Central Information Commission
Rashmi Sharma vs Gnctd on 8 November, 2021
CIC/GNCTD/A/2018/127006
केन्द्रीय सूचना आयोग
Central Information Commission
बाबा गंगनाथ मागग ,मुननरका
Baba Gangnath Marg, Munirka
नई निल्ली, New Delhi - 110067
नितीय अपील संख्या / Second Appeal No. CIC/GNCTD/A/2018/127006
Smt. Rashmi Sharma ...अपीलकताग /Appellant
VERSUS/बनाम
Guru Harkrishan Public School,
Purana Quila Road, ...प्रनतवािीगण/Respondent
New Delhi.
Relevant facts emerging from the instant Second Appeal:
RTI application filed on : 05.09.2017
CPIO replied on : Not on record.
First appeal filed on : 10.11.2017
First Appellate Authority order : Not on record.
Second Appeal received at CIC : 24.04.2018
Date of Hearing : 04.02.2021, 04.10.2021
Date of Decision : 01.11.2021
Note: The Division Bench was constituted by the former Chief Information
Commissioner vide note dated 11.05.2020. Subsequently, the present Chief
Information Commissioner has re-constituted the present Division Bench.
Page 1 of 18
CIC/GNCTD/A/2018/127006
Information soughtand background of the case:
The Appellant filed a RTI application dated 05.09.2017 seeking information on the following 5 points:
1. Kindly arrange to provide the qualification of each teacher appointed as PGTs from 2004 till date, of each of the branch of your school.
2. Kindly arrange to provide the information as to how many teachers have been given relaxation of minimum qualification for appointment as PGT's from 2004 till date, in each of the branch of your school.
3. Kindly arrange to provide the information as to how many teachers have been given relaxation of minimum experience for appointment as PGT's from 2004 till date, in each of the branch of your school.
4. Kindly arrange to provide the approval sought from Directorate of Education regarding minimum qualification of teachers as PGT's from 2004 till date, in each of the branch of your school.
5. Kindly arrange to provide the approval granted by Directorate of Education regarding minimum qualification of teachers as PGTs from 2004 till date, in each of the branch of your school.
The Respondent vide reply dated 10.10.2017 denied disclosure of information stating that it is not a public authority as defined under the provisions of the RTI Act.
Aggrieved with the denial of information, the Appellant filed a First Appeal on 10.11.2017, which was adjudicated by the First Appellate Authority vide order dated 07.12.2017, wherein the decision of the PIO was upheld. Thus, being denied information once again, the Appellant approached the Commission with the instant Second Appeal.
Grounds for Second Appeal:
The PIO has not furnished the desired information to the Appellant.Page 2 of 18
CIC/GNCTD/A/2018/127006 Relevant Facts emerging during the Hearing on 04.02.2021:
Both the parties are present for the hearing and both the parties reiterated their respective contentions.
The Appellant has placed forth her averments seeking information from Guru Harkrishan Public School, duly supporting her averments with a decision of the Commission in case no. CIC/DIRED/A/2017/165594 & CIC/GNCTD/A/2017/164924 titled Gurvinder Singh Saini vs. DDE & Ors. dated 30.10.2019, wherein it was held that Guru Harkrishan Public School is a public authority in view of the fact that the Commission had decided this issue by an earlier decision dated 10.02.2010 in Second Appeal No. CIC/SG/A/2009/003014, which has attained finality as the same was not challenged before any judicial fora.
The Respondent represented by the Learned Counsel appearing for the school raised only one contention during the hearing, i.e., that Delhi Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1971 was enacted by the Parliament and came into force on 30.12.1971, while the Respondent society, viz., Guru Harkrishan Public School was registered on 05.02.1971, prior to the enactment of this Act. Therefore, the Respondent society cannot be said to be established under the aegis of the Delhi Sikh Gurdwaras Management Committee.
Furthermore, the Respondent placed reliance on an earlier decision passed by this Bench in the case of Shri Manjeet Singh vs. Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee dated 06.03.2019 and another decision in a batch of matters comprising 26 Second Appeals in the case of Bhupinder Singh vs. Guru Harkrishan Public School, dated 26.04.2018 passed by the predecessor Bench.
Page 3 of 18CIC/GNCTD/A/2018/127006 After hearing the above contentions put forth by both the parties, this Division Bench notes that on various earlier instances, there have been differing decisions on the issue of Guru Harkrishan Public School being a public authority or not and that the various Benches of this Commission have taken independent views, supported by one or more contentions. In order to prevent any contradiction which may have thus crept in the earlier judicial views and to enable decision of this issue conclusively, it is found expedient that both the parties be granted opportunity to place on record their respective submissions in the form of a brief synopsis, within two weeks from the date of hearing.
Pursuant to the hearing held on 04.02.2021, the Commission is in receipt of a synopsis from the Appellant, wherein she has apprised as under:
1. ...
2. In view of the aforesaid direction the appellant is hereby filing her written submissions as under:
Brief Facts:
I) Vide application dated 05.09.2017 the appellant sought some information from the school. The school vide letter dated 10.10.2017 denied the information by stating that Guru Harkishan Public School, society is a distinct legal entity governed under the Society Registration Act, 1869. The Society is not a Public Authority as defined under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, 2005.
II) Not satisfied with the said reply, the appellant filed appeal on 10.11.2017, but the appellate authority also vide its order 07.12.2017 rejected the appeal by stating that society that the society is not a public authority hence the information could not be provided.
III) Hence, the appellant filed the second appeal before this Hon'ble Court. IV) During the arguments Ld. Counsel appearing for the school raised only one contention that Delhi Sikh Gurudwaras Act 1971 was enacted or came into force on 30.12.1971 and respondent society was registered on 05.02.1971 which is prior to the enactment of this Act, therefore respondent society cannot be said to be established under the aegis of the Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee.Page 4 of 18
CIC/GNCTD/A/2018/127006 V) It is submitted in this regard that in the January 1971, the Govt. of India, through an ordinance entrusted the management to a five member Gurdwara Board.
VI) Thereafter, the ordinance was replaced by the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1971 by the parliament of India which was enacted on 30.12.1971. VII) It is submitted that the GHPS society came into existence or got registered only after the five member Gurudwara Board was formed through an ordinance by the Govt. of India and the said ordinance was replaced by the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1971, therefore the said society automatically comes within the ambit of the Act.
VIII) It is pertinent to mention here that the present society since then is being governed by the Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee which is formed under Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Act, 1971 and hence GHPS society comes within the purview of the aforesaid Act, 1971, the said society cannot be treated as standalone society.
IX) Further, Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee has opened many schools, polytechnics, and Khalsa Colleges for imparting education and Guru Harkishan Public School is one of the school being operated by the said committee.
X) Further, Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee is operating the educational institutes from the offerings and charity of the public and Delhi High Court has also held that the Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee is a public authority.
XI) Hence, when the parent body i.e. Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee itself is a public authority then how come any society which is being run and governed by the said parent body can isolate itself from the parent body and self declared itself a private body.
XII) Not giving the information to the appellant by Guru Harkishan Public School, under the garb of absurd plea being of private society is not at all reasonable and is illegal.
XIII) Further, Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, 2005 defines the public authority which includes statutory body, and Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee is formed under the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1971 and hence is a statutory body.
XIV) It is not out of place to mention here that earlier also Guru Harkishan Public School has provided the information not only to the appellant but to many others without raising any such absurd plea.
XV) Hence the respondent Guru Harkishan Public School running under the aegis of Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee which is a public authority and therefore is liable to give the information to the appellant under the RTI Act.
Page 5 of 18CIC/GNCTD/A/2018/127006 The Commission is also in receipt of written submissions from the Respondent vide letter dated 17.02.2020, wherein the Commission has been apprised as under:
1. ... she has been contended that the respondent Guru Harkrishan Public School (New Delhi) Society, herein after referred as the respondent society is a Public Authority and hence, is liable to provide information sought by the appellant. The appellant also has contended that the respondent Society is a public Authority as held by this Hon'ble Commission vide order dated 10.02.2010, where it has been held that as the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee (DSGMC), which is a public Authority and manages and controls the affairs of the respondent Society, therefore the respondent society is a public Authority as defined U/s 2(h) of the RTI Act, 2005 and thus is liable to provide the information as sought by the appellant.
It has also been contended by the appellant. It has been contended by the appellant that in the year 2009 Guru Harkrishan Public School, West Jyoti Nagar, Shahdara provided the information in compliance of Order dated 07.10.2009 of the Central Information Commission, ergo could not deny the information at this stage. It is submitted that the respondent society is not a public authority as averred by the appellant in her appeal and hence, is not covered under the purview of RTI Act.
A. Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, 2005 defines the public authority which is as under:
"(h) "public authority" means any authority or body or institution of self- government established or constituted -
(a) by or under the Constitution;
(b) by any other law made by Parliament;
(c) by any other law made by State Legislature;
(d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government, and includes any -
(i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed;
(ii) non-Government organisation substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government."
2. It is submitted that the respondent authority is neither established nor constituted by or under the Constitution, the respondent society has not been established or constituted by any act of Parliament or by the State legislature and further the respondent society also has not been substantially financed by the funds provided by the appropriate government and therefore the respondent society cannot be brought under the purview of section 2(h) of the RTI Act as contended by the appellant.
Page 6 of 18CIC/GNCTD/A/2018/127006 B. That the respondent society has been registered with the Registrar of Society on 05.02.1971 and therefore, it is covered under the provisions of the Societies Registration Act' 1860 and therefore, it cannot be said that it is a public Authority as alleged by the appellant. The copy of the Registration certificate bearing no. 4834 dated 05.02.71 is annexed herewith as annexure-A. C. That the respondent society being an entirely independent entity even applied for the issuance of certificate as a Minority Educational Institution from the Government of India National Commission qua the institutions i.e. Gutu Harkrishan Public School, managed and controlled by the respondent society. It is submitted that on the basis of the application filed by the respondent society with the Government of India National Commission For Minority Educational Institutions a certificate was issued by the National Commission For Minority Educational Institutions declaring Guru Harkrishan Public School run by the respondent society as a minority educational institution covered U/s 2(g) of the National Commission For Minority Educational Institutions Act, 2004.
D. That the appellant has alleged that the respondent Society being managed and controlled by DSGMC which is a public Authority therefore, the respondent society is a public authority under the RTI Act, 2005. It is submitted that the respondent society was got registered on 05.01.71 whereas the DSGMC got established by the Act of Parliament i.e. The Delhi Sikh Gurudwaras Act, 1971 Act no. 82/1971 dated 30.12.71 and further the said Act was notified on 07.04.72, vide notification no.G.S.R. 241 (E). It is submitted that once the existence of the respondent society came before the enactment of The Delhi Sikh Gurudwaras Act' 1971, therefore, the DSGMC cannot be a parental body of the respondent society as alleged by the appellant. The copy of the Delhi Sikh Gurudwaras Act, 1971 is annexed herewith and is marked as ANNEXURE-B. E. That apart from that, the appellant also cannot take the help of the order dated 07.10.2009 and 10.02.2010 passed by this Hon'ble Commission. It is submitted that the DSGMC was brought under the purview of the RTI Act by the order dated 26.12.2016 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter Kuldeep Singh Bhogal Vs Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee and therefore once the DSGMC became a public authority in December 2016 naturally the appellant cannot take the advantage of the order passed by this Hon'ble Commission dated 10.02.10 in which the DSGMC was held as a public Authority whereas, the DSGMC was declared as a public Authority only in December 2016 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
F. That during the proceedings in which the order dated 10.02.10 and 07.10.2009 was passed in the appeal number CIC/SGA/2009/003014 and CIC/SG/A/2009/000013/4221, the respondent society even was not a party in that proceeding and therefore, the said order cannot be made applicable Page 7 of 18 CIC/GNCTD/A/2018/127006 against the respondent society as the same has been passed without adhering the cardinal principles of natural justice i.e. Audi alteram partem. It is further submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Nawab Khan Abash Khan Vs. State of Gujrat reported as AIR 1974 SC has held in para 19:
In the present case a fundamental right of the petitioner has been encroached upon without due hearing. So the court quashed it-not killed it then but performed the formal obsequies of the order which had died at birth. The legal result is that the accused was never guilty of flouting an order which never legally existed.
G. That apart from that the stand of the respondent society even stands fortified by a judgment dated 19.11.14 passed by the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court of New Delhi in the LPA no. 867/2013 in the matter titled as "Army welfare Housing Organization Vs. Adjutant General Branch & ors." where it has been categorically held that the co-operative societies are not owned by the Government and the same cannot be brought under the purview of the RTI Act. It is submitted that the Hon'ble Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court of New Delhi while passing the said judgement relied upon the judgement dated 07.10.13 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Civil Appeal no. 9017/13 in the matter titled as "Thalappalam Ser. Coop. Bank Ltd. & Anr. Vs. State of Kerala & ors." where the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the Co-operative Societied registered under the Societies Registration Act will not fall within the scope of the Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. It is submitted that both the judgement are very much clear qua the status of the Society with respect to the public authority as defined under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, therefore the respondent society cannot be brought under the purview of the RTI Act, 2005.
H. That the above noted issued has already been dealt by the Coordinate Bench of this Hon'ble Commission Sh. Yashovardhan Azad (Information Commissioner) in its order dated 26.04.18 and the submissions advanced herein have already been considered by the Hon'ble Commissioner and it has been held that the GHPS is not a Public Authority within the meaning of RTI Act' 2005. The copies of the relevant judgements are annexed herewith. In view of the above submissions it is prayed that the appeal filed by the appellant against the respondent society i.e. the Guru Harkrishan Public School may kindly be dismissed, in the interest of justice.
NOTE: Upon perusal of the averred submissions of both the parties, the Single member/Judge Bench of this Commission opined that the instant matter raises an important question about whether or not the Respondent herein Page 8 of 18 CIC/GNCTD/A/2018/127006 should be declared as a 'public authority' and brought under the purview of Right to Information Act, 2005. In view of the foregoing, the said Single member/Judge Bench requested the Chief Information Commissioner to refer the instant matter to a larger Bench of the Commission and therefore, the present Division Bench was constituted by the Chief Information Commissioner on 11.05.2020 and that the matter was directed to be taken up after the situation of the current pandemic i.e. COVID-19 subsides.
Now, the matter is listed for hearing on 04.10.2021 Relevant Facts emerging during the Hearing on 04.10.2021:
The following were present: -
Appellant: Represented by Mr. Manish Chauhan, Advocate.
Respondent: (1) Mr. Gurbaksh Singh, Advocate for Guru Harkrishan Public School.
(2) Ms. Avneet Kaur, Advocate for Guru Harkrishan Public School.
The representative of the Appellant has placed forth his averments seeking information from the GHPS. He further stated that he has already given detailed written submissions/synopsis for the perusal of the Commission.
The Respondent represented by the Ld. Counsels appearing for the school reiterated the factual matrix of the case and reiterated the similar submissions made previously on 04.02.2020 and thus, the same are not reiterated for the sake of brevity.
Upon the Commission's query regarding the mode of funding or management of the GHPS, the Ld. Counsel for the Respondent submitted that since the averred schools Page 9 of 18 CIC/GNCTD/A/2018/127006 are minority schools, the funding is either in the form of fees received from the students or donations from various organizations including DSGMC and/or various private individuals. He further amplified on the funding issue, by stating that funding is mostly dependent on the charity from various sources and does not solely depend on one organization for the same.
The Commission interjected to seek a transpicuous response from the Respondent and again questioned as to how funds are regulated in GHPS, as a common practice (and again stressed the need for clarity from the respondent about the regulation of funds in the day-to-day affairs in GHPS). The Ld. Counsel of the Respondent failed to satisfy the Bench in a lucid manner regarding funding and reiterated the submissions, that there is no regular grant received by the GHPS from any organization and that the school is being run based on the funds received, through fees paid by students, or by way of charity or through rotation of funds amongst schools which had surplus funds. They further submitted, including inter alia, that DSGMC has no control over the day to day working of the GHPS and GHPS enjoys autonomy in its finances and decision making.
DECISION:
1. The Commission has gone through the case records as well as the written submissions of both the parties and based on the proceedings during the hearing observes that the Respondent admits that the Hon'ble Apex Court had held that DSGMC is a public authority in December 2016. Notwithstanding the applicability of the CIC decisions dated 10.02.2010 and 07.10.2009 passed in the Second Appeal nos. CIC/SGA/2009/003014 & CIC/SG/A/2009/000013/4221, in the instant case, it is an undisputed fact that Page 10 of 18 CIC/GNCTD/A/2018/127006 the abovementioned CIC decisions have not been set aside so far and thus attained finality in law.
2. On the contrary it is also an admitted position that the Delhi High Court had declared DGSMC as a public authority. The Delhi High Court upon dealing in detail with all the relevant aspects and about the applicability of the RTI Act on the DGSMC, decided the matters of i) DELHI SIKH GURUDWARA MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE & ORS. Versus MOHINDER SINGH MATHARU[LPA No. 606/2010] AND ii) DELHI SIKH GURUDWARA MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE & ORS VERSUS JATHEDAR KULDIP SINGH BHOGAL[LPA NO. 607/2010] vide a decision pronounced on: September 12, 2012, holding as hereunder:
"....9. Once we read the definition of "public authority" in Section 2(h) of the RTI Act in the aforesaid manner, obvious conclusion would be that the appellant is a "public authority" as it is constituted by the Act of the Parliament. Undeniably, the appellant is a statutory body under Delhi Sikh Gurdwaras Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the "DSG Act"). It is constituted under Section 3 of the DSG Act. It is not a body made under any law, but a body made by the aforesaid law. The learned Single Judge as rightly pointed out that there is a distinction between the use of the words "by any law made by Parliament" and "by or under the Constitution". The Parliament has consciously not used the words "by or under" in sub-clause (b) of Section 2(h). In other words, once the body is established or constituted by the law made by Parliament, it would be a "public authority" under Section 2(h)(b) of the RTI Act.
10. We are in agreement with the aforesaid view. We, thus, hold that once it is found that an authority or body or institution of self- Government is established or constituted in any manner prescribed in Clause (a) to (d) of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, then there is no further requirement of such a body to be either owned or controlled or substantially financed by an appropriate Government.Page 11 of 18
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3. The aforesaid decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi was assailed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the form of a Special Leave Petition(C)No. 34418/2012 and SLP(C) No. 34793/2012, whereby the Apex Court concluded the case vide decision dated 28.03.2016, with the following observations: ".....During the course of hearing, we have been handed over a letter dated 25.03.2016 which is kept on record. The contents of the said letter reads thus:
The Competent Authority of DSGMC has decided to implement the Right to Information Act with immediate effect and accordingly Office Order is being sent to you.
In course of submission before the Supreme Court we may request the Court to grant us 3-4 months time so that legal formalities for the appointment of Officials of DSGMC which is required under the RTI Act-2005 can be completed.
In view of the above, no further order is required to be passed and time for four months as prayed for is granted..."
A subsequent decision was passed by the Apex Court in the aforesaid matter, on 29.08.2016, contents whereof are as under:
".....Heard the learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioners. For the reasons stated in the Interlocutory Application No.1/2016, we grant further four months' time to the petitioners to appoint officials under the Right to Information Act, 2005 and to comply with the Order dated 28-3-2016 passed by this Court. It is made clear to the learned Senior counsel that no further extension of time will be granted in the matter under any circumstance."
In view of the aforesaid legal position, as clearly enunciated from the abovementioned decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, there is no room for doubt that the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee has been held to be a public authority, as defined under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act.
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4. Now, dealing with the respondent in this case, viz. GHPS in particular, and whether it falls within the ambit of the RTI Act, foremost reliance has to be placed on the provisions of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, which reads as under:
"2 (h) "public authority" means any authority or institution of self- government established or constituted -
(a) by or under the Constitution;
(b) by any other law made by Parliament;
(c) by any other law made by State Legislature;
(d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government, and includes any-
(i) body owned, controlled or substantially financed;
(ii) non-Government organization substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government."
The facts presented before this Commission and discussed above, reveal that an ordinance was passed in January 1971 by the Government of India and the management was entrusted to a five member Gurdwara Board, viz., the Gurdwara Management Committee. Subsequently, the ordinance was replaced by the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Act, 1971[hereinafter referred as the "DSG Act"] passed by the Parliament of India. The GHPS society came into existence on 05.02.1971, after the ordinance was passed by the Government of India and under the aegis of the five member Board [Gurdwara Management Committee] was formed in January 1971, and subsequently replaced by the DSG Act, 1971. The Respondent has not placed forth any counter submissions to refute the above position but only stated that the GHPS is registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and claims to have obtained a certificate from the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions declaring the GHPS run by the GHPS Society as a minority educational institution. Nowhere has the Respondent made any factual submission to establish anything about the origin and existence of the GHPS which indicates any fact contrary to Page 13 of 18 CIC/GNCTD/A/2018/127006 what the Appellant has avowed, thereby indicating that the GHPS came into existence pursuant to the ordinance of 1971. Thus, in the absence of any other factual submission by the Respondent, it can be inferred that the Respondent - GHPS owes its existence to the Governmental ordinance of 1971 and is therefore, covered under the provision of clause (d) of the Section 2(h) of the RTI Act. The origin/formation of the body determines its character as a public authority, as defined under the RTI Act, whereas its subsequent registration or certification thereafter has no bearing in this regard.
5. Coming to the second limb of the contention, it is noted that firstly, the Respondent has nowhere established as to how GHPS [Guru Harkishan Public School] is an independent entity, not owing its allegiance to the DGSMC nor made any lucid submissions about its financing. Whereas, the official website of the GHPS run Schools declare, "Founded in 1975 under the aegis of Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Committee,..." and particularly, the GHPS, India Gate-Purana Qila division claims on its website as: "Alluded to as the 'Mother School' of all Guru Harkrishan Public Schools, it is the main school to be built up in 1965 by Delhi Sikh Gurudwara Management Committee ..". Thus while the GHPS has consistently declared its existence and allegiance to the DGSMC, which is a public authority, held by the Apex Court in 2016; there is no documentary evidence or contention placed forth so far by the Respondent-GHPS to establish as to why the provisions of Section 2(h) of the RTI Act are not applicable to it. The Commission further notes that the decisions whereupon reliance has been placed by the Respondent are not applicable to it, particularly because neither the GHPS is a cooperative Society nor is it an independent entity in terms of control or funding thereof, operating independent of the influence of DGSMC. Right from its inception to its present day existence, everything is owed to the Page 14 of 18 CIC/GNCTD/A/2018/127006 DGSMC which is a public authority, as declared by the Respondent on their website.
6. The Commission notes that the submissions of the parties above indicate contradiction in the decisions of this Commission. The first decision cited by the respondent was passed in a batch of matters comprising of 26 Second Appeals in the case of Bhupinder Singh vs. Guru Harkrishan Public School, whereby it was held and disposed of the said batch of cases with the observation that: "...It was incumbent upon the appellant to meet the contention of the respondents that GHPS is not a public authority within the meaning of RTI Act, 2005. Having failed to discharge the aforesaid onus, the Commission is constrained to dispose of the present complaints and appeals...".Thus, the aforesaid decision dated 26.04.2018 was passed by the predecessor Bench without deciding the merits of the case, due to non-submission of adequate data by the Appellant. Hence, it was not based on a factual matrix of the case and cannot be thus held as the final and conclusive position of law. Be that as it may, this Division Bench cannot and shall not sit in review of an order passed by a predecessor Bench for the sake of judicial propriety. The next decision cited by the respondent is in the case of Shri Manjeet Singh vs. Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee passed by this Bench on 06.03.2019 while deciding a batch of three appeals whereby information sought by the Appellant related to records maintained by GHPS. Perusal of the conclusive part of the decision reads thus:"... The Commission finds that the RTI applications seek information which is not within the custody of the respondent public authority DSGMC. As such, the Commission finds the present RTI applications to be non-maintainable and reject the same. As a Page 15 of 18 CIC/GNCTD/A/2018/127006 result, the present appeals are dismissed." Hence, clearly, even in this decision, the issue as to whether GHPS is a public authority or not was not discussed while arriving at the conclusion. Thus this decision also does not conclusively determine the applicability of the Section 2(h) of the RTI Act in declaring the GHPS as a public authority.
Whereas the decision of this Bench in CIC/DIRED/A/2017/165594 & CIC/GNCTD/A/2017/164924 titled Gurvinder Singh Saini vs. DDE & Ors. dated 30.10.2019 clearly held the GHPS as a public authority in view of the fact that the Commission had decided this issue by an earlier decision dated 10.02.2010 in Second Appeal No. CIC/SG/A/2009/003014, which has attained finality as the same was not challenged before any judicial fora. Thus, from the above discussion there appears no contradiction of opinion on complete evaluation of all factual aspects of the origin/creation and functionality viz. substantial control of the respondent-GHPS in the light of the provisions of the RTI Act.
After detailed examination of the above facts and contentions which have come before this Division Bench during the course of deciding the instant Second Appeal, the Division Bench is of the considered opinion that inputs from the parties indicate that there is no case made out by the Respondent on non- applicability of the RTI Act to Guru Harkishan Public School, while the fact that the creation and existence of the Respondent clearly owes allegiance to DGSMC which is a public authority is quite clear. The present GHPS Society in its website, itself claims to have been established by the Gurdwara Management Committee in 1965, and after the ordinance of 1971 it was taken over by the Delhi Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee, formed under the DSG Act, 1971. Thus, there Page 16 of 18 CIC/GNCTD/A/2018/127006 appears no impediment in declaring the GHPS as a public authority as defined under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act and as the Commission views it, in fact, in the current day and age, bringing the GHPS within the ambit of public authority will only enhance transparency of its operations thereby further boosting public confidence in the institution.
In the light of the above position, the public authority- GHPS is directed to respond to the five simple queries raised by the appellant, with respect to the qualifications of its teachers, within three weeks from the date of receipt of this order, marking a copy of the compliance report to the Commission, reachable within a week thereafter.
The appeal is thus disposed of with the above observations.
Heeralal Samariya (हीरालाल सामररया) Vanaja N. Sarna (वनजा एन. सरना)
Information
Information चनाक्त
(सूचना(सूआयु
Commissioner
Commissioner आयु) क Information Commissioner (सूचना आयुक्त)
Authenticated true copy
(अभिप्रमाभितसत्याभितप्रभत)
Ram Parkash Grover (राम प्रकाश ग्रोवर)
Dy. Registrar (उि-िंजीयक)
011-26180514
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