Madhya Pradesh High Court
Manoj Kumar Verma vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 26 July, 2024
Author: Vishal Mishra
Bench: Vishal Mishra
1 WP-18157-2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT JABALPUR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE VISHAL MISHRA
ON THE 26 th OF JULY, 2024
WRIT PETITION No. 18157 of 2024
MANOJ KUMAR VERMA
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Rajendra Pratap Singh - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri Ankit Agrawal - Government Advocate for the respondent/State.
ORDER
The petition has been filed seeking following relief(s):-
"(i) Issue a writ of mandamus and call the entire records relating to present issue of compassionate appointment.
(ii) Issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondent to grant compassionate appointment to the petitioner.
(iii) Issue a direction to the respondents to take necessary action on the concern as petitioner has been waiting addressing the concern from a very long time in interest of the justice.
(iv) Issue any other order or direction as this Hon'ble Court may deems fit in the nature and circumstances of the case."
2. It is the case of the petitioner that th e father of the petitioner was died on 28.10.2000 during the course of employment and at that time, the age of the petitioner was 10 years. Therefore, in the year 2008 when he attained the age of 18 years, he has submitted a representation for compassionate appointment on 08.08.2008. The respondent No.6 has sent the same to respondent no.5 after a period of two years and the respondent no.5 has rejected the application on the ground of delay. Hence, the present petition.
3. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/State has opposed the Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 7/29/2024 7:05:28 PM 2 WP-18157-2024 contentions on the ground that the petition has been filed at a belated stage i.e. after a period of 24 years from the date of death of the employee, without any explanation for the delay. Therefore, prayed for dismissal of the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches.
4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
5. Record indicates that the petitioner's father died in the year 2000 and the petitioner moved an application on 08.08.2008 after attaining the age of majority. The application has been rejected by the respondents in the year 2010. Thereafter, he has filed representations in the year 2016 and again the petitioner kept quite and slept over the matter. He has filed this petition on 04.07.2024 i.e. after a lapse of almost eight years from the date of second visit to the respondents and after 24 years from the date of death of the employee. It is his case that with a great difficulty he has survived after death of sole bread winner of the family in the year 2000. However, there is no explanation made by the petitioner for the delay in approaching this court.
6. The petitioner and other family members have survived for considerable period of almost 24 years from the date of death of sole bread earner. The sole consideration for grant of compassionate appointment is to overcome the sudden hardship being faced by the dependent of the sole earner of the family owing to sudden demise. The factum of penury and dependency and the urgent requirement of a job, are the factors to be considered in the cases of compassionate appointment. In the present case, the petitioner and other family members have survived for a considerable period of more than 24 years. The very object of grant of compassionate appointment will be defeated and frustrated in the present facts Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 7/29/2024 7:05:28 PM 3 WP-18157-2024 and circumstances of the case.
7. The law with respect to compassionate appointment is considered and decided in several judgments and held that the compassionate appointment cannot be an alternate mode of recruitment, rather it is in a form of compassion shown by the authorities while considering the cases. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in several cases has held there are two recognized contingencies for grant of compassionate appointment; (i) to meet the sudden crisis occurring on account of death of the bread winner of the family and; (ii) to meet the crisis in a family on account of medical invalidation of the bread winner of the family. The factum of dependency and penury are required to be considered by the authorities.
8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Santosh Kumar Dubey vs. State of U.P., reported in (2009) 6 SCC 481 has held as under:
"12. The request for appointment on compassionate grounds should be reasonable and proximate to the time of the death of the bread earner of the family, inasmuch as the very purpose of giving such benefit is to make financial help available to the family to overcome sudden economic crisis occurring in the family of the deceased who has died in harness. But this, however, cannot be another source of recruitment. This also cannot be treated as a bonanza and also as a right to get an appointment in government service."
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar vs. State of Bihar and others, reported in (2000) 7 SCC 192 has held as under:
"3... This Court has held in a number of cases that compassionate appointment is intended to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over sudden crisis resulting due to death of the bread earner who had left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood. In fact such a view has been expressed in the very decision cited by the petitioner in Director of Education Vs. Pushpendra Kumar. It is also significant to notice that on the date when the first Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 7/29/2024 7:05:28 PM 4 WP-18157-2024 application was made by the petitioner on 02/06/1988, the petitioner was a minor and was not eligible for appointment. This is conceded by the petitioner. There cannot be reservation of a vacancy till such time as a petitioner becomes a major after a number of years, unless there are some specific provisions. The very basis of compassionate appointment is to see that the family gets immediate relief."
10. A similar view was taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Beni Lal Bamney vs. Union of India and others , reported in 2003 (1) MPLJ 342 and in the case of Riazuddin Khan vs. State of M.P. and others , reported in 2005(4) MPLJ 575 and in the case of Managing Director, Madhya Pradesh Paschim Kshetra Vidyut Vitaran Co. and others vs. Ashiq Shah and another (W.A.No.10 of 2020).
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of West Bengal vs. Debabrata Tiwari and others reported in AIR 2023 SC 1467 has held as under:
"13- The sense of immediacy in the matter of compassionate appointment has been lost in the present case. This is attributable to the authorities of the Appellant-State as well as the Respondents-Writ Petitioners. Now, entertaining a claim which was made in 2005-2006, in the year 2023, would be of no avail, because admittedly, the Respondents- Writ Petitioners have been able to eke out a living even though they did not successfully get appointed to the services of the Municipality on compassionate grounds. Hence, we think that this is therefore not fit cases to direct that the claim of the Respondents-Writ Petitioners for appointments on compassionate grounds, be considered or entertained."
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered the aspect of delay in approaching the Court in the case Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Ors. reported in (2013) 12 SCC 649 wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :-
Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 7/29/2024 7:05:28 PM5 WP-18157-2024 "21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:
21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, nonpedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bonafides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 7/29/2024 7:05:28 PM 6 WP-18157-2024 ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go-by in the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 7/29/2024 7:05:28 PM 7 WP-18157-2024 litigation.
21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.
21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.
22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:-
22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.
22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 7/29/2024 7:05:28 PM 8 WP-18157-2024 which is basically subjective.
22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.
22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.
13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa & Anr. vs. Mamata Mohanty, (2011) 3 SCC 436 has opined as under:-
"54. This Court has consistently rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches in case the petitioner approaches the Court after coming to know of the relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. A litigant cannot wake up from deep slumber and claim impetus from the judgment in cases where some diligent person had approached the Court within a reasonable time."
14. A Division Bench of this Court in Focus Energy Ltd. (M/s) vs Government of India, (DB) reported in I.L.R. (2011) M.P. 53; relying upon Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 7/29/2024 7:05:28 PM 9 WP-18157-2024 judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under :
"10. Thus, facts stated supra leads to irresistible conclusion that appellant is guilty of delay and laches. Its conduct disentitles it to any relief. In New Delhi Municipal Council v. Pan Singh and Others, AIR 2007 SC 1365 the Supreme Court has held that delay and laches are relevant factors for exercise of equitable jurisdiction.
In Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48 the Supreme Court has observed that discretionary relief can be provided to one who has not by his act or conduct given a go-bye to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an indolent litigant. In the State of Haryana v. Aravali Khanij Udyog, (2008) 1 SCC 663 it has been held that where third party rights are created, the High Court should not interfere. Similarly, in Shiba Shankar Mohapatra (supra) it has been held that the Court exercising public law jurisdiction does not encourage agitation of stale claims where the right of third parties crystallizes in the interregnum."
15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. vs K. Thangappan reported in (2006) 4 SCC 322 has held as follows:
"6. Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 7/29/2024 7:05:28 PM 10 WP-18157-2024 time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769] . Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329] . Sir Barnes had stated:
"Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 7/29/2024 7:05:28 PM 11 WP-18157-2024 place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy."
16. It is further held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar vs District Magistrate, Basti reported in (2012) 3 SCC 311 that :-
"10. ... It is time and again, stated that a party who has slept over his right since is not entitled to the discretionary relief of the High Court."
17. In the present case, admittedly, the death took place in the year 2000. The petitioner has moved an application on 08.08.2008, which was dismissed in the year 2010. He was kept quite for considerable period and again approached the authority by filing another application in the year 2016. The petitioner and other family members have survived for considerable period of almost 24 years from the date of death of sole bread earner. The basic object of Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 7/29/2024 7:05:28 PM 12 WP-18157-2024 grant of compassionate appointment is to overcome the sudden hardship and financial crisis arisen to the family members of the deceased Government servant on account of sudden death of bread earner of the family, but a direction for considering of the application for grant of compassionate appointment after lapse of 24 years is against the very object of the compassionate appointment. In the present case though the petitioner has filed an application in the year 2008, but thereafter slept over his rights, woke up in 2016, again approached the authorities and again went to deep sleep. It is only in the year 2024, he woke up from his deep slumber and filed the present petition, without there being any explanation for delay. Hence, no relief can be granted to the petitioner in the present petition.
18. The petition sans merits and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.
(VISHAL MISHRA) JUDGE sj Signature Not Verified Signed by: SUSHEEL KUMAR JHARIYA Signing time: 7/29/2024 7:05:28 PM