held that criminal proceedings shall continue to its
logical end.
23. The above precedents set by this Court make it
crystal clear that pendency of civil proceedings on
the same subject matter, involving the same parties
is no justification to quash the criminal proceedings if
a prima facie case exists against the accused
persons. In present case certainly such prima facie
case exists against the respondents. Considering
the long chain of events from creation of family tree
excluding the daughters of K.G. Yellappa Reddy,
partition deed among only the sons and grandsons
of K.G. Yellappa Reddy, distribution of
compensation award among the respondents is
sufficient to conclude that there was active effort by
respondents to reap off the benefits from the land in
question. Further, the alleged threat to appellant and
her sisters on revelation of the above chain of
events further affirms the motive of respondents. All
the above factors suggest that a criminal trial is
necessary to ensure justice to the appellant.
24. Therefore, we set aside the Impugned order of
High Court dated 23.11.2023 in Writ Petition No.
23106 of 2021. Accordingly, we direct the Trial Court
to continue its proceedings against respondent Nos.
1 and 2 in accordance to law
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16. In the case of Priti Saraf v. State (NCT of Delhi) -
(2021) 16 SCC 142, the Apex Court held as under:-
31. In the instant case, on a careful reading of the
complaint/FIR/charge-sheet, in our view, it cannot be said
that the complaint does not disclose the commission of
an offence. The ingredients of the offences under
Sections 406 and 420IPC cannot be said to be absent on
the basis of the allegations in the complaint/FIR/charge-
sheet. We would like to add that whether the allegations
in the complaint are otherwise correct or not, has to be
decided on the basis of the evidence to be led during the
course of trial. Simply because there is a remedy
provided for breach of contract or arbitral proceedings
initiated at the instance of the appellants, that does not by
itself clothe the court to come to a conclusion that civil
remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal
proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the
process of the court for exercising inherent powers of the
High Court under Section 482CrPC for quashing such
proceedings.
32. We have perused the pleadings of the parties,
the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet and orders of the courts
below and have taken into consideration the material on
record. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties,
we are satisfied that the issue involved in the matter
under consideration is not a case in which the criminal
trial should have been short-circuited. The High Court
was not justified in quashing the criminal proceedings in
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exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The High Court has
primarily adverted on two circumstances,
(i) that it was a case of termination of agreement to
sell on account of an alleged breach of the contract and;
(ii) the fact that the arbitral proceedings have been
initiated at the instance of the appellants.
Both the alleged circumstances noticed by the
High Court, in our view, are unsustainable in law. The
facts narrated in the present complaint/FIR/charge-sheet
indeed reveal the commercial transaction but that is
hardly a reason for holding that the offence of cheating
would elude from such transaction. In fact, many a times,
offence of cheating is committed in the course of
commercial transactions and the illustrations have been
set out under Sections 415, 418 and 420IPC.
33. Similar observations have been made by this
Court in Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh
Agarwal [Trisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal,
(1999) 8 SCC 686 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 47] : (SCC p. 690,
para 9)
"9. We are unable to appreciate the reasoning that
the provision incorporated in the agreement for referring
the disputes to arbitration is an effective substitute for a
criminal prosecution when the disputed act is an offence.
Arbitration is a remedy for affording reliefs to the party
affected by breach of the agreement but the arbitrator
cannot conduct a trial of any act which amounted to an
offence albeit the same act may be connected with the
discharge of any function under the agreement. Hence,
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those are not good reasons for the High Court to axe
down the complaint at the threshold itself. The
investigating agency should have had the freedom to go
into the whole gamut of the allegations and to reach a
conclusion of its own. Pre-emption of such investigation
would be justified only in very extreme cases as indicated
in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 426] ."
17. In the case of K. Jagadish v. Udaya Kumar G.S., -
(2020) 14 SCC 552, the Apex Court held as under:-
7. One of the striking features of the matter is that on
the day when the Sale Deed was executed, not a single
paisa was actually received by way of consideration. Three
post-dated cheques were handed over to the appellant and
one of those three cheques was deposited in the bank for
encashment on the next date. It is a matter of record that
subsequent cheques were not even sought to be encashed
and the appellant showed his willingness to deposit even
the sum of Rs.15 lakhs received by encashment of first
cheque. Further, neither the conveyance deed was
preceded by any agreement of sale nor any advertisement
was issued by the appellant showing his inclination to
dispose of the property in question.
8. It is true that civil proceedings have been
subsequently initiated to get the registered Sale Deed set-
aside but that has nothing to do with the present criminal
proceedings.
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9. It is thus well settled that in certain cases the very
same set of facts may give rise to remedies in civil as well
as in criminal proceedings and even if a civil remedy is
availed by a party, he is not precluded from setting in
motion the proceedings in criminal law. 10. In Pratibha Rani
v. Suraj Kumar and another1 this Court summed up the
distinction between the two remedies as under:
"21. ............ There are a large number of cases
where criminal law and civil law can run side by side. The
two remedies are not mutually exclusive but clearly
coextensive and essentially differ in their content and
consequence. The object of the criminal law is to punish an
offender who commits an offence against a person,
property or the State for which the accused, on proof of the
offence, is deprived of his liberty and in some cases even
his life. This does not, however, affect the civil remedies at
all for suing the wrongdoer in cases like arson, accidents
etc. It is an anathema to suppose that when a civil remedy
is available, a criminal prosecution is completely barred.
The two types of actions are quite different in content,
scope and import. It is not at all intelligible to us to take the
stand that if the husband dishonestly misappropriates the
stridhan property of his wife, though kept in his custody,
that would bar prosecution under Section 406 IPC or
render the ingredients of Section 405 IPC nugatory or
abortive. To say that because the stridhan of a married
woman is kept in the custody of her husband, no action
against him can be taken as no offence is committed is to
override and distort the real intent of the law."
11. In Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi and others
- this Court observed:
"10. It may be that the facts narrated in the present
complaint would as well reveal a commercial transaction or
money transaction. But that is hardly a reason for holding
that the offence of cheating would elude from such a
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transaction. In fact, many a cheatings were committed in
the course of commercial and also money transactions.
One of the illustrations set out under Section 415 of the
Indian Penal Code [Illustration f] is worthy of notice now:
"(f) A intentionally deceives Z into a belief that A means to
repay any money that Z may lend to him and thereby
dishonestly induces Z to lend him money, A not intending
to repay it. A cheats."
11. The crux of the postulate is the intention of the
person who induces the victim of his representation and not
the nature of the transaction which would become decisive
in discerning whether there was commission of offence or
not. The complainant has stated in the body of the
complaint that he was induced to believe that the
respondent would honour payment on receipt of invoices,
and that the complainant realised later that the intentions of
the respondent were not clear. He also mentioned that the
respondent after receiving the goods had sold them to
others and still he did not pay the money. Such averments
would prima facie make out a case for investigation by the
authorities.
12. The High Court seems to have adopted a strictly
hypertechnical approach and sieved the complaint through
a colander of finest gauzes for testing the ingredients under
Section 415 IPC. Such an endeavour may be justified
during trial, but certainly not during the stage of
investigation. At any rate, it is too premature a stage for the
High Court to step in and stall the investigation by declaring
that it is a commercial transaction simpliciter wherein no
semblance of criminal offence is involved."
12. The aforesaid view was reiterated in Kamladevi
Agarwal v. State of West Bengal and others as under:
"9. Criminal prosecution cannot be thwarted at the
initial stage merely because civil proceedings are also
pending. After referring to judgments in State of Haryana v.
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Bhajan Lal and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, this
Court inTrisuns Chemical Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal held:
(SCC p. 690, paras 7-8)
"7. Time and again this Court has been pointing out
that quashing of FIR or a complaint in exercise of the
inherent powers of the High Court should be limited to very
extreme exceptions (vide State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal4
and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi5).
8. In the last referred case this Court also pointed
out that merely because an act has a civil profile is not
sufficient to denude it of its criminal outfit. We quote the
following observations: (SCC p. 263, para 10) '10. It may
be that the facts narrated in the present complaint would as
well reveal a commercial transaction or money transaction.
But that is hardly a reason for holding that the offence of
cheating would elude from such a transaction. In fact, many
a cheatings were committed in the course of commercial
and also money transactions."
After referring to various decisions it was finally concluded
as under:
"17. In view of the preponderance of authorities to
the contrary, we are satisfied that the High Court was not
justified in quashing the proceedings initiated by the
appellant against the respondents. We are also not
impressed by the argument that as the civil suit was
pending in the High Court, the Magistrate was not justified
to proceed with the criminal case either in law or on the
basis of propriety. Criminal cases have to be proceeded
with in accordance with the procedure as prescribed under
the Code of Criminal Procedure and the pendency of a civil
action in a different court even though higher in status and
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authority, cannot be made a basis for quashing of the
proceedings."
13. In R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta and others, this
Court culled out propositions concerning interference under
Section 482 of the Code as under:
"15. Propositions of law which emerge from the said
decisions are: (1) The High Court ordinarily would not
exercise its inherent jurisdiction to quash a criminal
proceeding and, in particular, a first information report
unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face
value and taken to be correct in their entirety, disclosed no
cognizable offence.
(2) For the said purpose the Court, save and except
in very exceptional circumstances, would not look to any
document relied upon by the defence.
(3) Such a power should be exercised very
sparingly. If the allegations made in the FIR disclose
commission of an offence, the Court shall not go beyond
the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to
hold absence of any mens rea or actus reus.
(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the
same by itself may not be a ground to hold that the criminal
proceedings should not be allowed to continue.
14. In the light of the principles as mentioned
hereinabove, we have no hesitation in concluding that the
High Court erred in quashing the criminal proceedings. We,
therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the decision
rendered by the High Court and direct that criminal
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proceedings shall be taken to logical conclusion in
accordance with law.
18. In the case of Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar - (1985) 2
SCC 370, the Apex Court held as under:-
21. After all how could any reasonable person
expect a newly married woman living in the same house
and under the same roof to keep her personal property or
belongings like jewellery, clothing etc., under her own
lock and key, thus showing a spirit of distrust to the
husband at the very behest. We are surprised how could
the High Court permit the husband to cast his covetous
eyes on the absolute and personal property of his wife
merely because it is kept in his custody, thereby reducing
the custody to a legal farce. On the other hand, it seems
to us that even if the personal property of the wife is
jointly kept, it would be deemed to be expressly or
impliedly kept in the custody of the husband and if he
dishonestly misappropriates or refuses to return the
same, he is certainly guilty of criminal breach of trust, and
there can be no escape from this legal consequence. The
observations of the High Court at other places regarding
the inapplicability of Section 406 do not appeal to us and
are in fact not in consonance with the spirit and trend of
the criminal law. There are a large number of cases
where criminal law and civil law can run side by side. The
two remedies are not mutually exclusive but clearly
coextensive and essentially differ in their content and
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consequence. The object of the criminal law is to punish
an offender who commits an offence against a person,
property or the State for which the accused, on proof of
the offence, is deprived of his liberty and in some cases
even his life. This does not, however, affect the civil
remedies at all for suing the wrongdoer in cases like
arson, accidents etc. It is an anathema to suppose that
when a civil remedy is available, a criminal prosecution is
completely barred. The two types of actions are quite
different in content, scope and import. It is not at all
intelligible to us to take the stand that if the husband
dishonestly misappropriates the stridhan property of his
wife, though kept in his custody, that would bar
prosecution under Section 406 IPC or render the
ingredients of Section 405 IPC nugatory or abortive. To
say that because the stridhan of a married woman is kept
in the custody of her husband, no action against him can
be taken as no offence is committed is to override and
distort the real intent of the law.
19. In the case of Kamaladevi Agarwal v. State of West
Bengal - (2002) 1 SCC 555, the Apex Court held as under:
9. Criminal prosecution cannot be thwarted at the
initial stage merely because civil proceedings are also
pending. After referring to judgments in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] and Rajesh
Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999
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SCC (Cri) 401] this Court in Trisuns Chemical
Industry v. Rajesh Agarwal [(1999) 8 SCC 686 : 2000
SCC (Cri) 47] held: (SCC p. 690, paras 7-8)
"7. Time and again this Court has been pointing
out that quashing of FIR or a complaint in exercise of
the inherent powers of the High Court should be limited
to very extreme exceptions (vide State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] and Rajesh
Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999
SCC (Cri) 401] ).
8. In the last referred case this Court also
pointed out that merely because an act has a civil
profile is not sufficient to denude it of its criminal outfit.
We quote the following observations: (SCC p. 263, para
10)
'10. It may be that the facts narrated in the
present complaint would as well reveal a commercial
transaction or money transaction. But that is hardly a
reason for holding that the offence of cheating would
elude from such a transaction. In fact, many a cheatings
were committed in the course of commercial and also
money transactions.' "
10. In Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P)
Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC
(Cri) 615] this Court again reiterated the position and
held: (SCC pp. 272 & 278, paras 2 & 14)
"2. Exercise of jurisdiction under the inherent
power as envisaged in Section 482 of the Code to have
the complaint or the charge-sheet quashed is an
exception rather than a rule and the case for quashing
at the initial stage must have to be treated as rarest of
rare so as not to scuttle the prosecution. With the
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lodgement of first information report the ball is set to roll
and thenceforth the law takes its own course and the
investigation ensues in accordance with the provisions
of law. The jurisdiction as such is rather limited and
restricted and its undue expansion is neither practicable
nor warranted. In the event, however, the court on a
perusal of the complaint comes to a conclusion that the
allegations levelled in the complaint or charge-sheet on
the face of it does not constitute or disclose any offence
as alleged, there ought not to be any hesitation to rise
up to the expectation of the people and deal with the
situation as is required under the law.
***
14. Needless to record however and it being a settled principle of law that to exercise powers under Section 482 of the Code, the complaint in its entirety shall have to be examined on the basis of the allegation made in the complaint and the High Court at that stage has no authority or jurisdiction to go into the matter or examine its correctness. Whatever appears on the face of the complaint shall be taken into consideration without any critical examination of the same. But the offence ought to appear ex facie on the complaint. The observations in Nagawwa v. VeerannaShivalingappaKonjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 507] lend support to the above statement of law: (SCC p. 741, para 5) '(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused;
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(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible;
and
(4) where the complaint suffers from
fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like.' The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash proceedings."
11. In Lalmuni Devi v. State of Bihar [(2001) 2 SCC 17: 2001 SCC (Cri) 275] this Court held: (SCC p. 19, para 8) "8. There could be no dispute to the proposition that if the complaint does not make out an offence it can be quashed. However, it is also settled law that facts may give rise to a civil claim and also amount to an offence. Merely because a civil claim is maintainable does not mean that the criminal complaint cannot be maintained. In this case, on the facts, it cannot be stated, at this prima facie stage, that this is a frivolous
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12. Again in M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] this Court held that while exercising powers under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court should be slow in interfering with the proceedings at the initial stage and that merely because the nature of the dispute is primarily of a civil nature, the criminal prosecution cannot be quashed because in cases of forgery and fraud there is always some element of civil nature. In a case where the accused alleged that the transaction between the parties is of a civil nature and the criminal court cannot proceed with the complaint because the factum of document being forged was pending in the civil court, the Court observed: (SCC pp. 647-48, para 5) "5. Accepting such a general proposition would be against the provisions of law inasmuch as in all cases of cheating and fraud, in the whole transaction, there is generally some element of civil nature. However, in this case, the allegations were regarding the forging of the documents and acquiring gains on the basis of such forged documents. The proceedings could not be quashed only because the respondents had filed a civil suit with respect to the aforesaid documents. In a criminal court the allegations made in the complaint have to be established independently, notwithstanding the adjudication by a civil court. Had the complainant failed to prove the allegations made by him in the complaint, the respondents were entitled to discharge or acquittal but
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13. Referring to the judgments of this Court in Manju Gupta v. Lt. Col. M.S. Paintal [(1982) 2 SCC 412 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 459] , Sardool Singh v. Nasib Kaur [1987 Supp SCC 146 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 672] and Karamchand Ganga Pershad v. Union of India [(1970) 3 SCC 694 : AIR 1971 SC 1244] the learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that the High Court was justified in quashing the complaint which does not require any interference by this Court in this appeal.
14. In Manju Gupta case [(1982) 2 SCC 412 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 459] the criminal proceedings were quashed under the peculiar circumstances of the case. After referring to para 20 of the complaint and holding (at SCC p. 414, para 4) "such an averment in our view, is clearly inadequate and insufficient to bring home criminality of the appellant in the matter of the alleged offences", the
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NC: 2025:KHC:37997 CRL.P No. 262 of 2025 C/W CRL.P No. 1352 of 2025 HC-KAR Court found that simply because the accused was the Secretary of the Society, the Magistrate was not justified in presuming her connection or complicity with the offence merely on that ground. The allegations in the complaint pertinent to forgery of rent receipts were held to be vague and indefinite. Sardool Singh case [1987 Supp SCC 146 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 672] was also decided on its facts on the basis of law earlier settled by this Court. In Karamchand Ganga Pershad case [(1970) 3 SCC 694 : AIR 1971 SC 1244] an observation was made that "it is a well-established principle of law that the decisions of the civil courts are binding on the criminal courts. The converse is not true" (SCC p. 695, para 4). In that case the appellants had filed a writ petition in the High Court for the issuance of appropriate directions requiring the Union of India to release and deliver to them some consignments of maize transported from the State of Haryana to Howrah. Alleging that the movement of maize had been controlled by the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act read with the Northern Inter-Zonal Maize (Movement Control) Order, 1967 promulgated by the State Government, the restrictions on export imposed by the Order were removed by the State of Haryana in October 1967 which was duly published and advertised. The contention of the Union was that the State of Haryana had not lifted the ban on export and further that it had no power to lift the ban. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the sole ground that in view of the pendency of the criminal proceedings before some court
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NC: 2025:KHC:37997 CRL.P No. 262 of 2025 C/W CRL.P No. 1352 of 2025 HC-KAR in the State of West Bengal it was inappropriate for the High Court to pronounce on the question arising for decision in the writ petition. In that context the Court held:
(SCC p. 695, para 4) "In our opinion the High Court seriously erred in coming to this conclusion. If the appellants are able to establish their case that the ban on export of maize from the State of Haryana had been validly lifted all the proceedings taken against those who exported the maize automatically fall to the ground. Their maintainability depends on the assumption that the exports were made without the authority of law. It is a well-established principle of law that the decisions of the civil courts are binding on the criminal courts. The converse is not true. The High Court after entertaining the writ petitions and hearing arguments on the merits of the case should not have dismissed the petitions merely because certain consequential proceedings had been taken on the basis that the exports in question were illegal."
15. We have already noticed that the nature and scope of civil and criminal proceedings and the standard of proof required in both matters is different and distinct. Whereas in civil proceedings the matter can be decided on the basis of probabilities, the criminal case has to be decided by adopting the standard of proof of "beyond reasonable doubt". A Constitution Bench of this Court, dealing with similar circumstances, in M.S. Sheriff v. State of Madras [AIR 1954 SC 397 : 1954 Cri LJ 1019] held that where civil and criminal cases are pending, precedence shall be given to criminal proceedings. Detailing the reasons for the conclusions, the Court held: (AIR p. 399, paras 15-16)
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NC: 2025:KHC:37997 CRL.P No. 262 of 2025 C/W CRL.P No. 1352 of 2025 HC-KAR "15. As between the civil and the criminal proceedings we are of the opinion that the criminal matters should be given precedence. There is some difference of opinion in the High Courts of India on this point. No hard and fast rule can be laid down but we do not consider that the possibility of conflicting decisions in the civil and criminal courts is a relevant consideration. The law envisages such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the other, or even relevant, except for certain limited purposes, such as sentence or damages. The only relevant consideration here is the likelihood of embarrassment.
16. Another factor which weighs with us is that a civil suit often drags on for years and it is undesirable that a criminal prosecution should wait till everybody concerned has forgotten all about the crime. The public interests demand that criminal justice should be swift and sure; that the guilty should be punished while the events are still fresh in the public mind and that the innocent should be absolved as early as is consistent with a fair and impartial trial. Another reason is that it is undesirable to let things slide till memories have grown too dim to trust.
This however, is not a hard and fast rule. Special considerations obtaining in any particular case might make some other course more expedient and just. For example, the civil case or the other criminal proceeding may be so near its end as to make it inexpedient to stay it in order to give precedence to a prosecution ordered under Section 476. But in this case we are of the view that the civil suits should be stayed till the criminal proceedings have finished."
16. In the present case we have noticed that before issuance of the process, the trial Magistrate had
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NC: 2025:KHC:37997 CRL.P No. 262 of 2025 C/W CRL.P No. 1352 of 2025 HC-KAR recorded the statement of the witnesses for the complainant, perused the record including the opinion of the expert and his deposition and prima facie found that the respondents were guilty for the offences for which the process was issued against them. The High Court rightly did not refer to any of those circumstances but quashed the proceedings only on the ground:
"Consideration is and should be whether any criminal proceeding instituted before a court subordinate to this Court should be allowed to continue when the very foundation of the criminal case, namely, forgery of document is under scrutiny by this Court in a civil proceeding instituted by same person i.e. the complainant in the criminal case. In my considered view it would not be proper to allow the criminal proceeding to continue when the validity of the document (deed of dissolution) is being tested in a civil proceeding before this Court. Judicial propriety demands that the course adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Manju Gupta [(1982) 2 SCC 412 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 459] and Sardool Singh [1987 Supp SCC 146 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 672] should be followed. If such course of action is adopted by this Court, that would be in consonance with the expression used in Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure -- 'or otherwise to secure the ends of justice'. In both the cases referred to above civil suits were pending, where the validity and genuineness of a document were challenged. It was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that when the question regarding validity of a document is sub judice in the civil courts, criminal prosecution, on the allegation of the document being forged, cannot be instituted."
17. In view of the preponderance of authorities to the contrary, we are satisfied that the High Court was not
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NC: 2025:KHC:37997 CRL.P No. 262 of 2025 C/W CRL.P No. 1352 of 2025 HC-KAR justified in quashing the proceedings initiated by the appellant against the respondents. We are also not impressed by the argument that as the civil suit was pending in the High Court, the Magistrate was not justified to proceed with the criminal case either in law or on the basis of propriety. Criminal cases have to be proceeded with in accordance with the procedure as prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the pendency of a civil action in a different court even though higher in status and authority, cannot be made a basis for quashing of the proceedings.
20. In the case of Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi) -
2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, the Apex Court held as under:
MERE INSTITUTION OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS CANNOT ACT AS A BAR TO INVESTIGATION OF COGNIZABLE OFFENCES
28. It is trite law that mere institution of civil proceedings is not a ground for quashing the FIR or to hold that the dispute is merely a civil dispute. This Court in various judgments, has held that simply because there is a remedy provided for breach of contract, that does not by itself clothe the Court to conclude that civil remedy is the only remedy, and the initiation of criminal proceedings, in any manner, will be an abuse of the process of the court.
This Court is of the view that because the offence was committed during a commercial transaction, it would not be sufficient to hold that the complaint did not warrant a further
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NC: 2025:KHC:37997 CRL.P No. 262 of 2025 C/W CRL.P No. 1352 of 2025 HC-KAR investigation and if necessary, a trial. [See : Syed AksariHadi Ali Augustine Imam v. State (Delhi Admin.), (2009) 5 SCC 528, Lee KunHee v. State of UP, (2012) 3 SCC 132 and Trisuns Chemicals v. Rajesh Aggarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686].
21. In the instant cases, as stated supra, a perusal of the complaint, FIR, pleadings of the parties and documents produced by both sides are sufficient to come to the conclusion that mere availability of civil remedies to the complainant or pendency of civil proceedings would not come in the way of further investigation to be conducted by the 1st respondent-police authorities, particularly when the petitioners-accused persons have failed to establish that the de facto complainant intends or seeks to give a criminal colour, which is clearly not borne out from the material on record so as to warrant interference by this Court in the present petitions and consequently, this contention urged by the petitioners cannot be accepted.
22. Petitioners have also contended that the complaint is barred by limitation and delay and latches, since the same relates to documents and transactions during the period from 2000 to 2008; in this context, it is relevant to state that it is well settled that
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NC: 2025:KHC:37997 CRL.P No. 262 of 2025 C/W CRL.P No. 1352 of 2025 HC-KAR mere delay by itself is not sufficient to infer that a complaint is barred by limitation or vitiated or latches, especially when the complaint allegations disclose the reason / explanation / cause for the delay; in the instant case, a perusal of the material on record comprising of the complaint, pleadings of the parties and documents will indicate that the complainant has specifically alleged that she has been residing in New Zealand from 1988 onwards and that her uncle Sri.B.N.Krishnamurthy - accused No.1 along with his family members and other persons including accused No. 5, who was a tenant were guilty of the alleged offences, about which she came to know and became aware only after returning to Bangalore; it is therefore clear that the complainant has offered sufficient, reasonable and plausible explanation as to the delay in filing the complaint and in light of the fiduciary relationship between the parties, it cannot be said that the delay, if any, in lodging the complaint would either be fatal or vitiate the impugned proceedings.
23. In the case of Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, the Apex Court held as under:-
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NC: 2025:KHC:37997
CRL.P No. 262 of 2025
C/W CRL.P No. 1352 of 2025
HC-KAR
DELAY CANNOT BE A GROUND FOR
QUASHING THE PRESENT FIR
36. Further, accepting the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order that 'there had been a delay in registration of the FIR and because of such delay, the allegations made by the Appellant are unbelievable' and the submissions of learned senior counsel for Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 that no complaint/FIR should be entertained 'at this distance of time', would mean in effect in accepting the argument that delay is a sufficient ground for quashing of the present FIR/complaint.
37. It is settled law that delay in registration of the FIR for offences punishable with imprisonment of more than three years cannot be the basis of interdicting a criminal investigation. The delay will assume importance only when the complainant fails to give a plausible explanation and whether the explanation is plausible or not, has to be decided by the Trial Court only after recording the evidence. In this context, the Supreme Court in Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 5 SCC 795 has held, "The mere delay on the part of the third respondent complainant in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a ground to quash the FIR. The law is too well settled on this aspect to warrant any reference to precedents....."
38. Further, as per the allegations in the complaint/FIR during 2004-2020 the accused persons kept representing that they were in the process of getting
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NC: 2025:KHC:37997 CRL.P No. 262 of 2025 C/W CRL.P No. 1352 of 2025 HC-KAR the property unencumbered and converted to freehold. Upon the failure of the accused persons to show documents for clear title of the property, the Appellant had initially instituted a suit for specific performance, and it was only during the suit proceedings that it came to light that after the Agreement to Sell with the Appellant, the property was subsequently mortgaged to SREI Infrastructure Finance Limited and SREI Equipment Finance Limited and the same was subsequently sold to J.K. Paper Limited vide sale deed dated 02nd December 2021. The fact that Vikramjit Singh (Respondent No. 2) was the Karta of the Bhai Manjit Singh HUF at the relevant time was also allegedly revealed for the very first time through the aforesaid sale deed dated 02nd December 2021, certified copy of which was obtained by the Appellant on 28th December 2021. Consequently, the fact of misrepresentation and deception at the inception, that is, at the time of execution of the Receipt-cum-Agreement to Sell dated 12th April 2004, came to the knowledge of the Appellant (according to the complaint) only on 28th December 2021.
39. The Appellant had, admittedly, filed the complaint before the Economic Offences Wing on 12th January 2022. Section 469 Cr. P.C. provides that the period of limitation commences from the date on which the offence comes to the knowledge of the person aggrieved. In the present case, as noted above, the Appellant became aware of the offence only on
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NC: 2025:KHC:37997 CRL.P No. 262 of 2025 C/W CRL.P No. 1352 of 2025 HC-KAR 28th December 2021. Consequently, prima facie there is no delay in filing the criminal proceedings.
40. Even otherwise, as the learned senior counsel for the Appellant has rightly pointed out, in terms of Section 468 Cr. P.C., there is no period of limitation for offences which are punishable with imprisonment of more than three years.
24. So also in the case of Skoda Auto Volkswagen (India) (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., - (2021) 5 SCC 795, the Apex Court held as under:-
15. The main contentions of the petitioner are:
15.1. That the police cannot investigate an issue, the substratum of which is sub judice before this Court in the civil appeals arising out of the order of the NGT.
15.2. That the High Court failed to take note of the long delay on the part of the third respondent in lodging the complaint and also the fact that VAHAN portal of the Government shows the purchase of only 3 vehicles as against the claim of the third respondent to have purchased 7 vehicles.
16. Let us take up the second contention first, since it is capable of being dealt with, without much ado.
The second contention has two parts, namely,
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NC: 2025:KHC:37997 CRL.P No. 262 of 2025 C/W CRL.P No. 1352 of 2025 HC-KAR
(i) that there is a long delay in lodging the complaint, and
(ii) that the third respondent complainant, appears to have purchased only 3 vehicles as against his claim to have purchased 7 vehicles.
17. The question whether the third respondent complainant purchased 3 vehicles as revealed by VAHAN portal of the Government or 7 vehicles as claimed by him in his complaint, is a question of fact which has to be established only in the course of an investigation/trial. In a petition for quashing the FIR, the Court cannot go into disputed questions of fact.
18. The mere delay on the part of the third respondent complainant in lodging the complaint, cannot by itself be a ground to quash the FIR. The law is too well settled on this aspect to warrant any reference to precedents. Therefore, the second ground on which the petitioner seeks to quash the FIR cannot be countenanced.
25. If the material on record is examined bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, I am of the considered opinion that mere delay, if any, in filing the complaint would by itself ipso facto not be sufficient for this Court to interfere with the impugned complaint and the FIR, especially when the complainant was undisputedly residing
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NC: 2025:KHC:37997 CRL.P No. 262 of 2025 C/W CRL.P No. 1352 of 2025 HC-KAR in New Zealand from 1988 onwards and had made serious allegations of forgery, breach of trust, fraud, cheating, land grabbing, criminal conspiracy etc., against the petitioners - accused persons.
Under these circumstances even this contention urged by the petitioners cannot be accepted.
26. Insofar as the various judgments relied upon by both sides are concerned, having regard to the facts and circumstances narrated hereinbefore, coupled with the fact that the said decisions would not be applicable to the facts of the instant cases and as such, the same are not elaborately dealt with for the purpose of the present order.
27. In view of the forgoing discussion, I do not find any merit in both the petitions and accordingly, both Crl.P.No.262/2025 and Crl.P.No.1352/2024 are devoid of merit and the same are hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
(S.R.KRISHNA KUMAR) JUDGE Srl.