Delhi District Court
M/S International Security Printers ... vs Mr. K.S. Bhandari on 30 September, 2015
In the Court of Sh. Sunil Kumar : Additional Rent Controller
Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi.
E. No. 493/14/12
Unique I.D. No. 02401C0238032012
In the matter of:
M/s International Security Printers Pvt. Ltd.
Through its Director Mr. Mohit Luthra
C/o E86, Malcha Marg, Diplomatic Enclave
New Delhi 110021 .............. Petitioner
Versus
Mr. K.S. Bhandari
S/o Sh. B.S. Bhandari
R/o 2nd Floor, Front Portion
3DB, Gupta Road
New Delhi110055 ............. Respondent
Date of Institution : 24.05.2012
Date of Arguments: 21.09.2015
Date of Order : 30.09.2015
ORDER:
This order shall decide the question whether the respondent be granted leave to contest the present application under clause (e) of proviso to subsection (1) of section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as ''Act 59 of 1958'').
E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 1/21
Brief facts for the decision on the application are that the petitioner company is the owner and landlord of built up property bearing Plot Number No.3, Block 1, Khasra No. 587/3 (Measuring 377.8 Sq. yards) at Desh Bandhu Gupta Road (Formerly known as original road), Multani Dhanda, Pahar Ganj, New Delhi 110055 more specifically shown in red colour in the site plan attached. The said premises are required bona fide by the petitioner company for its own use, benefit, occupation and residence of its director. It is further submitted that the petitioner company is not in possession of any other sufficient and reasonable accommodation. It is submitted by virtue of sale deed DT 22nd July, 1998 registered as Document No. 179 Book No.1 Vol. No.8 at pages 78 to 96 on 22 nd July, 1998 executed by "The D.D. Puri Charity Trust" in the favour of the petitioner company, the petitioner became the owner of the entire property situated at Plot Number No.3, Block 1, Khasra No. 587/3 (Measuring 377.8 Sq. yards) at Desh Bandhu Gupta Road (Formerly known as Original Road), Multani Dhanda, Pahr Ganj, New Delhi110055. The respondenttenant attorned the petitioner as owner and landlord of the premises in dispute and started paying rent to the petitioner company. In fact, the respondent tenant has paid a sum of Rs. 4,320/ (Rupees Four Thousand Three Hundred and Twenty Only) by way of cheque No. 542749 Dt. 19.12.2011 drawn on Central Bank of India as legally recoverable rent for the last three years. Copy of the said cheque is attached herewith. The letter DT17.12.2011 sent by the respondent tenant is reply to the legal notice Dt. 3.12.2011 issued to E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 2/21 him by the petitioner company further supports the submission made by the petitioner herein above. The petitioner company is carrying on the business of manufacturing, sale, storage and export of garments, in the name and style of M/s International Security Printers Private Ltd. in the basement, ground, first floor and back portion of second floor of Plot Number No.3 Block 1, Khasra No. 587/3 (Measuring 377.8 Sq. yards) at Desh Bandhu Gupta Road (Formerly known as Original Road), Multani Dhanda, Pahar Ganj, New Delhi 110055 which is shown in blue in the site plan attached herewith. The petitioner company is in occupation and possession of the basement, ground floor, first floor and back portion of second floor of property situated at Plot Number No.3, Block 1, Khasra No. 587/3 (Measuring 377.8 Sq. yards) at Desh Bandhu Gupta Roaad (Formerly known as Original Road), Multani Dhanda, Pahar Ganj, New Delhi 110055 and is carrying on the business of manufacturing, storage and sale of stocks and is also using the above said property as its office for carrying on its business, besides this, huge stocks of petitioner company are being stored in the premises owned by petitioner company. The accommodation and space which is with the petitioner company is not sufficient to accommodate the stocks of the business of petitioner company (M/s International Security Printers Private Ltd), its office and residence of its Director, at the same time. The nature of the business of petitioner company is such that it demands sufficiently and reasonably large area for safely keeping its stocks, similarly large area is required for office purpose, display and sale of E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 3/21 products in addition to requirement of accommodation for the residence of its director. Accommodation for residence of its Director, safety of stocks and sufficiently secured space for carrying on its activities is the prime concern in any business and petitioner company is no exception. However, due to paucity of space the petitioner company is in a serious difficulty and is unable to conveniently run and expand the afore said business from its premise despite the fact, that it has resources in terms of manpower and finances to successfully manage its daytoday business affairs. The shortage of accommodation for its director is presently a serious impediment in the petitioner company's growth and it will not be out of place to mention that such impediment is even constraining the fundamental right of the employees and directors of the petitioner company to carry on its business activities and enhance the same. It is submitted that at present the petitioner company has two directors Sh. Mohit Luthra and Smt Neena Luthra, and now Sh. Mohit Luthra, considers it fit and appropriate to expand the existing business of the petitioner company and for that purpose his stay in the premises is necessary even otherwise the petitioner company has no other accommodation to provide him except the premises under the use and occupation of the respondent tenant. Therefore, the petitioner company needs sufficiently enough accommodation/ space for the residence of its director which can only be made available if the respondent tenant vacates the portion of the property under his occupation and handover the peaceful possession of the same to the petitioner company. The E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 4/21 accommodation available with the petitioner company in the said premises has been shown in blue colour. As the petitioner company has already expressed above, the expansion of the petitioner company's business has today become a necessity and the same requires that the director of the company Sh. Mohit Luthra makes his residence in the tenanted premises to personally oversee the expansion process. Therefore, an eviction order be passed.
It is stated in the affidavit, filed by the respondent alongwith the application for leave to defend that the deponent is the defendant in the present case and living in the suit premises since long and as such deponent is fully conversant with the facts and circumstances of present to do all such acts, deeds and things necessary to obtain an unconditional leave to defend and as such competent to swear this affidavit. The deponent has carefully gone through the petition filed u/s 14 (1)(e) for eviction and affidavit in support thereof. That the deponent states at the time of commencement of tenancy, most of the conditions pertaining to tenancy rights and obligations were determined orally and no written agreement was entered between the deponent and the erstwhile owner of the property. Moreover at that point of time there was not much hustle and bustle, hence ethics prevailed and simply words were sufficient to honour any commitments. That deponent further states that the eviction petition is bad for nonjoinder of parties as the tenancy was a joint tenancy, created in the name of deponent and his wife Smt. Kiran Bhandari by the D.D. Puri Charity Trust. Even the trust has not been impleaded in the array of parties. This issue itself is a triable E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 5/21 issue and entitles deponent leave to defend. The rent receipts issued in the joint name of the deponent and his wife, are being enclosed herewith. That the deponent is a tenant in the suit property since long and was regularly paying the determined rent without any default, till March 1998. The initial rent was much less however the same was increased subsequently and lastly the present deponent was paying rent @ Rs. 120/ per month. Event the tenancy rights of the defendant are being reflected in the sale deed itself, relied upon by the petitioner. That the deponent states that the petitioner, in order to evict the deponent, has taken this false plea of "bonafide requirement", otherwise the present petitioner, a mighty landlord is a man of sufficient means, is not in need of the suit premises at all for any residence purposes as being claimed in the present petition. That the deponent further states that it is a matter of fact that the petitioner and his family tie ups and extraordinarily high, being mighty landlords of the city, having several commercial and residential properties in the territory of Delhi. These properties are fetching enough money either in the shape of rent or in the shape of capital value. Besides that, enough vacant space is available with petitioner in the same building where the suit premises are situated. The said spaces can easily be converted into office, godown or a residence for the petitioner as well as for the workers for petitioner. That is is being further stated by the deponent that infact since 2000 onwards, the petitioner was consistently asking either for huge money in the shape of security/ pagadi or in the alternative asking for extraordinary rent and on its E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 6/21 denial, in order to harass, started threatening applicant/ tenant, flouting all the norms of the land. After lot of persuasions and raising voice against the might of the petitioner, later on the representatives of the petitioner assured the deponent that law of the land will never be flouted. That as per the knowledge of the deponent, the petitioner is well settled having a marvelous place to reside which is a landmark area not only in the city but also nationwide, i.e. MALCHA MARG, NEW DELHI. How a person can adjust in the suburb of Paharganj, OLD DELHI, after living throughout in Malcha Marg, New Delhi, type posh locality. This malafide obsession of the petitioner upon the suit property ostensibly proves that the eviction petition is merely an eye wash to get the premises vacated. That as per the knowledge of the deponent, the petitioner have umpteen number of buildings which are residential and commercial in nature and many of them are lying vacant. Moreover, the sale deed through which the petitioner is claiming ownership depicts one address whereas the present petition mentions another residence address of the present petitioner. Besides that details of the portions lying vacant in the same property where the suit property is located, are being described: (a) Rear portion, IInd Floor, Plot no.3, Block 1, D.B. Gupta, Delhi55, this portion of the property is a built up portion lying vacant since long. It is pertinent to mention here that even before the date of purchase of the property by the petitioner, this rear portion is unoccupied. Barring two small rooms in addition, this portion is typically identical with front portion, i.e. the area in possession of the E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 7/21 tenant/ defendant. The photos are attached herewith. If the petitioner wants to use any portion for residence, there is no impediment in using this portion. The rooms in this portion of the second floor can be easily converted into residence without any hindrance; (b) Rear portion, first Floor, Plot No.3, Block 1, D.B. Gupta, Delhi55 the said portion of the property is partly built up and partly open. The front portion as well as rear portion of first floor of this property is lying vacant for the last so many years which is being retained by the petitioner. This entire floor can exclusively be used by the petitioner for his own so called bonafide use; and
(c) Ground Floor, Plot No.3, Block 1, D.B. Gupta, Delhi55,the entire ground floor is having one big hall whereas from the front it gives an idea of two big shops cum godown. This is quite evident from the photographs annexed herewith. This is commercially more viable and lying vacant much before the purchase of the said property as revealed by the petitioner. The said fact can easily be authenticated with the various clauses of the sale deed which pertains to the sale purchase of the suit property. Infact, to be precise, the entire building comprising of ground floor, first floor and second floor, is lying vacant except the front portion of Second floor which is under the possession and occupation of the present defendant. This fact can be very well authenticated by the fact that till September 2011, only one electricity meter was running, in the entire building and that too in the name of defendant. It is pertinent to mention here that there was no electricity meter or any electricity/ water consumption from the said building except E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 8/21 the present defendant's usage. It clearly establishes that the entire premises were vacant and is still lying vacant. Further, it is not the case of the petitioner that the tenanted premises is having some advantages attached to it, which the other vacant portions are not having. Therefore, in these circumstances, it is ostensible that the petitioner has preferred the present petition only to get vacated the suit property by invoking the summary procedure especially incorporated for the genuinely needy landlords. That the deponent further states that under such circumstances, when the petitioner has in abundance suitable vacant space, either to use for his residence or for any other activity, there is absolutely no bonafide need for this particular portion, simply being used as residence by the defendant/ tenant, since long. That deponent states that as the eviction petition is filed malafide and without any just cause of bonafide requirement, thus the same is untenable in the eyes of law and as held in catena of judgments, the same is liable to be dismissed with exemplary costs. Once again it is being reiterated that the eviction petition is a sheer misuse of process of law and has been preferred with a clear intent to harass the deponent so that either huge money could be extorted in the name of security/ pagadi or a heavy rent can be extracted from the defendant/ tenant. It is obvious that after this portion is being vacated, the entire building would be empty and the shop can be sold to a prospective buyer, fetching hand sum price for the petitioner. The defendant stood against the might of the petitioner and is therefore now forced to face the wrath of the petitioner. That deponent E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 9/21 states that the petitioner has not come before this Hon'ble Court with clean hands. It is absolutely wrong to allege that the petitioner requires suit property bonafide. Even if it is presumed that the petitioner requires the tenanted premises for its own use, benefit and occupation and residence of its Director, then the entire vacant premises can be utilized for the same. Further, the petitioner has failed to elaborate that what is the need which has arisen recently so as to get the said property vacated as the company is existed since long. It is evident that the petitioner does not require the tenanted premises for its use and occupation and the suit is being filed merely to get the property vacated. That deponent states that even otherwise the suit property is not being required bonafide for residence purposes as per the own avermnets of the petitioner only. The deponent states that it is being required simply to convert the entire place into a more viable commercial venture. As in the nearly vicinity of Motia Khan, a big mall has already started operating, hence the hence wants to get the portion vacated by any method. This is not the correct spirit of the legislature are envisaged by section 14(i)(e) of DRC ACT. That the deponent is not having any other place to live at this fag end of his life, cannot even think of shifting to any other place. Since the commencement of tenancy, the deponent and other members of his families have given their blood to groom tenanted suit property which now has got a better shape. As stated earlier, the suit property has been transformed from a dilapidated condition to tis present beautified look only because of the hard, consistent and time consuming E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 10/21 efforts of the deponent. That by invoking such a statute, on the basis of false, frivolous and baseless averments, the deponent cannot be deprived of his right to live. That the deponent has got a strong case in his favour and therefore is entitled for unconditional leave to defend to contest the said eviction petition.
The application is contested by the petitioner by way of a written reply supported by affidavit of the petitioner wherein it is stated that the petitioner is entitled to eviction of the respondent from the premises as he required the premises for bonafide residential use of director of company; that the respondent has made frivolous, baseless and irrelevant averments in its application for leave to contest and the affidavit whereby no triable issues are raised; that the petitioner is entitled to relief as claimed under section 14 (1) (e) of Act 59 of 1958 and the application seeking leave to contest be dismissed.
To the reply of the petitioner a rejoinder has been filed on behalf of the respondent wherein the contention raised by way of the application for leave to defend have been reiterated.
I have heard counsel for the parties and gone through the material on record carefully.
On behalf of petitioner, reliance is placed upon the case laws titled as Rajender Kumar Sharma & Ors Vs. Leela Wati & Ors 155 (2008) DLT 383, Rishal Singh Vs. Bohat Ram & Ors 2014 (144) DRJ 633, Mohd. Ayub & Anr Vs. Mukesh Chand (2012) 2SCC 155, R.C Tamrakar & Anr. E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 11/21 Vs. Nidhi Lekha (2001) 8SCC 431, Siddaalingamma & Anr. Vs. Mamtha Shenoy (2001) 8SCC 561, Sarla Ahuja Vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. (1998) 8SCC 119,Canara Bank Vs. T.T. Ltd. 214 (2014) DLT 526.
On behalf of respondent, reliance is placed upon the case laws titled as IPasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. The Motor & General Traders AIR 1975 SC 1409, Gopal Dass & Sons Vs. Dineshwar Nath Kedar 2013 (133) DRJ 468, Deepak Gupta Vs. Sushma Aggarwal 202 (2013) DLT 121, Nibro Limited Vs. National Insurance Company Ltd. 41 (1990) DLT 633, Santosh Devi Soni Vs. Chand Kiran Civil Appeal No. 412 of 2000 decided on January 17, 2000. S.M. Mehra Vs. B.D. Malik Civil Appeal No. 120 of 1990 decided on January 11, 1990, Narender Kumar Manchanda & Anr. Vs. Hemant Kumar Talwar R.C.REV.107/2012 DHC.
I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made on behalf of the parties.
The present petition for eviction is under clause (e) of proviso to subsection (1) of section 14 of Act 59 of 1958 which reads as under :
14.(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by and court or Controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant:
Provided that the Controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely: * * * E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 12/21
(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation :
Explanation. For the purpose of this clause, "premises let for residential purposes" include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes;
* * * As per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India and another, 148 (2008) DLT 705 (SC) clause (e) of proviso to subsection (1) of section 14 of Act 59 of 1958 is also applicable to the premises let out for purpose other than residential purpose.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Charan Dass Duggal v. Brahma Nand, (1983)1 SCC 301 while dealing with the question in the matter of granting leave to contest the eviction petition filed on the ground of personal requirement, in para 5 has stated thus:
5. What should be the approach when leave to defend is sought?
There appears to be a mistaken belief that unless the tenant at that stage makes out such a strong case as would nonsuit the landlord, leave to defend cannot be granted. This approach is wholly improper. When leave to defend is sought, the tenant must make out such a prima facie case raising such pleas that a triable issue would emerge and that in our opinion should be sufficient to grant leave. The test is the test of a triable issue and not the final success in the action (see Santosh Kumar v. Bhai Mool Singh). At the stage of granting the leave parties rely in support of their rival contentions on affidavits and assertions and counter assertions on affidavits may not afford such incontrovertible E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 13/21 evidence to lead to an affirmative conclusion one way or the other. Conceding that when possession is sought on the ground of personal requirement, an absolute need is not to be satisfied but a mere desire equally is not sufficient. It has to be something more than a mere desire. And being an enabling provision, the burden is on the landlord to establish his case affirmatively. If as it appears in this case, the landlord is staying at Pathankot, that a house is purchased, may be in the name of his sons and daughters, but there may not be an apparent need to return to Delhi in his old age, a triable issue would come into existence and that was sufficient in our opinion to grant leave to defend in this case.
In the same judgment, in para 7 it is further observed:
7. The genesis of our procedural laws is to be traced to principles of natural justice, the principal amongst them being that no one shall suffer civil or evil or pecuniary consequence at his back without giving him an adequate and effective opportunity to participate to disprove the case against him and provide his own case. Summary procedure does not clothe an authority with power to enjoy summary dismissal. Undoubtedly wholly frivolous defence may not entitle a person leave to defend. But equally a triable issue raised, enjoins a duty to grant leave. Maybe in the end the defence may fail. It is necessary to bear in mind that when leave to defend is refused the party seeking leave is denied an opportunity to test the truth of the averments of the opposite party by cross examination and rival affidavits may not furnish reliable evidence for concluding the point one way or the other. It is not for a moment suggested that leave to defend must be granted on mere asking but it is equally improper to refuse to grant leave though triable issues are raised and the controversy can be properly adjudicated after ascertainment of truth through crossexamination of witnesses who have filed their affidavits. Burden is on the landlord to prove his requirements and his assertion is required to be tested more so when it is shown that for long he is staying outside Delhi, that he has a building albeit standing in the names of his sons and daughters where he is staying and at which place he receives his normal correspondence. If in such a situation one E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 14/21 can say that a triable issue is not raised, one is at a loss to find out where, when and in what circumstances such an issue would arise. We are, therefore, satisfied that this is a case in which triable issues were raised and both the learned Rent Controller and the High Court were in error in refusing to grant the leave. Further in Precision Steel and Engineering Works v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal, AIR 1982 SC 1518 the Hon'ble Supreme Court having discussed the relevant provisions of Act 59 of 1958 held as follows:
The Controller has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant under subsec. (4) and the reply if any On perusing the affidavit filed by the tenant and the reply if any filed by landlord the Controller has to pose to himself the only question, `Does the affidavit disclose, not prove, facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession on the ground specified in cl. (e) of the proviso to Section 14 (1)?' The Controller is not to record a finding on disputed questions of facts or his preference of one set of affidavits against the other set of affidavits. That is not the jurisdiction conferred on the Controller by subsec. (5) because the Controller while examining the question whether there is a proper case for granting leave to contest the application has to confine himself to the affidavit filed by the tenant disclosing such facts as would prima facie and not on contest disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for recovery of possession. At the stage when affidavit is filed under subsec. (4) by the tenant and the same is being examined for the purpose of subsec. (5) the Controller has to confine himself only to the averments in the affidavit and the reply if any and that become manifestly clear from the language of subsec. (5) that the Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest the application if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from recovering possession etc. The jurisdiction to grant leave to contest or refuse the same is to be exercised on the basis of the affidavit filed by the tenant. That alone at that stage is the relevant document and one must confine to the averments in the affidavit. If the averments in the affidavit disclose such facts which, if ultimately proved to the satisfaction E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 15/21 of the Court, would disentitle the landlord from recovering possession, that by itself makes it obligatory upon the Controller to grant leave. It is immaterial that facts alleged and disclosed are controverted by the landlord because the stage of proof is yet to come. It is distinctly possible that a tenant may fail to make good the defence raised by him. Plausibility of the defence raised and proof of the same are materially different from each other and one cannot bring in the concept of proof at the stage when plausibility has to be shown.
From the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court it can be discerned that while deciding the question of the grant of leave to contest under the provisions of section 25B of Act 59 of 1958, the Rent Controller should see the affidavit filed by the tenant and the counter affidavit filed by the landlord. From the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court it is also clear that while deciding the question of the grant of leave, the Controller is not required to conduct a full fledged trial and should only see that if the affidavit of the tenant raise any triable point the decision on which may disentitle the landlord from recovering possession of the premises. At the time of the decision on the question of leave, the Controller is not required to seek the proof of the defence of the tenant.
In Sarwan Dass Bange v. Ram Prakash, 2010 IV AD (Delhi) 252 it has been observed by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court as follows: The Controller has not discussed as to how the pleas raised by the respondent/tenant in the application for leave to defend are such which if established by adducing evidence would disentitle the petitioner/landlord of an order of eviction under Section 14 (1)(e) of the Act. Ordinarily, when a tenant approaches an advocate for drafting a leave to defend E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 16/21 application, the advocate, using his legal acumen would dispute each and every plea of the landlord in the eviction petition.
However, merely because the tenant so disputes and controverts the pleas of the landlord does not imply that the provisions of summary procedure introduced in the Act with respect to ground of eviction on the ground of requirement is to be set at naught. The Controller is required to sift/comb through the application for leave to defend and the affidavit filed therewith and to see whether the tenant has given any facts/particulars which require to be established by evidence and which if established would disentitle the landlord from an order of eviction. The test is not of the tenant having controverted/denied the claim of the landlord and thus disputed questions of fact arising; the test is to examine the pleas of facts and then to determine the impact thereof.
In the application for leave to contest the respondent has not disputed the fact that the he is not the tenant under petitioner and the petitioner is not the landlord/Owner of the premises and the rent is being paid to him. Therefore, I hold in the light of the pleadings of the parties and other material placed before this court, in so far as the purpose of clause (e) of subsection (1) of section 14 of Act 59 of 1958 is concerned, the applicant is the owner of the premises and it is also found that there exists relationship of landlord/Owner and tenant between the applicant and the respondent.
According to the respondent there is triable point regarding the bona fide necessity of the petitioner. It is contended on behalf of the respondent that it is the desire of the petitioner to hold the property by hook or crook and not the bonafide requirement of the premises for its director as E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 17/21 they are already having sufficient vacant space available in the entire suit property which can be converted into office, godown or a residence for the petitioner as well as for its worker with them for their residence. It is also contended on behalf of the respondent that the petitioner can meet its requirement from the properties i.e. rear portion, IInd Floor, Plot no.3, Block 1, D.B. Gupta, Delhi55, Rear portion, First Floor, Plot No.3, Block 1, D.B. Gupta, Delhi55 and Ground Floor, Plot No.3, Block 1, D.B. Gupta, Delhi55 as all these are lying vacant, therefore, no premises is required by the petitioner for his alleged bonafide need. Therefore, the petitioner has reasonable, suitable, sufficient accommodation available for the need of its director.
In the considered opinion of the court this contention of the respondent is without merit and cannot be sustained, as the petitioner is the owner and landlord of the premises. The law is well settled that in so far as the question of necessity is concerned the landlord is the best judge of his necessity and a tenant can not dictate terms to the landlord what to do and what not to do.
The petitioner want to use the tenanted premises for residence of its director as the suit/tenanted premises is situated at second floor adjacent to the back portion of the second floor which is under the occupation and possession of the petitioner company. Further, as one of the director want to stay in the premises for expansion of the business of petitioner company and the company has no other accommodation to E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 18/21 provide him except the premises under the use and occupation of the respondent/ tenant, as the other portion i.e. basement ground floor, first floor and back portion of the second floor in the entire building are used by the company for its occupation and business. Further, the petitioner company want to manage its daytoday business affairs for its expansion and due to shortage of space and they are not able to prove and they are facing serious difficulties. In view of the Court, the petitioner has every right to use its property as per its requirements. Further, if a landlord wants to use the tenanted premises for residence, then by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that the requirement of the landlord for premises in question is neither bonafide nor genuine. Further its always the privilege of the landlord to choose the place of residence as per his convenience and tenant cannot advise him what he should do and what he should not. Further, the suitability of requirement has to be seen for the convenience of landlord and the same cannot be termed as not bonafide. Further, in the absence of any substantial material brought before the court or pointed out by the respondent in his affidavit it cannot be said that the present application for eviction is actuated by mala fide and has not been made with bona fide intention. Merely stating in the affidavit that the application for eviction has been made with mala fide intention is not sufficient to sustain the contention of the respondent. The court is satisfied that there is no triable point between the parties on this aspect of the case. E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 19/21
The other plea of the respondent regarding having other vacant properties i.e. rear portion, IInd Floor, Plot no.3, Block 1, D.B. Gupta, Delhi55, Rear portion, First Floor, Plot No.3, Block 1, D.B. Gupta, Delhi55 and Ground Floor, Plot No.3, Block 1, D.B. Gupta, Delhi55 is concerned the same is of no relevance and value in the light of fact that petitioner company is carrying its business in the suit building and for expansion and for managing the day to day affairs one of the Director of the company want to reside in the tenanted premises. In the considered opinion of the court, there is no triable issue on this aspect of the matter.
Even if there is any issue the same is insignificant and does not entitle the respondent from seeking leave to contest the application for eviction.
In view of above discussion having gone through the contents of the affidavit and counter affidavit of the parties and the documents filed by them, this court is of the considered view that there is no triable issue between the parties which entitles the respondent for leave to contest the present application for eviction. The application for leave to contest is without merit and the same is dismissed.
As an off shoot of the dismissal of the application for leave to contest made by the respondent, the petitioners is found entitled to recover the possession of property front portion, 2nd Floor of Plot Number No.3, Block 1, Khasra No. 587/3 (Measuring 377.8 Sq. yards) at Desh Bandhu Gupta Road (Formerly known as original road), Multani Dhanda, Pahar E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 20/21 Ganj, New Delhi 110055 more specifically shown in red colour in the site plan attached with the application for eviction. The application for eviction is allowed. In the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs. File be sent to records.
In view of the provisions of subsection (7) of section 14 of Act 59 of 1958 this order for recovery of possession of premises shall not be executed before the expiration of a period of six months from this date.
Announced in the open court (Sunil Kumar)
on this 30th day of September, 2015 Additional Rent Controller02
Central/Tis Hazari Courts
E. No. 493/14/12 Page No. 21/21