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Gulab Singh Chauhan vs State on 28 August, 2025

DLND010014802025                                                       Page 1 of 20
CA No.70/25
Gulab Singh Chauhan
Vs.
State


        IN THE COURT OF ADDITIONAL SESSIONS JUDGE-05
     NEW DELHI DISTRICT : PATIALA HOUSE COURTS : NEW DELHI

Criminal Appeal No.70 of 2025

In the matter of :-
Gulab Singh Chauhan
        S/o. Sh. Bijender Singh Chauhan
        R/o. A No.13 - WZ - 370, Palam,
        Palam Village, South-West Delhi,
        Delhi-110045
                                                                    ....Appellant
                                               (accused before the Ld. Trial Court
                                    represented by Sh. Akash Chauhan, Advocate)
Versus

State
                                                                  ....Respondent
                                       (Represented by Ld. Addl. PP for the State)

Criminal Appeal under Section 374(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(now Section 415 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) against the
Judgment dated 31.08.2024 and Order on Sentence dated 31.01.2025 passed in FIR
No. 119/2017 under Sections 279/304A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, by the
Court of Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate-01, Patiala House Court, New Delhi District.


Date of institution             :     10.03.2025
Date when judgment reserved :         11.08.2025
Date of Judgment                :     28.08.2025
    DLND010014802025                                                        Page 2 of 20
   CA No.70/25
   Gulab Singh Chauhan
   Vs.
   State


  JUDGMENT:

-

1. Introduction 1.1. This appeal arises from the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant, Gulab Singh Chauhan, by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate-01, Patiala House Court, New Delhi, in Case No. 14759/2018 arising out of FIR No. 119/2017 registered at Police Station Connaught Place, New Delhi. The appellant was convicted under Sections 279 (rash driving or riding on a public way) and 304A (causing death by negligence) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). He was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months along with a fine of Rs. 1,000/- (in default, further simple imprisonment for one month) under Section 279 IPC, and simple imprisonment for one year along with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- (in default, further simple imprisonment for three months) under Section 304A IPC. The sentences were directed to run concurrently.

1.2. The appellant challenges the impugned judgment and order on sentence primarily on the grounds that the prosecution failed to establish the essential ingredients of rash and negligent driving beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, it is contended that the mere allegation of "high speed" without quantifiable evidence or proof of rashness/negligence is insufficient for conviction, and the trial court's reliance on photographs of the damaged barricades is misplaced as they constitute inadmissible electronic evidence in the absence of a certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The appeal relies on DLND010014802025 Page 3 of 20 CA No.70/25 Gulab Singh Chauhan Vs. State precedents from the Hon'ble Supreme Court, Hon'ble Himachal Pradesh High Court, and Hon'ble Delhi High Court to argue that the conviction is unsustainable.

1.3. Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State, and after perusing the trial court record, this Court proceeds to adjudicate the appeal.

2. Brief Allegations 2.1. As per the prosecution's case, on 03.07.2017 at approximately 09:15 p.m., the appellant was driving a motorcycle bearing registration number DL12-SJ- 1051 in a rash and negligent manner on Baba Kharak Singh Marg, Connaught Place, New Delhi, endangering human life and safety. While driving at high speed, the motorcycle allegedly hit a police barricade, causing the pillion rider, Sunil Kumar, to sustain grievous injuries. Sunil Kumar succumbed to his injuries during treatment. The prosecution alleged that the accident resulted from the appellant's rash and negligent driving, leading to the registration of FIR No. 119/2017 under Sections 279 and 304A IPC at Police Station Connaught Place.

3. Proceedings Before Trial Court 3.1. The notice of accusation under Sections 279 and 304A IPC was put to the appellant, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial on 14.01.2019. 3.2. The prosecution examined eight witnesses to prove its case:

A. PW-1: Eyewitness (a police constable on duty) who deposed about seeing the motorcycle approaching at "high speed" and hitting the barricade.

Gulab Singh Chauhan Vs. State B. PW-2: Another eyewitness who corroborated PW-1 but could not specify the speed.

C. PW-3 to PW-8: Included the investigating officer, doctor who conducted the postmortem, mechanical examiner of the vehicle, and formal witnesses who proved documents such as the site plan, FIR, and photographs of the damaged barricade.

3.3. After the closure of prosecution evidence, the appellant's statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), was recorded on 24.06.2024, wherein he denied the incriminating circumstances and claimed false implication. He admitted that he was riding the motorcycle and that the accident did take place, however, he gave a different reason for the accident, as under :

"Ans. It is incorrect. I was riding the motor cycle at a speed of 20-25 k.m. per hour. At that moment, one car was going ahead my motor cycle whose driver took a sudden turn, as a result of which my eyes were closed due to lights and suddenly my motor cycle collided with barricade. There was no negligence on my part."

3.4. Final arguments were heard, and the learned trial court convicted the appellant vide judgment dated 31.08.2024. The order on the quantum of sentence was passed on 31.01.2025, as detailed above. The operation of the sentence was suspended for one month to enable the filing of this appeal.

4. Impugned Judgment Paragraphs 30 to 33 of impugned judgment, wherein the Ld. Trial Court has stated the reasons for convicting the appellant, are reproduced as under :

Gulab Singh Chauhan Vs. State "30. The prosecution has examined eight witnesses. The main witnesses of the prosecution are PW-1 and PW-3, who are eye-witnesses of the incident as they were on picket duty at the barricades at the time of incident. Both, PW-1 and PW-3 have deposed that the motor cycle approached the barricade at a very high speed and hit against the barricades. They have also deposed that there was no speed breaker ahead of the barricades. The fact that the accused was driving the offending motor cycle is un-

disputed as in his own statement under Section 313 Cr.PC, the accused has stated that he was driving the same at a speed of 20-25 k.m. per hour. Thus, there is no dispute regarding the first issue. I may also note that the accused has been correctly identified by both the eye witnesses in the Court as the person, who was driving the offending motor cycle.

31. As regards the manner of driving, I may place reliance upon the testimonies of PW-1 and PW-3, who have categorically deposed that the offending motor cycle approached the barricades at a very high speed and collided against the barricades. In this regard, Ex. P-4 comprising of the pictures of the barricades, is also relevant as the pictures indicate that the barricades got completely twisted after the collision, which goes on to indicate that the collision took place at a high speed and the impact was very strong. The subsequent fact emanating from the pictures of the barricades as well as from the broken blinkers is indicative of the manner in which the motor cycle was being driven and the same is in line with the oral testimonies of PW-1 and PW-3. It is also noteworthy that blinker lights were installed on the barricades and therefore, the accused could have easily seen the barricades from a distance and in ordinary circumstances, the accused ought to have slowed down the motor cycle. However, the same was not done in the present case which in itself is indicative of rashness and negligence on the part of the accused. The cause behind rashness of the accused could be explained in light of the examination report Ex. PW-8/A, prepared by Dr. Shweta Sinha/PW-8, wherein Ex. 1-A was examined by PW-8. The said exhibit was a blood sample of the accused and ethyl alcohol was detected in his blood sample, which is indicative of the fact that the accused was driving the motor cycle in a drunken state and under the influence of alcohol.

32. In a case wherein the overall circumstances proved by the prosecution are in line and consistent with the guilt of the accused, it could safely be observed that the prosecution has succeeded in discharging his burden. Furthermore, the ocular evidence of PW-1 and PW-3, examination report Ex. PW-8/A and photographs of the barricades Ex. P-4 (collectively), collectively point towards an in-escapable conclusion that the vehicle DLND010014802025 Page 6 of 20 CA No.70/25 Gulab Singh Chauhan Vs. State was being driven by the accused in a rash and negligent manner.'

33. It is also clear from the evidence of PW-1, PW-2, PW-3, PW-5 and PW-7 that the deceased got entangled with the barricades as a result of the collision and the causation of death was attributable to the rash and negligent act of the accused. The causation of death was a direct consequence of the act of the accused."

5. Grounds of Appeal 5.1. The impugned judgment has been challenged on the following grounds :

a) Failure to Prove Rash and Negligent Driving A. The defense argues that the prosecution did not establish rash or negligent driving beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. Merely alleging "high speed" without specific evidence does not meet the requirement for proving rashness or negligence, as "high speed" is a relative term and no witness clarified what this meant in the circumstances.

C. Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in State of Karnataka v. Satish (1998) SCC 493 is cited, emphasizing that criminal liability for rash/negligent driving requires concrete evidence--not presumptions based on speed alone.

b) Material Inconsistencies in Prosecution Case A. The appeal points out inconsistencies in witness testimonies and prosecution evidence, including contradictions about the presence of CCTV cameras and public witnesses at the scene.

B. No clear explanation was offered by the prosecution regarding the meaning of "high speed".

Gulab Singh Chauhan Vs. State

c) Faulty Interpretation and Application of Law A. The trial court is said to have misapplied legal precedents and failed to appreciate the Supreme Court's position that criminal rashness and negligence must be proven with reliable evidence, not presumed from vague witness statements.

d) Evaluation of Evidence and Witnesses A. The prosecution relied primarily on police witnesses; the defense claims these are "interested" witnesses, raising questions about impartiality and reliability.

B. The court placed undue emphasis on photographs of barricades and vehicle damage, overlooking the mechanical report which indicated only minor damage to the motorcycle--contradicting the claim of a hard impact.

C. The presence of alcohol in the blood of the accused was below statutory limits, and as such, the accused / applicant could not be said to be driving the vehicle under the influence of intoxication.

e) Procedural & Investigative Lapses A. The defense highlights deficiencies in the investigation, such as not examining available CCTV footage (with witnesses making conflicting statements about its existence).

B. Contradictions exist between the depositions of PW-3 (eye witness) and PW-5 (investigating officer) regarding the scene's documentation and presence of witnesses.

Gulab Singh Chauhan Vs. State

f) Alternative Hypotheses A. The appeal alleges the court did not consider reasonable alternative explanations for the accident, as highlighted by the appellant in his statement u/s.313 Cr.P.C.

B. It asserts that the trial court's findings were influenced by conjecture and bias, especially regarding the interpretation of impact evidence. Arguments

6. The counsel for the accused, representing appellant Gulab Singh Chauhan, argued that the prosecution failed to prove rash and negligent driving beyond reasonable doubt under Sections 279 and 304A IPC, emphasizing that vague references to "high speed" without quantifiable evidence or specific acts of negligence cannot sustain conviction, as supported by precedents like State of Karnataka v. Satish (1998) 8 SCC 493. They highlighted material inconsistencies in witness testimonies, such as conflicting statements on CCTV presence and lack of public witnesses, alongside procedural lapses like unexamined footage and minor vehicle damage contradicting high-impact claims. The defense also contended that photographs of damaged barricades were inadmissible without Section 65B certification, alcohol levels were below legal limits, and alternative explanations like a sudden car turn were ignored, violating the presumption of innocence and natural justice principles.

7. The Additional Public Prosecutor for the State countered that the conviction was well-founded on eyewitness accounts (PW-1 and PW-3) describing the motorcycle approaching at "very high speed" and colliding with a visible barricade, DLND010014802025 Page 9 of 20 CA No.70/25 Gulab Singh Chauhan Vs. State corroborated by photographs showing significant damage and the FSL report indicating alcohol influence, even if below statutory prosecution thresholds. They asserted that cumulative evidence, including no vehicle defects and direct causation of the pillion rider's death, invoked res ipsa loquitur to establish negligence, distinguishing the case from precedents like Abdul Subhan v. State (2006) 133 DLT 562. The prosecution maintained the investigation was thorough, minor discrepancies immaterial, and upholding the concurrent sentences served public safety interests.

Findings on the Grounds of Appeal

8. Evidence to prove High Speed: The primary contention--that "high speed" alone, without quantifiable evidence or specific acts of rashness/negligence, cannot sustain conviction under Sections 279 and 304A IPC--is well-founded and merits acceptance.

8.1. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka Vs. Satish (supra) held that criminality cannot be presumed from mere "high speed". The Court observed:

3. Both the trial court and the appellate court held the respondent guilty for of-

fences under Sections 337, 338 and 304A IPC after recording a finding that the re- spondent was driving the truck at a "high speed". No specific finding has been recorded either by the trial court or by the first appellate court to the effect that the respondent was driving the truck either negligently or rashly. After holding that the respondent was driving the truck at a "high speed", both the courts pressed into aid the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to hold the respondent guilty.

Gulab Singh Chauhan Vs. State

4. Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing ev- erything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject of course to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa lo- quitur". There is evidence to show that immediately before the truck turned turtle, there was a big jerk. It is not explained as to whether the jerk was because of the uneven road or mechanical failure. The Motor Vehicle Inspector who inspected the vehicle had submitted his report. That report is not forthcoming from the record and the Inspector was not examined for reasons best known to the prosecu- tion. This is a serious infirmity and lacuna in the prosecution case.

5. There being no evidence on the record to establish "negligence" or "rashness" in driving the truck on the part of the respondent, it cannot be said that the view taken by the High Court in acquitting the respondent is a perverse view. To us it appears that the view of the High Court, in the facts and circumstances of this case, is a reasonably possible view. We, therefore, do not find any reason to interfere with the order of acquittal. The appeal fails and is dismissed. The respondent is on bail. His bail bonds shall stand discharged.

8.2. Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Abdul Subhan vs State (Nct Of Delhi) 133(2006)DLT562, while relying upon the aforesaid judgment observed as under:

"7. At the outset I would like to observe that I am appalled by the investigation, or shall I say the lack of it, that was carried out in this particular case. I may also note that I am of the view that the testimony of PW 3 head constable Munim Dutt, even if taken to be entirely true only leads to the conclusion that the vehicle driven by the present petitioner was being driven at a high-speed. This in itself does not mean that the petitioner was DLND010014802025 Page 11 of 20 CA No.70/25 Gulab Singh Chauhan Vs. State driving the vehicle rashly or negligently. Furthermore, the testimony of PW 3 leads to ambiguities and doubts and, I am afraid, my conscience does not permit me to convict a person under Section 279/304A IPC on the nature and degree of evidence that is on record in this case. There are so many questions which remain unanswered. What is meant by high-speed? Were the traffic lights working or not? Why was the investigating officer not examined? Why were photographs not taken? Why is there no evidence with regard to tyre skid marks? Why was the site plan not exhibited? There are questions which remain unanswered pertaining to the motorcyclist who unfortunately lost his life in this incident. Was the motorcyclist on Mathura Road? What was his direction of movement? Was he coming from Sher Shah Road and turning towards Mathura road? Or, was he on Mathura Road turning towards Sher Shah road? What was the speed of the motorcyclist? Did the motorcyclist suddenly curve into the path of the petitioner's truck? A host of other questions remain unanswered purely because the degree of investigation carried out and the quality of investigation carried out is quite unsatisfactory. It is well known in criminal cases that it is for the prosecution to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. Unfortunately, in the present case I find that the prosecution has failed to achieve this standard. On the other hand there are grave doubts that the petitioner is at all guilty of the offences for which he has been convicted and sentenced. ......

In the present case also, I find that apart from the allegation that the truck was being driven at a very high-speed there is nothing to indicate that the petitioner acted in a manner which could be regarded as rash or negligent. In any event there is no description or approximation of what was the speed at which the truck was being driven. The expression "high-speed" could range from 30 km per hour to over 100 km per hour. It is not even known as to what the speed limit on Mathura Road was and whether the petitioner was exceeding that speed limit. Therefore, in the absence of material facts it cannot be said, merely because there is an allegation that the petitioner was driving the truck at a high-speed, that the petitioner is guilty of a rash or negligent act. Clearly the petitioner cannot be convicted on the sole testimony of PW 3 which itself suffers from various ambiguities.

8.3. In matter of Mohammed Aynuddin alias Miyam Vs. State of A.P. AIR 2000 SC 2411, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Para 9 and 10 as under :-

"The principle of res ipsa loquitor is only a rule of evidence to determine the onus of proof in actions relating to negligence. The said principles has application only when the nature of the accident and the attending circumstances would reasonably lead to the belief that in the absence of negligence the accident would not have occurred and that the thing DLND010014802025 Page 12 of 20 CA No.70/25 Gulab Singh Chauhan Vs. State which caused injury is shown to have been under the management and control of the alleged wrong doer.

.......A rash act is primarily an over hasty act. It is opposed to a deliberate act. Still a rash act can be a deliberate act in the sense that it was done without due care and caution. Culpable rashness lies in running the risk of doing an act with recklessness and with indifference as to the consequences. Criminal negligence is that failure to exercise duty with reasonable and proper care and precaution guarding against injury to the public generally or to any individual in particular........."

8.4. This view is reinforced by the judgment of the Hon'ble Himachal Pradesh High Court in Deep Raj Vs. State of H.P., 2025:HHC:19449 (decided on 24.06.2025). In that case, involving a truck-bus collision attributed to "high speed", the Court set aside the conviction, holding : "25. Even otherwise, the negligence of the truck driver was not proved. The informant Pritam Singh (PW-10) stated that the truck bearing registration No. HP63-5015 came with high speed and hit the bus. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term 'high speed' by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed:

"Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath dey was struck by the bus, though not: from the front side of the bus as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death."

26. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, and it was held:

"Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either DLND010014802025 Page 13 of 20 CA No.70/25 Gulab Singh Chauhan Vs. State "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed".

"High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur."

27. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed:-

"It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs."

28. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: -

"Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case."

29. Thus, the accused cannot be held liable based on high speed alone without any further evidence that the accused was in breach of his duty to take care, which he had failed to do."

The Court emphasized that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be imported to presume criminal negligence without specific evidence. The facts here are analogous: no mechanical defect, but reliance solely on vague eyewitness accounts of speed.

8.5. Hon'ble Delhi High Court in a recent judgment in case titled Manish Kumar DLND010014802025 Page 14 of 20 CA No.70/25 Gulab Singh Chauhan Vs. State vs State Of NCT Delhi 2025 DHC 2169 observed as under:

25. Another vital factor for consideration is whether the petitioner was indeed driving in a "rash and negligent" manner and which has all throughout been overlooked is that though it is the case of the prosecution/ State that the accident was caused by the petitioner since he was driving the Car at a "high speed", it is nowhere mentioned/ proved as to what was the cause/ reason thereof. Furthermore, most relevantly there is no whisper from any of the witnesses and/ or by the prosecution/ State about what was/ is meant by "high speed"

and/ or what was/ is the "high speed", the petitioner was actually driving at. Therefore, no such presumption, per-se, can be drawn qua the petitioner driving at a "high speed"

merely on the basis of the testimonies of PW1 to PW4.

26. In any event, merely because the petitioner was driving at a "high speed" it cannot lead to the conclusion that there was any element of his being "rash and negligent". The petitioner driving at a "high speed" does not/ cannot in itself always mean and/ or establish that he was acting in "rash and negligent" manner. Thus, even assuming that the petitioner was driving at a "high speed", the same is not sufficient to conclude that the petitioner was, in fact, driving the Car in a "rash and negligent" manner.

27. This Court cannot draw an inference or come to any presumption on the basis thereof whence there are gaps left unfilled by the prosecution/ State. This Court finds support in State of Karnataka (supra), wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with a similar issue, as the aforesaid, has held as under: -

"4. Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved..."

28. Reliance may also be placed upon Abdul Shubhan (supra) wherein a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, while dealing with the very same issue, has held as under: -

"7. ...I may also note that I am of the view that the testimony of PW 3 head constable Munim Dutt, even if taken to be entirely true only leads to the conclusion that the vehicle driven by the present petitioner was being driven at a high-speed. This in itself does not DLND010014802025 Page 15 of 20 CA No.70/25 Gulab Singh Chauhan Vs. State mean that the petitioner was driving the vehicle rashly or negligently..."

29. In fact, in Ram Chander (supra) a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has similarly held as under: -

"15. A reading of aforesaid Section shows that to constitute an offence under Section 279 IPC, it must be shown that the person was driving the vehicle in a rash or negligent manner. Criminal negligence or criminal rashness is an important element of the offence under Section 279 IPC. Mere fact that the accused was driving the vehicle at high speed may not attract the provisions of Section 279 IPC and the prosecution is required to brig on record such negligence and rashness. High speed by itself may not in each case be sufficient to hold that a driver is rash or negligent. Speed alone is not the criterion for deciding rashness or negligence on the part of the driver."

30. In Ram Chander (supra) also a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has held as under: -

"10. ...The said witness has stated that the bus was being driven at a "very fast speed". He further stated that because it was so being driven, the driver could not control the bus and the accident was caused. Therefore, the foundation of the allegation against the petitioner is that he was driving the bus at a "very fast speed". There is no evidence as to what this "very fast speed" was..."

8.6. In view of the above said law, it is clear that the rashness and negligence can not be presumed and have to be proved by the prosecution positively on record. Thus, the appellant cannot be made liable by invoking maxim res ipsa loquitor. In these circumstances, this court is of the opinion that the accused person can not be held liable for offence under Section 279 and 304-A of Indian Penal Code.

8.7. In the opinion of this court, this is not a case of rash or negligent driving or the result of a rash or negligent act; it is a case of an accident which just happened to have taken place.

9. Reliance placed on photographs of barricades1: Regarding the photographs of the 1 Ld. Trial Court had observed: "In this regard, Ex. P-4 comprising of the pictures of the barricades, is also relevant as the pictures indicate that the barricades got completely DLND010014802025 Page 16 of 20 CA No.70/25 Gulab Singh Chauhan Vs. State barricades, the trial court's reliance is erroneous. The barricades were not produced as material exhibits, depriving the appellant of cross-examination on their condition. The photographs, captured electronically, required a certificate under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act to make them admissible in court. The word 'admissible' means the evidence which can be admitted in court and taken on record. The concept of admissibility is completely different from concept of relevant and probative value of the evidence adduced. Section 65 B makes electronic evidence admissible, it does not dispense with the relevancy and probative value. In State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Raj Narain (1975)4 SCC 428 , it has been held that facts should not be received in evidence unless they are both relevancy and admissible. The Apex Court in State of Bihar Vs Sri Radha Krishna Singh 1983 AIR 684 has further held that admissibility of document is one thing and its probative value is quite another thing - these two aspects cannot be combined. In Arjun Panditrao Khotkar (2020 (5) CTC 200) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that Section 65 differentiates between existence, condition and contents of a document. Whereas existence goes to 'admissibility' of a document 'contents' of a document are to be proved after a document becomes admissible in evidence.

In Anvar P V V/S P K Basheer And Others 2014 LawSuit(SC)783 in Para 24 it is twisted after the collision, which goes on to indicate that the collision took place at a high speed and the impact was very strong. The subsequent fact emanating from the pictures of the barricades as well as from the broken blinkers is indicative of the manner in which the motor cycle was being driven and the same is in line with the oral testimonies of PW-1 and PW-3. It is also noteworthy that blinker lights were installed on the barricades and therefore, the accused could have easily seen the barricades from a distance and in ordinary circumstances, the accused ought to have slowed down the motor cycle."

Gulab Singh Chauhan Vs. State clarified that primary evidence of electronic record was not covered under Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act. The expression "document" is defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act to mean any matter expressed or described upon any substance by means of letters, figures or marks, or by more than one of those means, intended to be used, or which may be used, for the purpose of recording that matter. In Anvar PV (supra), it is observed in Para 14 that any documentary evidence by way of an electronic record under the Evidence Act, in view of Sections 59 and 65A, can be proved only in accordance with the procedure prescribed under Section 65B. Section 65B deals with the admissibility of the electronic record. The purpose of these provisions is to sanctify secondary evidence in electronic form, generated by a computer. It may be noted that the Section starts with a non-obstante clause. Thus, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a document only if the conditions mentioned under sub- Section (2) are satisfied, without further proof or production of the original. The very admissibility of such a document, i.e., electronic record which is called as computer output, depends on the satisfaction of the four conditions under Section 65B(2).

In the present case, no such certificate was tendered, rendering the photographs of the barricade inadmissible as secondary evidence. Even if no objection was raised to the mode of proof, inadmissible evidence cannot form the basis of conviction (Anvar P.V. Vs. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473). The photographs were not DLND010014802025 Page 18 of 20 CA No.70/25 Gulab Singh Chauhan Vs. State taken in the appellant's presence, further vitiating their evidentiary value.

10. Intoxication: As per the FSL result dated 25.9.2017 Ex.PW-8/A the blood sample of the accused was found to have ethyl alcohol 28.00 mg/ml of blood. In view of the said FSL result, Ld. Trial court observed that the rashness of the appellant could "be explained in light of the examination report Ex. PW-8/A, prepared by Dr. Shweta Sinha/PW-8, wherein Ex. 1-A was examined by PW-8. The said exhibit was a blood sample of the accused and ethyl alcohol was detected in his blood sample, which is indicative of the fact that the accused was driving the motor cycle in a drunken state and under the influence of alcohol." 10.1. The said observation, however, in the opinion of this court is not in line with the provisions of section 185 Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The presence of ethyl alcohol at 28 mg per 100 ml of blood does not amount to driving by intoxication under Indian law, as it falls within the permissible limit stipulated by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Section 185 of the Act explicitly provides that only those drivers who have "alcohol exceeding 30 mg per 100 ml of blood"

can be prosecuted for the offense of drunken driving. Accordingly, any measurement below this statutory threshold, such as 28 mg/100 ml, does not meet the legal criteria for intoxication or attract penal consequences under the Act. Thus, it cannot be said that the appellant was under the influence of alcohol or was in drunk state while driving the offending vehicle.

11. Inference of speed from injuries in MLC 11.1. It may be noted that as per MLC No.143457/17 dated 3.7.2017 the accused received just "Minor abrasion noted in B/L elbow and (L) lower back region ".

Gulab Singh Chauhan Vs. State If the accident had occurred with such force and impact that the barricade got badly damaged, as noted by Ld. Trail Court, then the rider i.e. the appellant must have suffered several injuries or fracture. However, the only injury that he suffered was minor abrasion in elbow and lower back region, which is not indicative of a very high speed or of very strong impact. 11.2. As per the MLC the deceased suffered "Deep abrasion above R eyebrow lateral angle and below eyebrow 4cm x 3cm". The said injury on head unfortunately resulted into hemorrhage and lead to death of the deceased. However, the fact that the deceased also did not receive any other injuries and that the rider/appellant only received minor abrasions indicate that the speed of the bike/offending vehicle was not so high, as to completely damage the barricades, as observed by Ld. Trail court.

11.3. Moreover, the bike also did not suffer huge damage as per mechanical inspection report. The bike/offending vehicle was "fit for road test" even after the accident.

11.4. All these facts indicate that the accident unfortunately resulted into injury on the head of the deceased, which caused hemorrhage and resulted into the death of the deceased. However, the injuries received by the appellant and the deceased and the condition of bike/offending vehicle after the accident do not indicate that the speed of the bike/offending vehicle was so high, as to completely damage the barricades as depicted in inadmissible photographs of the barricades.

12. Conclusion DLND010014802025 Page 20 of 20 CA No.70/25 Gulab Singh Chauhan Vs. State 12.1. In light of the foregoing, the impugned judgment and order on sentence are unsustainable. The prosecution has not proved rash and negligent driving beyond reasonable doubt, as required under Sections 279 and 304A IPC. The vague reference to "high speed" without corroborative details, coupled with the inadmissibility of the photographs, vitiates the conviction. This Court is guided by the principles enunciated in referenced judgments, which mandate setting aside such conviction based on presumptions rather than evidence.

13. Final Order 13.1. The appeal is allowed.

13.2. The judgment of conviction dated 31.08.2024 and the order on sentence dated 31.01.2025 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate-01, Patiala House Court, New Delhi, in Case No. 14759/2018 (arising out of FIR No. 119/2017) are hereby set aside.

13.3. The appellant, Gulab Singh Chauhan, is acquitted of the charges under Sections 279 and 304A IPC.

13.4. The fine, if paid, shall be refunded to the appellant. 13.5. The bail bonds/surety bonds, if any, stand discharged. 13.6. TCR, if any, be sent back along with copy of this judgment. 13.7. The appeal file be consigned to the Record Room.

     Announced in the open Court
     on 28th of August 2025                                    (Saurabh Partap Singh Laler)
                                                                         ASJ-05 New Delhi
                                                                      Patiala House Courts
                                                                          Delhi/28.08.2025