Madras High Court
Periyammal vs / on 4 May, 2018
Author: G.Jayachandran
Bench: G.Jayachandran
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS RESERVED ON :23.04.2018 PRONOUNCED ON :04.05.2018 CORAM THE HONOURABLE DR.JUSTICE G.JAYACHANDRAN Second Appeal No.1469 of 1993 1.Periyammal 2.Kunjammal .. Appellants /versus/ 1.Angaiya Pandithar 2.Dhandapani 3.Shanmugam 4.K.V.Alagesan 5.Chinnathayee 6.Minor Sulochana 7.Minor Silambarasan 8.Minor Silpha Minor represented by Guardian 6th respondent viz. Chinna Thayee 9.Krishnan(died) 10.Chinnaraj 11.Madappan 12.K.Kannammal 13.K.Raja 14.K.Veeramani 15.K.Venkatachalam 16.Govindaraj 17.K.Muthammal 18.Lakshmi RR4 to 11 impleaded as party respondents and 5th respondent is appointed as guardian of RR6 to 8 as per vide Court order dated 06.01.2006 made in C.M.P.Nos.12027/1994 and 12028/1994 in S.A.No.1469/93 RR12 to 18 brought on record as LRS of the deceased 9th respondent viz., Krishnan as per order dt.12.07.2017 made in C.M.P.No. 3744 to 3746/17 in S.A.No.1469/1993 by DR.GJJ .. Respondents Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code against the judgment and decree dated 06.09.1993 and made in A.S.No.55 of 1990 on the file of Subordinate Court at Dharmapuri reversing the judgment and decree dated 30.10.1989 and made in O.S.No.275 of 1984 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Dharmapuri. For Appellant :Mr.T.R.Rajagopalan, Sr.C. for Mr.T.R.Rajaraman For Respondents :Mr.S.V.Jayaraman, Sr.C. for Mr.V.Srinivasan for R1 Mr.K.Selvarangan-R4 to 8, 10 to 18 R9-died ---------- J U D G M E N T
The appellants herein are the plaintiffs in O.S.No.275/1984 on the file of District Munsif Court, Dharmapuri. The suit filed for declaration and permanent injunction by them was allowed by the trial Court. On appeal preferred by the defendants, in A.S.No.55/1990 the trial Court judgment and decree was set aside by the first appellant Court hence, against the reversal judgment, the present Second Appeal is preferred by the aggrieved plaintiffs.
2. Gist of the dispute:
The subject matter of the suit is in respect of the properties mentioned as A and B in the plaint schedule purchased by Late Arumuga Pandithar at Kurkampattu Village, Ponnagaram Taluk, Dharmapuri District and bequeathed to his second wife Periyammal (first plaintiff) and to his daughter Kunjammal (second plaintiff) born to his first wife (Angammal) through his Will dated 31.08.1977.
3. The case of the plaintiffs is that, the suit properties are self earned property of Arumuga Pandithar. About 40 years prior to the suit, Arumuga Pandithar and his second wife (first plaintiff) left Vanawasi village and settled at Kurkampattu village, due to cruelty caused to them by first wife (Angammal) of Arumuga Pandithar and her son (first defendant). As barber by profession and nathaswaram player, out of his exertion Arumuga Pandithar purchased the suit property. The second plaintiff, who is the daughter of Arumuga Pandithar born to his first wife was subsequently driven out from the ancestral house at Vanwasi by the first defendant wife, who joined her father Arumuga Pandithar at Kurkampattu village and lived along with her father Arumuga Pandithar. The marriage of the second plaintiff was solemnized by her father Arumuga Pandithar. During his life time, Arumuga Pandithar wrote a Will dated 31.08.1977 bequeathing A schedule property to the first plaintiff and the B schedule property to the second plaintiff. Accordingly, after the demise of Arumuga Pandithar on 27.07.1979, the properties were succeeded by the plaintiffs and they became the absolute owners of the properties. They are in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the properties paying kist. While so, the first defendant Angaiya Pandithar is the son of Late Arumuga Pandithar born to his first wife Angammal taking undue advantage of the fact that the first plaintiff is issue less and the second plaintiff has lost her husband and helpless, attempted to grab the property by force and threat during the month of April 1984. Hence, suit for declaration and permanent injunction against Angaiya Pandithar, S/o Arumuga Pandithar (first defendant) and two sons of the first defendant.
4. The contra case of the first defendant is that, the suit properties are not the absolute property of the plaintiffs or Arumuga Pandithar. The said property was purchased from out of joint family nucleus. The suit property was purchased by Arumuga Pandithar in his name as manager of the joint family. The sale consideration to purchase this property was derived from sale of a portion of the maniyam property given to the family and mortgage loan of Rs.5,000/- from one Kasim Sahib. The property being joint family property, Arumuga Pandiathar and his son (first defendant) jointly sold a portion of the maniyam property at Vanawasi village and jointly borrowed money through mortgage. Later, they both jointly sold 3acres of the joint family property adjustant to the suit property to discharge the mortgage debt. After the demise of Arumuga Pandithar, first plaintiff and first defendant jointly mortgaged the property and raised loan of Rs.5,000/- from one Kuttappan to discharge the debt arose to meet the funeral expenses of Arumuga Pandithar and sundry family expenses. Later, to clear the mortgage debt, they both jointly borrowed Rs.7,000/- from Appadurai on executing promissory note. The plaintiffs were never in dispute with regard to the nature of the property, the joint possession and enjoyment among the family members till the first plaintiff tried to obtain loan against the joint family property without the knowledge of the first defendant.
5. It is also contented by the first defendant that the Will alleged to have been executed by Arumuga Pandithar is not a genuine Will. Arumuga Pandithar was bedridden for three years till his death. He was affected by paralysis and not in good state of mind to execute the Will. Further, he has no right to execute the Will in respect of the joint family property.
6. The trial Court had framed the following issues:
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7. Before the trial Court, the plaintiffs, the attesting witnesses to the Will Ex.P-21 of Arumuga Pandithar and Duraisamy Reddy were examined as plaintiffs side witnesses PW-1 to PW-4. 28 documents were filed on behalf of the plaintiffs. On the side of the defendants, three witnesses including the first defendant were examined and 28 documents were marked as defendants exhibits.
8. The trial Court allowed the suit holding that the suit properties were the self acquired property of Arumuga Pandithar under the sale deed Ex.A-1 and the Will Ex.P-21 executed by Arumuga Pandithar in favour of the plaintiffs is genuine and free from suspicion.
9. On appeal, the first appellate Court, reversed the finding on the ground that, the earliest document filed in this suit is Ex.B-8 dated 20/04/1951, which is a sale deed executed by Arumuga Pandithar on his behalf and on behalf of his minor son Angaiya Pandithar (first defendant) to one Palaniappa Gounder. In this sale deed, the property sold by Arumuga Pandithar is described as ancestral property. The first appellate Court has accepted the plea of the first defendant that from out of the sale proceeds of the ancestral property covered under Ex.B-8, 25 days later the suit property covered under Ex.A-1 dated 16/05/1951 was purchased by Arumuga Pandithar in his name as Manager of the joint family. Later, loans were raised jointly by Arumuga Pandithar and his son through mortgage and sale of a portion of the property purchased under Ex.A-1.
10. The first appellate Court had referred the recitals in usufructurery mortgages Ex.B-2 dated 27/11/1951 and Ex.B-4, dated 12/03/1954 executed by Arumuga Pandithar on his behalf and on behalf of his minor son Angaiya Pandithar (first defendant) describing the suit properties as ancestral property and Ex.B-9, sale deed dated 29.07.1967 in respect of 3 acres land forming part of the larger extend of land covered under Ex.A-1 sale deed was jointly executed by Arumuga Pandithar and his son Angaiya Pandithar in favour of Rathinavel Chettiar. The mortgage deed Ex.B-1, dated 24.04.1981 executed jointly by first plaintiff and first defendant, where consistently, the properties are characterised as joint family property. Having held that the suit properties are joint family property, the first appellate Court has further held that Ex.A-21, the Will of Arumuga Pandithar bequeathing the joint family property to the plaintiffs is invalid.
11. This Court, while admitting the Second Appeal, had framed the following Substantial Questions of Law:
1.When the 1st defendant himself admits that his father Arumugham Pandithar had no other property except the inam lands which are his separate properties, is the learned Subordinate Judge right in holding that the suit properties were purchased by Arumugham Pandithar from and out of the joint family funds?
2.When there is no presumption that the properties standing in the name of a member of Hindu Joint Family is the joint family property, is not the learned Subordinate Judge wrong in holding that the suit properties are joint family properties without any positive evidence to prove the same?
3.Is not the learned Subordinate Judge wrong in dismissing the suit in its entirety when admittedly the plaintiffs are entitled to atleast half of the suit properties by virtue of the Will Ex.A-21 executed by Arumugham Pandithar, the father of the 1st defendant in favour of the plaintiffs?
4.When it is established that the first defendant had knowledge of the Will executed by his father under Ex.A-21 that he had also allowed the plaintiff to remain in possession of the suit properties absolutely, is not the learned Subordinate Judge wrong in holding that the Will under Ex.A-21 is invalid and not binding on the defendants especially in the light of the fact that the 1st defendant has been given sufficient properties by Arumugham Pandithar in his native village?
5.When it is admitted fact that the 2nd plaintiff is residing in the suit B schedule property and that the plaintiffs are paying all the kists and other land taxes in respect of the suit properties, is the learned Subordinate Judge right in holding that the plaintiffs are not in possession?
12. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants besides filing written arguments also submitted that, while the trial Court has arrived at the right conclusion, after due consideration of the oral and documentary evidence, more particularly the admission of the first defendant that his father Arumuga Pandithar had no other property except the land in Vanawasi given to him as grant (maaniyam). The first appellate Court, without any material either by way of pleadings or evidence to prove the existence of any ancestral property and contrary to the admission of the first defendant, had reversed the finding of the trial Court. The learned Senior Counsel further contented that, without proof of family nucleus, no amount of pleading or recital in the documents will give a property the character of ancestral property or joint family property.
13. To buttress the above submission, the following judgments were relied by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants:
M.P.P.Jayaganthi Nadar and Company by its Partner, M.P.P.Jayagandhi Nadar -vs- Arunachalam Pillai and another reported in 1996 (1) MLJ 251.
K.V.Narayanan -vs- K.V.Ranganadhan and others reported in AIR 1976 SC 1715.
Naina Pillai and others -vs- Daivanai Ammal reported in AIR 1936 Madras 177.
G.Narayana Raju -vs- G.Chamaraju and others, reported in AIR 1968 SC 1276.
14. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants would also submit that the lower appellate Court holding that the Will Ex.A-21 is invalid since Arumuga Pandithar has bequeathed the joint family property is factually and legally incorrect. Even assuming the suit properties are joint family properties, the right of Arumuga Pandithar to bequeath his share cannot be taken away. Therefore, the reasoning of the first appellate Court to reverse the finding of the trial Court is not legally sustainable. The learned Senior Counsel would also submit that, in such circumstances, dehors of the character of the properties, in view of the amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 2005, the plaintiffs are entitled for 2/3 share in the properties. Therefore, by exercising the inherent power of the Court to meet the ends of justice, the larger relief sought may be moulded and relief to the extend the plaintiffs entitle has to be granted. In support of the said submission, the judgment of this Court in S.Jothi -vs- P.Velu in S.A.336/2015 dated 09/01/2017 is relied.
15. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents would submit that, the appellants contention and the judgments relied does not apply to the facts of the case. The joint family character of the property is expressly mentioned in all the documents executed by Arumuga Pandithar. If it is a stray reference, the judgments cited by the appellants may have any relevance. Further, it is not the recitals found in the documents, the conduct of the parties, both Arumuga Pandithar and the first plaintiff admitting the character of the property as joint family property had even subsequent to the death of Arumuga Pandithar had jointly encumbered the properties. Consistent description of the property as joint family property in all the documents except the disputed and self serving Will Ex.A-21 cannot be brushed aside. The defendant has not only pleaded that the property is joint family property but also proved through the documents and conduct of Arumuga Pandithar and the first plaintiff that the suit properties were treated as joint family property by all the parties concern.
16. Further the learned counsel for the respondent/first defendant would also submit that, the lower appellate Court has rejected the plea of the plaintiff claiming absolute right over the properties through Ex.A-21 not only on the ground that joint family properties cannot be bequeathed by the Kartha but also had discussed about the suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will. The exclusion of the only son (the first defendant) and conspicuous absence to mention him and reason to exclude him coupled with the fact that the beneficiaries were present during the execution of the Will and actively participated in execution had prompted the first appellate Court to reverse the erroneous judgment of the trial Court.
17. The first appellate Court on appreciation of the facts and law, particularly Ex.A-1, Ex.A-2, Ex.B-2 to Ex.B-4, Ex.B-8 and Ex.B-9 has come to a conclusion that the suit properties were purchased from out of the sale proceeds of joint family property held and sold by Arumuga Pandithar on his behalf and on behalf of his minor son. Loans were raised by mortgage of the properties morefully described as joint family property. The first defendant had been a party to all the documents, which have either created right or encumbrance to the property. The defendant had proved through documentary evidence that out of total sale consideration of Rs.10,000/- for the purchase of the suit property under Ex.A-1, part sale consideration of Rs.5,000/- has derived from sale of a property under Ex.B-8 jointly by Arumuga Pandithar and minor Angaiya Pandithar. The suit properties were thereafter encumbered by Arumuga Pandiathar and his son Angaiya Pandithar (first defendant). After the life time of Arumuga Pandithar, his second wife Periyammal (first plaintiff ) and his first wife son Angaya Pandithar (first defendant had jointly mortgaged the property in the year 1981 under Ex.B-1.
18. For the point whether the inam land sold by Arumuga Pandithar and his son Angaiya Pandithar through Ex.P-8 hardly 25 days before acquiring the suit land under Ex.A-1, is self acquired property of Arumuga Pandiathar or the joint family property, the first appellate Court has held that it is the family property. To substantiate this finding, the Court below has relied on other exhibits such as Ex.B-9, Ex.B-2 , Ex.B-3 and Ex.B-4. The lower appellate Court reasoning probablising the case of the defendant and improbablising the case of the plaintiff is based on these documents. In second appeal, this Court finds no Substantial Question of Law is involved in this regard.
19. In the judgment reported in Naina Pillai and others v.Daivanao Ammal and another [AIR 1936 Madras 177], the properties are admittedly karnam service inam lands enfranchised to the husband of the plaintiff, so the Court rightly held that, when karnam service inam lands have been enfranchised, the lands form the separate property of the person in whose name they have been enfranchised and are not subject to any claim to partition by other members of the family.
20. In the above said judgment, the Division Bench after referring the judgements of the Privy Council reported in 26 Mad 339 and 30 Mad 434 which held, enfranchised properties are the joint family properties and the subsequent ruling of the Privy Council in 44 Mad 643 which held enfranchised lands form the private property of the holder. This change in the view of the Privy Council was due to the resolution introduced by the Privy Council. The period of the resolution cover Oct-Nov 1884 to April 1921. While the earlier two judgments of the Privy Council was prior to 1921, the later judgment Venkata Jagannadha -vs- Veerabhadrayya reported in 44 Mad 643(PC) was in the year 1922.
21. In this case, the plaintiffs though plead that the maaniyam was to Arumuga Pandithar and he sold the property enfranchised to him to purchase the suit property, there is no clear evidence to ascertain whether the inam was for Arumuga Pandithar in personam or to the family to which Arumuga Pandithar is one of the member. Contrarily, the first defendant had proved through documents that the suit properties were purchased from the sale of inam land. His father has treated the inam land as joint family property and sold it on behalf of the family and not as individual. Further, Arumuga Pandithar had treated the suit property purchased out of the sale proceeds of the inam land also as joint family property.
22. As pointed out in Periyakaruppan Chetty -vs- Arunachala Chetty 1927 Mad 676 = 102 IC 290, the separate property of a Hindu ceases to be his separate property, not by any physical mixing with his joint family or ancestral property, but by his own volition and intention, by his waiving or surrendering his special right in it as separate property.
23. The other judgment relied on by the appellant is one reported in 1996 (1) MLJ 251 (M.P.P.Jayagandhi Nadar and Company by Partner, M.P.P.Jayagandhi Nadar v. Arunachalam Pillai and another). In this judgment, the learned Single Judge of the Madras High Court referring the proposition of law laid down in Neelakandan Demodaran, Namaboodri and another -vs- Velayudhan Pillai and another reported in AIR 1958 SC 832, held that, unless the son shows that he had pre-existing right in the property purchased, mere recital in subsequent documents that he is also a co-owner of the property along with his father will not convey any right on him. The fact that son also joined in execution of subsequent mortgage deeds not sufficient to show that father intended to waive his separate right over his self acquisition.
24. As far as the facts of this case is concerned, the pre-existing right in the property purchased through Ex.A-1 is found in Ex.B-8. The sale of the inam property by the father for himself and on behalf of his minor son hardly 25 days prior to the purchase of the suit property cannot be ignored. If the father had exclusive right over the inam land, it is suffice for him to sell it as his personal property. It is not at all necessary for him to sell the property on behalf of his son also and after purchase of the property in his name exclusively, he need not have jointly executed the mortgage deeds along with his son. That apart, even after his demise, the property has been treated as joint family property by the members of the family, particularly the first plaintiff. That is the reason why in Ex.B-1 both the first plaintiff and the first defendant had jointly created mortgage in favour of one Kuttappan. If really the property did not carry the character of joint family property, the subsequent documents need not carry recitals referring the suit properties as ancestral property and the first defendant as party to the documents.
25. There is no pleadings or evidence in this case that, the subsequent mortgage deeds executed jointly by the father and son or the son (first defendant ) and the step mother (first plaintiff) were due to the dictates of the creditors, except a suggestion to DW-1 in the cross examination, which is denied. Therefore, the judgements cited and referred by the appellants only enhance the case of the defendants/respondents and not to the advantage of the plaintiffs/ appellants.
26. Regarding the Will marked as Ex.A-21, the lower appellate Court has held that it is to be invalid not only for bequeathing the joint family property but also for other attending circumstances. Primarily, but for the Will Ex.A-21, the son, who is one of the legal heir and entitle to get a share in the property is not even referred in the Will by the testator. A portion of the land mentioned in the Will was already acquired by the Government and compensation received by Arumuga Pandithar. While so, inclusion of that portion also in the Will cause doubt about the good state of mind of the executor.
27. The lower appellate Court while rightly held that the suit properties are joint family properties after considering the recitals in Ex.B-8, Ex.B-4, Ex.B-9, Ex.B-6 and Ex.B-1 and the conduct of the parties, erred in holding the Will Ex.A-21 as invalid. Validity of a Will is tested by proof of its due execution. The content of the Will is to be considered to find out whether the execution was out of own violation, free consent and executed while in good state of mind. The testator may have no title or defective title, whatever right he have in the property will pass on to the propounder if the execution of the Will is duly proved to be valid.
28. In this case, PW-2[Manickam] the attestor to the Will Ex.A-21 has been examined. PW-1[Tmt.Periyammal] and PW-3[Tmt.Kunjammal] being the wife and daughter of the Arumuga Pandithar had deposed that they were present at the time of executing the Will and saw Arumuga Pandithar signed in the Will and the attesting witness saw Arumuga Pandithar affixing his signature. Thereafter, the witnesses affixed their signature and that was witnessed by Arumuga Pandithar. The due execution of the Will cannot be doubted for the reason that the testator had no exclusive right to bequeath the joint family property. Even non- examination of the scribe or the other attesting witnesses will not invalidate the Will. The exclusion of the son, who is one of the probable person to inherit the property and omission to mention his name in the Will and reason for exclusion may at the most be a reason to suspect but cannot be a ground to invalidate the Will.
29. DW-1[Tr.Angaiya Pandiathar] had admitted that he saw the Will Ex.A-21 of his father, while executing Ex.B-1. He admits that the schedule of the property and the boundaries mentioned in Ex.B-1 were drawn from Ex.A-21. The lower appellate Court while considering the recital found in Ex.B-1 to hold that the property is joint family property by document as well as conduct, it ought to have also given due consideration of the admission of DW-1 regarding the schedule of the property and boundaries mentioned in Ex.B-1. Therefore, for the aforesaid reasons, holding the Will as invalid by the lower appellate Court is not correct.
30. However, in view of certain facts which are very peculiar and unique to this case, mere holding that the suit properties are joint family properties and the Will of Arumuga Pandithar is valid, will not be adequate and proper. Those peculiar facts are,
a) The suit is to declare the title in respect of the properties described under schedule A and B of the plaint as the properties of first and second plaintiffs respectively and consequentially permanent injunction not to disturb their peaceful possession and enjoyment.
The facts proved and accepted by the lower appellant Court is that, the properties are not the self acquired properties of Arumuga Pandithar. It is joint family properties. In which the first defendant is also a co-sharer. No question of Law Substantial arise in the background of the factual scenario.
In the light of the said finding, Arumuga Pandithar, had alienable right only to an extend of 1/2 share in the suit property on the date of the Will Ex.A-21 (31/08/1977). The remaining 1/2 share vest with his son (the first defendant/first respondent herein). On the demise of Arumuga Pandithar in the year 1979 ( 27/07/1979) only the 1/2 share to which the Arumuga Pandithar entitle shall devolve to the plaintiffs.
b) It is an admitted fact that a portion of the suit land was acquired by the Government for access to the water tank. Though the acquisition was during the life time of Arumuga Pandithar and he had participated in the acquisition proceedings along with his family members, he had not excluded the extend of land in his Will. Therefore, the relief of declaration to the entire extend of suit properties more fully described in the plaint is legally impermissible.
c) It is also an admitted fact that pending suit, the plaintiffs have alienated the property to third parties. This fact never disclosed by the plaintiffs till they were cross examined. Even thereafter, they did not implead them as parties to the suit. Records reveals that, the purchasers pendent lite had got themselves impleaded in the second appeal. The affidavit filed to get themselves impleaded does not disclosed, when actually they purchased the property and no evidence available to hold they are the bona fide purchasers for value. In any case, the consequential injunction relief being a right in personam, does not exist once the property is admittedly alienated.
d) The plaintiffs, who are the legatees to the Will cannot claim a declaration of title for an extend more than what the testator is entitled. As on the date the will come into effect, the testator had only 1/2 share in the properties by notional partition. The amendment Act, 2005 has no application in this case, since the joint family property of the Hindu male had been devolved by way of testament ( Will Ex A-21) much before the amendment came into effect. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act as amended by Act 39 of 2005 reads as below:-
6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property:-
(1)On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment)Act, 2005, in a Joint Hindu Family governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall-
(a)by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son;
(b)have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son;
(c)be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son, and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shals be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener:
Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004.
e) If in case there is difficulty in interpreting the construction, the general rule relating to will is to give effect to the intention of the testator as far as possible. Section 87 of the Indian Succession Act, which is a provision set out in Schedule III of the Indian Succession Act and applicable to the wills executed by Hindus as per section 57 of the said Act, reads , the intention of the testator shall not be set aside because it cannot take effect to the full extent, but effect is to be given to it as far as possible.
f) The construction of the will Ex A-21 does not fall under the category of uncertainty to hold it void in toto as erroneously held by the lower appellate court. The intention of the testator is to bequeath, his right in the property which he purchased under Ex A-1, to the first plaintiff and second plaintiff in a particular proportion. Therefore it is essential to apply the armchair principle.
31. As a result, the Second Appeal is partly allowed. The first plaintiff is entitle only for 1/2 share in A schedule property and the second plaintiff is entitle only for 1/2 share in B schedule property. The first defendant is entitle for the remaining 1/2 share in both A and B schedule properties. The plaintiffs and first defendant can either divide the property amicably based on the above declaration or seek the intervention of the court, if necessary. No order as to costs.
04.05.2018 Index:yes Internet:yes/no ari To
1.The Subordinate Court,Dharmapuri.
2.The District Munsif Court, Dharmapuri.
Dr.G.JAYACHANDRAN,J.
ari Pre-delivery judgment made in S.A.No.1469 of 1993 04.05.2018