Madras High Court
T.V. Swamy vs The Management Of Best & Crompton on 28 June, 2010
Author: B. Rajendran
Bench: R.Banumathi, B. Rajendran
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED : 28.06.2010
CORAM :
THE HONOURABLE Mrs.JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI
and
THE HONOURABLE Mr.JUSTICE B. RAJENDRAN
W.A. No. 1168 of 2002
T.V. Swamy .. Appellant
Versus
1. The Management of Best & Crompton
Engineering Limited
Automotive Products Division
No.723, T.H. Road, Madras 600 081
rep. by its Deputy General Manager
2. The Presiding Officer
I Additional Labour Court
Chennai .. Respondents
Writ Appeal filed under Clause 15 of Letters Patent against the Order dated 30.01.2002 made in WP No.5470 of 1997 on the file of this Court.
For Appellants : Mr. B. Divakaran
For Respondents : Mr. S. Ravindran
for M/s. T.S. Gopalan & Co for R1
JUDGMENT
B. RAJENDRAN, J This writ appeal arises out of the Order dated 30.01.2002 made in WP No. 5470 of 1997 which was filed praying for a Writ of Certiorari to call for the records of the I Additional Labour Court, Chennai made in I.D. No. 45 of 1991 and set aside its award dated 26.12.1996. The learned single Judge allowed the Writ Petition filed by the first respondent/Management on the ground that the Labour Court, Chennai has no jurisdiction to entertain the dispute raised by the appellant.
2. The facts which are necessary for disposal of the writ appeal are that the appellant herein was employed as a casual labour on 06.06.1977 in the first respondent/management to render assistance to the clerk and mechanics in the APD Service centre at Jamshedpur. According to the management, the appellant was appointed as casual employee by the Reginoal Office at Calcutta and working at Jamshedpur where they have their service centre to cater to the needs of M/s. TELCO, their major consumer for the products manufactured by the management. According to the management, when the service centre itself was closed, the appellant was terminated from service by a letter dated 27.01.1989 with effect from 28.02.1989 by offering him one month salary in lieu of his termination. The order of termination was valid as it was issued by the management of the respondent at Calcutta and this order of termination was challenged by the appellant before the Labour Court at Chennai in I.D. No. 45 of 1991. The management contested the I.D.No. 45 of 1991 on the ground that Labour Court at Chennai has no jurisdiction to entertain or adjudicate upon the dispute raised by the appellant. However, the I Additional Labour Court, Chennai passed an award dated 26.12.1996 in I.D. No. 45 of 1991 directing the management to reinstate the appellant with backwages. As against the same, the management has filed the WP No. 5470 of 1997
3. The learned single Judge, after taking into consideration that the petitioner was only employed on a casual basis at Jamshedpur, by order dated 30.01.2002, held that the the Labour Court at Chennai has no jurisdiction to entertain the Industrial Dispute raised by the appellant, thereby allowed the writ petition filed by the management and dismissed the I.D. No. 45 of 1991 raised by the appellant on the ground of jurisdiction as well as on merits. Aggrieved by the said order dated 30.01.2002 of the learned single Judge, the present writ appeal has been filed.
4. The contention of the employee/appellant is as follows:-
The appellant was appointed on 06.06.1977 as a casual labour by the head office at Madras and at that time, the Madras office was the head office, where he was appointed. Subsequently, he was transferred to Jamshedpur. Thereafter, he was transferred to Chennai office for a brief period and again he was re-transferred to Jamshedpur where he continued to work as a casual labour. The services of the appellant were not regularised and he was not a permanent employee. The appellant was also making periodical request to consider his claim for permanency, but it was not considered for more than ten years. While so, by letter dated 27.01.1989, he was terminated from service with effect from 28.02.1989 by giving him one month salary in lieu of his termination. According to the appellant, the management has absorbed two other employees similarly placed and posted them in the Chennai office, but he alone was singled out. In any view of the matter, as the legal right of the appellant relating to his employment is denied by the management, he raised the dispute before the Industrial Forum at Chennai. It is further stated that though originally he raised a dispute with the Assistant Commissioner of Labour at Jamshedpur, as the Central Office is situate at Madras, he filed a suit in O.S. No. 1533 of 1989 before the V Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai praying for a declaration to declare that he is entitled to the benefits of Section 3 of Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workman) Act 46 of 1981 and for consequential injunction restraining the management from terminating his service. The trial Court dismissed the suit by a decree and judgment dated 01.12.1992. As against the same, the appellant filed A.S. No. 215 of 1994 before the III Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, which was decreed on 09.02.1995. Thereafter, the appellant filed I.D. No. 45 of 1991 before the Labour Court at Chennai. Before the labour Court, the appellant produced records to show that his initial appointment was made by the office at Madras, the Controlling authority is having office at Madras and therefore the dispute raised by the appellant before the Labour Court at Chennai is maintainable and triable. On consideration of various factors, evidence and documents, the Labour Court passed an award dated 26.12.1996 in I.D. No. 45 of 1991 directing the management to pay backwages to the appellant. As against the same, the management preferred WP No. 5470 of 1997, but unfortunately, the learned single Judge, by mainly relying upon the fact that at the time of termination, the appellant was employed at Jamshedpur, allowed the writ petition filed by the management by an Order dated 30.01.2002.
5. The case put forward by the management is to the effect that right from the beginning, the appellant was working only at the regional office at Calcutta as Casual Labour and posted at Jamshedpur. The appellant was all along working at Jamshedpur and ultimately he was terminated by the management at Jamshedpur, therefore, as he was lastly employed at Jamshedpur, he cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court at Madras. It was also contended that the appellant originally approached the Conciliation Officer appointed by the Government of Tamil Nadu and the same was taken up by the Labour Officer-III, Madras. The Labour Officer-III, accepting the plea of the management, by a communication dated 05.09.1989 itself informed the appellant that his dispute could not be entertained. Pursuant to such communication, the appellant raised a dispute before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Government of Bihar at Jamshedpur. The Assistant Commissioner of Labour at Jamshedpur also held conciliation proceedings, but, for the reasons best known to the appellant, he abandoned his claim before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour at Jamshedpur. Not content with, the appellant raised a plea once again before the Conciliation Officer at Madras and on failure of conciliation, he took up the case of non-employment before the Labour Court. According to the management, the Labour Court at Madras lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Industrial Dispute raised by the appellant. Further, the Jamshedpur Unit itself has become unviable and due to its closure the termination of the appellant is valid and justified. It was also contended by the management that all the 160 employees of the management have left their service and availed the Voluntary Retirement Scheme offered by the management. Even, at that time, the Madras Office itself was closed and therefore, the contention of the appellant cannot be accepted. It was further stated that as against the decree and judgment dated 09.02.1995 made in A.S. No. 215 of 1994 before the III Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai, the management has filed S.A. No. 1443 of 1995 before this Court and the same was allowed by setting aside the decree and judgment dated 09.02.1995 passed by the First Appellate Court. As the employment of the appellant was terminated only at Jamshedpur, by the Office at Jamshedpur, where he lastly worked, the dispute raised by the appellant before the Labour Court at Madras is not maintainable and the labour Court ought not to have entertained I.D.No. 45 of 1991. All these factors were carefully considered by the learned single Judge while allowing the writ petition and prayed for dismissal of the writ appeal.
6. We have heard Mr. Divakaran, learned counsel for theappellant and Mr. Ravindran for the management.
7. At the outset, it has to be seen whether the I.D. No. 45 of 1991 raised by the appellant before the Labour Court, at Madras is maintainable.
8. The learned counsel for the appellant would mainly center his argument around the fact that the appellant was initially appointed in the year 1977 by the Central Office at Madras, though he was working at Jamshedpur at the time when he was terminated. Having regard to the fact that his initial appointment was only at Madras, the Labour Court at Madras is having jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the I.D. No. 45 of 1991 filed by the appellant relating to his employment with the management. The termination order passed by the management is illegal in view of the fact that the management has absorbed other two employees similarly placed like the appellant at Chennai, however, he alone was singled out. The learned counsel for the appellant would further contend that merely because the appellant raised a plea before the Conciliation Officer at Jamshedpur, that by itself would not preclude his legal right to challenge the order of termination before the Labour Court at Madras. Though the termination order was passed by the Regional Office at Jamshedpur, yet, he was initially appointed only by the Chennai Office and therefore, the Labour Court at Madras is having the jurisdiction to entertain the dispute raised by him.
9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the management contended that the order of termination was passed only by the Regional Office at Calcutta, the appellant lastly worked at Jamshedpur, therefore, the appellant has no right to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court at Madras. The appellant originally raised a plea before the Conciliation officer at Madras and the same was rejected by the competent authority and thereafter he moved the Conciliation Office at Jamshedpur, however, he abandoned his claim before the Conciliation Officer at Jamshedpur and filed the I.D. No. 45 of 1991 before the Labour Court at Madras, which is legally not sustainable. The labour Court failed to take into consideration the fact that the appellant was lastly employed at Jamshedpur, he was only a casual labour, therefore, the cause of action for raising the dispute arises only at Jamshedpur. Inasmuch as reference was made by the Government of Tamil Nadu instead of the Bihar Government, the dispute raised before the Labour Court at Madras is legally not sustainable or maintainable.
10. We have gone through the material records as well as the judgment of the learned single Judge. It is clear that the appellant was employed at Jamshedpur as casual labour during the relevant period and thereafer, he was terminated from service by the regional office at Calcutta. This is not disputed by both sides. It is also seen from Ex.M20, the judgment of this Court in S.A. No. S.A. No. 1443 of 1995 dated 09.02.1995 that this Court has categorically held that there is no cause of action for the appellant to raise the dispute before the Labour Court at Madras. Before this Court, in the second appeal, the appellant claimed that he was entitled to the benefits conferred under Section 3 of Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workman) Act 46 of 1981 and for a consequential injunction restraining the management from terminating his service. This Court held that no part of cause of action arises at Madras as the appellant was employed only at Jamshedpur and his services were also terminated by the Regional Office at Calcutta and therefore, the suit filed before the Civil Court at Madras is not maintainable. The findings rendered by this Court in the second appeal between the appellant and the management clearly establishes that the appellant was only employed at Jamshedpur, no part of cause of action arises at Chennai and the dispute raised by the appellant before the Labour Court at Madras is not maintainable. Further, a perusal of Exs. M9 and M11 would indicate that the appellant initially raised a dispute before the Labour Officer-III, Madras as regards his termination. The claim of the appellant was rejected by the Conciliation Officer on the ground that there was no cause of action arise for consideration at Chennai. Subsequently, the appellant raised an Industrial Dispute before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Jamshedpur, which was transferred to the file of Commissioner of Labour, Bihar at Patna but the petitioner abandoned his claim before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour at Bihar. It is seen from Ex.M15 that the appellant was paid salary only by the office at Jamshedpur. Exs. M15 and M12 were filed by the Management to show that the management has closed the Automotive Products Division at Jamshedpur on 23.03.1994 and more than 160 employees have taken the Voluntary Retirement Scheme offered by the management and left their service. It is also seen from Exs. M17 and M18 that the two employees namely Ashraf and Hussain were permanent employees appointed at Chennai, thereafter they were transferred to Jamshedpur and they were only re-transferred to Chennai on closure of the factory at Jamshedpur. Threfore, the contention of the appellant that he ought to have been absorbed by the management on par with the said two persons does not merit acceptance. Moreover, the appellant is only a casual labourer and engaged at Jamshedpur office and the office at Jamshedpur was also closed. Therefore, the appellant cannot attempt to seek to enforce his right by raising a dispute at Madras.
11. As regards the argument of the appellant that subsequent to his termination, a paper publication was made under Ex.W8 by the management and the management attempted to recruit sales Managerial personnel at Jamshedpur, it was stated by the learned counsel for the management that Ex.M21 was filed by the management to show that due to adverse trading condition, the recruitment proposal under Ex.W8 was deferred and therefore, we are not inclined to deal with the same any longer. Even otherwise, the appellant was only engaged as a casual labour and he cannot, as a matter of right, claim that he should be employed by the management. Barring the sole contention of the appellant that he was initially engaged at Chennai and subsequently transferred to Jamshedpur, no other documentary evidence was placed by the appellant to show that he is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the Labour Court at Madras.
12. In the typed set of papers produced before us, it is seen that by virtue of a letter dated 03.12.1981 written by the appellant to the Manager of the Madras Office through the Manager of the Jamshedpur Office, it was categorically stated that "I am recruitted on 06.06.1977 as a casual labour during the stay of Mr. V.R. Srinivasan at Jamshedpur and worked under him upto 31.03.1981." Therefore, even according to his own admission, the appellant was working only as a casual labour at Jamshedpur and he wrote this letter seeking for permanancy, through the office at Jamshedpur. Therefore, the contention of the appellant that his initial appointment was made at the office at Chennai is not established. Even otherwise, at the time of his termination, admittedly, the appellant was working at Jamshedpur and the order of termination emanated only from the Regional Office at Calcutta.
13. With this background, let us analyse the legal aspects as to whether the dispute raised by the appellant before the Labour Court at Chennai is maintainable or not. In the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (Eastern Coalfields Limited and others vs. Kalyan Banerjee) 2009 (1) L.L.N. 139 the Honourable Supreme Court held that the location of Head office of a company within the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court, will not automatically confer jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition. In that case, the company was having its head office in West Bengal. The services of its employee was terminated at Jarkhant by his appointing authority whose office was also located at the same place and termination order is not subject to sanction of the head office. In such circumstance, it was held that no part of cause of action having arisen within West Bengal and the entire cause of action having arisen outside West Bengal State, mere location of the head office of the company in West Bengal would not confer jurisdiction upon the Calcutta High Court to entertain the writ petition. In Para Nos. 12 and 13, it was held as follows:-
"12. ....These directions are authorities for the proposition that only that Court will have jurisdiction within which, the entire cause of action had arisen. In this case, no part of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court.
13. In view of the decision of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the entire cause of action arose in Mugma area within the State of Jharkhand, we are of the opinion that only because the head office of the appellant company was situated in the State of West Bengal, the same by itself will not confer any jurisdiction upon the Calcutta High Court, particularly when the head office had nothing to do with the order of punishment passed against the respondent.
14. The learned counsel for the management also brought to the notice of this Court the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 1287 of 1997 dated 06.10.2007 (Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank Limited, Tuticorin, rep. by its Chairman vs. The Dy. Commisioner of Labour, Tirunelveli and another). In that case, the question arose was the Bank appointed deposit canvasser for the Nagercoil branch of the appellant bank. Thereafter, the employee was appointed as Apprentice Clerk, temporarily for five months and posted at Gulburgah Branch, Karnataka branch. Later on, he was orally terminated with effect from 18.12.1981. A counsel notice was issued on 19.03.1984 for which a reply was given by the bank stating that the employee resigned from his post on 16.12.1981. The employee thereafter filed an appeal under Section 41 (2) of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947 before the Deputy Commissioner, Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu contending that he was orally terminated from service which is contrary to Section 2 (oo) and 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and sought for reinstatement in service with backwages. The bank contested the appeal on the ground that as there is no termination of service and he was posted temporarily and he has voluntarily resigned from the post, the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act will not apply. It was specifically contended by the bank that no part of cause of action arose in Tamil Nadu as he was employed, at the time of termination, only at Karnataka and the Deputy Commissioner, Tirunelveli has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. The Division Bench of this Court, relying upon the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Workmen of Sri Ranga Vilas Motors (Pvt) Ltd and another vs. Sri Ranga Vilas Motors (Pvt) Ltd., and another, 1967 (SC) II Labour Law Journal 12 as well as the decision of this Court rendered in (Management of Best & Crompton Engineering Ltd., vs. Presiding Office, I Addl. Labour Court, Chennai and another) 2002 2 LLN 306 held in Para Nos. 16, 18 and 19 as follows:-
16. (a) The Supreme Court in the decision reported in AIR 1967 SC 1040 = (1967) 2 SCR 528 (Workman of Shri Ranga Vilas Motors (P) Ltd., vs. Sri Ranga Vilas Motors (P) Ltd., and others) considered similar jurisdictional issue and in paragraph 14 held as follows:-
"14. Therefore, the appeal must succeed unless the Company can satisfy to us that the points decided against it should have been decided in its favour. This takes us to the other points. Mr. O.P. Malhotra strongly urges that the State Government of Mysore was not the appropriate Government to make the reference. He says that although the dispute started at Bangalore, the resolution sponsoring this dispute was passed in Krishnagiri, and, that the proper test to be applied in the case of individual disputes is where the dispute has been sponsored. It seems to usthat on the facts of this case it is clear that there was a separate establishment at Bangalore and Mahalingam was working there. There were a number of other workmen working in this place. The order of transfer, it is true, was made at Krishnagiri at the head office, but the order was to operate on a workman working in Bangalore. In our view the High Court was right in holding that the proper question to raise is: where did the dispute arise? Ordinarily, if there is a separate establishment and the workman is working in that establishment, the dispute would arise at that place. As the High Court observed, there should clearly be some nexus betweenthe dispute and the territory of the State and not necessarily between the territory of the State and the industry concerning which the dispute arose. This Court in Indian Cable Co. Ltd., vs. Workmen held as follows:-
The Act contained no provisions bearing on this question, which must consequently, be decided on the principles governing the jurisdiction of Courts to entertain actions or proceedings. Dealing with a similar question under the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946, Chagla, C.J., observed in Lalbhai Tricumlal Mills Ltd., vs. Vin;
But what we are concerned with to decide is; where did the dispute substantially arise? Now, the Act does not deal with the cause of action, nor does it indicate what factors will confer jurisdiction upon the Labour Court. But applying the well known tests of jurisdiction, a Court or Tribunal would have jurisdiction if the parties reside within jurisidiction or if the subject-matter of the dispute substantially arises within jurisdiction.
In our opinion, those principles are applicable for deciding which of the States has jurisdiction to make a reference under Section 10 of the Act>?
Applying the above principles to the facts of this case, it is quite clear that the subject matter of the dispute in this case substantially arose within the jurisdiction of the mysore Government.
(b) This Court in the decision reported in 2002 (2) LLN 306 (Management of Best & Crompton Engineering Ltd. vs. Presiding Office, I Additional Labour Court, Chennai and another) followed the said judgment of the Supreme Court and held that what is relevant for sustaining a report before the Labour Court is the place where the cause of action arose substantially viz., the place where the employee was working at the time when the order of termination was issued and not as to the place of initial appointment elsewhere, even though he was transferred to other places.
(c) The above said judgments of the Supreme Court as well as this Court were subsequently followed in the decision reported in 2003 3 LLN 296 (N. Ramathilagam vs. Labour officer (Conciliation),Kuralagam, Chennai and others)
(d) in the recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in (2007) 5 SCC 591 (Bikash Bhushan Ghosh vs. Novartis India Ltd.,) the cause of action in a dispute was considered. The Supreme Court held that termination order was served due to disobedience of the transfer order and the transfer order having been set aside, the appellants would be deemed to be continuing tobe posted as Collectors and hence the State of West Bengal had jurisdiction to make the reference. The Supreme Court held that the State Government of the State where the part of cause of action arose would also have jurisdiction to make the reference under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
18. Here in this cae, the territorial jurisdiction is given to the Inspectors as per the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947, as well s to the Deputy Commissioner of Labour in different regions under Section 41 (2) of the Act. The entire cause of action viz., place of posting, joining duty, last served, the alleged resignation and the alleged oral termination have all taken place at Gulbgurgah branch. Hence, the entire cause of action and bundle of facts have taken place only at Gulburgah and nothing has taken place at Tirunelveli. Therefore,the first respondent, who has no jurisdiction over the Gulburgah branch is not competent to entertain the appeal filed by the second respondent challenging the oral termination and seeking to set aside the oral termination with reinstatement with back wages and continuity of service.
19. In view of our finding that the first respondent has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, we are of the view that we need not go into the other issues raised in this writ appeal."
15. Therefore, as per the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, it is very clear that the Court has to decide where did the dispute arose and whether there is a separate establishment and whether the workmen is working there. As far as these two questions are concerned, in this case, the answer is simple. The dispute is termination of the appellant at Jamshedpur. It is also clearly admitted by both sides that Jamshedpur office comes under the Regional Office at Calcutta. The order was only passed by the Calcutta Regional Office and it is a separate establishment. The Jamshedpur unit ultimately got closed down. Therefore, taking into consideration these factors, it is very clear that the grievance of the appellant can only be considered or adjudicated by the Labour Court at Jamshedpur and not before the Labour Court at Madras, Tamil Nadu. Therefore, on the question of jurisdiction, we are of the firm opinion that the learned single Judge has rightly held that the Labour Court at Madras and the reference made to the Labour Court lacks jurisdiction, especially, more so, when on the earlier occasion, the appellant himself have moved Conciliation Officer and the same was rejected, therefore, it is not open to him to challenge the order of termination before the Labour Court at Madras. Above all, the appellant has abandoned his claim before the Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Bihar. Under those circumstance, we do not find any reason to interfere with the reasoned order passed by the learned single Judge.
16. Even on merits, as rightly pointed out by the learned single Judge, almost 160 employees employed in Jamshedpur unit have left their service after availing Voluntary Retirement Scheme and the unit at Jamshedpur is closed down. The two employees said to have been absorbed by the management is concerned, it is seen that they are permanent employees of the chennai office and they were originally working in Chennai Office and they have been taken back. After closure of the Jamshedpur Unit, they were brought back to Chennai Office. Therefore, there cannot be any ill-intention on the part of the management to isolate the appellant. Contra, the management has stated that since the appellant is only a casual employee and not permanent employee, as per law, he was paid one month salary in lieu of the termination. Therefore, on merits also, we do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the learned single Judge.
16. In the result, we confirm the Order dated 30.01.2002 made in WP No.5470 of 1997 passed by the learned single and consequently, the writ appeal is dismissed. No costs.
(R.B.I.J.,) (B.R.J.,)
28.06.2010
rsh
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To
The Presiding Officer
I Additional Labour Court
Chennai
R. BANUMATHI, J
and
B. RAJENDRAN, J
rsh
Pre-delivery Order in
WA No. 1168 of 2002
28.06.2010