Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand vs Raj Kishore Prasad on 23 December, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Sanjay Prasad
2025:JHHC:38750-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.716 of 2023
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1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. Principal Secretary, Road Construction Department,
Government of Jharkhand, Ρ.Ο. and P.S. Dhurwa,
Ranchi.
3. Under Secretary, Road Construction Department,
Government of Jharkhand, Ρ.Ο. and P.S. Dhurwa,
Ranchi.
4. Deputy Secretary, Road Construction Department,
Government of Jharkhand, Ρ.Ο. and P.S. Dhurwa,
Ranchi.
5. Executive Engineer, Road Construction Department,
Government of Jharkhand, Ρ.Ο. and P.S. Giridih Sadar,
Ranchi.
... ... Appellants
Versus
Raj Kishore Prasad, Son of Late Lekhraj Das, Resident of
Village-Chorsua, P.O. Pawapuri, P.S. Giriyak, District-
Nalanda (Bihar). ... ... Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY PRASAD
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For the appellants : Ms. Sunita Kumari, A.C. to Sr. S.C.-II
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Order No. 07/Dated 23 December, 2025
rd
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. The instant appeal is under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent directed against the order/judgment dated 11.04.2023 passed in W.P.(S) No.6481 of 2014. The appeal since has been filed after a delay of 250 days and, as such, to condone the delay one application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, has been filed being I.A. No.8323 of 2024. 1
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2. This Court, therefore, deems it fit and proper to first consider the interlocutory application before entering into the issue on merit.
I.A. No.8323 of 2024
3. The instant application has been filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay.
4. The reason has been assigned, as per the averments made in paragraphs 4 to 9, and this Court, considering the reason to be sufficient cause to condone the delay, is condoning the delay.
5. Accordingly, the delay of 250 days in preferring the appeal is hereby condoned.
6. The instant interlocutory application (I.A. No.8323 of 2024) stands allowed.
L.P.A. No.716 of 2023
7. The instant appeal has been filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent directed against the order/judgment dated 11.04.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court whereby and whereunder the impugned order as contained in notification No.8717(s) dated 23.09.2013 issued under the signature of Deputy Secretary, Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand whereby the petitioner has been inflicted punishment of censor and stoppage of three annual increments with cumulative effect as well as the order as contained in notification No.6419(s) 2 2025:JHHC:38750-DB dated 28.08.2014 issued under the signature of Under Secretary, Road Construction Department, Government of Jharkhand affirming the order passed by the disciplinary authority was quashed and set aside.
Factual Matrix
8. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition, which are required to be enumerated, read as under :-
The petitioner was appointed as Research Assistant in Road Construction Department, Supaul Division, Bihar on 07.07.1981 and he superannuated from service on 31.08.2016 from the post of Assistant Director, Quality Control, National Highway Division, Hazaribag.
A departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner when he was posted as Assistant Director, Quality Control (Road Sub-division), National Highway Division, Medininagar, Daltonganj as informed by the respondent no.5 to the respondent no.4 vide letter as contained in memo no.2473 dated 20.12.2007, levelling various charges of irregularities committed by him while discharging the duty on the said post at Giridih with a recommendation to take disciplinary action against the petitioner.
Accordingly, a memo of charge was also served to him by the respondent no.4 on 28.01.2008, particularly, for not handing over some measurement books to his successor in 3 2025:JHHC:38750-DB post, for conspiring in disappearance of some articles from the laboratory, for submitting fabricated enquiry report for a certain period and also for unauthorized absence from the present place of posting.
Thereafter, departmental enquiry was initiated against the petitioner in which one Navin Kumar, In-charge Superintending Engineer, Advance Planning Circle, Road Construction Department, Ranchi was appointed as Conducting Officer and one Satrughan Mishra, the then Under Secretary, Road Construction Department was appointed as Presenting Officer.
The Conducting Officer submitted inquiry report vide letter no.628 dated 05.11.2012, however, the said inquiry report was kept in abeyance by the respondent no.4 stating that the same was incomplete and vague.
Thereafter, direction was issued by the respondent no.4 vide memo no.745 (S) dated 29.01.2013 for conducting 2nd inquiry by appointing Pramod Kumar Singh, (Special Rationing Officer, Ranchi) as Conducting Officer and Ashok Kumar Thakur, Section Officer, Road Construction Department, Ranchi as Presenting Officer in terms with the order passed by the State Government.
The petitioner submitted his reply on 07.08.2013, denying the charges levelled against him. However, 2nd inquiry report was submitted by the said Conducting Officer 4 2025:JHHC:38750-DB on 18.5.2013 in which the charges levelled against the petitioner were found true and, thereafter, vide notification no.8717 (S) dated 23.09.2013 an order was passed against him inflicting punishment of censor and stoppage of three annual increments with cumulative effect.
The petitioner then preferred an appeal on 20.03.2014 before the Governor of Jharkhand, through the respondent no.2, however, the same was rejected vide notification no. 6419(s) dated 28.08.2014 issued under the signature of the respondent no.3, affirming the order of punishment passed against him.
Being aggrieved with the aforesaid orders, the petitioner approached this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No.6481 of 2014 taking the ground that the order of punishment is absolutely arbitrary, unjust and illegal, since both minor and major punishments were imposed against the petitioner under the same memo of punishment, which is violative of the rules of the departmental proceeding.
The ground has also been taken that the 2nd inquiry report was not given to the petitioner, causing serious prejudice to him.
The learned Single Judge, after hearing the parties, has quashed the impugned order as contained in notification No.8717(s) dated 23.09.2013 and notification No.6419(s) 5 2025:JHHC:38750-DB dated 28.08.2014 and allowed the writ petition, against which the present appeal has been preferred by the State.
9. It is evident from the factual aspect that the writ petitioner while working as Assistant Director, Quality Control (Road Sub-division), National Highway Division, Medininagar, Daltonganj, a departmental proceeding was initiated for commission of the irregularities by virtue of decision so taken as contained in letter No.2473 dated 20.12.2007.
10. The enquiry officer was appointed. The first enquiry officer has not found the charges proved but the same was not accepted by the disciplinary authority without giving the difference of opinion and without assigning the reason therewith, an order for conducting the second enquiry was passed by appointing another enquiry officer and based upon the second enquiry report, the punishment was inflicted upon the writ petitioner.
11. The writ petitioner has challenged the said order by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No.6481 of 2014 on two grounds, i.e., (i) there is no provision under the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules to have a consecutive enquiry if in one enquiry charge has not been found to be proved and (ii) the disciplinary authority has imposed punishment by one stroke of pen, both major and minor, which is not permissible.
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12. The writ court has called upon the State. The State although has filed counter affidavit but failed to substantiate the decision so taken by the disciplinary authority in conducting the second enquiry, said to be de novo one, when the charge was not found to be proved in the first enquiry.
13. The learned Single Judge, by relying upon the settled position of law that there cannot be consecutive enquiry for the purpose of proving the charge, rather, the mechanism is already there which is to be followed by the disciplinary authority in a situation where by the enquiry officer has not found the charge proved, has quashed the order of punishment which is the subject matter of the present appeal.
Submission of the learned counsel for appellant-State
14. Ms. Sunita Kumari, learned A.C. to Sr. S.C.-II, appearing for the State of Jharkhand, has failed to submit on what ground the appeal has been filed said to be legal one and merely gravity of nature of allegation has been sought to be submitted.
15. This Court had posed a pinpointed question to the learned Senior Standing Counsel on 19.12.2025 when Mr. Manish Kumar was representing the State that on what legal ground the present appeal has been filed then he has submitted at bar that the nature of allegation against the present respondent-writ petitioner is serious. 7
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16. The question herein is that even accepting that the nature of allegation is serious but is it permissible for the disciplinary authority to inflict punishment upon the delinquent employee defying the statutory provisions and the settled position of law.
17. It cannot be said that the State is not knowing about the law to inflict punishment in a situation where the enquiry officer has not found the charge proved since the same has already been decided by Hon'ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Punjab National Bank & Others Vs. Kunj Behari Misra reported in (1998) 7 SCC 84 wherein it is for the first time by way of aforesaid judicial pronouncement a mechanism has been carved out that what remedy is available.
18. It has been laid down therein that in a situation where the charge has not been found to be proved then the disciplinary authority is to take decision by differing with the finding so recorded by the enquiry officer supported by the reason and the same is to be communicated to the delinquent employee for the purpose of providing an opportunity to defend. Such mechanism is made available to the disciplinary authority in a situation where the enquiry officer is different identity to that of the disciplinary authority. Since the punishment is to be inflicted by the disciplinary authority based upon the finding so recorded by 8 2025:JHHC:38750-DB the enquiry officer in a situation where the charge is found to be proved then the disciplinary authority merely by accepting the charge found to be proved by the enquiry officer is to issue second show cause notice and thereafter to proceed to inflict punishment as enlisted in the list of punishment.
19. But, in a situation where the enquiry officer has not found the charge proved, then the disciplinary authority has been held to be not remediless, rather, the disciplinary authority is to differ with the finding by assigning reason and the same is to be communicated to the delinquent employee for the purpose of taking his defence since the disciplinary authority is to inflict punishment who has differed with the opinion furnished by the enquiry officer and, as such, it is the bounden duty of the disciplinary authority to apprise the delinquent employee of the reason of different of opinion with the enquiry officer. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is being referred herein :-
"18. Under Regulation 6, the enquiry proceedings can be conducted either by an enquiry officer or by the disciplinary authority itself. When the enquiry is conducted by the enquiry officer, his report is not final or conclusive and the disciplinary proceedings do not stand concluded. The disciplinary proceedings stand concluded with the decision of the disciplinary authority. It is the disciplinary authority which can impose the penalty and not the enquiry officer. Where the disciplinary authority itself holds an enquiry, an opportunity of hearing has to be granted by him. When the disciplinary 9 2025:JHHC:38750-DB authority differs with the view of the enquiry officer and proposes to come to a different conclusion, there is no reason as to why an opportunity of hearing should not be granted. It will be most unfair and iniquitous that where the charged officers succeed before the enquiry officer, they are deprived of representing to the disciplinary authority before that authority differs with the enquiry officer's report and, while recording a finding of guilt, imposes punishment on the officer. In our opinion, in any such situation, the charged officer must have an opportunity to represent before the disciplinary authority before final findings on the charges are recorded and punishment imposed. This is required to be done as a part of the first stage of enquiry as explained in Karunakar case [(1993) 4 SCC 727]."
20. The question of second enquiry has also been dealt with way back in the year 1971 by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of K.R. Deb v. Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, (1971) 2 SCC 102 wherein the consecutive enquiry has been deprecated. It is for the reason that if consecutive enquiry will be allowed to be there, then the enquiry proceeding will be an unending proceeding and the disciplinary authority will appoint enquiry officer till the charges will not be found to be proved.
21. Similarly, in Kanailal Bera v. Union of India and Ors., (2007) 11 SCC 517 while relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of K.R. Deb v. Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, (supra), it has been observed that further evidence may be directed to be adduced but the same would not mean that despite holding a delinquent officer to be partially guilty of the charges 10 2025:JHHC:38750-DB levelled against him another inquiry would be directed to be initiated on the selfsame charges which could not be proved in the first inquiry, for ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
6. The question as to whether a punishment of confinement to Civil Lines could have been directed or not should not detain us as we agree with the contention raised by learned counsel for the appellant that the purported order dated 5-4-1995 of the disciplinary authority was unsustainable in law. Rule 27 of the Central Reserve Police Force Rules, 1955, inter alia, lays down the procedure for conducting a departmental inquiry.
Once a disciplinary proceeding has been initiated, the same must be brought to its logical end meaning thereby a finding is required to be arrived at as to whether the delinquent officer is guilty of charges levelled against him or not. In given situation further evidence may be directed to be adduced but the same would not mean that despite holding a delinquent officer to be partially guilty of the charges levelled against him another inquiry would be directed to be initiated on the selfsame charges which could not be proved in the first inquiry.
22. Thus, if the consecutive enquiry will be permitted then that will mean to confer power upon the disciplinary authority to conduct the enquiry endlessly till the date the charge will not be found to be proved by the enquiry officer.
23. The requirement to refer these judgments are that the law is already settled but even then the State is not following the same for the reasons best known to the State.
24. It can be both ways i.e., on the count of ignorance or to extend cooperation to the delinquent employee so that ultimately the delinquent employee may succeed in a case of 11 2025:JHHC:38750-DB serious nature of allegation by taking advantage of the judgment rendered by the court of law.
25. So far as the issue of ignorance is concerned, it cannot be accepted that the department is not knowing about the law and if the department which is being headed by the Secretary of the concerned department or any functionary of the said department is not knowing the law, they are not worth to be in the department because they are dealing with the State affairs and in a case of Road Construction Department that too in the case of a person holding the post of Assistant Director, Quality Control, much accountability is upon the quality control to have the road perfect so as not to cause any inconvenience to the people at large.
26. In the present facts of the case, the learned Single Judge has quashed the order of punishment reason is that consecutive enquiry is not permissible.
27. The instant appeal has been preferred but no legal ground has been agitated save and except the nature of allegation against the delinquent employee is said to be serious one. We are not denying that the nature of allegation is not serious but the question is that if the nature of allegation is serious then why the departmental proceeding was not proceeded with all sincerity and following the settled 12 2025:JHHC:38750-DB position of law that is the question which is to be considered by this Court.
28. This Court is having with the opinion that by flouting or defying the settled position of law in one way or the other the delinquent employee is being favoured as the facts of the present case that even though the appeal has been preferred on the pretext that the nature of allegation against the delinquent employee, the writ petitioner-respondent, is serious but even then the order of punishment has been quashed reason is that the wrong procedure has been followed by conducting consecutive enquiry that too the second enquiry being the de novo one which is not permissible as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court way back in the year 1971 in the case of in the case of K.R. Deb v. Collector of Central Excise, Shillong, (Supra).
29. It is also not that the disciplinary authority is having no authority, rather, the remedy has already been provided by the judicial pronouncement of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab National Bank & Others Vs. Kunj Behari Misra (Supra). If the enquiry officer has not found the charge proved in the first enquiry, then what prevented the disciplinary authority in differing with the said opinion along with the reason and by supplying it to the delinquent employee for the purpose of inflicting punishment but that mechanism has not been followed, reasons best known to 13 2025:JHHC:38750-DB the State, rather, they have proceeded by appointing another enquiry officer for the purpose of de novo enquiry even that is not permissible.
30. The law since is settled then it is the bounden duty of the State authorities to proceed strictly in accordance with law so that the delinquent employee, against whom the departmental proceeding has been initiated, must be punished since the serious nature of allegation has been found to be there and if the punishment is being quashed by the court of law then what message is being tried to be given by the disciplinary authority to the other employees whether the issue of corruption will not accelerate that is the question.
31. The punishment, whether in the departmental or the criminal proceeding is always deterrent to give a lesson to the other employees that if such thing will be done then they will also be punished like this and that will give a message to the people also.
32. But herein this Court has found that only the formality has been done by conducting the departmental proceeding in one way or the other to help the delinquent employee. Even though the nature of allegation is serious but that does not mean that by flouting the procedure the punishment is to be inflicted.
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33. We are conscious that in the departmental proceeding, preponderance of probability is available but even in a case of preponderance of probability, the cogent evidence is to be there and to be proceeded strictly in accordance with law.
34. This Court, having discussed the aforesaid factual and legal aspect and adverting to the order passed by the learned Single Judge wherein the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the fact that there is no provision to have the de novo enquiry and the order of punishment is based upon de novo enquiry bypassing the first enquiry report where the charge has not been proved, is of the view that the order impugned needs no interference.
35. It needs to refer herein the settled proposition of law that if disciplinary authority holds the inquiry without following the settled position of law, the department can take action against the said disciplinary authority.
36. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of A.P. v. N. Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154 has observed that it is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules and if he deviates from this path, he is to suffer a penalty prescribed.
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37. This Court, in view of the aforesaid, is of the view that in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, a direction is required to be passed for conducting an enquiry against the erring officers who have conducted the enquiry by distracting it in the wrong way.
38. In view of the aforesaid, the Chief Secretary of the State of Jharkhand is directed to conduct an enquiry against the erring officers who have conducted the enquiry.
39. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.
40. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
41. Let this order be communicated to the Ministry of DoPT, Government of India, New Delhi.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Sanjay Prasad, J.) Date : 23.12.2025 A.F.R. Birendra/ 16