Allahabad High Court
M/S Ganesh Grain Store, Raniganj Bazar ... vs State Of U.P. Thru Secy. Agriculture & 5 ... on 21 January, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 ALL 77, (2020) 2 ADJ 230 (ALL)
Author: Sudhir Agarwal
Bench: Sudhir Agarwal
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD, LUCKNOW BENCH AFR Reserved on 24.07.2019 Delivered on 21.01.2020 Court No. - 11 (1) Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 3225 of 2008 Petitioner :- M/S Ganesh Grain Store, Raniganj Bazar Ballia Respondent :- State of U.P. and others Counsel for Petitioner :- Shafiq Mirza Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C., N.C. Mehrotra (2) Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 3271 of 2008 Petitioner :- M/S Shri Laxmi Ji Flour & Dal Mill through its Proprietor Respondent :- State of U.P. and others Counsel for Petitioner :- Shafiq Mirza Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C, N.C.Mehrotra (3) Case :- MISC. SINGLE No. - 3272 of 2008 Petitioner :- M/S Shri Laxmi Ji Dal Mill through its Partner Respondent :- State of U.P. and others Counsel for Petitioner :- Shafiq Mirza Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C, N.C.Mehrotra Hon'ble Sudhir Agarwal, J.
1. Heard Sri Shafiq Mirza, Advocate, for petitioner; and, learned Standing Counsel and Sri N.C. Mehrotra, Advocate, for respondents in all these writ petitions.
2. Petitioner in Writ Petition No. 3225 of 2008 (hereinafter referred to as "WP-1"), M/s. Ganesh Grain Store, Raniganj Bazar, Ballia has filed WP-1 under Article 226 of Constitution praying for issue of a writ of certiorari and quash order dated 31.03.2008 (Annexure-6 to WP-1) passed by Sri R.K. Arya, Deputy Director (Administration), Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Varanasi dismissing petitioner's Revision No. 993 of 2007 submitted under Section 32 of U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1964"). Petitioner has also prayed for a writ of certiorari to quash order dated 14.09.2007 (Annexure-9 to WP-1) issued by Additional Legal Adviser informing Regional Deputy Director, Mandi Samiti, Varanasi that vide order dated 13.08.1999 he has been authorized to decide Revision under Section 32 of Act, 1964. Petitioner has also prayed for a writ of mandamus commanding respondent-1 to exercise its power under Section 33B of Act, 1964 and also prayed that Section 20 of Act, 1964 be declared ultra vires and unconstitutional.
3. Facts in brief, giving rise to WP-1, are that vide Government Order dated 24.12.2001 (Annexure-1 to WP-1) two per cent exemption in Mandi Fee and half percent rebate in Development Cess was granted, besides two per cent concession in Trade Tax. Petitioner conducted business in the Financial Years (hereinafter referred to as "F.Y.") 2003-04, 2004-05, 2005-06. The exemption aforesaid was granted for the F.Y. 2001 to 2006. Therefore, with the end of scheme, petitioner's business also stood closed. However, petitioner received a letter dated 30.04.2007 issued by Mandi Samiti, Ballia (respondent-5), raising demand of Rs. 10,22,622.90 stating that petitioner did not deposit the bill of loading/shipment H Form Second Copy and, therefore it was liable to pay the aforesaid amount. A reminder demand notice dated 22.05.2007 directing petitioner to deposit the aforesaid amount was also received. Thereafter, petitioner filed Revision against the aforesaid orders before Director, Mandi Samiti vide memo of Revision dated 31.07.2007. Before filing Revision, petitioner filed Writ Petition before this Court challenging demand notice in which an interim order was also passed but when petitioner availed statutory remedy of Revision, Writ Petition (MB) No. 6858 of 2007 was dismissed vide judgment dated 17.09.2007 with a direction to competent authority to decide Revision within a period of one month from the date of receipt of certified copy. Consequently, impugned revisional order has been passed on 31.03.2008 by Deputy Director rejecting petitioner's Revision.
4. Learned counsel for petitioner, Sri Shafiq Mirza, in WP-1 has challenged the aforesaid order of Revision on the ground that Deputy Director had no authority or jurisdiction to decide Revision inasmuch Director, Mandi Samiti himself was exercising delegated power and had no authority to further delegate or sub-delegate his power, therefore, sub-delegation by Director to Deputy Director is wholly without jurisdiction. In this regard, he placed reliance on Sections 2(h), 26-I, 27, 33 and 33-A of Act, 1964 and Rule 135 of U.P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as "Rules, 1965").
5. On behalf of Mandi Samiti, Counter Affidavit has been filed stating that validity of Section 20 of Act, 1964 has been upheld by this Court. Further, power to decide Revision has been conferred by Board upon Additional Director, Deputy Director as well as Regional Deputy Director.
6. On the contrary, Sri N.C. Mehrotra, learned counsel appearing for respondent-Mahdi Samiti, submitted that Board has delegated the power with authority of further sub-delegation and therefore, Deputy Director has validly exercised revisional power. He placed reliance on Supreme Court's judgment in Heinz India Private Limited and another Vs. State of U.P. and others (2012) 5 SCC 443.
7. Facts in both the connected Writ Petition No. 3271 of 2008 (hereinafter referred to as "WP-2") and Writ Petition No. 3272 of 2008 (hereinafter referred to as "WP-3") are also similar inasmuch therein also order passed by Deputy Director deciding petitioner's Revision vide order dated 31.03.2008 are under challenge on the same grounds, therefore, I am not repeating the facts since question of law raised in all these Writ Petitions is common and same.
8. Thus issue up for consideration in all these Writ Petitions is "whether Director was competent to delegate power of deciding Revision filed under Section 32 of Act, 1964 upon Deputy Director". In other words, "whether power conferred upon Deputy Director to decide Revision under Section 32 of Act, 1964 is validly exercised power", and "whether Revision has been decided by competent statutory authority or not".
9. In order to to examine the aforesaid issue I may have a bird eye view of Act, 1964.
10. Act, 1964 was enacted with an objective to regulate Agricultural Markets in State of U.P. with a view to achieve following objects:
"(i) to reduce the multiple trade charges, levies and exactions charged at present from the producer-sellers;
(ii) to provide for the verification of accurate weights and scales and see that the producer-seller is not denied his legitimate due;
(iii) to establish market committees in which the agricultural producer will have his due representation;
(iv) to ensure that the agricultural producer has his say in the utilisation of market funds for the improvement of the market as a whole;
(v) to provide for fair settlement of disputes relating to the sale of agricultural produce;
(vi) to provide amenities to the producer-seller in the market;
(vii) to arrange for better storage facilities;
(viii) to stop inequitable and unauthorised charges and levies from the producer-seller; and
(ix) to make adequate arrangements for market intelligence with a view to posting the agricultural producer with the latest position in respect of the markets dealing with his produce."
11. Chapter 2 deals with "Market Area And Market Yards" and contains Sections 5 to 11. Section 5 confers power upon Government whenever it is of opinion that it is necessary or expedient in the interest of public to regulate sale and purchase of any agricultural produce in any area, for that purpose it may declare that area as a Market Area by Notification in Gazette and after inviting objections such Market Area can be declared by State Government under Section 6. Once a Market Area is declared, State Government by Notification in Gazette under Section 7 may declare certain portion of Market Area as "Principal Market Yard" and other portion as "Sub-Market Yard". It can also declare that whole-sale transactions of all or any of specified agricultural produce, in respect of a Market Area, shall be carried on only at a specified place or place within Principal Market Yard by Sub-Market Yard. Once a market is declared as per Section 9 of Act, 1964, no legal body or other person shall, within the Market Area, set up, establish or continue or allow to be set up, established or continued any place for the sale-purchase, storage, weighment or processing of the specified agricultural produce except under and in accordance with the conditions of licence granted by Committee concerned. This provision has been given overriding effect over any other law, custom or usage or agreement providing otherwise.
12. Chapter-III deals with the "Market Committee". Section 12 provides that there shall be a Committee to be called "Mandi Samiti" of every Market Area which shall be a body corporate having perpetual succession and an official seal. Subject to such restrictions and/or qualifications, if any, imposed by Act, 1964 or any other enactment, 'Mandi Samiti' may sue or be sued in its corporate name and acquire, hold, and dispose of property and enter into contracts. A 'Mandi Samiti' is deemed to be a Local Authority for the purposes of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1894") and any other law for the time being in force by virtue of Section 12(2) of Act, 1964. I am not going into details of Committee, its power etc. as the same are of no relevance to the issues raised in these Writ Petitions.
13. Chapter-V deals with external control of Market Area etc. Section 26-A empowers State Government to constitute a Board by the name of State Agricultural Produce Markets Board with its Head Office at Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as "Board"). I may notice at this stage that Definition of Board under Section 2(a-i) states that 'Board' means the State Agricultural Produce Markets Board constituted under Section 26-A. The constitution of Board is provided in Section 26-E. Director is defined in Section 2(h) and it read as under:
"(h) "Director" means an officer appointed by the State Government as Director of Mandis and includes any other Officer authorised by the Director to perform all or any of his functions under this Act;"
14. Director is an Ex-officio of Secretary of Board and has been termed as 'Member Secretary' at various places in Act, 1964.
15. The power of employment of officers and servants for effective functioning of Board is conferred upon Board under Section 26-F. The Board can also lay down terms and conditions of Officers and Servants appointed by it but the same have to be framed with previous approval of State Government. However, subject to superintendence of Board, general control and direction over all Officers and servants of Board is vested in Director vide Section 26-G. Board may delegate its powers under Act, 1964 to any such Committee appointed by it or to Director or Member Secretary or any other Officer of Board by virtue of Section 26-I.
16. Power and functions of Board are provided in Section 26-L and it reads as under:
"26-L. Powers and functions of the Board.-(1) The Board shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, have the following functions and shall have power to do anything which may be necessary or expedient for carrying out those functions-
(i) superintendence and control over the working of the Market Committees and other affairs thereof including programmes undertaken by such Committees for the construction of new Market yards and development of existing Markets and Market areas;
(ii) giving such direction to Committees in general or any Committee in particular with a view to ensure efficiency thereof;
(iii) any other function entrusted to it by this Act;
(iv) such other functions as may be entrusted to the Board by the State Government by notification in the Gazette.
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, such power shall include the power-
(i) to approve proposals of the new sites selected by the Committee for the development of Markets;
(ii) to supervise and guide the Committees in the preparation of site-plans and estimates of construction programmes undertaken by the Committee;
(iii) to execute all works chargeable to the Board's fund;
(iv) to maintain accounts in such forms as may be prescribed and get the same audited in such manner as may be laid down in regulations of the Board;
(v) to publish annually at the close of the year, its progress report, balance-sheet, and statement of assets and liabilities and send copies to each member of the Board as well as to the Chairman of all Market Committees;
(vi) to make necessary arrangements for propaganda publicity on matters related to regulated marketing of agricultural produce;
(vii) to provide facilities for the training of officers and servants of the Market Committees;
(viii) to prepare and adopt budget for the ensuring year;
(ix) to make subventions and loans to Market Committees for the purposes of this Act on such terms and conditions as the Board may determine;
(x) to do such other things as may be of general interest to Market Committees or considered necessary for the efficient functioning of the Board as may be specified from time to time by the State Government."
17. Section 27 provides power and duties of Director and reads as under:
"27. Powers and duties of the Director.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the general superintendence, direction and control over the Committee and its Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other members, its Secretary and other officers referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 23, shall be vested in the Board.
(2) The Board or the Director may inspect, or cause to be inspected, all documents or records relating to the affairs of the Committee and, require the Committee, its Chairman, Vice-Chairman, members, officers or servants to furnish such information or material as he may consider necessary.
(3) On receipt of a complaint in respect of an act relating to the affairs of the Committee, the State Government may require the Director to conduct enquiry or institute proceeding against the Committee, its Chairman, Vice-Chairman, member or officer, and the Director shall act accordingly.
(4) The Director shall, for the purpose of holding any enquiry under this Act, have the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, when trying a suit, in respect of the following matters, namely-
(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of documents; and
(c) any other matters which may be prescribed."
18. Power to entertain Revision has been conferred upon Board against an order or proceedings of a Committee under Section 32 and it reads as under:
"32. Powers of the Board to call for the proceedings of a Committee and pass orders thereon.- The Board may, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any decision of, or order passed by, a Committee, at any time call and examine the proceedings of the Committee, and, where it is of the opinion that the decision or order of the Committee should be modified, annulled or reversed, pass such orders thereon as it may deem fit."
19. Section 33 talks of development of power and reads as under:
"33. Delegation of powers.-The Board may, by regulations, delegate subject to such conditions and restrictions and in such manner, as may be specified therein, any of its powers to the Director." (emphasis added)
20. Power of framing Rules have been conferred upon State Government by virtue of Section 40 of Act, 1964. In exercise of power under Section 40 of Act, 1964 State Government has framed Rules, 1965.
21. Procedure for filing Revision is dealt with by Rule 133-A of Rules, 1965 and it reads as under:
"133-A. Revision under the Act (Section 32).-(1) A fee of Rupees Ten in cash shall be deposited with the Committee for every revision to be filed under the Act and a receipt therefor shall be obtained from the Committee.
(2) No revision under the Act shall be entertained unless it is accompanied by a receipt duly granted by the Committee for the payment of the amount of fee as referred to in sub-rule (1).
(3) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2), on receipt of a revision under Section 32 of the Act, the Board or the Officer nominated by it shall after examining the case and affording the person concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard in person, dispose of the revision within 60 days from the date of filing of the revision. The Board or the officer nominated by it shall during the hearing of the revision also consider the propriety of the order passed by the Committee on the basis of merit and demerit thereof and pass the suitable order. The order passed by the Board or the officer nominated by it shall be final and binding." (emphasis added)
22. Rule 135 of Rules, 1965 talks of power of Director in certain cases with reference to Section 27 read with Section 40(2) (xxx) and it reads as under:
"135. Power of the Director in certain cases [Sections 27 and 40(2)(xxx)].- Without prejudice to the provisions of the Act, and these rules, the Director, may-
(i) cause periodical inspection of the affairs of the Committee to be carried out by any Officer Authorised by him in this behalf;
(ii) order, on receipt of a report or complaint or on his own motion, for special audit of the accounts of the Committee at the cost of the Committee;
(iii) direct the Committee, Chairman, Vice-Chairman, or any Member, Officer or Servant of the Committee to undertake such measures as he may consider necessary, for the improvement and development of the Market Area, Principal Market Yard and Sub-Market Yards;
(iv) exercise such powers and pass such orders as he may deem necessary for proper functioning of and effective superintendence and control over the Committee and the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Members, Officers and Servants of the Committee under the Act:
Provided that such powers superintendence and control in so far as they relate to the Officers and Servants appointed by the Committee under sub-section (1) of Section 23 of the Act, shall be exercised through, the Chairman of the Committee.
(v) inspect or cause to be inspected any premises, vehicles or stocks for the purpose of holding any inquiry under sub-section (4) of Section 27 of the Act."
23. It is no doubt true that a well settled principle in law is, 'delegatus non potest delegare'. A delegate has no power to delegate. The principle, however, has a different field of operation in the context of legislative powers vis-a-vis non-legislative/administrative powers. It is well settled that delegation of power to legislate cannot be sub-delegated. In other words, Legislature cannot delegate essential legislative functions which consists of determination or choosing of the legislative policy and formally enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct. Subordinate legislation, however, is in the realm of Rules and Regulations dealing with the procedure on implementation of plenary legislation and generally a task entrusted to a specified authority. Principal Legislature is not supposed to spend its time for working out details on implementation of law. It can entrust such task to an agency and to this extent sub-delegation is permissible but such agency cannot further entrust such task to its subordinates. It would be a breach of confidence reposed on delegate. With regard to delegation of non-legislative/administrative powers on a person or a body to do certain things, whether delegatee himself is to perform such functions or whether after taking decision as per the terms of the delegation, the said agency can authorize the implementation of the same on somebody else, depends upon the Statute concerned. Once power is conferred, after exercising power of taking decision as per the Policy etc., the question how to implement the decision taken in the process, is a matter of procedure. The Legislature may, after laying down legislative policy, confer discretion on an administrative agency with regard to execution of policy. It can leave this task to agency to work out the details within the framework of that policy. So long as essential functions of decision making is performed by the delegate, the burden of performing the ancillary and clerical task need not be shouldered by the primary delegate. It is not necessary that primary delegate himself should perform ministerial acts as well. Implementation of decision already taken by primary delegate as per the delegation, ministerial or clerical tasks can be performed by authorized officers. Practical necessities or exigencies of administration require that the decision making authority who has been conferred with statutory power, be able to delegate tasks when the situation so requires. Thus, the maxim "delegatus non potest delegare", gives way in the performance of administrative or ministerial tasks by subordinate authorities in furtherance of the exercise of delegated power by an authority.
24. In Barium Chemicals Limited and another Vs. The Co. Law Board and another AIR 1967 SC 295 Court said:
"... the maxim delegatus non potest delegare must not be pushed too far. The maxim does not embody a rule of law. It indicates a rule of construction of a statute or other instrument conferring an authority. Prima facie, a discretion conferred by a statute on any authority is intended to be exercised by that authority and by no other. But the intention may be negatived by any contrary indications in the language, scope or object of the statute. The construction that would best achieve the purpose and object of the statute should be adopted." (emphasis added)
25. In Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. Vs. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and others (1974) 4 SCC 98, a Constitution Bench held that essential legislative functions consist in the determination or choosing of the legislative policy and it is formally has a binding rule of conduct, cannot be delegated by Legislature, nor is there any unlimited right of delegation inherent in the legislative power itself. The legislature must retain in its own hands the essential legislative functions and what can be delegated is the task of subordinate legislation necessary for implementing the purposes and objects of the Act. Where the law passed by Legislature declares legislative policy and lays down the standard which is enacted into a rule of law, it can leave the task of subordinate legislation like making of rules, regulations or bye-laws which by its very nature is ancillary to the statute, to subordinate bodies.
26. In Director General, E.S.I. and another Vs. T. Abdul Razak, etc. (1996) 4 SCC 708, Court held that statutory power must be exercised only by body or officer in whom it has been confided unless sub-delegation of power is authorised by express words or necessary implication.
27. This Court has also followed authorities in Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. Vs. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and others (supra) and Director General, E.S.I. and another Vs. T. Abdul Razak, etc. (supra) in its judgment in Writ Petition (Writ-A) No. 786 of 1995 (Ravinder Kumar Pal and others Vs. Nideshak, Karmchari Rajya Beema Sharam Chikitsalay and others) decided on 18.12.2013, para 5 and 6 whereof read as under:
"5. However, I find no force in the submission. It is well settled legal principle in constitutional and administrative law that 'delegatus non potest delegare, ''one to whom power is delegated cannot himself further delegate that power' (See: Gwalior Rayon Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Vs. The Asstt. Commissioner of Sales 1974 AIR 1660).
6. Following the above principle, Apex Court in Director General, E.S.I. and another Vs. T . Abdul Razak AIR 1996 SC 2292 has held as under:
"The law is well settled that in accordance with the maxim delegatus non potest delegare, a statutory power must be exercised only by the body or officer in whom it has been confided..."
28. In Jamal Uddin Ahmad Vs. Abu Saleh Najmuddin and another (2003) 4 SCC 257, scope of delegation in the matter of judicial functions of Court was examined. Court held:
"13. The functions discharged by a High Court can be divided broadly into judicial and administrative functions. The judicial functions are to be discharged essentially by the Judges as per the Rules of the Court and cannot be delegated. However, administrative functions need not necessarily be discharged by the Judges by themselves, whether individually or collectively or in a group of two or more, and may be delegated or entrusted by authorization to subordinates unless there be some rule of law restraining such delegation or authorisation. Every High Court consists of some administrative and ministerial staff which is as much a part of the High Court as an institution and is meant to be entrusted with the responsibility of discharging administrative and ministerial functions. There can be "delegation" as also there can be "authorization" in favour of the Registry and the officials therein by empowering or entrusting them with authority or by permitting a few things to be done by them for and on behalf of the Court so as to aid the Judges in discharge of their judicial functioning. Authorization may take the form of formal conferral or sanction or may be by way of approval or countenance. Such delegation or authorization is not a matter of mere convenience but a necessity at times. The Judges are already overburdened with the task of performing judicial functions and the constraints on their time and energy are so demanding that it is in public interest to allow them to devote time and energy as much as possible in discharging their judicial functions, relieving them of the need for diverting their limited resources of time and energy to such administrative or ministerial functions, which, on any principle of propriety, logic, or necessity are not required necessarily to be performed by the Judges. Receiving a cause or a document and making it presentable to a Judge for the purpose of hearing or trial and many a functions post-decision, which functions are administrative and ministerial in nature, can be and are generally entrusted or made over to be discharged by the staff of the High Court, often by making a provision in the Rules or under the orders of the Chief Justice or by issuing practice directions, and at times, in the absence of rules, by sheer practice. The practice gathers the strength of law and the older the practice the greater is the strength. ..."
29. In NGEF Ltd . Vs . Chandra Developers Pvt . Ltd . and others (2005) 8 SCC 219, Court has observed that BIFR being a statutory authority, in absence of any provision empowering it to delegate its power in favour of any other authority, had no jurisdiction to do so. 'Delegatus non potest delegare' is a well-known maxim which means unless expressly authorized a delegate cannot sub-delegate its power.
30. Referring to some of the above authorities, same proposition of law has been followed in Sidhartha Sarawgi Vs. Board of Trustees for the Port of Kolkata and others (2014) 16 SCC 248 and Union of India Vs. B.V. Gopinath and others (2014) 1 SCC 351.
31. Now we will examine the issues raised before this Court in the present case in the light of above exposition of law.
32. The definition of 'Director' includes any other Officer authorized by Director to perform all or any of his functions under Act, 1964.
33. Section 32 of Act, 1964 confers power of Revision upon Board. Section 33 which was substituted by U.P. Act No. 10 of 1991 with effect from 01.09.1990 provides that the Board may, by Regulations, delegate, subject to such conditions and restrictions and in such manner, as may be specified therein, any of its power to 'Director'. Petitioners in these Writ Petitions have not disputed that power of Revision is delegated to Director and Revisions were preferred by petitioners to Director. Revisions preferred to 'Director' were transferred to Deputy Director with reference to Board's resolution dated 12.12.1994 and 19.01.1998 and order dated 13.08.1999 and delegation of power by Director to Deputy Director, Varanasi communicated to him vide letter dated 14.09.2007.
34. The submission is that 'Director' exercised power delegated to it by Board under Section 33 and it is not Director's any of his functions under Act, 1964 and, therefore, Section 2(h) which defines "Director" will not include within its ambit Deputy Director, Varanasi who has decided the Revision in question. I find that almost similar question has been considered by Supreme Court in Heinz India Pvt. Ltd. and others Vs. State of U.P. and others (2012) 5 SCC 443 wherein also Revision was decided by an Officer authorized by Director and Court said as under:
"33. .... It is manifest from a plain reading of the above that the expression 'Director' wherever used in the Act including Section 33 thereof includes an officer authorised by the Director to perform all or any of his functions under the Act. Significantly enough neither before the High Court nor before us was it contended that the officer who had handled and disposed of the revision petitions filed by the dealers, was not duly authorised in terms of Section 2(h) or that the power of the Board under Section 32 of the Act was not duly delegated to the Director. It is not, therefore, a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. All that the Appellants propose is that the revisions could either be heard by the Board itself or made over for disposal to a Committee of officers senior enough to decide issues of fact and law involving substantial financial stakes of the parties.
34. Now it is true that the stakes involved in the present batch of cases are substantial and those called upon to satisfy the demands raised against them would like their cases to be heard by a senior officer or a Committee of officers to be nominated by the Board. But in the absence of any data as to the number of cases that arise for consideration involving a challenge to the demands raised by the Market Committee and the nature of the disputes that generally fall for determination in such cases, it will not be possible for this Court to step in and direct an alteration in the mechanism that is currently in place. The power to decide the revisions vests with the Board who also enjoys the power to delegate that function to the Director. So long as there is statutory sanction for the Director to exercise the revisional power vested in the Board, any argument that such a delegation is either impermissible or does not serve the purpose of providing a suitable machinery for adjudication of the disputes shall have to be rejected.
35. It is noteworthy that Rule 133-A of the Rules framed under the Act regulates the filing and disposal of the revision petitions under Section 32 thereof. This provision was inserted with effect from 11th May, 2008 and empowers the Board either to decide the revision petition itself or to nominate an officer for doing so. It also provides for grant of an opportunity of being heard to the person concerned and a time bound disposal of the revision. Rule 133-A is, therefore, a step in the direction of providing a machinery under the Act for adjudication of disputes that may arise between dealers on the one hand and the market committee on the other. That being so, the Act is not completely bereft of a machinery nor can it be said that the observations made by this Court in Ram Chandra Kailash Kumar's case (supra) have gone unheeded. All that we need to add is that in order to make the Board's revisional power more effective and its exercise more transparent and credible, the Board would do well to delegate the power of hearing and disposal of the revision petitions to a senior and experienced officer who is well-versed in dealing with legal issues concerning assessment and/or determination of the liability under the Act. Beyond that it is neither necessary nor proper for us to say anything. Question No. 1 is answered accordingly." (emphasis added)
35. The power of Revision when delegated to Director by virtue of Section 33 becomes a function to be performed by Director under Act, 1964 and, therefore, Director can authorize any other Officer to perform all or any of his functions under Act, 1964 which includes delegated powers to be performed by Director under Section 32 of Act, 1964. In view thereof I find myself unable to accept the contention of learned counsel for petitioners that power exercised by Deputy Director in deciding Revision is bad in law as he had no jurisdiction to decide Revision and Director had no power to authorize Deputy Director to decide Revision.
36. The issues, formulated above, are answered against petitioners.
37. Since this Court has not been addressed on merits of issue as to whether demand raised from petitioners was valid or not, hence, I have not gone into that issue at all.
38. No other point has been argued.
39. The writ petitions lack merit. Dismissed.
40. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
Dt. 21.01.2020 PS