Chattisgarh High Court
Rameshwar Gond vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 29 February, 2024
Author: Sanjay K. Agrawal
Bench: Sanjay K. Agrawal
Neutral Citation
2024:CGHC:7390-DB
1
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Criminal Appeal No. 1177 of 2017
(Arising out of judgment dated 16.09.2016 passed in
Sessions Trial No.13/2016 by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Pratappur, District Surajpur, CG)
Rameshwar Gond S/o Ramkishun Gond, Aged About
40 Years, R/o Village Bonga, Police Station Ramkola,
District Surajpur, Chhattisgarh.
---- Appellant
Versus
State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Station House Officer,
Police Station Ramkola, District Surajpur,
Chhattisgarh.
---Respondent
For Appellant : Mr. Shivang Dubey, Advocate/Panel
Lawyer, appointed by Chhattisgarh High
Court Legal Services Committee
For Respondent : Mr. Arvind Dubey, Govt. Advocate
(Division Bench)
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal
Judgment On Board
(29.02.2024)
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.
1. This criminal appeal preferred by the appellant under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. is directed against the impugned judgment dated 16.09.2016, passed by Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 2 learned Additional Sessions Judge, Pratappur, District Surajpur, Chhattisgarh in Sessions Trial No. 13/2016, by which, the appellant herein has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of ₹500/-, in default of payment of fine, to undergo one year additional rigorous imprisonment.
2. The case of prosecution, in brief, is that in the intervening night of 15/16.05.2016, in village Bonga, Police Station, Ramkola, district Surajpur, the appellant assaulted his wife Tejmati by bamboo stick, as a result of which, she sustained grievous injuries and died. In the morning, the appellant is alleged to have told his neighbour Gulal Neti (PW-13) that he had assaulted his wife by stick, as a result of which, she suffered grievous injuries and died. The matter was reported to the Police by Gulal Neti (PW-13), pursuant to which Merg intimation was registered vide Ex.P-13 & FIR was registered vide Ex. P-14. Inquest proceedings were conducted vide Ex.P-2 and the dead body of deceased was subjected to postmortem, which was conducted by Dr. A. K. Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 3 Vishwakarma (PW-05), who has proved the post- mortem report Ex. P-4, in which, cause of death has been opined to be Neurogenic shock and the death was homicidal in nature. Pursuant to memorandum statement of the appellant (Ex.P/19), the weapon of offence i.e. bamboo stick was seized vide Ex. P-20 which was sent for chemical examination to FSL and in FSL report (Ex. P-12), blood was found on bamboo stick.
3. After completion of investigation, appellant was charge-sheeted for the aforesaid offence before the jurisdictional criminal court, which was ultimately committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and disposal in accordance with law, in which, the appellant abjured his guilt and entered into defence stating that he has not committed any offence and he has been falsely implicated.
4. In order to bring home the offence, prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses and exhibited 29 documents and the appellant-accused in support of his defence has not examined any witness but has exhibited one document.
Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 4
5. The learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence available on record, convicted the appellant / accused for the offence as mentioned in the opening paragraph of the judgment, against which this appeal has been preferred by the appellant questioning the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence.
6. Mr. Shivang Dubey, learned counsel for the appellant, appointed by CG High Court Legal Services Committee, would submit that if the entire prosecution case is taken as it is, no offence is made out against the appellant under section 302 of IPC as the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. He would submit that the trial Court has relied upon the extra judicial confession made by the appellant before Gulal Neti (PW-13) but this witness has not supported his version in cross- examination. He would further submit that the incriminating circumstance against the appellant as has been held by the trial Court is that on the date of offence, appellant and deceased both were residing together in the house and the dead body of the Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 5 deceased was found in the morning but no specific question has been asked to the appellant under section 313 of CrPC statement as to how and under what circumstances his wife died in the house. Hence, the trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for the said offence applying the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act and therefore, the appellant is entitled for acquittal on the basis of the principles of benefit of doubt and the appeal deserves to be allowed.
7. Mr. Arvind Dubey, learned State counsel, would support the impugned judgment and submit that the prosecution has been able to bring home the offence beyond reasonable doubt and the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant for offence under Sections 302 of I.P.C. As such, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their rival submissions made herein-above and gone through the records with utmost circumspection.
Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 6
9. It is not a case of direct evidence. It is a case of circumstantial evidence. The five golden principles which constitute the 'Panchsheel' of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence have been laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 which must be fulfilled for convicting an accused on the basis of circumstantial evidence. The relevant paragraph 153 of the said judgment reads as under: -
"153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and "must be or should be proved" as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra where the following observations were made:
Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 7 merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."
10. The first and foremost question for consideration is as to whether the death of deceased Tejmati was homicidal in nature?
11. Learned trial Court has recorded an affirmative finding in this regard relying upon the postmortem report (Ex. P-4) proved by Dr. A. K. Vishwakarma (PW-5), which in our considered opinion is a correct Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 8 finding of fact based on evidence available on record and it is neither perverse nor contrary to the record. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding.
12. The next incriminating circumstance that the trial court has found established is that the appellant and the deceased both were residing together in the house on the date and time of offence and in the morning, the appellant himself reported the matter to his neighbour Gulal Neti (PW-13) but the appellant could not explain in his statement made under Section 313 CrPC as to how and in what circumstances his wife died. Therefore, the trial Court has invoked Section 106 of the Evidence Act for convicting the appellant under Section 302 of IPC.
13. Now, the question for consideration is as to whether Section 106 of the Evidence Act would be applicable or not?
14. At this stage, it would be appropriate to quote Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, states as under: -
"106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.--When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 9 person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him."
15. This provision states that when any fact is specially within the knowledge of any person the burden of proving that fact is upon him. This is an exception to the general rule contained in Section 101, namely, that the burden is on the person who asserts a fact. The principle underlying Section 106 which is an exception to the general rule governing burden of proof applies only to such matters of defence which are supposed to be especially within the knowledge of the other side. To invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by prosecution is that the accused persons were in such a position that they could have special knowledge of the fact concerned.
16. In the matter of Shambhu Nath Mehra v. The State of Ajmer1, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 of the Evidence Act is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be 1AIR 1956 SC 404 Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 10 impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution, to establish facts which are "especially" within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The Supreme Court while considering the word "especially" employed in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, speaking through Vivian Bose, J., observed as under: -
"11. ... The word "especially" stresses that it means facts that are preeminently or exceptionally within his knowledge. If the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than he whether he did or did not. It is evident that that cannot be the intention and the Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on an accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. The King, 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R. 1936-3 ER 36 AT P. 49 (B)."
Their Lordships further held that Section 106 of the Evidence Act cannot be used to undermine the well established rule of law that save in a very exceptional class of case, the burden is on the prosecution and never shifts.
Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 11
17. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shambhu Nath Mehra (supra) was followed with approval recently in the matter of Nagendra Sah v. State of Bihar2 in which it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: -
"19. In this case, as mentioned above, neither the prosecution witnesses have deposed to that effect nor any other material has been placed on record to show that the relationship between the appellant and the deceased was strained in any manner. Moreover, the appellant was not the only person residing in the house where the incident took place and it is brought on record that the parents of the appellant were also present on the date of the incident in the house. The fact that other members of the family of the appellant were present shows that there could be another hypothesis which cannot be altogether excluded. Therefore, it can be said that the facts established do not rule out the existence of any other hypothesis. The facts established cannot be said to be consistent only with one hypothesis of the guilt of the appellant.
*** *** *** *** ***
22. Thus, Section 106 of the Evidence Act will apply to those cases where the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts which are within the special knowledge of the accused. When the accused fails to offer proper explanation about the existence of said other facts, the court can always draw an appropriate inference.
23. When a case is resting on circumstantial evidence, if the accused fails to offer a 2(2021) 10 SCC 725 Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 12 reasonable explanation in discharge of burden placed on him by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, such a failure may provide an additional link to the chain of circumstances. In a case governed by circumstantial evidence, if the chain of circumstances which is required to be established by the prosecution is not established, the failure of the accused to discharge the burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is not relevant at all. When the chain is not complete, falsity of the defence is no ground to convict the accused."
18. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Gurcharan Singh v. State of Punjab3, while considering the provisions contained in Sections 103 & 106 of the Evidence Act, held that the burden of proving a plea specially set up by an accused which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him, but neither the application of Section 103 nor that of 106 could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held by their Lordships that it is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the 3AIR 1956 SC 460 Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 13 burden of proof may lie upon the accused. Their Lordships also held that the burden of proving a plea specifically set up by an accused, which may absolve him from criminal liability, certainly lies upon him.
19. The principle of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gurcharan Singh (supra) has been followed with approval by their Lordships in the matter of Sawal Das v. State of Bihar4 and it has been held that burden of proving the case against the accused was on the prosecution irrespective of whether or not the accused has made out a specific defence.
20. In the matter of Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra5, relying upon the earlier decision in the matter of Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu 6, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that when the husband and wife remaining within four walls of a house and death taking place, it would be a strong circumstance, but that by alone in absence of any evidence of violence on the deceased cannot be 4(1974) 4 SCC 193 5(2021) 5 SCC 626 6(2009) 14 SCC 415 Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 14 held to be conclusive and observed in paragraph 20 as under:-
"20. That leads us to the reliance placed by the High Court as well as the trial court on the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In Subramaniam (supra), this Court had occasion to consider the similar case of the husband and wife remaining within the four walls of a house and death taking place. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court:-
"23. So far as the circumstance that they had been living together is concerned, indisputably, the entirety of the situation should be taken into consideration. Ordinarily when the husband and wife remained within the four walls of a house and a death by homicide takes place it will be for the husband to explain the circumstances in which she might have died. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that although the same may be considered to be a strong circumstance but that by alone in the absence of any evidence of violence on the deceased cannot be held to be conclusive. It may be difficult to arrive at a conclusion that the husband and the husband alone was responsible therefor.""
21. Similarly, their Lordships in Shivaji Chintappa Patil (supra) have relied upon the decision of Gargi v. State of Haryana7 and observed in paragraphs in 22 & 23 as under:-
7(2019) 9 SCC 738 Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 15
"22. It will also be relevant to refer to the following observations of this Court in the case of Gargi (supra):-
"33.1. Insofar as the "last seen theory" is concerned, there is no doubt that the appellant being none other than the wife of the deceased and staying under the same roof, was the last person the deceased was seen with. However, such companionship of the deceased and the appellant, by itself, does not mean that a presumption of guilt of the appellant is to be drawn. The trial court and the High Court have proceeded on the assumption that Section 106 of the Evidence Act directly operates against the appellant. In our view, such an approach has also not been free from error where it was omitted to be considered that Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of its primary burden. This Court has explained the principle in Sawal Das (supra) in the following:
"10. Neither an application of Section 103 nor of 106 of the Evidence Act could, however, absolve the prosecution from the duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused.""
23. It could thus be seen, that it is well-settled that Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not directly operate against either a husband or wife staying under the same roof and being the last person seen with the deceased. Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of discharging its primary burden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 16 conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof would lie upon the accused."
22. Further, relying upon the decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra), their Lordships further have concluded that by now it is well settled that principle of law, that false explanation or non- explanation can only be used as an additional circumstance, when the prosecution has proved the chain of circumstances leading to no other conclusion than the guilt of the accused. However, it cannot be used as a link to complete the chain of circumstances.
23. Similarly, in the matter of Balvir Singh v. State of Uttarakand8, their Lordships of the Supreme Court, reviewing its earlier decision on the point of Section 106 of the Evidence Act, have held that Section 106 has to be applied in criminal cases with care and caution and held in paragraphs 41 to 48 as under:-
"41. Thus, from the aforesaid decisions of this Court, it is evident that the court should apply Section 106 of the Evidence Act in criminal cases with care and caution. It cannot be said that it has no application to criminal cases. The ordinary rule which applies to criminal trials in this country that the onus lies on the 82023 SCC OnLine SC 1261 Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 17 prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused is not in any way modified by the provisions contained in Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
42. Section 106 cannot be invoked to make up the inability of the prosecution to produce evidence of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused. This section cannot be used to support a conviction unless the prosecution has discharged the onus by proving all the elements necessary to establish the offence. It does not absolve the prosecution from the duty of proving that a crime was committed even though it is a matter specifically within the knowledge of the accused and it does not throw the burden of the accused to show that no crime was committed. To infer the guilt of the accused from absence of reasonable explanation in a case where the other circumstances are not by themselves enough to call for his explanation is to relieve the prosecution of its legitimate burden. So, until a prima facie case is established by such evidence, the onus does not shift to the accused.
43. Section 106 obviously refers to cases where the guilt of the accused is established on the evidence produced by the prosecution unless the accused is able to prove some other facts especially within his knowledge which would render the evidence of the prosecution nugatory. If in such a situation, the accused gives an explanation which may be reasonably true in the proved circumstances, the accused gets the benefit of reasonable doubt though he may not be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the truth of the explanation. But if the accused in such a case does not give any explanation at all or gives a false or unacceptable explanation, this by itself is a circumstance which may well turn the scale against him. In the language of Prof. Glanville Williams:
"All that the shifting of the evidential Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 18 burden does at the final stage of the case is to allow the jury (Court) to take into account the silence of the accused or the absence of satisfactory explanation appearing from his evidence."
44. To recapitulate the foregoing : What lies at the bottom of the various rules shifting the evidential burden or burden of introducing evidence in proof of one's case as opposed to the persuasive burden or burden of proof, i.e., of proving all the issues remaining with the prosecution and which never shift is the idea that it is impossible for the prosecution to give wholly convincing evidence on certain issues from its own hand and it is therefore for the accused to give evidence on them if he wishes to escape. Positive facts must always be proved by the prosecution. But the same rule cannot always apply to negative facts. It is not for the prosecution to anticipate and eliminate all possible defences or circumstances which may exonerate an accused. Again, when a person does not act with some intention other than that which the character and circumstances of the act suggest, it is not for the prosecution to eliminate all the other possible intentions. If the accused had a different intention that is a fact especially within his knowledge and which he must prove (see Professor Glanville Williams-- Proof of Guilt, Ch. 7, page 127 and following) and the interesting discussion--para 527 negative averments and para 528--"require affirmative counter-evidence" at page 438 and foil, of Kenny's outlines of Criminal Law, 17th Edn. 1958.
45. But Section 106 has no application to cases where the fact in question having regard to its nature is such as to be capable of being known not only by the accused but also by others if they happened to be present when it took place. From the illustrations appended to the section, it Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 19 is clear that an intention not apparent from the character and circumstances of the act must be established as especially within the knowledge of the person whose act is in question and the fact that a person found travelling without a ticket was possessed of a ticket at a stage prior in point of time to his being found without one, must be especially within the knowledge of the traveler himself: see Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, illustrations (a) and (b).
46. A manifest distinction exists between the burden of proof and the burden of going forward with the evidence. Generally, the burden of proof upon any affirmative proposition necessary to be established as the foundation of an issue does not shift, but the burden of evidence or the burden of explanation may shift from one side to the other according to the testimony. Thus, if the prosecution has offered evidence which if believed by the court would convince them of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused is in a position where he should go forward with counter-vailing evidence if he has such evidence. When facts are peculiarly within the knowledge of the accused, the burden is on him to present evidence of such facts, whether the proposition is an affirmative or negative one. He is not required to do so even though a prima facie case has been established, for the court must still find that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before it can convict. However, the accused's failure to present evidence on his behalf may be regarded by the court as confirming the conclusion indicated by the evidence presented by the prosecution or as confirming presumptions which might have been rebutted. Although not legally required to produce evidence on his own behalf, the accused may therefore as a practical matter find it essential to go forward with proof. This does not alter the burden of proof resting upon the Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 20 prosecution (Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Edn. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 2 p. 37 and foil). Leland v. State reported in 343 U.S. 790=96 L.Ed. 1302, Raffel v. U.S. reported in 271 U.S. 294=70 L.Ed. 1054.
WHAT IS "PRIMA FACIE CASE" IN THE CON- TEXT OF SECTION 106 OF THE EVIDENCE ACT?
47. The Latin expression prima facie means "at first sight", "at first view", or "based on first impression". According, to Webster's Third International Dictionary (1961 Edn.), "prima facie case" means a case established by "prima facie evidence" which in turn means "evi-Ideuce sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted". In both civil and criminal law, the term is used to denote that, upon initial examination, a legal claim has sufficient evidence to proceed to trial or judgment. In most legal proceedings, one party (typically, the plaintiff or the prosecutor) has a burden of proof, which requires them to present prima facie evidence for each element of the charges against the defendant. If they cannot present prima facie evidence, or if an opposing party introduces contradictory evidence, the initial claim may be dismissed without any need for a response by other parties.
48. Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply to cases where the prosecution could be said to have succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding death."
24. Thereafter, recently, in the matter of Santosh @ Bhure v. State (G.N.C.T.) of Delhi 9 it has been held that even if the accused fails to explain as to how the 92023 LiveLaw (SC) 418 Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 21 dead body of the deceased was found in his apartment, an inference of his guilt cannot be drawn. In nutshell, in any case the prosecution has to elevate its case from the realm of "may be true" to the plane of "must be true" as is indispensably required for conviction on the criminal charge.
25. In the case at hand, the trial Court has held that the appellant and the deceased resided together on the date of offence and in the morning he himself reported the matter to his neighbour Gulal Neti (PW-
13), but it has not been explained by the appellant as to how and in what circumstances his wife Tejmati died, which is a strong incriminating circumstance against the appellant, however, that is one of the incriminating circumstances and non-explanation of circumstance against the appellant would constitute an additional circumstance but that cannot be used as a link to complete the chain of circumstance. Even otherwise, no specific question in this regard has been put to the appellant under section 313 CrPC statement, as to how and what circumstances his wife Tejmati died in the house. As such, this incriminating Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 22 circumstance to invoke section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act is completely missing and not established at all.
26. So far as the extra judicial confession which is alleged to have been made by the appellant before Gulal Neti (PW-13) is concerned, this witness in para-1 of his court statement has stated that the appellant told him in the morning that he had assaulted his wife by stick, due to which, she died, whereas, in para-7 of his cross examination, he has stated that the appellant had informed him only about the death of his wife but did not tell him how she died. As such, there is contradiction in the statement of Gulal Neti (PW-13) in respect of the extra judicial confession made by the appellant before him and this witness himself has not supported his version in cross- examination. Even otherwise the extra judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence and unless it is corroborated by further evidences it cannot be made basis of conviction and in present case there is no such corroborating piece of evidence.
27. The last incriminating circumstance found established by the trial Court is that blood stained Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 23 has been found on the bamboo stick seized from the possession of the appellant, however, as per the FSL report (Ex. P-12) no human blood was found on the Bamboo stick. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh 10 , finding of blood stained on the weapon of offence is one of the circumstances, on the basis of which, the appellant cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 302 of IPC.
28. In that view of the matter, we find that as per the principle of 'Panchsheel' given by the Honorable Supreme Court in the case of Sharad Birhichand Sarda (Supra), the chain of evidences are not so complete in which the appellant can be held guilty for the incident. Consequently, we are unable to uphold the conviction of the appellant for offence under Sections 302 of the IPC and the appellant is entitled for acquittal on the basis of the principle of the benefit of doubt.
29. Accordingly, the impugned judgment dated 16.09.2016 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Pratappur, District Surajpur, in Sessions Trial No.
10. (2024) SCC Online SC 67 Neutral Citation 2024:CGHC:7390-DB 24 13/2016 is hereby set aside on the ground of benefit of doubt. The appellant stands acquitted from the charges framed against him for the offence punishable under Sections 302 of the IPC and he shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless he is required in connection with any other offence.
30. The appeal is allowed.
31. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with the original record be transmitted forthwith to the trial Court concerned and the Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is lodged and suffering jail sentence, for information and necessary action, if any.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal)
Khatai Judge Judge