Delhi High Court
Tilak Ram (Since Deceased) vs Z.U. Siddiqui And Ors. on 5 September, 2003
Equivalent citations: 2003VIIAD(DELHI)262, 107(2003)DLT565
Author: Vikramajit Sen
Bench: Vikramajit Sen
JUDGMENT Vikramajit Sen, J.
1. In this Contempt Petition it has been alleged that the Orders of the Division Bench dated July 15, 2002 have not been complied with by the Respondents. The relevant paragraph of the said Order in Civil Writ No. 1750/1996, whereby the Petition was allowed with costs of Rs.5,000/- payable by the Delhi Administration, Land and Building Department, New Delhi, reads thus:
''Resultantly, the petition is allowed. The impugned letter Annexure-`J' dated 1.6.1982 and consequential actions taken there under are quashed and set aside. Consequently, DDA is directed to allot the plot in question and execute a lease deed in respect of the said plot reserved within a period of two months from the date receipt of this writ order of from the date of production of a copy of this order by the petitioner to the DDA, subject to the petitioner complying with all other requisite formalities, including payment of requisite charges and the premium. In case for any reason whatsoever the plot is not available, the petitioner will be allotted plot of similar size in the same area/residential scheme on same terms.'' (underlining added)
2. It is contended by Mr. Ravinder Sethi, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, that since the Bench had employed the words ''on same terms'', it was implicit that while allotting the plot to the Petitioner, the DDA could not claim payment at the current rates. In the present case, the Petitioner's land was acquired in 1969. By letter dated 1.6.1982, the Petitioner was informed that since his application for allotment of an alternate plot in lieu of the acquired land had not been received within time the recommendation made in his favor for allotment of a plot measuring 250 sq.yards on 21st February, 1980 stood withdrawn. It was this action which was successfully challenged before the Division Bench in Civil Writ No. 1750/1996.
3. Mr. Sethi has drawn attention to Rule 6 of the Delhi Development Authority (Disposal of Developed Nazul Land) Rules, 1981 which stipulates, inter alia, that subject to other provisions of the Rules, the Authority shall allot Nazul land at the pre-determined rates to individuals whose land has been acquired for planned development of Delhi after 1st day of January, 1961, and which forms part of Nazul land. Rule 2 (l) defines ''Pre-determined rates'' to mean the rates of premium chargeable from different categories of persons and determined by notification from time to time by the Central Government, having regard to-
(a) cost of acquisition,
(b) development charges, and
(c) concessional charges for use and occupation.
4. The Provisos to the Rule permit different rates being levied in respect of middle and low income groups, and thereafter also permits a differences in the rates between plots situated at main roads, corner of two roads or other advantage positions, and others.
5. The only controversy which arises in these proceedings is that although a plot has now been offered to the Petitioner, the DDA has computed the pre-determined rate thereof in accordance with existing in 2003, whereas the Petitioner claims that it should be those prevailing in 1982. In 1982 it is stated that the rate was Rs.178 per sq.mtr., whereas the amount changed/levied in 2003 is calculated at the rate of Rs.6224/- per sq.mtr., thereby brining about an astronomical increase. The Petitioner contend that this demand is not ''on the same terms'' prevailing in 1982 and therefore there has been a willful Contempt of the Orders of the Division Bench. The contention of Respondent, however, is that inasmuch as the Division Bench had also employed the words ''including payment of requisite charges and the premium'', it was clearly in contemplation that the allotment would be subject to the prevailing rates as on date.
Reliance has been placed in Delhi Development Authority Versus Pushpendra Kumar Jain, in which it was pronounced that a mere drawl of lots does not vest indefeasible right in the allottee for allotment at the price obtaining on the date of drawl of lots. This observation was made in circumstances not similar to those obtaining in the present case as is evident from the following passage relied upon by counsel for the Respondent.
'' Now coming to the other ground, we are unable to find any legal basis for holding that the respondent obtained a vested right to allotment on the drawl of lots. Since D.D.A. is a public authority and because the number of applicants are always more than the number of flats available, the system ofdrawing of lots is being resorted to with a view to identify the allottee. It is only a mode, a method, a process to identify the allottee, i.e, it is a process of selection. It is not allotment by itself.
Mere identification or selection of the allottee does not clothe the person selected with a legal right to allotment at the price prevailing on the date of drawl of lots. The scheme evolved by the appellant does not say so either expressly or by necessary implication. On the contrary, clause (14) thereof says that ''the estimated prices mentioned in the brochure are illustrative and are subject to revision/modification depending upon the exigencies of lay out, cost of construction etc.'' It may be noted that registration of applicants under the said scheme opened on September 1, 1979 and closed on September 30, 1979. About, 1,70,000/- persons applied. Flats were being constructed in a continuous process and lots were being drawn from time to time for a given number of flats ready for allotment. Clause (14) of the Scheme has to be understood in this context-the steady rise in the cost of construction and of land. No provision of law also could be brought to our notice in support of the proposition that mere drawl of lots vests an indefeasible right in the allottee for allotment at the price obtaining on the date of drawl of lots. In our opinion, since the right to flat arises only on the communication of the letter of allotment, the price or rates prevailing on the date of such communication is applicable, unless otherwise provided in the Scheme. If in case the respondent is not willing to take or accept the allotment at such rate, it is always open to him to decline the allotment. We see no unfairness in the above procedure.'' Ms. Chandra, learned counsel for the Respondent has justifiably drawn attention to the decision of the Full Bench in Raman and Versus Union of India and others, AIR 1994 DELHI 29 wherein it has been held that the rates of premium chargeable from an individual whose land have been acquired shall be the predetermined rates in force at the time when the offer is made to the concerned person or the allotment of a specific plot of land in a particular area or zone, under Rule 6 of the Nazul Rules. However, as I see it, when this ratio is applied to the present case, it is certainly arguable that it could relate either to 1982 as well as to 2003. The principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Delhi Development Authority Versus Pushpendra Kumar Jain, , had already been expressed in anticipation by the Full Bench, in that it had opined that ''we find that an individual whose land has been acquired for planned development of Delhi has no absolute right of allotment, but, he is eligible to be considered for allotment of an alternative plot for residential purposes; and that the D.D.A. may allot Nazul land to such an individual, in conformity with the plans and subject to other provisions of the Nazul Rules.''
6. Counsel has also relied on Gurpawan Kumar Versus S.P. Jakhanwal, 1996 (36) DRJ. Mr. Sethi has drawn attention to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in J.S. Rao (Prof.) Versus D.D.A. and Another, 2001 1 AD (DELHI) 235 wherein it was observed that a person whose name was incorrectly not entered in the drawl of lots can claim allotment of the flat at the price prevailing on the date of his application.
7. In my view, it would not be appropriate to proffer an opinion on the merits of these contentions raised before me in the present Petition wherein contempt of the Orders of this Court has been alleged. The correct approach in the present proceedings is to ascertain whether the words of the Order/Judgment admit of only one interpretation, which has not been implemented. Wherever two or more understandings or interpretations are reasonably possible, it is wholly inappropriate for the Court to press into use the powers contained under the Contempt of Courts Act.
8. The following paragraph in Jhareswar Prasad Paul and Another Versus Tarak Nath Ganguly and Others, (2002) 5 Supreme Court Cases 352 is of great instructive value:-
''The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the courts of law, since the respect and authority commanded by the courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen and the democratic fabric of society will suffer if respect for the judiciary is undermined. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 has been introduced under the statute for the purpose of securing the feeling of confidence of the people in general for true and proper administration of justice in the country. The power to punish for contempt of court is a special power vested under the Constitution in the courts of record and also under the statute. The power is special and needs to be exercised with care and caution. It should be used sparingly by the courts on being satisfied regarding the true effect of contemptuous conduct. It is to be kept in mind that the court exercising the jurisdiction to punish for contempt does not function as an original or appellate court for determination of the disputes between the parties. The contempt jurisdiction should be confined to the question whether there has been any deliberate disobedience of the order of the court and if the conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed such disobedience is contumacious. The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is alleged by the applicant. The court has to consider the direction issued in the judgment or order and not to consider the question as to what the judgment or order should have contained. At the cost of repetition, be it stated here that the court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party, which is alleged to have committed deliberate default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If the judgment or order does not contain any specific direction regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein then it will be better to direct the parties to approach the court which disposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead of the court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the court passing the judgment or order. If this limitation is borne in mind then criticisms which are sometimes leveled against the courts exercising contempt of court jurisdiction ''that it has been exceeded its powers in granting substantive relief and issuing a direction regarding the same without proper adjudication of the dispute'' in its entirety can be avoided. This will also avoid multiplicity of proceedings because the party which is prejudicially affected by the judgment or order passed in the contempt proceeding and granting relief and issuing fresh directions is likely to challenge that order and that may give rise to another round of litigation arising from a proceeding which is intended to maintain the majesty and image of courts.''
9. For these reasons, the present Petition is dismissed with liberty granted to the Petitioner to pursue any appropriate legal proceedings so that the controversy can be laid to rest in a fuller adjudication. Parties to bear their respective costs.